Staff (military)

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From the earliest days of conflict, leaders had staff assistants, if only to hand them the next rock to throw at the mammoth. As man's ability to kill grew, so did the need for assistance to leaders. Still, for centuries, a military staff was organized around an individual, rather than in a systematic way.

One of the challenges of discussing the development of modern staff concepts is separating them from operational art, as true staffs emerged at roughly the same time as the corps level of organization, historically the first level that could force battle to be conducted at a particular place, time, and set of condition. While the technology of current units can put the operational role at a considerably lower level, the challenge remains. Contemporary histories tend, for example, to intermix accounts of Napoleon's use of corps with his use of a staff.

Historical development

While commanders, as far back as we know the role, had personal companions and aides, a leader such as Alexander the Great would fight at the head of his troops, rather than commanding from a headquarters that let him see the the "big picture".[1]

At some point in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, a recognizable staff function emerged. "In 1805, a new style of operational warfare burst upon the fields of Europe as Napoleon Bonaparte's Grand Army swept from the Rhine to the Danube surrounding the Austrian army at Ulm and initiating a revolution in military affairs (RMA) whose effects are still felt today. The question remains whether this new style of warfare was merely a natural outgrowth of the work of 18th century military thinkers, whose theories were imitated by a dynamic leader, or did Napoleon bring something new to warfare, a true innovation in the conduct of operational warfare?" Not all historians agree Napoleon was, indeed, that much of an innovator. [2]

Napoleon's transition to a staff model

Napoleon Bonaparte did not have a staff on the general model used by modern militaries, but was important in the transition between assistants to an individual and a modern staff. His Grand Quartier-General consisted of three main branches:

  • Napoleon's Maison
    • Aides-de-camp
    • Cabinet
  • Grand Etat-Major General (Berthier)
  • Intendance.

Maison

The Maison was Napoleon's personal staff, but with an important addition to the usual clerks.

Aides-de-Camp

As opposed to the current role of an aide, which is both to relieve the commander of details, but also to learn how high commanders actually worked, Napoleon's aides were experienced general officers, each an expert in his own branch of service, who were 'trained up in Napoleon's own school of war', and capable of significant independent assignments, from a task force of all arms on the battlefield to the negotiating of a treaty.

In modern terms, these aides were a combination of high command observers, but also with delegated authority, even over Marshals of France, and the ability to command task forces. Napoleon had up to 12, although not all were present at every engagement. These officers had their own "little aides-de-camp, [who] were employed by Napoleon when needed."[3]

Secretariat

This office was responsible for his correspondence and consisted of civilian secretaries, archivists, and a librarian.

Bureau de Renseignments

A military intelligence organization, responsible largely for strategic intelligence, which was passed on to Berthier's cabinet.

Topographic Bureau

While this group did keep maps and plans, it was closer to the current intelligence and intelligence reference library of a modern intelligence staff. It kept Napoleon's situation map, but also reference materials on potential areas of operations and their resources.

Grand Etat-Major General

Napoleon's principal staff officer, Bethier, was trained by Pierrre de Bourcet. Kiley cites Spencer Wilkinson aptly stated, regarding Bourcet, that 'On every occasion when an important decision had to be made Bourcet would write a memorandum in which he analyzed the situation and set forth in detail, with full explanations and reasons, the course which seemed to him best. In very many cases, his suggestions were adopted and were usually justified by success, and when they were rejected the results were seldom fortunate.' Not only was Bourcet the most expert staff officer of his day, he was the first to come up with what is called today an estimate of the situation, as illustrated above. From him, and the staff school at Grenoble, of which he was the director from 1764-1771, came the embryo from which evolved the Napoleonic staff, of which Berthier was the preeminent product.'

A plan ought to have several branches ... One should ... mislead the enemy and make him imagine that the main effort is coming at some other part. And ... one must be ready to profit by a second or third branch of the plan without giving one’s enemy time to consider it. — Pierre de Bourcet[4]

David Chandler maintains that "Napoleon contributed little new." As we struggle today with the implications of a possible RMA, it is important that we fully understand the forces that caused former RMA's to occur. For the historian, it is also important that we get our interpretations of past events as correct as possible. Was this a RMA that would have happened with any energetic leader who strictly followed the teachings of Bourcet and Guibert, as a sort of TTP put together by theorists, or did Napoleon take their theories, and meld them with his own ideas to create a new form of warfare and initiate a RMA? Does a true RMA require more than just theories and doctrine, does it require an inquiring mind on the part of the practitioner as well? ...The writings of Bourcet and Guibert, and their influence on Napoleon's conduct of operational warfare, and the development and utilization of the corps d'armee system, have not received a thorough examination since Chandler published The Campaigns of Napoleon in 1966. This monograph will perform that task by analyzing Bourcet's Principles de la Guerre de Montagnes, and Guibert's General Essay on Tactics, and then examining the linkage from these writings to Napoleon's approach to campaigns and battles.[2]

Bourcet was the premier staff officer of his time, and the development of the modern staff definitely dates from him. His work and publications mark the beginnings of the development of the modern staff system. Bourcet's importance to Napoleon's developing method of making war cannot be overestimated.

Berthier was the first of the great chiefs-of-staff in history.

Intendance

Prussian developments

Recognizable staff organization, which split planning and supervisory functions into reasonably well-defined functions, usually are attributed to the Prussians.[5] Their earliest staffs did not follow the current model, but began with a military historian that would record how things were done in a given conflict, so officers could study and avoid mistakes of the past. Current staffs still have a historical function, which sometimes is formalized as a center for "lessons learned", as with Australia, [6]Canada[7] and the United States.[8]

Staff leadership

The concept of a formal "chief of staff" is rarely present until a unit is led by a general officer (i.e., division-equivalent or above). Below that, the "S" organization reports to the commanding officer. Several militaries, including those of Russia and the U.S., had assistants that coordinated subgroups of the staff. In the U.S. Army, the executive officer typically was responsible for personnel and logistics (and civil affairs if present); the Soviet/Russian equivalent went by several names, but "chief of the rear" was representative. The operations officer, however, has his own section, but also oversees intelligence and communications-electronics,

General vs. special staff

All staff officers having duties at a headquarters and not included in the general (coordinating) staff group or in the personal staff group. The special staff includes certain technical specialists and heads of services, e.g., quartermaster officer, antiaircraft officer, transportation officer, etc[9]

Levels of staff

Subdivisions of a staff are usually identified by a letter and number. The letter indicates the level of organization with which the staff is associated. While the boundaries of a level may vary, common NATO levels are:

  • S: Battalion through brigade
  • G: Division through army; assumes a single military service
  • J: Joint command, which can be multiservice, multinational, or both.

Traditional divisions of a general staff

G-1: Personnel and administration

This branch is responsible for tracking the number and status of personnel in the unit, replacing or augmenting manpower, individual training, awards and decorations, etc.

G-2: Intelligence

An intelligence staff both produces analyses and other reports, and frequently has intelligence collection units reporting to it.

G-3: Operations

Responsible for unit, as opposed to individual training, and the mobilization and deployment of units for combat. Ground units frequently have a deputy for air support.

Eurocorps divides the G-3 function into five branches, which can split into more cells under crisis conditions.[10]

G3 Plans

As opposed to a Plans and Policy staff division, which is typically the J-5 at a higher headquarters, G-3 plans is responsible for short-term operational procedures, guidance, and specific plans. These include: co-ordination of all operational short-term planning and all operational guidelines, manuals and Standard Operating *close, deep and rear operations by conventional forces.

  • special operations
  • information operations (IO). In Eurocorps, this is normally divided into a psychological operations and an information operations cell, while U.S. doctrine has psychological operations as a subgroup of IO

"The G3 Branch’s brains are tasked with foreseeing operations in the future and thinking over all possible ways of action within the very strict frame of order writing...The G3 Plans section manages the Decision-Making Process (DMP) and the Corps Battle Rhythm. The co-operation, co-ordination and liaison with the higher echelon, LNOs to the HQ EC, Air and Naval Component are conducted within G3 Plans.

G3 Training and Exercises

This branch prepares both command post and troop exercises, as well as budgeting for training and supervising the execution of exercises.

G3 Operations

G-3 operations maintains the "big picture" for the commander and staff, and communicates status and actions within the Eurocorps headquarters, to subordinate units, and to external headquarters and organizations that need such information. It operates the Main and Alternate command post, and also manages alerting and mobilization. In Eurocorps, it is responsible for force protection through the Military Police Staff Officer/Force Protection Officer, while [[force The primary functions of G3 Operations are the maintenance and promulgation of a common operating picture, both within the headquarters and externally, and the conduct of the current battle. It contains:

  • Alert & Mobilization cell
  • Home Base Ops Centre cell
  • OPSCEN cell

(Military Police & Force Protection cell.

G3 Fire Support Co-Ordination Centre

Two major areas fall under this branch, working closely with the G-3 Air. First, it is responsible for the overall coordination of land, air, and naval fires in support of maneuver. It also plans both lethal and non-lethal fires in support of operations, and does the targeting for those fires. The section is organised in the following sub-cells:

  • Command
  • Operations
  • Plans
  • Targeting.

G3 Air

This staff section interfaces among the organic aviation and air defense units, as well as airspace management to deconflict aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles from higher headquarters or the supporting Air Force components.

G-4: Logistics

G-5: Plans, Policy, Civil Affairs

G-6: Communications-Electronics

Divisions without standardized numbers

Great staff officers

In an amusing aside, [11] U. S. Infantry Journal, in an article by George L. Simpson, lieutenant colonel of Field Artillery, presents an extraordinary slant on world military history by picking an allstar, alltime, all-nation army corps command. Selections :

Commanding General: Frederick the Great.

Chief of Staff: Alfred, Count von Schlieffen, who planned Germany's World War strategy.

G-1 (Chief of Personnel): Graf von Moltke, German Commander in 1870.

G-2 (Intelligence): Robert E. Lee.

G-3 (Operations): Pierre de Bourcet, artillery commander of Louis XV.

G-4 (Supplies): William Tecumseh Sherman, who marched through Georgia living on the country.

Adjutant General: Julius Caesar.

Judge Advocate: Marquis de Caulain-court, Napoleon's confidential aide.

Finance Officer: Alcibiades, shrewd manager of Athens' wars.

Chemical Officer: Karl von Clausewitz, tactician who made Germany's army a great war machine.

Chaplain: Mohammed.

References