Compartmented control system: Difference between revisions

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To achieve selective separation of program information while still allowing full access to those working on the program, a separate "compartment," identified by a unique codeword (itself sometimes classified), is created for the information.  
To achieve selective separation of program information while still allowing full access to those working on the program, a separate "compartment," identified by a unique codeword (itself sometimes classified), is created for the information.  
===Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility====
===Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility===
This entails establishing communication channels, data storage, and work locations '''Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)''', which are physically and logically separated not only from the unclassified world, but from general Department of Defense classified channels as well.  Facilities comparable to SCIFs may be required for Special Access Programs. SIOP-ESI material is handled in such shielded rooms
This entails establishing communication channels, data storage, and work locations '''Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)''', which are physically and logically separated not only from the unclassified world, but from general Department of Defense classified channels as well.   
 
Facilities comparable to SCIFs may be required for Special Access Programs. SIOP-ESI material, for example, is handled in such shielded rooms. Since SIOP-ESI deals with nuclear warfare, it is subject to the supplemental "no lone zone"; it must always be in the sight of two cleared individuals.
 
===Marking information to indicate compartment(s)===
===Marking information to indicate compartment(s)===
Thus established, all information generated within the compartment is classified according to the general rules above. However, to emphasize that the information is compartmented, all documents are marked with both the classification level and the codeword (or sometimes the caveat "Handle via <compartment name> Channels Only").
Thus established, all information generated within the compartment is classified according to the general rules above. However, to emphasize that the information is compartmented, all documents are marked with both the classification level and the codeword (or sometimes the caveat "Handle via <compartment name> Channels Only").

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Above and beyond their regular security classification systems for military, diplomatic, and intelligence information that needs protection, the United States, as do several other nations with complex security needs, have implemented compartmented control systems Especially for the intelligence-related systems described below, there is significant sharing among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Intelligence sharing is more selective among other NATO nations and with friendly countries in other areas. In NATO, and especially the UK, there is some level of sharing nuclear weapons information.

In a less formalized way, such systems came into use during the Second World War. MAGIC and ULTRA, respectively, covered communications intelligence on Japan and Germany. A strange term, BIGOT, derived from the stamping of orders for officers going to Gibraltar to plan the North African invasions, "TO GIB". Spelling this backwards gave BIGOT, which was a compartment for information about the Normandy invasion. The term "BIGOT List" remains in U.S. intelligence use, as the list of people given access to a particular compartment. In WWII, it was convenient, in trying to find out if someone had access to NEPTUNE and OVERLORD planning information, to ask "are you bigoted?" An indignant answer of "no" ended that part of classified discussion.

Compartmented control systems fall into several broad categories:

  • Special access programs (SAP) for military plans, weapons, special procurement, and other matters of unusual sensitivity, under regulations promulgated by the United States Secretary of Defense,
  • Sensitive compartmented information (SCI) for intelligence material, with regulations promulgated by the Director of National Intelligence,
  • Restricted Data (RD) and other labels for nuclear weapons design, naval power reactors, and other information. Critical Nuclear Weapons Design Information, which may have other labels, is one such subcategory.

The compartmented control systems are used in addition to the regular classification markings and control procedures. These are the main categories, although there have been specific programs, such as the PSALM compartment established by the President during the Cuban Missile Crisis (see example [1]

Compartmented control systems are sometimes called "codeword" systems. A CIA document containing SCI might have its cover page marked "TS-CODEWORD", indicating TOP SECRET material in a compartment, the actual code word for which is itself classified.

Collateral information

The term collateral or collateral-level is used to describe material that is classified, but not under a compartmented control system.

Special Access Program

Special Access Programs (SAP) deal with United States Department of Defense, not United States Intelligence Community, information. [2].

SAPs are subdivided into three further groups [2]There is no public reference to whether SCI is divided in the same manner, but news reports reflecting that only the "Big 8" Members are briefed on certain intelligence activities, it may be assumed that similar rules apply for SCI. The groups are

  • Acknowledged: appears as a line item as "classified project" or the equivalent in the US budget, although details of its content are not revealed. The budget element will associate the SAP with an organization or major command, such as the Navy or Strategic Command
  • Unacknowledged: no reference in the published budget; its funding is hidden in another entry, often called the "black budget". The appropriate Congressional committees, however, are briefed on the nature of the SAP and approve it.
  • Waived: no mention in the budget, and briefed only to the "Big 8" members of Congress: Speaker of the House, House Minority Leader, Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of the appropriate committees.

As one example, GEN Tommy Franks, commanding United States Central Command, designated the plans for the 2003 invasion of Iraq as POLO STEP. Codeword designations should not have any relationship to the information they protect, but the United States has renamed operations with a name that affects public perception. For example, the actual plans for the 1989 invasion of Panama were coded BLUE SPOON, but the public name of the operation was Operation Just Cause

Sensitive Compartmented Information

For the most sensitive operations, there is essentially are systems parallel to, or perhaps above the regular security clearance system, of "Sensitive Compartmented Information" (SCI) [3]

To achieve selective separation of program information while still allowing full access to those working on the program, a separate "compartment," identified by a unique codeword (itself sometimes classified), is created for the information.

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

This entails establishing communication channels, data storage, and work locations Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which are physically and logically separated not only from the unclassified world, but from general Department of Defense classified channels as well.

Facilities comparable to SCIFs may be required for Special Access Programs. SIOP-ESI material, for example, is handled in such shielded rooms. Since SIOP-ESI deals with nuclear warfare, it is subject to the supplemental "no lone zone"; it must always be in the sight of two cleared individuals.

Marking information to indicate compartment(s)

Thus established, all information generated within the compartment is classified according to the general rules above. However, to emphasize that the information is compartmented, all documents are marked with both the classification level and the codeword (or sometimes the caveat "Handle via <compartment name> Channels Only").

For example, the NSA domestic telephone surveillance program is almost certainly designated "Handle through COMINT Channels Only", so its documentation would read, at least, TOP SECRET-CCO, probably with a special compartment within CCO, which, hypothetically, would be an arbitrary word such as ORWELL. It is presumably SCI.

Examples of compartmented topics are sensitive intelligence activities (SCI), nuclear secrets (Restricted Data), and stealth technology (SAP). One or more compartments may be created for each area, and each of these compartments may contain multiple programs or projects (e.g., a specific reconnaissance satellite, ICBM, or stealth aircraft), themselves with their own codenames.

So, it is a reasonable assumption that the NSA telephone surveillance program might be a designated a Waived SCI program, with documentation stamped TS-CCO-ORWELL.

Major control systems

The major compartmented control systems, whose names, and even the classification of the name, have changed over time, all have subcompartments. In any event, the major SCI systems are:

Type of information Protected Representative Marking
Human-source intelligence Humint Control System (HCS)
Imagery intelligence TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK)
Signals intelligence, including communications intelligence and electronic intelligence HANDLE THROUGH COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Designs and operations of National Reconnaissance Office airborne and space reconnaissance programs BYEMAN (B), no longer used

Restricted Data

Sensitive information about nuclear weapons is under a control system called RESTRICTED DATA,[4] the especially sensitive compartments dealing with design also bearing CRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN INFORMATION, or SIGMA-xx (where xx is a number). There is also a category of FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA that does not have detailed design information, but puts a tighter control on data about specific nuclear weapons.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 sets requirements for protection of information about nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials. Such information is "classified from birth," unlike all other sensitive information, which must be classified by some authorized individual. However, authorized classifiers still must determine whether documents or material are classified or restricted.

Sigma Categories and Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information

RESTRICTED DATA contains further compartments. The Department of Energy establishes a list of "SIGMA Categories"[5] for more fine-grained control than RESTRICTED DATA. Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI) (colloquially pronounced "Seen-Windy") reveals the theory of operation or design of the components of a nuclear weapon. As such, it would be SIGMA 1 or SIGMA 2 material, assuming laser fusion is not involved in the information.

Access to CNWDI is supposed to be kept to the minimum number of individuals needed. In written documents, paragraphs containing the material, assuming it is TOP SECRET, would be marked (TS)(RD)(N), where (N) is a shorter way of writing CNWDI. SIGMA information of especial sensitivity may be handled much like SAP or SCI material

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information

While most Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information is sensitive, it may or may may also bear RESTRICTED DATA and certain SIGMA caveats. Since naval reactors normally run with highly enriched fuel and, as opposed to most other reactors, possibly could be driven into an uncontrolled fission reaction, however, design details will almost certainly be classified.

Sharing of classified information with other countries

In cases where the United States wishes to share classified information bilaterally (or multilaterally) with a country that has a sharing agreement, the information is marked "REL" (release) and the three-letter country code.

For example, if the U.S. wanted to release classified information to the governments of France, UK, and Canada, it would mark the document "REL TO CAN, FRA and GBR." There are also group releases, such as NATO or UKUSA. Those countries would have to maintain the classification of the document at the level originally classified (TOP-SECRET, SECRET, etc.).

In practice, documents may be marked NOFORN EXCEPT (Country or countries).

References

  1. SNIE [Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-62: Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba], 19 October 1962, SNIE 11-18-62
  2. 2.0 2.1 Department of Defense Overprint to the National Industrial Security Program, February 1995
  3. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/7: Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information (June 1998). Retrieved on 2000-09-30.
  4. Los Alamos National Laboratory, Guide to Portion Marking Documents and Material, Appendix B, Definitions, accessed December 15, 2006
  5. [no title, apparent extract from University of California laboratory security briefing]. University of California (n.d.). Retrieved on 2007-09-30.