Arab Spring: Difference between revisions

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==Political and constitutional change==
==Political and constitutional change==
While there is little evidence that any of the protest movements had a predominately [[religion|religious]] motivation, it is likely that religious organisations  will influence the political and constitutional changes that are to follow.  In many Arab Spring countries  a variety of religiously-motivated political parties, collectively referred to as  [[Islamist]], are set to be opposed by a spectrum of [[Secularism|secularist]] groups. In Tunisia, a single Islamist party had enough support to get  it  more assembly  seats than any other party, but the majority of seats  were shared among its four secularist opponents. In Egypt, the dominant Islamist party <ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/al-hurriyya-wa-al-%E2%80%98adala-freedom-and-justice-party ''Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party)'', Carnegie Endowment. 2011]</ref>  is attempting  to form a ''Democratic Alliance'' group of Islamist and non-Islamist parties<ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/26/the-democratic-alliance ''Democratic Alliance'', Carnegie Institute, October 2011]</ref>.
While there is little evidence that any of the protest movements had a predominately [[religion|religious]] motivation, it is likely that religious organisations  will influence the political and constitutional changes that are to follow.  In many Arab Spring countries  a variety of religiously-motivated political parties, collectively referred to as  [[Islamist]], are set to be opposed by a spectrum of [[Secularism|secularist]] groups. In Tunisia, a single Islamist party had enough support to get  it  more assembly  seats than any other party, but the majority of seats  were shared among its four secularist opponents. In Egypt, the dominant Islamist party <ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/al-hurriyya-wa-al-%E2%80%98adala-freedom-and-justice-party ''Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party)'', Carnegie Endowment. 2011]</ref>  is attempting  to form an electoral alliance with a group of non-Islamist parties<ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/26/the-democratic-alliance ''Democratic Alliance'', Carnegie Institute, October 2011]</ref>.


==References==
==References==
{{reflist|2}}
{{reflist|2}}

Revision as of 11:04, 27 October 2011

This article is developed but not approved.
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This editable, developed Main Article is subject to a disclaimer.
This article consists of: -

the summary below;
a chronology of main events;
notes on individual national movements;
a catalogue of major personalities, and
notes on the international response.

The term Arab Spring (also known as the "Arab Awakening") refers to the sequence of protest movements that started with the successful uprising in Tunisia that began in December 2010. The subsequent protest movements in other Arab countries were mainly motivated by a wish to put an end to what was perceived as government oppression, corruption and incompetence. They have led to the overthrow of existing regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and the initiation in those countries of transitional processes that are to include the election of representative assemblies and the adoption of new constitutions. Major protest movements have also arisen in Syria and Yemen, but they have so far been frustrated by violent resistance by their governments. The protest movements elsewhere in the Arab world have achieved little more than promises of minor reforms.

Background: the Arab condition

The political structures of the countries involved in the Arab uprisings have (with the exception of Lebanon) been categorised as "authoritarian" (with Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia ranking among the 15 least democratic countries[1]). Five of them have suffered unusually high levels of corruption (Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Yemen appear among the upper half in the ranking of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index) [2]. Their populations are predominately ethnically Arab with small native Berber minorities. They include two mixed oil economies (Algeria and Libya); three oil economies (Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia); six diversified economies (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia); and one primary export economy (Yemen). The oil-producing countries of Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Libya are among the world's more prosperous countries. The prosperity of each of the others is below, or well below the world average in terms of GDP per head, with Syria ranking 153rd out of a total of 228. According to an estimate based upon data from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen, at least 19% of the Arab population lived below the poverty line at the end of the 1990s.[3]

The development of national protest movements

The violent mass protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt succeeded within a few months in the overthrow of their existing regimes and, as noted below, the same was acheived, with the assistance of NATO, in Libya after eight months of civil war. The governments of Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Oman responded to more limited protests with promises of political and constitutional reform. Saudi Arabia's administration sought to avoid confrontation by announcing a major programme of infrastructure investment, and its forces were used to suppress dissent in Bahrain. Political instability in Lebanon has inhibited governmental response to demonstrations for constitutional change. In Yemen and Syria, continuing protests are being frustrated by violent military opposition.
 : (More detailed accounts of Arab national movements are available on the addendum subpage.)

The processes of creating democratically-elected governments now dominate the situations in Tunisia and Libya, and in Egypt they are being accompanied by sporadic demonstrations against the behaviour of its transitional military government. The transitional process in Libya, is expected to include - and may be hampered by - the need to disarm its local militias. In Syria and Yemen, the undeterred vigour of the protest movements in the face of violent resistance suggests the possibility of democratic transition in those countries. Elswhere in the Arab Spring countries, the prospects appear to be limited to partial relaxations of authoritarian governance.

Civil war in Libya

In mid-February 2011, government forces opened fire on demonstrators in the Libyan second city of Benghazi. A bitter conflict ensued in which the rebels took control of the city. The government responded with an aerial bombardment that caused thousands of casualties. There was international outrage at the brutality of its actions and, on 18th March, the United Nations Security Council responded to the Arab League's request for the imposition of a no-fly zone with a resolution that authorised member states to to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack. In the course of the following week, air attacks by US, British and French aircraft destroyed the Libyan air force. In the following months there developed a civil war between government forces based in Tripoli in the west of Libya and rebel forces based in Benghazi in the east. After six months of fighting, rebel forces entered Tripoli, the principal remaining government-held city. Libya’s Interim National Transitional Council, [4] was recognised as the country’s legitimate government, by the United States in July, and subsequently by most other countries. With the fall of Tripoli, the National Transitional Council moved from Benghazi to Tripoli on August 26. Fierce fighting continued after the fall of Tripoli, however, until the fall of the remaining government-held town of Sirte and the killing of Colonel Gaddafi in October 2011.

International reactions

There is no evidence of non-Arab influences upon the Arab Spring uprisings, and every indication that they came as a sudden surprise to all who were not directly involved. (Among the explanations for the rapid spread of the protest movement from its origin in Tunis, Amnesty International has suggested that the leaks of candid diplomatic cables by the whistleblower organization WikiLeaks served as a trigger for the uprising.[5]) There were supportive reactions from many western governments, however, and in May, the G8 countries promised $20bn (£12bn) of loans and aid to Tunisia and Egypt over the following two years and suggested more would be available if the countries continued on the path to democracy. However, there was no support for active participation until the news of Libyan air force attacks upon the areas held by rebels. Expressions of condemnation were followed by calls for protective action.

The main support for military intervention came from the governments of the United States, France and Britain, but a crucial factor was an Arab League recommendation to the United Nations for a no-fly zone. The Libya resolutions 1970 and 1973 that were subsequently passed by the Security Council have been described as "the most wide-ranging that it had passed for more than 20 years". [6]

The European Council later declared its commitment to "the full implementation" of Security Council Resolutions,[7] but there was also opposition to military intervention, even from within the European Union. There was opposition by Germany [8] and reluctant participation by Italy.[9] Among other reactions was the condemnation of the UN resolution on Libya as comparable to "medieval calls for crusades" by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (repudiated, however, by President Dmitry Medvedev[10]). NATO air strikes were also condemned by the governments of China,[11] Venezuela and Cuba.[12]. However, Libya's National Transition Council has since been almost universally recognised as the legitimate government of Libya.

Political and constitutional change

While there is little evidence that any of the protest movements had a predominately religious motivation, it is likely that religious organisations will influence the political and constitutional changes that are to follow. In many Arab Spring countries a variety of religiously-motivated political parties, collectively referred to as Islamist, are set to be opposed by a spectrum of secularist groups. In Tunisia, a single Islamist party had enough support to get it more assembly seats than any other party, but the majority of seats were shared among its four secularist opponents. In Egypt, the dominant Islamist party [13] is attempting to form an electoral alliance with a group of non-Islamist parties[14].

References