U.S. intelligence activities in the Americas: Difference between revisions

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{{subpages}}
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{{main|Central Intelligence Agency}}
{{seealso|Director of National Intelligence}}
This article deals with activities of the [[United States]] [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in North and South America.  
{{seealso|Central Intelligence Agency}}
{{seealso|U.S. government training of foreign police}}
This article deals with activities of the [[United States intelligence community]] in the region of Americas; since the creation of the Office of the [[Director of National Intelligence]], not all activities are strictly associated with the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]. Some activities are focused more on law enforcement rather than the classic concept of national intelligence.


During World War II, the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] had been the primary US intelligence agency for [[Latin America]], with some involvement with the [[Office of Strategic Services]], the predecessor of CIA. After the war, the CIA developed strong operations in Latin America.  For issues regarding possible improprieties in police training, see [[CIA Activities by Transnational Topic: Human Rights#Police Training|Latin American police training]].
Due to the amount of material, this article covers historical and regional issues, and the shorter country-specific material. There are subordinate articles for individual countries of the American sub-regions when the material on an individual country grew unwieldy.
:*'''Caribbean sub-region''': [[CIA activities in Cuba|Cuba]], Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras
:*'''Central American sub-region''': [[CIA activities in Guatemala|Guatemala]], Guyana, Honduras, [[CIA activities in Nicaragua|Nicaragua]]
:*'''South America sub-region''': [[CIA activities in Argentina| Argentina]], Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, [[CIA activities in Peru|Peru]], Venezuela
==Intelligence History==
During World War II, the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] had been the primary US intelligence agency for [[Latin America]], with some involvement with the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of CIA. After the war, the CIA developed strong operations in Latin America.  For issues regarding possible improprieties in police training, see [[CIA Activities by Transnational Topic: Human Rights#Police Training|Latin American police training]].


===Caribbean===
==Caribbean sub-region==
See [[Radio Swan (Honduras)| Radio Swan]] for a [[Caribbean]] radio station generally associated with the US and Honduras, and, during the [[Bay of Pigs]] operation, apparently to assist with covert communications. After the invasion failed, however, it changed to a generally anti-Castro, but not inciting to revolution, station until 1968.
Radio Swan was a Caribbean radio station generally associated with the US and Honduras, and, during the [[Bay of Pigs invasion operation, apparently to assist with covert communications. After the invasion failed, however, it changed to a generally anti-Castro, but not inciting to revolution, station until 1968.


In 1962, a Special National Intelligence Estimate addressed "The threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area.<ref name=carib62>{{citation
In 1962, a Special National Intelligence Estimate addressed "The threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area.<ref name=carib62>{{citation
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Potential threats were seen as "Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them."  It foreshadowed the potential of the Cuban Missile Crisis with the general assessment "the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes."
Potential threats were seen as "Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them."  It foreshadowed the potential of the Cuban Missile Crisis with the general assessment "the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes."


====Cuba====
===Cuba===
 
{{see also|CIA activities in Cuba}}
{{see|Cuba-United States relations}}
After its revolution, Cuba sent forces to Africa and South America, in support of rebel forces.<ref name=NSAEBB67> {{citation
 
After its revolution, [[Cuba]] sent forces to Africa and South America, in support of rebel forces.<ref name=NSAEBB67> {{citation
  | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/
  | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/
  | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
  | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
Line 31: Line 36:
}}</ref>  
}}</ref>  


=====Cuba 1959=====
===Dominican Republic===
On 11 December 1959, CIA recommends [[Fidel Castro#Assassination Attempts|assassinate]] [[Fidel Castro]]{{Fact|date=December 2007}}.
====Dominican Republic 1961====
 
=====Cuba 1960=====
 
[[Cuban Project|Operation Mongoose]] was approved by U.S. President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to assassinate [[Fidel Castro]].
 
The Soviet Ambassador to the US said the USSR had no plans to put bases into Cuba.
 
There had been CIA agent reports and NSA [[SIGINT]] of increased military activity in Cuba starting in  late 1960, but these initially appeared to be of defensive equipment.<ref name=NSACubaCrisis>{{cite web
| title = Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis
| author = National Security Agency
| url = http://www.nsa.gov/publications/publi00033.cfm
}}</ref>
 
=====Cuba 1961=====
Between August 1960, and April 1961, the CIA pursued a series of plots to poison or shoot Castro according to the assassination plots proposed by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, director of the CIA's Office of Security.<ref name="NYC_use_refs_tags_dammnit">{{cite web
| title = Bay of Pigs 40 years after.
| work = National Security Archive
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html
| accessdate= 2007-07-16
}} p. 3, 14 ''CIA, Inspector General's Report on Efforts to Assassinate Fidel Castro.''</ref>
 
The CIA-organized [[Bay of Pigs Invasion]] of [[Cuba]] in 1961, failed, using plans that the regular military advised against. Kennedy also required the invasion to be less visible, and reduced its air support.  Recently declassified documents show that President Kennedy had officially denied the CIA authorization to invade Cuba. Cuban leader [[Fidel Castro]] used the routed invasion to consolidate his power and strengthen Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union.
 
CIA establishes a main physical facility in Miami, Florida, as one of the bases for intelligence and covert actions against Cuba. The station itself had the [[cryptonym]] [[JMWAVE]]; operations using it had their own cryptonyms or code words, such as [[Cuban Project|Operation Mongoose]]. The facility, under commercial cover of "Zenith Technical Enterprises", was located at the University of Miami, was considered too obvious and closed in 1968. Some of its functions moved to other locations in the Miami area, including the overt radio broadcast monitoring station of the [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service]].
 
[[Cuban Project|Operation Mongoose]] was re-approved to [[Edward Lansdale]] by U.S. President [[John F. Kennedy]] in November 1961.  The CIA tried and failed several times to [[Fidel Castro#Assassination Attempts|assassinate]] Fidel Castro.  Various methods are discussed, such as hiding bombs in seashells.<ref name="WeinerBook"/>
 
The CIA supported a variety of anti-Castro agents such as [[Orlando Bosch]] and [[Luis Posada Carriles]], who are wanted in Venezuela for terrorism charges. [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB153/index.htm]
 
=====Cuba 1962=====
The January 1962 Special National Intelligence Estimate suggested "We believe that Castro's Cuba will continue to do what it can to export its revolution."<ref name=carib62>carib62</ref> Such attempts were made, especially under the leadership of [[Che Guevara]].
 
While there were CIA agent reports of increased Soviet activity from late 1960 on, NSA [[SIGINT]] gave indications of increased air defense activity from approximately May 1962. In August, CIA imagery intelligence [[IMINT]] confirmed the presence of Soviet [[SA-2]] [[surface-to-air missiles]], the presence of which indicated something was receiving exceptional protection. Surveillance, without overflights, was stepped up.<ref name=NSACubaCrisis>NSACubaCrisis</ref>
 
In October 1962, high-altitude reconnaissance photographs, taken from outside Cuban airspace by [[Lockheed U-2|U-2]] aircraft flown by Air Force pilots were analyzed at the CIA's [[National Photographic Interpretation Center]] (NPIC), indicated that Soviet missile construction was underway. As described by [[Dino Brugioni]], these photographs were brought to the President and Secretary of Defense, who authorized overflights that confirmed the construction and triggered the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].
 
NPIC IMINT was key in assessing the activity in the crisis. A selection of the actual photographs, as well as supporting data such as the chart of CIA photographs are at the George Washington University [[National Security Archive]].<ref name=GWUNSA>{{cite web
  | last = National Security Archive
  | title = The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962: The Photographs
  | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
  |date=2002
  | url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/photos.htm
  | accessdate = 2007-09-16 }}
</ref> Some of the techniques used to determine what was being shipped into Cuba, and out of it after the US-USSR agreement was reached, was called "crateology", or recognizing the characteristic ways in which the Soviets crated military equipment, is Hilsman's ''To Move a Nation''.<ref>{{cite book | last = Hilsman
  | first = Roger
  | title = To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy
  | publisher = Doubleday
  |date=1967
}}</ref> A photograph analyzed using the crateology technique is shown in.<ref name=GWUNSA>GWUNSA Photograph 9</ref>
 
=====Cuba 1963=====
 
November 1963, [[Cuban Project|Operation Mongoose]] was cancelled following the [[John F. Kennedy assassination]].<ref name="WeinerBook"/>
 
=====Cuba 1965=====
In a letter read by Fidel Castro, on [[Che Guevara]] bids a "Farewell", resigns from all of his official positions within the Cuban government. The letter, which Che apparently never intended to be made public, states that "I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution...and I say goodbye to you, to the comrades, to your people, who are now mine."<ref name=NSAEBB5>{{citation
| title = National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 5
| title = The Death of Che Guevara: Declassified
| contribution = Kornbluh, Peter
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/index.html
| publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
}}</ref>
 
(CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Castro and Communism: The Cuban Revolution in Perspective," 5/9/66).
 
=====Cuba 1967=====
An agreement of April 28 between the US Army Military Group in Bolivia, and the Bolivian military, assigned mission  sixteen-member [[United States Army Special Forces]], drawn from the 8th Special Forces group of the U.S. Army Forces at Southcom in Panama, to "produce a rapid reaction force capable of counterinsurgency operations and skilled to the degree that four months of intensive training can be absorbed by the personnel presented by the Bolivian Armed Forces." In October, the 2nd Battalion, aided by U.S. military and CIA personnel, did engage and capture Che Guevara's small band of rebels.<ref name=BolivRgr>{{cite web
| author = Macek, Kenneth T.
| title = Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Activation, Organization and Training of the 2d Battalion - Bolivian Army
|date=April 28, 1967
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/che14_1.htm
}}</ref>
 
Written in October, a CIA Directorate of Intelligence report presents an assessment that Guevara's preeminence as a leader of the Cuban revolution has waned, and his internal and international policies have been abandoned. In domestic policy, his economic strategy of rapid industrialization has "brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power," and observes that Guevara believed centralized economic planning was an ideological necessity.
 
In foreign policy, he "never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the revolution." Guevara also preferred, in opposition to Castro, the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet split.
 
With Guevara no longer in Cuba, the CIA's assessment concludes, "there is no doubt that Castro's more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led to Che's downfall."<ref name=Latell1965>{{cite web
| author = Latell, Brian
| title = Intelligence Memorandum: The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution
| publisher = Central Intelligence Agency
|date=October 18, 1965
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/che14_1.htm
}}</ref>
 
[[Che Guevara]] is [[#Bolivia 1967| captured and executed]] by Bolivian Army Rangers. The CIA officer with the team tried to follow US government wishes and take him alive to Panama, but failed.
 
=====Cuba 1976=====
On May 17, 2005, documents from the National Security Archives were presented on ABC's television show "Nightline". Among other things, they discussed [[Luis Posada Carriles]], who was detained in Miami in May 2005 by Homeland Security. Posada is a Venezuelan living in the US, who is a member of anti-Castro groups, and is charged with plotting to blow up a Cubana airliner in 1976. Venezuela, from where the airliner flew, has charged him with terrorism against the aircraft.<ref name=NSAEBB153>{{citation
| contribution = Luis Posada Carriles: the Declassifed Record, CIA and FBI Documents Detail Career in International Terrorism; Connection to U.S.
| title = National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 153
| publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
| author = Kornbluh, Peter
|date=May 10, 2005
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB153/index.htm
}}</ref>
The Posada matter points out the inherent conflict between US anti-terrorism and its policy of hostility to Cuba. "He has admitted to plotting attacks that damaged tourist spots in Havana and killed an Italian visitor there in 1997. He was convicted in Panama in a 2000 bomb plot against Mr. Castro."<ref name=NYT2005-05-09>{{cite news
| title = Cuban Exile Could Test U.S. Definition of Terrorist
| author = Weiner, Tim
| journal = New York Times
|date=May 9, 2005
| url = http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/09/national/09exile.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
}}</ref>. Posada, who was a Venezuelan intelligence officer, claims asylum in the US, although Venezuela (not Cuba) is trying to extradite him. "If Mr. Posada has indeed illegally entered the United States, the Bush administration has three choices: granting him asylum; jailing him for illegal entry; or granting Venezuela's request for extradition.
 
It is unclear if Posada, or his associate [[Orlando Bosch]], notified the CIA or FBI before the airliner attack. "According to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive's Cuba Documentation Project, Posada's presence in the United States "poses a direct challenge to the Bush administration's terrorism policy. The declassified record," he said, "leaves no doubt that Posada has been one of the world's most unremitting purveyors of terrorist violence." President Bush has repeatedly stated that no nation should harbor terrorists, and all nations should work to bring individuals who advocate and employ the use of terror tactics to justice. During the Presidential campaign last year Bush stated that "I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world." Although Posada has reportedly been in the Miami area for more than six weeks, the FBI has indicated it is not actively searching for him.<ref name=NSAEBB153>NSAEBB153</ref>
 
=====Cuba 2005=====
======Intelligence analysis======
[[Porter Goss]] indicated Agency concern with the succession, given that [[Fidel Castro]] was suffering the effects of a serious fall.<ref name=Goss2005-02-16 />
 
====Dominican Republic====
=====Dominican Republic 1961=====
There was CIA involvement in the assassination of the President of the [[Dominican Republic]], [[Rafael Trujillo#The Downfall and Assassination|Rafael Trujillo]], but declassified reports conflict about the extent. In a report to the deputy [[attorney general]], CIA officials described the agency as having "no active part" in the assassination and only a "faint connection" with the groups that planned the killing.<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_wilderotter.pdf Justice Department Memo, 1975;] [[National Security Archive]] </ref>  However, an internal CIA memorandum states that an Office of Inspector General investigation into Trujillo's murder disclosed "quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters."<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf CIA "Family Jewels" Memo, 1973 (see page 434)] [[Family jewels (Central Intelligence Agency)]]</ref>
There was CIA involvement in the assassination of the President of the [[Dominican Republic]], [[Rafael Trujillo#The Downfall and Assassination|Rafael Trujillo]], but declassified reports conflict about the extent. In a report to the deputy [[attorney general]], CIA officials described the agency as having "no active part" in the assassination and only a "faint connection" with the groups that planned the killing.<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_wilderotter.pdf Justice Department Memo, 1975;] [[National Security Archive]] </ref>  However, an internal CIA memorandum states that an Office of Inspector General investigation into Trujillo's murder disclosed "quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters."<ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf CIA "Family Jewels" Memo, 1973 (see page 434)] [[Family jewels (Central Intelligence Agency)]]</ref>


=====Dominican Republic 1967=====   
====Dominican Republic 1967====   
A report to President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] refers to the guerilla problem being dormant in the Dominican Republic, and US training being provided there. Cause and effect were not analyzed. "There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities. Balaguer has given strong support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units. In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training for guerrilla activities."<ref name=FRUS-XXXI-59>{{citation
A report to President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] refers to the guerrilla problem being dormant in the Dominican Republic, and US training being provided there. Cause and effect were not analyzed. "There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities. Balaguer has given strong support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units. In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training for guerrilla activities."<ref name=FRUS-XXXI-59>{{citation
  |date=June 24, 1967
  |date=June 24, 1967
  | author = Rostow, Walt
  | author = Rostow, Walt
Line 165: Line 58:
}}</ref>
}}</ref>


====Haiti====
===Haiti===
=====Haiti 1963=====
====Haiti 1963====
In a White House meeting, DCI McCone suggested that this looked like the Cuban policy in July 1959 which gave the Soviets an opening into Cuba, and suggested the US have a complete diplomatic relationship that was visibly informal. The President agreed, ordered Ambassador Thurston recalled, and reserved the decision as to whether he should be returned or another Ambassador returned.  
In a White House meeting, DCI McCone suggested that this looked like the Cuban policy in July 1959 which gave the Soviets an opening into Cuba, and suggested the US have a complete diplomatic relationship that was visibly informal. The President agreed, ordered Ambassador Thurston recalled, and reserved the decision as to whether he should be returned or another Ambassador returned.  


Line 180: Line 73:
}}</ref>
}}</ref>


=====Haiti 2005=====
====Haiti 2005====
======Intelligence analysis======
=====Intelligence analysis=====
According to [[Porter Goss]]' testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, "the outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely elections in November 2005 in Haiti--even with substantial international support."<ref name=Goss2005-02-16 /><ref name=Goss2005-02-16 />
According to [[Porter Goss]]' testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, "the outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely elections in November 2005 in Haiti--even with substantial international support."<ref name=Goss2005-02-16 /><ref name=Goss2005-02-16 />


==Central America==
==Central American sub-region==
===Guatemala===
===Guatemala===
Several hundred records were released by the CIA on May 23, 1997 on its involvement in the 1954 coup in [[Guatemala]].<ref name=NSAEBB4>{{citation
CIA has had a long history with Guatemala, as shown by several hundred records were released by the CIA on May 23, 1997 on its involvement in the 1954 coup in [[Guatemala]].<ref name=NSAEBB4>{{citation
  | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
  | publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
  | date =
  | date =
Line 194: Line 87:
  | contribution = CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents
  | contribution = CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents
  | title = Electronic Briefing Book No. 4
  | title = Electronic Briefing Book No. 4
}}</ref>
}}</ref>. For details, see [[CIA activities in Guatemala]].
They reflected Truman Administration feeling on the government of Arbenz government, elected in 1950, would continue a process of socio- economic reforms that the CIA disdainfully refers to in its memoranda as "an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy, anti-foreign inferiority complex of the 'Banana Republic.'"
 
Between 1954 and 1990, human rights groups estimate, the repressive operatives of successive military regimes "murdered more than 100,000 civilians.<ref name=NSAEBB4>NSAEBB4</ref>
 
"Although most high-level US officials recognized that a hostile government in Guatemala by itself did not constitute a direct security threat to the United States, they viewed events there in the context of the growing Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and feared Guatemala could become a client state from which the Soviets could project power and influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.
 
CIA and IC reports tended to support the view that Guatemala and the Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of communism. DCI Walter Bedell Smith…believed the situation called for action. Their assessment was that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized and efficient. The anti-Communist elements -- the Catholic hierarchy, landowners, business interests, the railway workers union, university students and the Army were prepared to prevent a Communist accession to power, but they had little outside support.
 
Other US officials, especially in the Department of State, urged a more cautious approach. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,for example, did not want to present "the spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse." It wanted a policy of firm persuasion with the withholding of virtually all cooperative assistance, and the concluding of military defense assistance pacts, with El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras. Although the Department of State position became the official public US policy, the CIA assessment…had support within the Truman administration as well.<ref name=NSAEBB4-1>{{citation
| publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
|date=June 1995
| author =  Haines, Gerald K.
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/cia-guatemala1_1.html
| contribution = CIA History Staff Analysis: CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954
| title = Electronic Briefing Book No. 4, Document 1
}}</ref>
 
====Guatemala 1952====
The first CIA effort to overthrow the Guatemalan president--a CIA collaboration with Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza to support a disgruntled general named Carlos Castillo Armas and codenamed Operation PBFORTUNE--was authorized by President Truman in 1952. As early as February of that year, CIA Headquarters began generating memos with subject titles such as "Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operations," outlining categories of persons to be neutralized "through Executive Action"--murder--or through imprisonment and exile.<ref name=NSAEBB4>NSAEBB4</ref>
 
Following a visit by Washington by Nicaraguan President [[Anastasio Somoza García|Anastasio Somoza]] in April 1952, in which Somoza boasted that if provided arms, he and Guatemalan exile Carlos Castillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Harry Truman asked DCI Smith to investigate the possibility…" After seeing the report of an agent sent to investigate, Smith approved a proposal to supply Castillo Armas with arms and $225,000 and that Nicaragua and Honduras provide air cover. PBFORTUNE was approved on 9 September 1952, but was terminated a month later when Smith learned it had become known. The general idea of assassinations were mentioned, but only at a general level.<ref name=NSAEBB4-1>NSAEBB4-1</ref>
 
====Guatemala 1953====
In 1953, the CIA continued to try to influence Guatemalan policy and explore disposing of key adversaries…As psychological warfare, the CIA Guatemala City station sent "death notice" cards to all leading communists. The one-month campaigns in April and June produced no apparent results.<ref name=NSAEBB4>NSAEBB4</ref>
 
The National Security Council and President Eisenhower approved a covert action against Arbenz in  August 1953. Ot carried a $2.7 million budget for "psychological warfare and political action" and "subversion," among the other components of a small paramilitary war.<ref name=NSAEBB4>NSAEBB4</ref>
 
====Guatemala 1954====
{{see|1954 Guatemalan coup d'état}}
[[PBSUCCESS]], authorized by President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], was the codename for the CIA first covert operation in Latin America, carried out in Guatemala.
The purpose of the operation was to overthrow  [[Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán]], the [[democratically-elected]] [[President of Guatemala]]. The U.S. began to worry about the growth of Communism there due Jacobo Arbenz's policies.  By recruiting a Guatemalan military force the CIA's operation succeeded in eliminating the democratic government and replacing it with a military junta headed by Colonel [[Carlos Castillo Armas]].
 
Contrary to popular belief the responsibility of the United Fruit Company in instigating the [[coup d'etat]] was relatively small; it is not mentioned in the declassified CIA history.<ref>{{cite web
| url=http://consortiumnews.com/archive/story38.html
| work=The Consortium
| title=Guatemala – 1954: Behind the CIA’s Coup
| first1 = Kate | last1 =Doyle
|date=1997
| accessdate=2007-04-15
}}</ref>
A [[United States Department of State|U.S. State Department]] report released in 2003 states that social unrest within Guatemala and Arbenz's alleged Communist ties were the reason the CIA first drew up a contingency plan to oust Arbenz, entitled [[Operation PBFORTUNE]]  The plan was drafted in 1951, before the U.S.-based [[United Fruit Company]]'s landholdings had been expropriated.
 
The CIA's own declassified analysis is generally consistent, although differing in detail with the above. Training for the new PBSUCCESS plan included preparation of a briefing plan for assassinations,separate from the NSC plan.
 
Dissident leaders urged the "violent disposal" of an opponent, as psychological warfare, but the CIA chief of the temporary covert action base, LINCOLN, cautioned that they only wanted to destroy effectiveness; "we do not mean to kill the man…scare not kill."
 
Castillo Armas' CIA-supported force entered Guatemala on June 16. Arbenz sought asylum on 27 June, and 120 other Arbenz officials were given safe passage out of the country. There is no evidence of executions. "Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalans…took place in a historical era quite different from the present. In the documents, however, was an unsigned, undated technical discussion of assassination.<ref name=NSAEBB4>{{citation
| publisher = George Washington University National Security Archive
| date =
| author = 
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/ciaguat2.html
| contribution = A Study of Assassination
| title = Electronic Briefing Book No. 4, Document 2
}}</ref>
 
Soviet Communism had earned a reputation of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow's interests internationally…American officials and the public regarded foreign Communist parties as Soviet pawns and as threatening to US security interest. The public perception was that the Soviets were intent on world hegemony -- which the Soviets believed of the US.
 
The political and consequent social instability created in Guatemala 6 years later resulted in a very long civil war and its consequent, destructive impact upon the society, the economy, human rights and the culture of Guatemala.  According to author Kate Doyle, the CIA-sponsored military coup in 1954 was “the poison arrow that pierced the heart of Guatemala's young democracy.”<ref>{{cite web
| url=http://consortiumnews.com/archive/story38.html
| work=The Consortium
| title=Guatemala – 1954: Behind the CIA’s Coup
| author=Doyle, Kate
|date=1997
| accessdate=2007-04-15
}}</ref>
 
====Guatemala 1965====
 
President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] wanted to invade Guatemala with [[private military contractors]].<ref name="WeinerBook">{{cite book
| last =Weiner
| first =Tim
| year =2007
| title =Legacy of Ashes
| publisher =[[Doubleday (publisher)|]]
| location =
| id =ISBN 978-0-385-51445-3
}}</ref>  In support of this, CIA Director [[William Raborn]] was tasked with finding evidence to support the President's belief that Guatemala was a Cuban [[puppet state]].  Raborn was unsuccessful in finding such evidence.
 
====Guatemala 1967====
CIA begins to train police and military of Guatemala.<ref name="WeinerBook"/>
 
====Guatemala 1993====
 
In 1993 the CIA helped in overthrowing [[Jorge Serrano Elías]] who attempted a [[self-coup]] and had suspended the constitution, dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court, and imposed censorship. He was replaced by [[Ramiro de León Carpio]].<ref>[http://www.ciponline.org/iob.htm Report on the Guatemala Review] Intelligence Oversight Board. June 28, 1996.</ref>
 
====Guatemala 2007====
 
Guatemala elects [[Alvaro Colom]], its first leftist president in 50 years, the last one having been overthrown in a CIA-arranged coup in 1954.<ref>[http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/01/15/guatemala.president/index.html " Guatemala's Colom takes office", CNN, January 14, 2008]</ref>


===Guyana===
===Guyana===
Line 288: Line 93:
In an NIE focused on the short term, the major conclusions were:  
In an NIE focused on the short term, the major conclusions were:  


"British Guiana will probably make a relatively smooth transition to independence, but racial suspicions between East Indians and Negroes will continue to dominate Guyanese politics.
There was a potential for violence after British troops leave in October 1966, which the NIE said Guyanese security forces probably can control if the violence is sporadic.  The probability of violence will depend on Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the Negro party (the PNC), and of Cheddi Jagan, leader of the East Indian party (the PPP). Burnham's moderate government has kept Jagan's side in control. The estimate said that if violence went out of control, and the US agreed, Britain would probably send troops on Burnham's request.


If "these tensions break out again into violence will depend in large measure on the conduct of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the Negro party (the PNC), and of Cheddi Jagan, leader of the East Indian party (the PPP)." Burnham's moderate government has kept Jagan's side in control. "...new elections are due by late 1968, and between now and then tensions will rise and may at some point get out of hand.
<blockquote>British Guiana will probably make a relatively smooth transition to independence, but racial suspicions between East Indians and Negroes will continue to dominate Guyanese politics...The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D'Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. ...chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together.The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D'Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. Friction between the partners over patronage and fiscal issues will probably be intensified after independence, but chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together.</blockquote>


"Even after British troops depart in October 1966, [[Guyana|Guyanese]] security forces can probably cope with sporadic violence. If violence got out of control, Burnham would probably call for a return of British troops. If US consent were forthcoming and British troops were available, we believe that London would comply.
No matter who was in power, Guyana would need foreign capital. Burnham, while a neutralist by nature, would keep "tolerable terms with the US, UK, and Canada. If Jagan took power, he would still need to get help, and while his Marxist affiliations would get some help from the Communist bloc, "they probably would furnish only token quantities of aid.<ref name=NIE87.2-1966>{{citation
 
"The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D’Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. Friction between the partners over patronage and fiscal issues will probably be intensified after independence, but chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together.
 
"Guyana’s economy will need substantial foreign capital, much of it from the US. The need for aid will keep Burnham on tolerable terms with the US, UK, and Canada, though his administration will incline toward a neutralist posture in foreign affairs. If Jagan came to power, he could, because of his Marxist sympathies and his connections in Communist countries, count on some help from these countries. However, they probably would furnish only token quantities of aid.<ref name=NIE87.2-1966>{{citation
  | url = http://www.guyana.org/govt/US-declassifed-documents-1964-1968.html
  | url = http://www.guyana.org/govt/US-declassifed-documents-1964-1968.html
  | contribution = NIE 87.2–66 Guyana(British Guiana)   
  | contribution = NIE 87.2–66 Guyana(British Guiana)   
Line 304: Line 105:
}}</ref>
}}</ref>
421. /1/
421. /1/
====Guyana 1967====
====Guyana 1967====
A covert action was proposed to the 303 Committee: "It is established U.S. Government policy that Cheddi Jagan, East Indian Marxist leader of the pro-Communist People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana, will not be permitted to take over the government of an independent Guyana. Jagan has the electoral support of the East Indians, who are approximately 50% of the total population of Guyana. It is believed that Jagan has a good chance of coming to power in the next elections unless steps are taken to prevent this. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the majority People’s National Congress (PNC) in the coalition, is aware of the problem, and has stated that he is fully prepared to utilize the electoral machinery at his disposal to ensure his own re-election. Burnham has initiated steps for electoral registration of Guyanese at home and abroad,<small>''In a meeting '''[deleted]''' on September 16, 1966, Burnham requested money for various political purposes and outlined his plans to issue identification cards to all Guyanans above the age of 10, and to identify and register all Guyanans of African ancestry in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in order to get their absentee votes in the next elections. "Conversely, Burnham acknowledged with a smile, East Indians living abroad may have trouble getting registered and, if registered, getting ballots." ''</small> and has requested financial assistance <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> for the PNC campaign. It is recommended that he and his party be provided with covert support in order to assure his victory at the polls. At the same time, it is believed that support to Peter D’Aguiar and his United Force (UF), the minority party in the coalition government, is also essential in order to offset Jagan’s solidly entrenched East Indian electoral support. It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the courses of action outlined in this paper at a cost of <small>'''[deleted]'''</small>
A covert action to help Burnham retain power was proposed to the 303 Committee: "It is established U.S. Government policy that Cheddi Jagan, East Indian Marxist leader of the pro-Communist People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana, will not be permitted to take over the government of an independent Guyana. Jagan has the electoral support of the East Indians, who are approximately 50% of the total population of Guyana. It is believed that Jagan has a good chance of coming to power in the next elections unless steps are taken to prevent this...Since we believe that there is a good likelihood that Jagan can be elected in Guyana unless the entire non-East Indian electorate is mobilized against him, we also believe that campaign support must be provided to Peter D'Aguiar, the head of the United Force (UF) and Burnham’s coalition partner."
<small>According to an April 10 memorandum for the record, 'the 303 Committee approved this proposal at its April 7 meeting. '''[deleted]''' emphasized during the Committee’s discussion the importance of starting early in the implementation of the proposal. '''</small>
 
The proposal said that Burnham had taken steps to ensure the absentee votes of supporters, but not those of the opposition. "Burnham has initiated steps for electoral registration of Guyanese at home and abroad,<small>''In a meeting '''[deleted]''' on September 16, 1966, Burnham requested money for various political purposes and outlined his plans to issue identification cards to all Guyanans above the age of 10, and to identify and register all Guyanans of African ancestry in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in order to get their absentee votes in the next elections.


"Problem: To prevent the election of Cheddi Jagan in the next elections in Guyana.
"Conversely, Burnham acknowledged with a smile, East Indians living abroad may have trouble getting registered and, if registered, getting ballots." ''</small> and has requested financial assistance <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> for the PNC campaign. It is recommended that he and his party be provided with covert support in order to assure his victory at the polls. At the same time, it is believed that support to Peter D’Aguiar and his United Force (UF), the minority party in the coalition government, is also essential in order to offset Jagan's solidly entrenched East Indian electoral support.  


"Under the Guyana Constitution, new elections for the National Assembly must take place prior to 31 March 1969, and can take place at any time should the Prime Minister bring about the dissolution of the Parliament. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana is aware that the U.S. Government is opposed to Cheddi Jagan’s assumption of power in Guyana. He is also acutely conscious of the racial factors in the country which work to Jagan’s advantage, and he realizes that he must immediately initiate a vigorous campaign if he is to defeat Jagan.
The 303 Committee was asked to approve the proposed actions, whose cost was deleted from the declassified document. According to an April 10 memorandum for the record, 'the 303 Committee approved this proposal at its April 7 meeting. '''[deleted]''' emphasized during the Committee’s discussion the importance of starting early in the implementation of the proposal. The urgency came from the mechanisms by which Burnham could call for elections, which must take place before 31 March 1969 but could take place whenever the Prime Minister dissolves Parliament.


He "has personally undertaken the task of reorganizing the PNC, which has not functioned in many areas since the last elections. He plans to establish campaign headquarters in Georgetown and other urban areas where the African vote is concentrated, and will also send organizers throughout Guyana to re-enlist PNC supporters who have been inactive in party affairs since the last elections. At the same time, Burnham is sending a trusted political adviser abroad to survey the potential absentee vote which he can expect from Guyanese residing in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the West Indies.
Burnham has taken personal responsibility both for organizing his inactive party in Guyana, as well as sending an advisor to survey the amount of expatriate support on which he can rely.  


"Burnham believes that he would have great difficulty ensuring his own re-election without support from the U.S. Government. He has requested financial support <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> for staff and campaign expenses, motor vehicles, small boats, printing equipment, and transistorized public address systems. He also wishes to contract for the services of an American public relations firm to improve his image abroad and counteract Jagan’s propaganda in the foreign press. Since we believe that there is a good likelihood that Jagan can be elected in Guyana unless the entire non-East Indian electorate is mobilized against him, we also believe that campaign support must be provided to Peter D’Aguiar, the head of the United Force (UF) and Burnham’s coalition partner. ''See document for non-redacted parts of plan.''<ref name=303-1967-03-17>{{citation
"Burnham believes that he would have great difficulty ensuring his own re-election without support from the U.S. Government. He has requested financial support <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> for staff and campaign expenses, motor vehicles, small boats, printing equipment, and transistorized public address systems. He also wishes to contract for the services of an American public relations firm to improve his image abroad and counteract Jagan's propaganda in the foreign press. ''See document for non-redacted parts of plan.''<ref name=303-1967-03-17>{{citation
  | url = http://www.guyana.org/govt/US-declassifed-documents-1964-1968.html
  | url = http://www.guyana.org/govt/US-declassifed-documents-1964-1968.html
  | contribution = Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee: Support to Anti-Jagan Political Parties in Guyana   
  | contribution = Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee: Support to Anti-Jagan Political Parties in Guyana   
Line 348: Line 151:


====Honduras 1995====
====Honduras 1995====
In 1995, "The special prosecutor for human rights brought charges in July against eight retired and two active-duty members of the armed forces for their role in the kidnaping, torture, and attempted murder in 1982 of six student activists.... They survived their captivity in a clandestine prison because two of those abducted were the daughters of a government official....With the exception of one suspect, those under investigation were connected with Battalion 3-16, a secret Honduran military unit whose members were instructed by and worked with CIA officials...Although Human Rights Watch/Americas has pressed for several years for an accounting of U.S. involvement, the Clinton administration did not take steps to begin to examine the complicity of the United States in Honduran abuses until 1995. In mid-June, CIA Director John Deutch began an internal review of the agency's relationship with the Honduran military during the 1980s. Deutch stated that the investigation, which he characterized as an "independent review," would yield "new information" and "lessons about how not to do things while I'm director and in the future."
In 1995, "The special prosecutor for human rights brought charges in July against eight retired and two active-duty members of the armed forces for their role in the kidnapping, torture, and attempted murder in 1982 of six student activists.... They survived their captivity in a clandestine prison because two of those abducted were the daughters of a government official....With the exception of one suspect, those under investigation were connected with Battalion 3-16, a secret Honduran military unit whose members were instructed by and worked with CIA officials...Although Human Rights Watch/Americas has pressed for several years for an accounting of U.S. involvement, the Clinton administration did not take steps to begin to examine the complicity of the United States in Honduran abuses until 1995. In mid-June, CIA Director John Deutch began an internal review of the agency's relationship with the Honduran military during the 1980s. Deutch stated that the investigation, which he characterized as an "independent review," would yield "new information" and "lessons about how not to do things while I'm director and in the future."


Deutch's announcement came after the Baltimore Sun published a four-part series in June on U.S. support given to the 316 MI Bn. Sun staff correspondents Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson obtained formerly classified documents and interviewed three former 316 Bn members to document the breadth and depth of the battalion's close relationship to the CIA. The Sun series followed revelations in March that linked the CIA to serious human rights violations in Guatemala."<ref name=HRWhon1995>{{cite web
Deutch's announcement came after the Baltimore Sun published a four-part series in June on U.S. support given to the 316 MI Bn. Sun staff correspondents Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson obtained formerly classified documents and interviewed three former 316 Bn members to document the breadth and depth of the battalion's close relationship to the CIA. The Sun series followed revelations in March that linked the CIA to serious human rights violations in Guatemala."<ref name=HRWhon1995>{{cite web
Line 364: Line 167:
The IG did verify that a Honduran Hostage Rescue Force had captured and executed one individual who had been freed under an amnesty; it was unclear from the report if he had rejoined an insurgency. Another case concerned Father Carney, a priest who had renounced his American citizenship, and died under questionable circumstances while being pursued by the HRF. He had been reported to be "cadaverous" and may have died of starvation, or may have been killed by the HRF. The IG concluded no US personnel had been involved with this HRF operation.
The IG did verify that a Honduran Hostage Rescue Force had captured and executed one individual who had been freed under an amnesty; it was unclear from the report if he had rejoined an insurgency. Another case concerned Father Carney, a priest who had renounced his American citizenship, and died under questionable circumstances while being pursued by the HRF. He had been reported to be "cadaverous" and may have died of starvation, or may have been killed by the HRF. The IG concluded no US personnel had been involved with this HRF operation.


Further Congressional inquiries generated more responses. It became clear that the HRF definitely executed some guerillas, including the aide to the priest. The details were redacted, but there was some, but not conclusive, evidence that Father Carney had starved. The IG concluded the cause of his death is unknown.<ref name=NSAEBB27-4>NSAEBB27-4</ref>
Further Congressional inquiries generated more responses. It became clear that the HRF definitely executed some guerrillas, including the aide to the priest. The details were redacted, but there was some, but not conclusive, evidence that Father Carney had starved. The IG concluded the cause of his death is unknown.<ref name=NSAEBB27-4>NSAEBB27-4</ref>


===Nicaragua===
===Nicaragua===
====Nicaragua 1982====
See [[CIA activities in Nicaragua]]. Nicaragua, through the [[Iran-Contra affair]], has had a major affect on U.S. oversight over covert operations.
Eventually, the Congress of the United States viewed Reagan Administration's anti-Sandinista policies with extreme skepticism. Their efforts resulted in passage in late 1982 of an amendment introduced by Representative [[Edward P. Boland]] to the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Appropriations bill. This first of a series of Boland Amendments prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the principal conduit of covert American support to the contras, from spending any money "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua."<ref name=Walsh1993>{{citation
| url = http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/
| title = Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters
| first = Lawrence E. | last = Walsh
| date = 4 August 1993}}</ref></blockquote>
The majority report stated, " The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] was the U.S. Government agency that assisted the contras. In accordance with Presidential decisions, known as findings, and with funds appropriated by Congress, the C.I.A. armed, clothed, fed and supervised the contras. Despite this assistance, the contras failed to win widespread popular support of military victories within Nicaragua."  After the Boland Amendments were passed, however, CIA no longer supported the Sandanistas.<ref name=IranContraCong>{{citation
| url = http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/PS157/assignment%20files%20public/congressional%20report%20key%20sections.htm
| title = Congressional Committee Investigating Iran Contra majority report
| date = 18 November 1987}}</ref>
====Nicaragua 1984====
Reagan's posture towards the [[Sandinista]] government was highly controversial. His Administration definitely circumvented the Boland Amendment, although it is not clear what he personally knew and ordered, and what was done in his name by White House staff and the then-DCI, [[William Casey]].
 
<blockquote>A number of actions were taken by [[National Security Council]] staff, actions that the Boland Amendments had forbidden to the CIA. While the CIA, as an organization, was not allowed to act in this manner, [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[William Casey]] took part in White House/NSC discussions and actions to follow the Reagan policy.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>The NSC staff's efforts to assist the contras in the wake of Congress's withdrawal of funding took many forms. Initially it meant extending its earlier initiative to increase third-country contributions to the contras. Casey and McFarlane broached the subject of such funding at a June 25, 1984, meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), consisting of the President, Vice President Bush, Casey, (National Security Advisor) [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Secretary of State]] [[George Shultz]], Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]], United Nations Ambassador [[Jeane Kirkpatrick]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] Gen. [[John Vessey]], and presidential adviser [[Edwin Meese III]]. Shultz warned that any approach to a third country could be viewed as an  "impeachable offense," and convinced the group that it needed a legal opinion from [[Attorney General]] [[William French Smith]]. McFarlane agreed and told the group not to approach any foreign country until the opinion was delivered. McFarlane said nothing about what he already had obtained from the Saudis. </blockquote>
 
<blockquote>Questions arose as to the propriety of certain actions taken by the National Security Council staff and the manner in which the decision to transfer arms to Iran had been made. Congress was never informed. A variety of intermediaries, both private and governmental, some with motives open to question, had central roles. The N.S.C. staff rather than the C.I.A. seemed to be running the operation. The President appeared to be unaware of key elements of the operation. The controversy threatened a crisis of confidence in the manner in which national security decisions are made and the role played by the N.S.C. staff.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote> As a supplement to the normal N.S.C. process, the Reagan Administration adopted comprehensive procedures for covert actions. These are contained in a classified document, NSDD-159, establishing the process for deciding, implementing, monitoring, and reviewing covert activities.<ref>{{citation
| url = http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/PS157/assignment%20files%20public/TOWER%20EXCERPTS.htm
| title = Excerpts from the Tower Commission's Reports}}</ref></blockquote>
After the [[Boland Amendment]] was enacted, it became illegal under U.S. law to fund the Contras; National Security Adviser [[Robert MacFarlane]], Deputy National Security Adviser Admiral [[John Poindexter]], National Security Council staffer Col. [[Oliver North]] and others continued an illegal operation to fund the Contras, leading to the [[Iran-Contra]] scandal. At that point, members of the [[National Security Council]] staff continued covert operations forbidden to the CIA.</blockquote>
=====Drug allegations=====
In 1984, U.S. officials began receiving reports of Contra cocaine trafficking.  Three officials told journalists that they considered these reports "reliable."  Former Panamanian deputy health minister Dr. [[Hugo Spadafora]], who had fought with the Contra army, outlined charges of cocaine trafficking to a prominent Panamanian official and was later found murdered.  The charges linked the Contra trafficking to [[Sebastian Gonzalez Mendiola]], who was charged with cocaine trafficking on November 26, 1984, in Costa Rica. 
=====The Iran Link=====
Sale of arms to Iran in exchange for cash to be sent to Nicaranguan Contras was facilitated by Israel, in the [[CIA Activities by Region: Americas#Nicaragua 1985|CIA-approved operation]] underlying the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].
 
====Nicaragua 1985====
"After bribing his way out of prison in Venezuela in September 1985, [[Luis Posada Carrilles]] went directly to El Salvador to work on the illicit contra resupply operations being run by Lt. Col. [[Oliver North]]. Posada assumed the name "Ramon Medina," and worked as a deputy to another anti-Castro Cuban exile, Felix Rodriguez, who was in charge of a small airlift of arms and supplies to the contras in Southern Nicaragua. Rodriguez used the code name, Max Gomez. ...Posada and Rodriguez obtaining supplies for contra troops from a warehouse at Illopango airbase in San Salvador."<ref name=NSAEBB153 />
 
=====Drug allegations=====
In 1985, another Contra leader "told U.S. authorities that his group was being paid $50,000 by Colombian traffickers for help with a 100-kilo cocaine shipment and that the money would go 'for the cause' of fighting the Nicaraguan government."  A 1985 [[National Intelligence Estimate]] revealed cocaine trafficking links to a top commander working under Contra leader [[Eden Pastora]].<ref name = "AP-19851220">Brian Barger and Robert Parry, "Reports Link Nicaraguan Rebels to Cocaine Trafficking," [[Associated Press]] (December 20, 1985).</ref>  Pastora had complained about such charges as early as March 1985, claiming that "two 'political figures' in Washington told him last week that State Department and CIA personnel were spreading the rumor that he is linked to drug trafficking in order to isolate his movement."<ref>John E. Newhagen, "Commander Zero blasts CIA, State Department," [[United Press International]] (March 25, 1985).</ref> 


On December 20, 1985, these and other charges were laid out in an [[Associated Press]] article after an extensive investigation which included interviews with "officials from the [[Drug Enforcement Administration]] (DEA), Customs Service, [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] (FBI) and Costa Rica's Public Security Ministry, as well as rebels and Americans who work with them."  Five American Contra supporters who worked with the rebels confirmed the charges, noting that "two Cuban-Americans used armed rebel troops to guard cocaine at clandestine airfields in northern Costa Rica. They identified the Cuban-Americans as members of the 2506 Brigade, an anti-Castro group that participated in the [[Bay of Pigs Invasion|1961 Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba]]. Several also said they supplied information about the smuggling to U.S. investigators."  One of the Americans "said that in one ongoing operation, the cocaine is unloaded from planes at rebel airstrips and taken to an Atlantic coast port where it is concealed on shrimp boats that are later unloaded in the Miami area."<ref name = "AP-19851220"/>
====Nicaragua 1986====
The U.S argued that "The United States initially provided substantial economic assistance to the Sandinista-dominated regime. We were largely instrumental in the OAS action delegitimizing the Somoza regime and laying the groundwork for installation for the new junta. Later, when the Sandinista role in the Salvadoran conflict became clear, we sought through a combination of private diplomatic contacts and suspension of assistance to convince [[Nicaragua]] to halt its subversion. Later still, economic measures and further diplomatic efforts were employed to try to effect changes in Sandinista behavior. Nicaragua's neighbors have asked for assistance against Nicaraguan aggression, and the United States has responded. Those countries have repeatedly and publicly made clear that they consider themselves to be the victims of aggression from Nicaragua, and that they desire United States assistance in meeting both subversive attacks and the conventional threat posed by the relatively immense Nicaraguan Armed Forces."<ref name =Walters>{{citation
| url = http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_v86/ai_4549750
| title =Nicaragua's role in revolutionary internationalism
| first = Vernon A. | last = Walters
| journal = US Department of State Bulletin
|date=Oct, 1986  }}</ref>
=====Drug allegations=====
On March 16, 1986, the ''[[San Francisco Examiner]]'' published a report on the "1983 seizure of 430 pounds of cocaine from a Colombian freighter" in San Francisco which indicated that a "cocaine ring in the San Francisco Bay area helped finance Nicaragua's Contra rebels."  [[Carlos Cabezas (drug trafficker)|Carlos Cabezas]], convicted of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, said that the profits from his crimes "belonged to... the Contra revolution." He told the Examiner, "I just wanted to get the Communists out of my country." [[Julio Zavala]], also convicted on trafficking charges, said "that he supplied $500,000 to two Costa Rican-based Contra groups and that the majority of it came from cocaine trafficking in the San Francisco Bay area, Miami and New Orleans."<ref>"Report: Cocaine Ring Finances Contras," Associated Press (March 16, 1986).</ref>


Former CIA agent [[David MacMichael]] explained the inherent relationship between CIA activity in Latin America and drug trafficking: "Once you set up a covert operation to supply arms and money, it's very difficult to separate it from the kind of people who are involved in other forms of trade, and especially drugs. There is a limited number of planes, pilots and landing strips. By developing a system for supply of the Contras, the US built a road for drug supply into the US."<ref>John Lichfield and Tim Cornwell, "'America has fought the wrong war': Did US policy in central America in the 1980s assist the growth of the Colombian cocaine cartels?" ''The Independent'' (26 August 1989) p. 8.</ref>
==South American sub-region==
====Nicaragua 1987====
 
The operation underlying the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] was given legal approval by then-CIA deputy counsel [[David Addington]] among others, according to [[Salon.com]] Washington bureau chief [[Sidney Blumenthal]].<ref>{{cite web
| url=http://www.salon.com/opinion/blumenthal/2007/11/01/mukasey/print.html
| work=Salon.com
| title=The sad decline of Michael Mukasey
|date=2007
| accessdate=2007-11-01
}}</ref>
====Nicaragua 1997====
The Office of the Inspector General, of the US Department of Justice, investigated the "CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine" matter, and planned to issue a report in 1997.<ref name=DOJ-OIG-1997-12>{{citation
| author = US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Michael R. Bromwich
| date = December 1997
| title = The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy: A Review of the Justice Department's Investigations and Prosecutions
| url = http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9712/
}}</ref> See [[#Nicaragua 1998| Nicaragua 1998]] for information on the initial suppression of this report and the actions taken by the Inspector General.
 
====Nicaragua 1998====
 
<blockquote>On December 17, 1997, I signed our completed report entitled, The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy: A Review of the Justice Department's Investigations and Prosecutions. This 407-page report was the culmination of a comprehensive 15-month investigation by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) into allegations first raised in the San Jose Mercury News that U.S. government officials -- including Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Justice (DOJ) employees -- either ignored or protected drug dealers in Southern California who were associated with the Nicaraguan Contras. We originally planned to publicly release the report the following day, December 18, 1997.<ref name=DOJ-OIG-1998-07>{{citation
| author = US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Michael R. Bromwich
| date = December 1997
| title = The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy: A Review of the Justice Department's Investigations and Prosecutions: Epilogue, July 1998
| url =http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9712/epilogue.htm
}}</ref></blockquote>
 
<blockquote>However, the Attorney General, citing law enforcement concerns, invoked Section 8E of the Inspector General Act to defer the release of our report. This was the first time that publication of one of our reports has been prevented in this manner. Given the extraordinary nature of the Attorney General's action and the significant interest in why our report was not released in December 1997, we believe it necessary to describe the sequence of events that resulted in the Attorney General's decision not to permit the report to be publicly disclosed until now.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>The report we are releasing today is the same report that we completed on December 17 and planned to release on December 18. It has not been changed in any way. </blockquote>
 
Inspector General Bromwich stated, in the epilogue, that the key issue causing the scheduled release to be deferred was the apparently lenient treatment given to an Nicaraguan, accused of drug dealing by the ''San Jose Mercury News''. This individual, Oscar Danilo Blandon, fled to the United States soon after the Sandinistas came to power. The articles said Blandon was a major supplier to Ricky Ross, a major cocaine dealer in Los Angeles. The question addressed by the Inspector General is why Blandon received much more lenient sentencing for drug crimes than did Ross.
 
<blockquote>One of the primary issues raised in the Mercury News series was why Blandon received such lenient treatment from the government. The articles and the public discussion that ensued also focused on the disparity between Blandon's sentence and the prison sentence of life without parole received by Ross upon his conviction on federal drug charges in 1996 -- a case developed by Blandon acting on behalf of the DEA. The articles suggested that the difference between the treatment of Blandon and Ross might be attributable to Blandon's alleged ties to the CIA or the Contras.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>[the OIG did not] find that he had any ties to the CIA, that the CIA intervened in his case in any way, or that any connections to the Contras affected his treatment. We explored the facts surrounding Blandon's sentence reductions and found through our interviews of DEA and federal prosecutors that his reductions in sentence were based on his substantial cooperation with prosecutors and investigators, not ties to the Contras or the CIA. We made no attempt independently to measure the value of Blandon's cooperation; instead we sought to determine whether his cooperation was the reason for his lenient treatment.</blockquote>
 
"The OIG interviewed Blandon in February 1997 (with the DEA's knowledge), DEA agents who worked with him, and federal prosecutors in San Diego who handled his case. ...we learned the extent of Blandon's cooperation and that he continued to cooperate with the DEA after he was released from prison in September 1994. We also learned that after the Mercury News articles focused attention on Blandon and his activities in late 1996, the DEA stopped using him as an informant."
 
<blockquote>Our investigation, which began in October 1996, was nearing completion of the investigatory phase in the summer of 1997. In August 1997 we were told by the DEA that it was considering reactivating Blandon and using him as an informant in a criminal investigation. We were asked by the DEA whether we had found any reason to believe that Blandon had perjured himself in interviews with us or in his testimony in a closed session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in October 1996. We replied that we had no such evidence.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>In November 1997, we provided a draft of our report to the DEA, the DOJ Criminal Division, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California (USAO). We asked them to review the document and provide us any comments regarding the report or disclosure of informant or other law enforcement information. We requested these comments by December 5 because we intended to release the report in mid-December.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>On December 8, 1997, we learned for the very first time that the DEA, the Criminal Division, and the USAO objected to our release of information about Blandon's past cooperation with the DEA. We learned that Blandon had been reactivated as an informant in September 1997 to assist with an investigation of international drug dealers. According to the DEA, in order to protect his credibility in the face of the publicity generated by the ''Mercury News'' articles, Blandon had told the drug dealers that he had cooperated with the U.S. government in the case against Ricky Ross but had not cooperated against anyone else. As disclosed in our report, Blandon provided assistance to the government in investigations of many drug traffickers other than Ross.</blockquote>
 
The OIG attempted to negotiate with the DEA, DOJ Criminal Division, US Attorney's Office, and the office of the Deputy Attorney General. They objected on the grounds of risk to Blandon and the DEA investigation. Since the OIG said that it was already known that Blandon had cooperated with law enforcement was a matter of public record, and publication would cause him no additional risk. "We also argued that the report dealt with a matter of substantial public interest, and we expressed our concern that preventing release of the report would simply add fuel to the allegation that the Department was involved in a cover-up."
 
"the Deputy Attorney General decided to recommend that release of our report be deferred while the DEA pursued its drug investigation. On January 23, 1998, the Attorney General issued a letter invoking her authority under the Inspector General Act to delay public release of our report based on those same representations. On July 14, 1998, the Attorney General wrote us a letter stating "the law enforcement concerns that caused me to make my determination no longer warrant deferral of the public release of your report." Her letter stated that we could therefore release the report. We are doing so now, with no changes from the original.
 
<blockquote>We believe that the decision to reactivate Blandon as an informant was undertaken without adequate notice or consultation about its impact on our ability to discuss in the report the critical issue of Blandon's past cooperation with the government. This was an important part of our investigation and report.</blockquote>
 
According to the OIG, the order to defer the release was based on the Attorney General's assessment of the risk to the investigation and Blandon "versus the benefit of timely release of a report that addressed a topic of significant public concern."
 
==South America==
===Regional issues===
===Regional issues===
====1980====
====South America 1975====
An intelligence-sharing arrangement among [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Chile]], [[Paraguay]] and [[Uruguay]] was established in 1975. It was called [[Operation Condor]], and the U.S. appeared to have some access to it.<ref name=CIA-Chile>{{citation
| title = CIA Activities in Chile
| date = September 18, 2000
| author = National Intelligence Council
| url = https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/index.html#4}}</ref>
====South America 1980====
The landmark [[Filártiga v. Peña-Irala]] ruling of 1980<ref name=Filartiga1980>{{cite court
The landmark [[Filártiga v. Peña-Irala]] ruling of 1980<ref name=Filartiga1980>{{cite court
   |litigants=Dolly M. E. Filartiga and Joel Filartiga, v. Americo Norberto Pena-Irala
   |litigants=Dolly M. E. Filartiga and Joel Filartiga, v. Americo Norberto Pena-Irala
Line 476: Line 190:
   |court=United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
   |court=United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
   |date=30 June 198-
   |date=30 June 198-
   |url=http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/filartiga-630F2d876.html}}</ref> "made history by awarding the first criminal damages against a torturer (a Paraguayan police agent) found to be in the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established that, under the 1789 [[Aliens Tort Claims Act]], U.S. courts have jurisdiction over claims for torture brought by aliens against torturers found to be in the United States."<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />  This decision opened up a new avenue for appeals of actions that took place outside the US.
   |url=http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/filartiga-630F2d876.html}}</ref> "made history by awarding the first criminal damages against a torturer (a Paraguayan police agent) found to be in the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established that, under the 1789 [[Aliens Tort Claims Act]], U.S. courts have jurisdiction over claims for torture brought by aliens against torturers found to be in the United States."<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US>{{citation
 
====1992====
In 1992, Congress codified these legal advances in the [[Torture Victims Protection Act]], which holds liable for damages any "individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation... subjects an individual to torture." During the decade between these important events, U.S. jurisprudence was largely shaped by Argentine cases.<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />
 
===National issues===
====Argentina====
Intelligence and police issues need to be understood in the context of [[Argentina]]'s political system. In the USA, the Executive Branch, and the Intelligence Community within it, are, at least in principle, subject to the oversight of Congress, and potentially to judicial review. There are barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, theoretically impervious in the case of the CIA and NSA, and carefully controlled with the FBI. Police are largely decentralized at the state and local level. While there will be differences, especially with a parliamentary system, most European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, have a workable set of controls, with continuing improvement.
 
Argentina, however, historically has not had such controls.
<blockquote>
Yet, in Argentina, the security and intelligence services remain today entirely exempt from this principle. In fact, there is no law regulating the powers or providing for accountability and control over the activities of the intelligence agencies.
For Argentina, the consolidation of democracy is still the main political challenge in the twenty-first century. And within this overdue task, one of the most problematic issues is the control of the intelligence apparatus. It is problematic not only because of its historical relationship with the military dictatorship, but also because it is a complicated issue in the most well established democracies.<ref name=Balestra>{{citation
| title = Towards a Democratic Control of Argentina's Intelligence Community.
| first = Florencia | last = Fontan Balestra
| url = http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/criminal-justice/argentina.pdf
}}</ref>.</blockquote>
 
There still needs to be external control, but a basic internal control mechanism is
<blockquote>
... the separation of the intelligence community into different agencies. Although this might reduce effectiveness, it eliminates the dangers of domination and monopoly by a single agency. The separation must be accompanied by a clear delimitation of responsibilities by each agency, trying not to overlap functions in a single one. A common way to do this is by diving the faculties and jurisdiction into external and internal conflicts.
</blockquote> 
This type of control is only beginning to evolve in Argentina, where
<blockquote>
Argentina’s intelligence community today must be understood within an historical context that includes a recent experience with state terrorism, in which the military-intelligence forces were the principal practitioners of state terror.  During the years of dictatorship, the main role of the Armed Forces in Argentina shifted form defending the country from external aggressions to defending it from its internal enemies.
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
With the return to democracy many steps were taken to dismantle the authoritarian legacy and the issue of the power and autonomy of the intelligence agencies came into public debate. The considerable autonomy it had from constitutional controls, either legislative or judicial, began to be questioned and gradually began to be reversed.</blockquote>
<blockquote>
As soon as the civilian government assumed power, the members of the military Juntas were tried and convicted for the atrocities they committed during the years of dictatorship. However, lower ranks were granted immunity after the enactment by Congress of two laws: “Punto Final” (Final Point) and “Obediencia de Vida” (Justification Defense). Some other initiatives included the appointment of a civilian as head of the State Intelligence Agency and the functional delimitation of the different components of the intelligence community by the National Defense Law [Law No. 23.554, April 13, 1988] and the Internal Security Law [Law No. 24.059 , December 18, 1991.]
</blockquote>
 
The intelligence agencies, moving forward, were not seen as effective or objective.
<blockquote>
During the 1990’s Argentina experienced two of the biggest terrorist attacks in its history: the AMIA (Israeli Association) and the Israeli Embassy bombings, that left a total of more than one hundred people dead. Till today, the authors of the bombings are still unknown. The inefficiency of the intelligence services is seen as the principal reason of this institutional failure. In August 2000, the head of the State Intelligence Agency, Fernando de Santibañes, was accused of paying bribes to opposition senators in Congress in order to enact a labor law. The scandal created an institutional crisis within Argentina. The head of the agency and several senators resigned in the last month. Additionally, the vice president Carlos Alvarez also resigned as an act of protest because he believed that the Executive Branch was not actively condemning the episode. A Federal Judge is still investigating the case
</blockquote>
 
The Argentine system is, in some respects, more decentralized, and, in other respects, more decentralized than the US intelligence community. There is no equivalent to the US [[Director of National Intelligence]], but there is a National Intelligence Center (CNI) that has a coordinating rather than management role. CNI, in principle, is responsible for medium and long-term analysis, while the State Intelligence Secretary (SIDE) is responsible for short-term strategic intelligence.
 
SIDE went through major changes in January 2000. First, the civilian head of the agency, Fernando de Santibañes, fired over 1000 employees.  Many of the discharged agents were related to the military dictatorship of the seventies, with histories of extortion, kidnapping, torture, disappearances and assassinations.  A new set of priorities were established: rather than focus on a threat ofinternal and external subversion, the new focus is on "illicit trafficking, corruption, white-collar crime, terrorism, money la undering, organized crime, and the formulation of strategic policies in different areas for the President."<ref name=Balestra />
 
In the Argentine context, "security forces" are intermediate forces  between police forces (provincial and federal) and the armed forces. They are coordinated, rather than commanded, by the National Direction of Internal Intelligence, located in the Interior Ministry. Still, they are national organizations, without decentralized police: the Naval Prefecture, National Gendarmerie, Federal Police Force, and Local Police Forces.
 
See [[#Transnational issues: human rights| for Argentinian methods used elsewhere in the Americas]].
 
=====Argentina 1975=====
A military junta took control, and suspended the constitution, dissolved Congress, imposed strict censorship, and banned all political parties. In addition, it embarked on a campaign of terror against leftist elements in the country. Thousands of leftist opposition supporters were persecuted, illegally imprisoned, tortured and executed without trial. Many of them disappeared and were never again seen by their families. The military dictatorship lasted until 1983, when democratic elections designed Raul Alfonsín (UCR) as President of the country.<ref name=Balestra />
 
The 1975-1983 period was the one most vulnerable to excesses, which may have involved foreign forces.
 
=====Argentina 1976=====
Human Rights Watch observed,
<blockquote>Until the 1976 coup, and for months afterwards, the United States relied to a large extent on the armed forces as its main interlocutors in Argentina's turbulent politics. Unlike in Chile and Uruguay, where the U.S had backed reformist parties (at least until the emergence of a serious left-wing challenge in the early 1970s), it was consistently hostile to the most popular political movement in Argentina, Peronism. In the face of Peron's populist rhetoric, economic nationalism, and fascist sympathies, the military seemed to provide a moderate alternative, favorable to American investment, and just as staunchly anti-communist.<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US>{{citation
  | url = http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/argentina/argen1201-11.htm
  | url = http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/argentina/argen1201-11.htm
  | chapter = XI. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
  | chapter = XI. The Role of the United States
  | title = Argentina: Reluctant Partner. The Argentine Government's Failure to Back Trials of Human Rights Violators
  | title = Argentina: Reluctant Partner. The Argentine Government's Failure to Back Trials of Human Rights Violators
  | date = December 2001}}</ref></blockquote>
  | date = December 2001}}</ref> This decision opened up a new avenue for appeals of actions that took place outside the US.


=====Argentina 1977=====
====South America 1992====
According to Wikipedia, the Argentine military workrf with CIA in [[Operation Charly]], in a program lasting until 1983. According to the Wikipedia article on [[Operation Charly]], while the invasion of the Falkland Islands and the subsequent return to civilian rule in 1983 put an end to Argentine operations in Central America, the "dirty war" continued well into the 1990s, with hundreds of thousands being "disappeared." The Reagan administration took over the covert operations.
In 1992, Congress codified these legal advances in the [[Torture Victims Protection Act]], which holds liable for damages any "individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation... subjects an individual to torture." During the decade between these important events, U.S. jurisprudence was largely shaped by Argentine cases.<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />
 
===Argentina===
The U.S. did not explicitly denounce the systematic nature of the abuses until the beginning of the Carter Administration in January 1977.<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />
Argentina has had a special influence on South American police and intelligence traditions.  For a detailed chronology, see [[CIA activities in Argentina]]. See [[CIA transnational human rights activities]] for Argentinian methods used elsewhere in the Americas]].
 
=====Argentina 1978=====
"In September 1978, after Vice-President Walter Mondale met Videla in Rome, U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro reported that "General Viola received me smiling broadly and immediately volunteered the observation that he believed the Rome meeting had gone very well... Viola clearly indicated he had received some positive signals from the USG [U.S. government] referring to the release of FMS [Foreign Military Sales] purchases.""<ref name=NSAEBB85>{{citation
| title = The Pentagon and the CIA Sent Mixed Message to the Argentine Military: The Argentine Generals were "told by U.S. government officials" that Washington was "not serious and committed" to human rights
|date=March 28, 2003
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB85/
| volume = National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 85
}}</ref>
 
=====Argentina 1979=====
"A 1979 telegram reveals how U.S. policy  placed U.S. officials in a moral and political predicament while dealing with those responsible for human rights atrocities. At a meeting with General Viola, then-U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro asked him to help clarify the fate of two recent disappeared Montonero insurgents, Mendizabal and Croatto. Viola responded without hesitation, "Mendizabal and Croatto were terrorists ... who were eliminated ... with my authorization."<ref name=NSAEBB85 />
 
=====Argentina 1981=====
HRW said that the climate for human rights changed radically with the election of [[President]] [[Ronald Reagan]].  In February 1981, the Administration ordered representatives to "international financial institutions to stop opposing loans on human rights grounds to Argentina and other Southern Cone countries. It began a long certification battle in Congress to resume military sales, loans, and training programs to Argentina, arguing that human rights conditions had dramatically improved. It was true that "disappearances" had declined, but more than a thousand political prisoners were still being held without charges, and temporary "disappearances," arbitrary arrests, and torture continued."<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />
 
=====Argentina 1983=====
In June 1983, the NGO Americas Watch visited Honduras and stated in its report that "The General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, head of the Hondurian military staff, has publicly defended the use of the Argentine method to confront the subversive threat in Latin America. As a matter of fact, Alvarez is responsible of having brought to Honduras the first Argentine military instructors, when he was commandant of the Fuerza de Seguridad Pública (Fusep [Public Security Force]).<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />
 
=====Argentina 1987=====
In the landmark case of [[Forti v. Suárez Mason]] (1987),<ref name=Forti1987>{{cite court
  |litigants=Forti v. Suarez-Mason
  |vol=672
  |reporter=F. Supp
  |opinion=1531
  |court=US Circuit Court for the Northern District of California
  |date=1987
  |url=http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/Final_Judgment.htm}}</ref><ref name=PBS>{{citation
| url = http://www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/law_background_torture2.html
| author = Public Broadcasting System (WNET)
| title = Filartiga and Its Progeny: From Perpetrator to Commander
}}</ref> the Court held that torturers were ''[[hostis humani generis]]'' and thus subject to the jurisdiction of any country, even though the acts had not taken place in that country, and the parties were not citizens of that country.   
 
Further, a commander could be held liable for tortures performed by subordinates, as in the doctrine of [[command responsibility]]. "The defendant in all but one of the cases was Gen. [[Guillermo Suárez Mason| Carlos Guillermo Suárez Mason]], whose clandestine presence in the U.S after fleeing prosecution in Argentina triggered lawsuits from several of his victims. As commander of the First Army Corps, Suárez Mason participated in the preparation of the 1976 coup, oversaw the operations of task forces, and was ultimately responsible for secret detention camps in the densely populated region comprising [[Buenos Aires]] and its suburbs, La Plata, Mar del Plata, and smaller cities."<ref name=HRW-Argentina-US />
 
Martínez Baca v. Suárez Mason (1988) used the Filartiga precedent
 
=====Argentina 1989=====
In Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic (1989),<ref name=Amerada1989>{{cite court
  |litigants=Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., ''et al.''
  |vol=488
  |reporter=U.S.
  |opinion=428
  |court=Supreme Court of the United States
  |date=30 June 1989
  |url=http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/filartiga-630F2d876.html}}</ref>, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of a ship that had been attacked by Argentine aircraft during the [[Falklands War]]. While this was not an explicit human rights case, it added to the body of law of jurisdiction over extraterritorial events.
 
Ouiros de Rapaport v. Suárez Mason, (1989), followed in the steps of Filartiga.
 
=====Argentina, date uncertain=====
"The other face of U.S. policy toward Argentina at this time was shown by the sympathetic treatment Suárez Mason received from certain U.S. authorities. ...[[Oliver North]]", a [[National Security Council]] staff member who often acted independently of the CIA, although he arranged orders to be given to the agency, was :reported to have arranged a false visa for Suárez to enter the United States. North had reportedly been discussing with him the possible establishment of a pan-American counterinsurgency force, a proposal that emerged out of ongoing cooperation between the CIA and the Argentine military, in which Suárez Mason was an important actor.
 
=====Argentina 1992=====
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina (1992) again used the precedent in Filartiga.


====Bolivia====
====Bolivia====
Line 626: Line 235:
'''Director of Central Intelligence [[Richard Helms]]''' reported, to State, Defense, and White House Officials in a memo drafted by  W.V. Broe and <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> in the Western Hemisphere Division and approved by Thomas H. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.
'''Director of Central Intelligence [[Richard Helms]]''' reported, to State, Defense, and White House Officials in a memo drafted by  W.V. Broe and <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> in the Western Hemisphere Division and approved by Thomas H. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.


"1. You are aware of the published accounts concerning the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara which were based in essence on the Bolivian Army press conference on 10 October attributing Guevara’s death to battle wounds sustained in the clash between the Army and the guerrillas on 8 October 1967.''On October 9 Rostow informed President Johnson the "tentative information" that the Bolivian unit trained by the U.S. "got Che Guevara," but that information was inconclusive and based primarily on press reports from Bolivia.'' Guevara was said to be in a coma when captured and to have died shortly thereafter, the heat of battle having prevented early or effective treatment by Bolivian soldiers.
"1. You are aware of the published accounts concerning the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara which were based in essence on the Bolivian Army press conference on 10 October attributing Guevara's death to battle wounds sustained in the clash between the Army and the guerrillas on 8 October 1967.''On October 9 Rostow informed President Johnson the "tentative information" that the Bolivian unit trained by the U.S. "got Che Guevara," but that information was inconclusive and based primarily on press reports from Bolivia.'' Guevara was said to be in a coma when captured and to have died shortly thereafter, the heat of battle having prevented early or effective treatment by Bolivian soldiers.


"2. <small>[deleted]</small> contrary information from <small>'''[deleted]'''</small>'''probably Felix Rodriguez''' the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion, the army unit that captured Guevara. According to <small>[deleted]</small> Guevara was captured on 8 October as a result of the clash with the Cuban-led guerrillas. He had a wound in his leg, but was otherwise in fair condition. ''According to the text of a message sent by <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> on the scene, Guevara’s fate would be decided on October 9 by the highest Bolivian military authorities. "I am managing to keep him alive," he reported, "which is very hard."'' He was questioned but refused to give any information. Two Bolivian guerrillas, "Willy" and "Aniceto," were also captured.
"2. <small>[deleted]</small> contrary information from <small>'''[deleted]'''</small>'''probably Felix Rodriguez''' the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion, the army unit that captured Guevara. According to <small>[deleted]</small> Guevara was captured on 8 October as a result of the clash with the Cuban-led guerrillas. He had a wound in his leg, but was otherwise in fair condition. ''According to the text of a message sent by <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> on the scene, Guevara’s fate would be decided on October 9 by the highest Bolivian military authorities. "I am managing to keep him alive," he reported, "which is very hard."'' He was questioned but refused to give any information. Two Bolivian guerrillas, "Willy" and "Aniceto," were also captured.
Line 656: Line 265:
:b. Camilo Cienfuegos: For many years the story has circulated that Fidel Castro Ruz had Cienfuegos, one of his foremost deputies, killed because his personal popularity presented a danger to Castro. Actually the death of Cienfuegos was an accident. Cienfuegos has been in Oriente Province when he received a call to attend a general staff meeting in Havana. He left by plane and the theory was that the plane became lost in low-ceiling flying conditions, consumed all of its fuel, and crashed in the ocean, and no trace of him was ever found. Castro had loved Cienfuegos more than any of his lieutenants.
:b. Camilo Cienfuegos: For many years the story has circulated that Fidel Castro Ruz had Cienfuegos, one of his foremost deputies, killed because his personal popularity presented a danger to Castro. Actually the death of Cienfuegos was an accident. Cienfuegos has been in Oriente Province when he received a call to attend a general staff meeting in Havana. He left by plane and the theory was that the plane became lost in low-ceiling flying conditions, consumed all of its fuel, and crashed in the ocean, and no trace of him was ever found. Castro had loved Cienfuegos more than any of his lieutenants.


:c. Fidel Castro Ruz: Castro had not been a Communist prior to the success of the Cuban Revolution. Castro’s own statements on the subject are correct.
:c. Fidel Castro Ruz: Castro had not been a Communist prior to the success of the Cuban Revolution. Castro's own statements on the subject are correct.


:d. The Congo: American imperialism had not been the reason for his failure there but, rather, the Belgian mercenaries. He denied ever having several thousand troops in the Congo, as sometimes reported, but admitted having had "quite a few".
:d. The Congo: American imperialism had not been the reason for his failure there but, rather, the Belgian mercenaries. He denied ever having several thousand troops in the Congo, as sometimes reported, but admitted having had "quite a few".
Line 664: Line 273:
:f. Future of the Guerrilla Movement in Bolivia: With his capture, the guerrilla movement had suffered an overwhelming setback in Bolivia, but he predicted a resurgence in the future. He insisted that his ideals would win in the end even though he was disappointed at the lack of response from the Bolivian campesinos. The guerrilla movement had failed partially because of Bolivian Government propaganda which claimed that the guerrillas represented a foreign invasion of Bolivian soil. In spite of the lack of popular response from the Bolivian campesinos, he had not planned an exfiltration route from Bolivia in case of failure. He had definitely decided to either fall or win in this effort.
:f. Future of the Guerrilla Movement in Bolivia: With his capture, the guerrilla movement had suffered an overwhelming setback in Bolivia, but he predicted a resurgence in the future. He insisted that his ideals would win in the end even though he was disappointed at the lack of response from the Bolivian campesinos. The guerrilla movement had failed partially because of Bolivian Government propaganda which claimed that the guerrillas represented a foreign invasion of Bolivian soil. In spite of the lack of popular response from the Bolivian campesinos, he had not planned an exfiltration route from Bolivia in case of failure. He had definitely decided to either fall or win in this effort.


4. According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] when Guevara, Simon Cuba, and Aniceto Reynaga Gordillo were captured on 8 October, the Bolivian Armed Forces Headquarters ordered that they be kept alive for a time. A telegraphic code was arranged between La Paz and Higueras with the numbers 500 representing Guevara, 600 meaning the phrase "keep alive" and 700 representing "execute". During the course of the discussion with Guevara, Simon Cuba and Aniceto Reynaga were detained in the next room of the school house. At one stage, a burst of shots was heard and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] learned later that Simon Cuba had been executed. A little later a single shot was heard and it was learned afterward that Aniceto Reynaga had been killed. When the order came at 11:50 a.m. from La Paz to kill Guevara, the execution was delayed as long as possible. However, when the local commander was advised that a helicopter would arrive to recover the bodies at approximately 1:30 p.m., Guevara was executed with a burst of shots at 1:15 p.m. Guevara’s last words were, "Tell my wife to remarry and tell Fidel Castro that the Revolution will again rise in the Americas." To his executioner he said, "Remember, you are killing a man."
4. According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] when Guevara, Simon Cuba, and Aniceto Reynaga Gordillo were captured on 8 October, the Bolivian Armed Forces Headquarters ordered that they be kept alive for a time. A telegraphic code was arranged between La Paz and Higueras with the numbers 500 representing Guevara, 600 meaning the phrase "keep alive" and 700 representing "execute". During the course of the discussion with Guevara, Simon Cuba and Aniceto Reynaga were detained in the next room of the school house. At one stage, a burst of shots was heard and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] learned later that Simon Cuba had been executed. A little later a single shot was heard and it was learned afterward that Aniceto Reynaga had been killed. When the order came at 11:50 a.m. from La Paz to kill Guevara, the execution was delayed as long as possible. However, when the local commander was advised that a helicopter would arrive to recover the bodies at approximately 1:30 p.m., Guevara was executed with a burst of shots at 1:15 p.m. Guevara's last words were, "Tell my wife to remarry and tell Fidel Castro that the Revolution will again rise in the Americas." To his executioner he said, "Remember, you are killing a man."


The <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> on site, reporting on Guevara’s execution, indicated that "it was impossible keep him alive."  
The <small>'''[deleted]'''</small> on site, reporting on Guevara’s execution, indicated that "it was impossible keep him alive."  
Line 704: Line 313:


====Chile====
====Chile====
The CIA, led by the National Intelligence Council, filed an informative report in response to requirements of Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Hinchey Amendment). Reviewed were relevant CIA records of the period predominantly from recent document searches; Congressional reports about US activities in Chile in the 1960s and 1970s; memoirs of key figures, including Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger; CIA’s oral history collection at the Center for the Study of Intelligence; and consulted with retired intelligence officers who were directly involved. From this information, a retrospective report about CIA activities in Chile was written. <ref name=CIA-Chile>{{citation
=====Chile 1964=====
| title = CIA Activities in Chile
CIA spreads [[disinformation]] that [[Salvador Allende]], the [[Socialist]] candidate, was receiving funds from [[Eastern Bloc]] nations or [[Cuba]]. The [[Christian Democrat Party of Chile]] candidate [[Eduardo Frei Montalva]] wins the election.
| date = September 18, 2000
 
| author = National Intelligence Council
=====Chile 1970=====
| url = https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/index.html#4}}</ref>
On [[September 4]], [[1970]] [[Salvador Allende]] gained presidency of [[Chile]] after four elections and became the first socialist to be democratically elected in the Western Hemisphere in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Soon after, President [[Richard Nixon]] ordered a covert operation, [[Project FUBELT]], to undermine Allende's government and promote a military coup in Chile. The operations included [[Henry Kissinger]] (National Security Advisor), [[Richard Helms]] (CIA Director), and Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell]]. Under the supervision of [[Thomas Karamessines]], a special task force was established and led by veteran [[David Atlee Phillips]].<ref name=NSAEBB8>{{cite web
For further details, see [[CIA activities in Chile]].
| title =Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976
| work =National Security Archives Online
| url =http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm
| accessdate=1998-09-11
}}</ref>   $10,000,000 is authorized; $8,000,000 is spent.
 
=====Chile 1973=====
On [[September 11]], [[1973]] General [[Augusto Pinochet]], who had just 19 days prior become the commander in chief of the army, executed a coup d'etat which resulted in the death of Allende and the beginning of Pinochet's dictatorship, during which opposition was suppressed via [[state terrorism]]. Whether the US directly participated in the coup itself is disputed, see [[1973 Chilean coup d'état]].


====Colombia====
====Colombia====
Line 776: Line 377:
  |date=1999
  |date=1999
  | url = http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=4D768E2407FE12B980256A0F005C1B4C&c=COL
  | url = http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=4D768E2407FE12B980256A0F005C1B4C&c=COL
}}</ref> but it did not mention any non-Colombian involvement, other than the UN Commission on Human Rights. "Some of these concerns were addressed in a statement by the Chairman of the Commission which expressed concern about the gravity and scale of human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law and,inter alia, urged the government to take steps to end impunity and to take effective action to prevent internal displacement. The Commission welcomed the agreement with the Colombian government to extend the mandate of the office of the un High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia until April 1999." The situation described by Amnesty, however, was:
}}</ref> but it did not mention any non-Colombian involvement, other than the UN Commission on Human Rights. "Some of these concerns were addressed in a statement by the Chairman of the Commission which expressed concern about the gravity and scale of human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law and, inter alia, urged the government to take steps to end impunity and to take effective action to prevent internal displacement. The Commission welcomed the agreement with the Colombian government to extend the mandate of the office of the un High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia until April 1999." The situation described by Amnesty, however, was:
<blockquote>More than 1,000 civilians were killed by the security forces or paramilitary groups operating with their support or acquiescence. Many victims were tortured before being killed. At least 150 people ''disappeared''. Human rights activists were threatened and attacked; at least six were killed. ''Death squad''-style killings continued in urban areas. Several army officers were charged in connection with human rights violations; many others continued to evade accountability. Armed opposition groups were responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including deliberate and arbitrary killings and the taking of hundreds of hostages.
<blockquote>More than 1,000 civilians were killed by the security forces or paramilitary groups operating with their support or acquiescence. Many victims were tortured before being killed. At least 150 people ''disappeared''. Human rights activists were threatened and attacked; at least six were killed. ''Death squad''-style killings continued in urban areas. Several army officers were charged in connection with human rights violations; many others continued to evade accountability. Armed opposition groups were responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including deliberate and arbitrary killings and the taking of hundreds of hostages.


Line 800: Line 401:
The article says "Disclosure of the allegation about army chief  comes as the high level of U.S. support for Colombia's government is under scrutiny by Democrats in Congress." Colombia is the third-largest recipient of US foreign aid, and, if the allegations are established, it could heighten pressure to reduce or redirect that aid because Montoya has been a favorite of the Pentagon and an important partner in the U.S.-funded counterinsurgency strategy called Plan Colombia.  
The article says "Disclosure of the allegation about army chief  comes as the high level of U.S. support for Colombia's government is under scrutiny by Democrats in Congress." Colombia is the third-largest recipient of US foreign aid, and, if the allegations are established, it could heighten pressure to reduce or redirect that aid because Montoya has been a favorite of the Pentagon and an important partner in the U.S.-funded counterinsurgency strategy called Plan Colombia.  


According to the CIA document provided to the reporters, from an anonymous source an allied Western intelligence agency reported the existence of such links during a [[2002]] [[Medellín]] offensive carried out against the [[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]] ([[spanish language|spanish]]: ''Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia'') (FARC) under the title of "Operation Orion".  
According to the CIA document provided to the reporters, from an anonymous source an allied Western intelligence agency reported the existence of such links during a 2002 [[Medellín]] offensive carried out against the [[Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]] ([[Spanish language|Spanish]]: ''Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia'') (FARC) under the title of "Operation Orion".  


While the operation was considered a success, there were allegations that over 40 people had [[Forced disappearance|disappeared]] during the operation and that the impending power vacuum was filled by paramilitary forces. The Western intelligence agency mentioned in the report considered that, the source of the claim was yet-unproven. A Defense [[attaché]] to the United States Embassy in Bogotá told the Los Angeles Times that  "this report confirms information provided by a proven source."<ref name=NYTimes2007-03-25>{{citation
While the operation was considered a success, there were allegations that over 40 people had [[Forced disappearance|disappeared]] during the operation and that the impending power vacuum was filled by paramilitary forces. The Western intelligence agency mentioned in the report considered that, the source of the claim was yet-unproven. A Defense [[attaché]] to the United States Embassy in Bogotá told the Los Angeles Times that  "this report confirms information provided by a proven source."<ref name=NYTimes2007-03-25>{{citation
Line 824: Line 425:
======Intelligence analysis======
======Intelligence analysis======
As part of testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 2005, [[Porter Goss]] mentioned that extremist groups in Colombia, with [[FARC]] heading the list, were of concern to the US. Pointing out that there would be an election in 2006, he warned that "progress against counternarcotics and terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership, may be affected by the election."<ref name=Goss2005-02-16 />
As part of testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 2005, [[Porter Goss]] mentioned that extremist groups in Colombia, with [[FARC]] heading the list, were of concern to the US. Pointing out that there would be an election in 2006, he warned that "progress against counternarcotics and terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership, may be affected by the election."<ref name=Goss2005-02-16 />
=====Colombia 2007=====
=====Colombia 2007=====
Reports on the 2002 event were not associated with the CIA, so it would appear that the funding does not come directly from the CIA, but from State or Defense. On April 16, according to HRW, [[Secretary of State]] [[Condoleezza Rice]] certified that the Colombian government and armed forces are making progress on human rights.<ref name=HRW2007-04-18>{{citation
Reports on the 2002 event were not associated with the CIA, so it would appear that the funding does not come directly from the CIA, but from State or Defense. On April 16, according to HRW, [[Secretary of State]] [[Condoleezza Rice]] certified that the Colombian government and armed forces are making progress on human rights.<ref name=HRW2007-04-18>{{citation
Line 835: Line 437:


====Peru====
====Peru====
=====Peru 1963=====
{{see |CIA Activities in Peru}}
A NIE addressed the "prospect for an elected civil government" and the problems it would face.  The first conclusion was that pressures for change, in a society going through urbanization and industrialization, would take many years to relieve.
 
[[Peru]] is now under a junta that seized power in July 1962, to prevent the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), a radical leftist but anti-Communist party established in 1924. APRA was originally revolutionary but now seeks to participate in the political process. The junta has failed to create a coalition that would be sure to defeat APRA, in the election it committed to have in June 1963.
 
Since the military can control the outcome, they would do whatever they considered necessary to prevent leftists such as APRA, or Communist groups, taking power. The security apparatus is capable of dealing with anything short of a major uprising or guerilla war.
 
"In the past, Peruvian Governments have been unwilling to make the sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the chance to try its method."<ref name=NIE97-63>{{citation
| volume = Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics
| url = http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xii/35162.htm
| title = NIE 97-63, Political Prospects in Peru
| author = Central Intelligence Agency
|date=1 May 1963
| id = FRUS XII-429
}}</ref>
 
=====Peru 1997=====
As early as 1997, the State Department annual human rights report's chapter about Peru described the massive power SIN had acquired under [[Vladimiro Montesinos]], head of the Peruvian [[National Intelligence Service (Peru)|National Intelligence Service]]'s (Spanish: Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional or SIN) direction and its use against domestic political opponents. Despite those concerns, arms sales to the Fujimori regime by the U.S. government and U.S.-licensed companies nearly quadrupled in 1998 to $4.42 million, compared to $1.17 million in 1997.<ref name=CPI2000>{{citation
| title = U.S. Shrugged Off Corruption, Abuse in Service of Drug War
| url = http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=257#
| author = Center for Public Integrity}}</ref>
 
Also in 1997, the State Department's [[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]] alerted the intelligence community to growing concerns about Montesinos, who very close to President [[Alberto Fujimori]]. "But in 1996 Fujimori began a slow decline in popularity as his constituency among the ruralcand urban poor started to tire of austerity measures that seemed to yield no appreciable benefits. Opposition grew in other sectors as well, questioning such heavy-handed tactics as the Fujimori-controlled congress's
constitutional interpretation allowing the president to run for a third term in 2000, the refusal to allow an investigation into narcocorruption charges against powerful national security adviser Valdimiro Montesinos, and a botched kidnapping by intelligence agents of a dissident retired general...These latest incidents conform to a pattern of arrogant, authoritarian behavior evident in Montesinos's large and unexplained income, continuous harassment of opposition figures and journalists, and the grisly murder of an army intelligence agent and the torture of another by their own organization<ref name=NSAEBB237>{{cite web
| author = State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
| title = Peru, Freefall
|date=July 31, 1997
| url = http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB237/document2.pdf
| id =  National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 237}}</ref>
 
=====Peru 1998=====
According to a ''New York Times'' report, [[Jordan]]ian officials asked the CIA station chief in [[Amman]], United States object if Jordan sold 50,000 surplus AK-47 assault rifles to the [[Peru| Peruvian]] military? After checking with embassy diplomatic and military personnel, CIA headquarters, but not with the State Department, the Jordanians were told that the US had no objections to the transaction. Subsequently, however, CIA told the [[Bill Clinton|Clinton Administration]] that the surplus rifles did not go to Peru, but to guerillas in [[Colombia]]. Peru has had a long-standing border dispute with [[Ecuador]], and US sources said that Peruvian arms purchases, due to that conflict, which involved open warfare in 1995, should have been closely monitored.<ref name=NYT2000-11-06>{{citation
| first1 = Tim | last1 = Golden
| journal = New York Times
|date=November 6, 2000
| title = C.I.A. Links Cited on Peru Arms Deal That Backfired
}}</ref> The CIA station in [[Lima]], Peru had been notified, but the matter was not discussed with Peruvian security officials on the basis of respecting the Jordanian confidence.
 
On the Peruvian side, the transaction was arranged by Montesino, working through an arms broker, [[Sarkis Soghanalian]], who said he did not know the guns were going other than to Peru, and he had received [[End user certificate]] (EUC) for them.<ref name=NYT2000-11-06>NYT2000-11-06>
 
The CIA suspected that Montesinos was involved in some illegal activities and was not surprised when informed of the diversion of funds, the U.S. sources said. Even though the agency had its suspicions about Montesinos, it continued doing business with him "because he solved problems, including problems he created himself," one source said. The U.S. Embassy has provided Peru's anti-corruption prosecutor with detailed information about the CIA's payments to Montesinos in response to the Peruvian government's wide-ranging investigations into Montesinos' malfeasance. The prosecutor, Ana Cecilia Magallanes, has told U.S. officials that she has documents showing the diversion of SIN money, including the CIA payments, toward illegal activities. Sources would not elaborate on what those activities included, but the prosecutor said it did not appear that those monies were diverted into Montesinos' personal accounts.Montesinos had founded and personally controlled a counter-drug unit within SIN. According to U.S. Embassy officials in Lima, interviewed by ICIJ, the SINs narcotics intelligence unit was funded and assisted by both the CIA and the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The State Department's share included $36,000 in 1996, $150,000 in 1997 and $25,000 in 1998, according to U.S. embassy officials. It was to that Narcotics Intelligence Division (DIN), U.S. officials told ICIJ, that the CIA directed at least $10 million in cash payments from 1990 until September 2000. Most of the money was to finance intelligence activities in the drug war, though officials acknowledged a small part went to antiterrorist acitivities. The CIA knew the money was going directly to Montesinos and had receipts for the payments, the sources said. "It was an agency-to-agency relationship," one U.S. official in Lima told ICIJ, "with Vladimiro Montesinos as the intermediary... Montesinos had the money under his control."<ref name=CPI2000 />
 
State Department sources, according to the ''Times'', were unhappy with the CIA role in the matter, "We don't know for sure that he [Montesinos] was involved, but there's a lot of smoke coming from his direction, We do know that we should have had a lot of the information a lot earlier than we got it." Their concern touched on the constant question of how closely US intelligence organizations can work with people accused of human rights violations and other criminal activities. They cited officials including the Undersecretary of State, [[Thomas R. Pickering]], as being dissatisfied with the flow of information from the agency, both about the its own early role in the case and about the possible involvement of Peruvian officials. According to the State personnel, "Every time you asked a question, it would take a few days to get an answer, and every time, their story would change a little. It was like pulling teeth."<ref name=NYT2000-11-06 />
 
CIA personnel, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that while they had been slow to discover the diversion of the rifles, once they were aware of it, they reported it immediately, when guns found in the field were traced back to Jordan. They said that they had made regular reports on his alleged illicit actions, while they also worked with him in covert anti-terrorism and counter-drug programs.
 
Montesinos fled to Panama on September 24, 1998, after the disclosure of a videotape that showed him bribing an opposition legislator. The ''Times'' article said that while the US and the [[Organization of American States]] (OAS) had urged Panama to grant him asylum, Panama refused and Montesinos flew back to hide in Peru on October 23, 1998.<ref name=NYT2000-11-06 />
 
[[Switzerland]] informed Peru of five bank accounts, containing USD $50 million, belonging to Montesinos, and Peru said they would try to prosecute him for corruption. The scope of his arms trading was apparently unknown to the CIA. CIA personnel said that there was no reason to suspect the Jordanian offer, which was of the flavor of "Would it upset our relationship with you if we sold these weapons to the Peruvian government?" The officials said the Jordanians were under no obligation to obtain US permission.
 
Soghanalian, who was awaiting unrelated criminal charges in Los Angeles, said  the Peruvians sought from the start to establish a discreet relationship they might use to buy more sophisticated weapons. He had been introduced to Montesinos, who was introduced to him as "the boss."
 
Peruvian officials presented Soghanalian with "a shopping list of more than $70 million worth of hardware that he thought could have been meant only for a regular army: antiaircraft weapons, communications gear and equipment to upgrade tanks. The broker said there were some strange aspects to the arrangement: The Peruvians asked to pay for the future purchases in cash and offered him $22 million as a down payment. They insisted on air-dropping the AK-47's to their troops. The first of the cargoes was also turned back in the Amazon basin for reasons that were never clear, and the shipments were finally aborted in August 1999 after 9,540 of the rifles had been sent...he did not think much of the fact that the Peruvians also wanted to buy a large quantity of Russian" shoulder-fired surface to air missiles, which would change the balance of power in Colombia if obtained by the Colombian rebels.
 
According to the ''Times'', Many military analysts have expected the Colombian guerillas to search for arms purchases to counter a $1.3 billion package of American aid that includes almost $400 million for new helicopters for the Colombian security forces. "The retired Peruvian Army lieutenant who arranged for the Jordanian shipment with Soghanalian, Jose Luis Aybar, has also identified Mr. Montesinos as the official who oversaw the arms deal. But Mr. Aybar said he was unaware that the Jordanian cargo consisted of assault rifles, a claim that Mr. Soghanalian and others contradicted."<ref name=NYT2000-11-06 />
 
=====Peru 1999=====
See [[#Colombia 1999| Colombia 1999]] for CIA's action after some rifles were seized in mid-1999. The report of the arms transfer led to an August 21, 1999 press conference at which  Fujimori and Montesinos took credit for detecting an arms smuggling ring. CIA personnel said that the statements of Soghanalian and Aybar, did not confirm Montesinos was involved in the diversion to Colombia.  "We don't have any illusions about his [Montesinos'] background...We do not have intelligence information -- other than the statements of a couple of individuals -- that ties him to it."<ref name="CPI2000>CPI2000" />
 
In 1999, State withheld aid to the SIN because of congressional anger about reports that Montesinos was using the unit to conduct intelligence against the regime's political opponents.<ref name=CPI2000>CPI2000</ref>
 
=====Peru 2000=====
According to the Center for Public Integrity,  Soghanalian in 2000, cooperated in the investigation of questionable practices under Fujimori and Montesinos. The Peruvian prosecutor,  José Carlos Ugaz, who is investigating wrongdoings by the Fujimori regime said "What Sarkis Soghanalian knew is fundamental to demonstrate that Montesinos controlled arms purchases during the Fujimori administration, at least since the conflict with Ecuador in 1995," Ugaz told the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists  (ICIJ). ICIJ is the investigative arm of the Center for Public Integrity.<ref name=CPI2000>CPI2000</ref>
 
Gen. [[Julio Salazar Monroe|Julio Salazar Monroe]], Rozas' predecessor at SIN from 1991 to 1998, and the last head of SIN, Rear Adm. Humberto Rozas Bonuccelli, both said, according to the Center for Public Integrity, "they ran the National Intelligence Service in name only and that Montesinos was its de facto chief. Montesinos had Fujimori's authority to manage his own state funds and personnel without any oversight, Rozas said. '"Montesinos had a very independent way of working and it was compartmentalized. He had his own private revenues...had a group of people that worked exclusively for him, even though no one knew how many they were or who they were.'Rozas said he discovered Montesinos' role in the arms sale to the FARC with the help of unspecified 'American' intelligence agents, who provided him with photocopies of documents concerning the transaction. The Americans, Rozas said in court testimony, "wanted an investigation to be carried out to determine if the Peruvian army had bought these arms.' U.S. Embassy officials told ICIJ that it was the CIA that provided documents about the arms deal to Rozas."
 
Rozas first met with CIA personnel, with respect to the arms sale, on Aug. 10, 2000. Eleven days later, after he had begun an investigation, Fujimori and Montesinos announced they had uncovered arms smuggling on August 21, declaring "that a serious blow against an arms trafficking ring had taken place, 'in which not one Peruvian intelligence agent is compromised' The Organization of American States was pressuring Peru to restructure and reform the duties of the SIN at the time, which may be why Fujimori attributed the 'notable success' of the operation to the SIN amd Montesinos. 'After they received the documents, they rushed to publicize the case. This was a political decision,' testified Rozas. The Peruvian judge hearing the case asked Rozas, 'What would have happened if the documents from the American intelligence agents had not been delivered to you, but instead only to Vladimiro Montesinos? Would the arms trafficking have been uncovered?' The ex-SIN head replied, 'Most likely, no.'"<ref name=CPI2000>CPI2000</ref>
 
"Angered by cuts in U.S. aid ordered by Congress in response to reports of abuses by the SIN, Fujimori called the sting operation "Plan Siberia" and said it was much smaller, yet more effective than Washingtons $1.3 billion Plan Colombia.
 
=====Peru 2004=====
Montesinos' first of 60 trials started in 2004.<ref name=CPI2000>CPI2000</ref> His defense<ref name=BBC2004-01-21>{{citation
|date=21 January, 2004
| title=Montesinos arms trial to call CIA: The court in the trial of Peru's disgraced former intelligence chief is to call on the director of the CIA to testify on his relationship with him.
| journal = BBC News
| url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3411831.stm}}</ref> According to BBC correspondent Hannah Hennessy, he is already serving nine years in a high security naval base near Lima after being convicted for lesser offences and has yet to face other charges including alleged involvement in death squad killings. Henesssy called him "The right hand man of former President Alberto Fujimori, Montesinos effectively ran Peru from the shadows throughout the 1990s"


====Venezuela====
====Venezuela====
Line 921: Line 448:
  | title = Venezuela coup linked to Bush team
  | title = Venezuela coup linked to Bush team
  | author = Vulliamy, Ed
  | author = Vulliamy, Ed
| accessdate = 2007-12-19
}}</ref> In Vulliamy's article, he makes no mention of the CIA.
}}</ref> In Vulliamy's article, he makes no mention of the CIA.


Former U.S. Navy intelligence officer [[Wayne Madsen]], told the British newspaper [[the Guardian]] that American military attaches had been in touch with members of the Venezuelan military to explore the possibility of a coup. "I first heard of Lieutenant Colonel James Rogers [the assistant military attache now based at the U.S. embassy in Caracas] going down there last June [2001] to set the ground," Mr. Madsen reported, adding: "Some of our counter-narcotics agents were also involved."  He claims the [[U.S. Navy]] assisted with signals intelligence as the coup played out and helped by jamming communications for the Venezuelan military, focusing on jamming communications to and from the diplomatic missions in Caracas. The U.S. embassy dismissed the allegations as "ridiculous".<ref name=Campbell-Coup> {{citation
Former U.S. Navy intelligence officer [[Wayne Madsen]], told the British newspaper [[the Guardian]] that American military attaches had been in touch with members of the Venezuelan military to explore the possibility of a coup. "I first heard of Lieutenant Colonel James Rogers [the assistant military attache now based at the U.S. embassy in Caracas] going down there last June [2001] to set the ground," Mr. Madsen reported, adding: "Some of our counter-narcotics agents were also involved."  He claims the [[United States Navy]] assisted with signals intelligence as the coup played out and helped by jamming communications for the Venezuelan military, focusing on jamming communications to and from the diplomatic missions in Caracas. The U.S. embassy dismissed the allegations as "ridiculous".<ref name=Campbell-Coup> {{citation
  | title = American navy 'helped Venezuelan coup'
  | title = American navy 'helped Venezuelan coup'
  | first1 = Duncan  | last1 =Campbell
  | first1 = Duncan  | last1 =Campbell
Line 977: Line 503:
  |title=Venezuela waits for reform result
  |title=Venezuela waits for reform result
  |publisher=BBC News
  |publisher=BBC News
  |date=[[December 3]] [[2007]]
  |date=3 December 3 2007  
|accessdate=2007-12-04
}}</ref> Having an operations officer, such as Middleton, bypass several levels of management is not unprecedented, as with some of the Bay of Pigs operations bypassing the Western Hemisphere Division chief in the Directorate of Plans (now the National Clandestine Service). Nevertheless, that is unusual, and even in the Cuba case, the division chief was directly informed, but the addressee was the Deputy Director for Plans. See [[Central Intelligence Agency#National Clandestine Service| a description or the information flow on the Cuban operation]]. While the NCS organization is not public information, from past examples, it would not be unreasonable for this report to bypass a station chief in Caracas, the Venezuela branch, the Western Hemisphere Division (however currently organized), and possibly some immediate deputies of Hayden.<ref name=>{{citation
}}</ref> Having an operations officer, such as Middleton, bypass several levels of management is not unprecedented, as with some of the Bay of Pigs operations bypassing the Western Hemisphere Division chief in the Directorate of Plans (now the National Clandestine Service). Nevertheless, that is unusual, and even in the Cuba case, the division chief was directly informed, but the addressee was the Deputy Director for Plans. See [[Central Intelligence Agency#National Clandestine Service| a description or the information flow on the Cuban operation]]. While the NCS organization is not public information, from past examples, it would not be unreasonable for this report to bypass a station chief in Caracas, the Venezuela branch, the Western Hemisphere Division (however currently organized), and possibly some immediate deputies of Hayden.<ref name=>{{citation
  | title = CIA Operation "Pliers" Uncovered in Venezuela: Psyop aims to destabilize Venezuela and overthrow President Chavez
  | title = CIA Operation "Pliers" Uncovered in Venezuela: Psyop aims to destabilize Venezuela and overthrow President Chavez
Line 986: Line 511:
  | url = http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7475}}</ref>
  | url = http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7475}}</ref>


Benjamin Ziff, an embassy spokesman said:<ref name=IHT>{{cite news
Benjamin Ziff, an embassy spokesman said:<ref name=IHT2007-11-30>{{cite news
  |url=http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/30/news/venez.php
  |url=http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/30/news/venez.php
  |title=In Chávez territory, signs of dissent
  |title=In Chávez territory, signs of dissent
  |author=Romero, Simon
  |author=Romero, Simon
  |date=[[November 30]], [[2007]]
  |date= 30 November 2007
  |journal =International Herald Tribune
  |journal =International Herald Tribune
  |accessdate=2007-12-04
  |accessdate=
}}</ref> "We reject and are disappointed in the Venezuelan government's allegations that the United States is involved in any type of conspiracy to affect the outcome of the constitutional referendum." A CIA spokesman called the memo "a fake", while independent analysts and researchers doubt its authenticity. Jeremy Bigwood, an independent researcher in Washington, agreed:"I find the document quite suspect. There's not an original version in English, and the timing of its release is strange. Everything about it smells bad."<ref name=IHT>name=IHT</ref>
}}</ref> "We reject and are disappointed in the Venezuelan government's allegations that the United States is involved in any type of conspiracy to affect the outcome of the constitutional referendum." A CIA spokesman called the memo "a fake", while independent analysts and researchers doubt its authenticity. Jeremy Bigwood, an independent researcher in Washington, agreed:"I find the document quite suspect. There's not an original version in English, and the timing of its release is strange. Everything about it smells bad."


==References==
==References==
{{reflist | 2}}
{{reflist | 2}}

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See also: Director of National Intelligence
See also: Central Intelligence Agency
See also: U.S. government training of foreign police

This article deals with activities of the United States intelligence community in the region of Americas; since the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, not all activities are strictly associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. Some activities are focused more on law enforcement rather than the classic concept of national intelligence.

Due to the amount of material, this article covers historical and regional issues, and the shorter country-specific material. There are subordinate articles for individual countries of the American sub-regions when the material on an individual country grew unwieldy.

  • Caribbean sub-region: Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras
  • Central American sub-region: Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua
  • South America sub-region: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela

Intelligence History

During World War II, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had been the primary US intelligence agency for Latin America, with some involvement with the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of CIA. After the war, the CIA developed strong operations in Latin America. For issues regarding possible improprieties in police training, see Latin American police training.

Caribbean sub-region

Radio Swan was a Caribbean radio station generally associated with the US and Honduras, and, during the [[Bay of Pigs invasion operation, apparently to assist with covert communications. After the invasion failed, however, it changed to a generally anti-Castro, but not inciting to revolution, station until 1968.

In 1962, a Special National Intelligence Estimate addressed "The threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area.[1] Potential threats were seen as "Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them." It foreshadowed the potential of the Cuban Missile Crisis with the general assessment "the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes."

Cuba

See also: CIA activities in Cuba

After its revolution, Cuba sent forces to Africa and South America, in support of rebel forces.[2]

Dominican Republic

Dominican Republic 1961

There was CIA involvement in the assassination of the President of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, but declassified reports conflict about the extent. In a report to the deputy attorney general, CIA officials described the agency as having "no active part" in the assassination and only a "faint connection" with the groups that planned the killing.[3] However, an internal CIA memorandum states that an Office of Inspector General investigation into Trujillo's murder disclosed "quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters."[4]

Dominican Republic 1967

A report to President Lyndon B. Johnson refers to the guerrilla problem being dormant in the Dominican Republic, and US training being provided there. Cause and effect were not analyzed. "There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities. Balaguer has given strong support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units. In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training for guerrilla activities."[5]

A little later, Rostow referred to a problem with one of the Dominican officials. "With the full cooperation of Balaguer and the armed forces, we have made good progress in our internal security programs. No additional measures by us are necessary. It would help if Balaguer got rid of his thuggish Chief of Police. Covey Oliver will ask John Crimmins to make the pitch."[6]

Haiti

Haiti 1963

In a White House meeting, DCI McCone suggested that this looked like the Cuban policy in July 1959 which gave the Soviets an opening into Cuba, and suggested the US have a complete diplomatic relationship that was visibly informal. The President agreed, ordered Ambassador Thurston recalled, and reserved the decision as to whether he should be returned or another Ambassador returned.

The aid program apparently involves only $3 million or $4 million for airport construction in Haiti, the administration of which is in the hands of Pan American.

"CIA was asked to explore the exile group possibilities and to determine what action, if any, should be taken." [7 lines of source text not declassified] The DCI said "most insurgents were political has-beens or influential Haitians who desire to regain property that has been lost through expropriation or otherwise. "[7]

Haiti 2005

Intelligence analysis

According to Porter Goss' testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, "the outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely elections in November 2005 in Haiti--even with substantial international support."[8][8]

Central American sub-region

Guatemala

CIA has had a long history with Guatemala, as shown by several hundred records were released by the CIA on May 23, 1997 on its involvement in the 1954 coup in Guatemala.[9]. For details, see CIA activities in Guatemala.

Guyana

Guyana 1966

In an NIE focused on the short term, the major conclusions were:

There was a potential for violence after British troops leave in October 1966, which the NIE said Guyanese security forces probably can control if the violence is sporadic. The probability of violence will depend on Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the Negro party (the PNC), and of Cheddi Jagan, leader of the East Indian party (the PPP). Burnham's moderate government has kept Jagan's side in control. The estimate said that if violence went out of control, and the US agreed, Britain would probably send troops on Burnham's request.

British Guiana will probably make a relatively smooth transition to independence, but racial suspicions between East Indians and Negroes will continue to dominate Guyanese politics...The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D'Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. ...chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together.The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D'Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. Friction between the partners over patronage and fiscal issues will probably be intensified after independence, but chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together.

No matter who was in power, Guyana would need foreign capital. Burnham, while a neutralist by nature, would keep "tolerable terms with the US, UK, and Canada. If Jagan took power, he would still need to get help, and while his Marxist affiliations would get some help from the Communist bloc, "they probably would furnish only token quantities of aid.[10] 421. /1/

Guyana 1967

A covert action to help Burnham retain power was proposed to the 303 Committee: "It is established U.S. Government policy that Cheddi Jagan, East Indian Marxist leader of the pro-Communist People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana, will not be permitted to take over the government of an independent Guyana. Jagan has the electoral support of the East Indians, who are approximately 50% of the total population of Guyana. It is believed that Jagan has a good chance of coming to power in the next elections unless steps are taken to prevent this...Since we believe that there is a good likelihood that Jagan can be elected in Guyana unless the entire non-East Indian electorate is mobilized against him, we also believe that campaign support must be provided to Peter D'Aguiar, the head of the United Force (UF) and Burnham’s coalition partner."

The proposal said that Burnham had taken steps to ensure the absentee votes of supporters, but not those of the opposition. "Burnham has initiated steps for electoral registration of Guyanese at home and abroad,In a meeting [deleted] on September 16, 1966, Burnham requested money for various political purposes and outlined his plans to issue identification cards to all Guyanans above the age of 10, and to identify and register all Guyanans of African ancestry in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in order to get their absentee votes in the next elections.

"Conversely, Burnham acknowledged with a smile, East Indians living abroad may have trouble getting registered and, if registered, getting ballots." and has requested financial assistance [deleted] for the PNC campaign. It is recommended that he and his party be provided with covert support in order to assure his victory at the polls. At the same time, it is believed that support to Peter D’Aguiar and his United Force (UF), the minority party in the coalition government, is also essential in order to offset Jagan's solidly entrenched East Indian electoral support.

The 303 Committee was asked to approve the proposed actions, whose cost was deleted from the declassified document. According to an April 10 memorandum for the record, 'the 303 Committee approved this proposal at its April 7 meeting. [deleted] emphasized during the Committee’s discussion the importance of starting early in the implementation of the proposal. The urgency came from the mechanisms by which Burnham could call for elections, which must take place before 31 March 1969 but could take place whenever the Prime Minister dissolves Parliament.

Burnham has taken personal responsibility both for organizing his inactive party in Guyana, as well as sending an advisor to survey the amount of expatriate support on which he can rely.

"Burnham believes that he would have great difficulty ensuring his own re-election without support from the U.S. Government. He has requested financial support [deleted] for staff and campaign expenses, motor vehicles, small boats, printing equipment, and transistorized public address systems. He also wishes to contract for the services of an American public relations firm to improve his image abroad and counteract Jagan's propaganda in the foreign press. See document for non-redacted parts of plan.[11]

Honduras

Honduras 1984

Declassified documents, from the CIA Inspector General, begin with a heavily redacted 21 July 1984 cable to the National Security Council, stating that Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, head of the Honduras military, ordered the establishment of the 316th Military Intelligence Battalion (316 MI Bn).[12]

Honduras 1987

Florencio Caballero was a former Honduran Army sergeant and interrogator until 1984. He stated that he had trained by the Central Intelligence Agency, which the New York Times confirmed with US and Honduran officials . Much of his account was confirmed by three American and two Honduran officials. may be the fullest given of how army and police units were authorized to organize death squads that seized, interrogated and killed suspected leftists. He said that while Argentine and Chilean trainers taught the Honduran Army kidnapping and elimination techniques, the C.I.A. explicitly forbade the use of physical torture or assassination.[13]

Caballero described the CIA role as ambiguous. "Caballero said his superior officers ordered him and other members of army intelligence units to conceal their participation in death squads from CIA advisers. He added that he was sent to Houston for six months in 1979 to be trained by CIA instructors in interrogation techniques.

"They prepared me in interrogation to end the use of physical torture in Honduras - they taught psychological methods," Mr. Caballero said of his American training. "So when we had someone important, we hid him from the Americans, interrogated him ourselves and then gave him to a death squad to kill."

"The C.I.A. had access to secret army jails and to written reports summarizing the interrogation of suspected leftists, according to Mr. Caballero and two American officials. The Americans also said the C.I.A. knew the Honduran Army was killing prisoners. The American officials said that at one point in 1983 the C.I.A. demanded the killings stop. In 1984, a C.I.A. agent was recalled from Honduras after a prisoner's relative identified him as having visited a secret jail, two American and one Honduran official said. According to Mr. Caballero, the agent was a regular contact between the interrogators and the C.I.A. Thus it seems likely that the C.I.A. was aware that killings were continuing.

Honduras 1995

In 1995, "The special prosecutor for human rights brought charges in July against eight retired and two active-duty members of the armed forces for their role in the kidnapping, torture, and attempted murder in 1982 of six student activists.... They survived their captivity in a clandestine prison because two of those abducted were the daughters of a government official....With the exception of one suspect, those under investigation were connected with Battalion 3-16, a secret Honduran military unit whose members were instructed by and worked with CIA officials...Although Human Rights Watch/Americas has pressed for several years for an accounting of U.S. involvement, the Clinton administration did not take steps to begin to examine the complicity of the United States in Honduran abuses until 1995. In mid-June, CIA Director John Deutch began an internal review of the agency's relationship with the Honduran military during the 1980s. Deutch stated that the investigation, which he characterized as an "independent review," would yield "new information" and "lessons about how not to do things while I'm director and in the future."

Deutch's announcement came after the Baltimore Sun published a four-part series in June on U.S. support given to the 316 MI Bn. Sun staff correspondents Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson obtained formerly classified documents and interviewed three former 316 Bn members to document the breadth and depth of the battalion's close relationship to the CIA. The Sun series followed revelations in March that linked the CIA to serious human rights violations in Guatemala."[14]

He was removed from his post at the end of March 1984. According to the cable, a Honduran human rights group claimed the battalion was responsible for almost all disappearances. At first, the new military leadership was going to dissolve the battalion, but they later decided to replace senior officers and keep it intact.

The CIA Inspector General investigator posed questions including whether any CIA employee was present during torture or hostile interrogation, and what was known about some disappearances and killings. It was also questioned if an employee lied to the House Intelligence Committee.

While the findings were heavily redacted, apparently one employee knew that torture had gone on, but not who was present. An individual was later identified, who denied participation. The Inspector General concluded there was no CIA participation in torture.

The IG did verify that a Honduran Hostage Rescue Force had captured and executed one individual who had been freed under an amnesty; it was unclear from the report if he had rejoined an insurgency. Another case concerned Father Carney, a priest who had renounced his American citizenship, and died under questionable circumstances while being pursued by the HRF. He had been reported to be "cadaverous" and may have died of starvation, or may have been killed by the HRF. The IG concluded no US personnel had been involved with this HRF operation.

Further Congressional inquiries generated more responses. It became clear that the HRF definitely executed some guerrillas, including the aide to the priest. The details were redacted, but there was some, but not conclusive, evidence that Father Carney had starved. The IG concluded the cause of his death is unknown.[12]

Nicaragua

See CIA activities in Nicaragua. Nicaragua, through the Iran-Contra affair, has had a major affect on U.S. oversight over covert operations.


South American sub-region

Regional issues

South America 1975

An intelligence-sharing arrangement among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay was established in 1975. It was called Operation Condor, and the U.S. appeared to have some access to it.[15]

South America 1980

The landmark Filártiga v. Peña-Irala ruling of 1980[16] "made history by awarding the first criminal damages against a torturer (a Paraguayan police agent) found to be in the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established that, under the 1789 Aliens Tort Claims Act, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over claims for torture brought by aliens against torturers found to be in the United States."[17] This decision opened up a new avenue for appeals of actions that took place outside the US.

South America 1992

In 1992, Congress codified these legal advances in the Torture Victims Protection Act, which holds liable for damages any "individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation... subjects an individual to torture." During the decade between these important events, U.S. jurisprudence was largely shaped by Argentine cases.[17]

Argentina

Argentina has had a special influence on South American police and intelligence traditions. For a detailed chronology, see CIA activities in Argentina. See CIA transnational human rights activities for Argentinian methods used elsewhere in the Americas]].

Bolivia

The 5412 Special Group and the 303 Committee were different names for the same committee, which approved covert actions.

Bolivia 1964

On 8 August 1963, the Special Group approved a request to provide a covert subsidy in the amount of [deleted] to take the necessary covert actions to overcome the emergency situation which existed in Bolivia at that time and, once the situation normalized, to enable Paz to consolidate his control. In late December, the United States Ambassador and the CIA [deleted] requested an additional sum of [deleted] to wrest control of labor organizations away from Juan Lechin Oquendo, the MNRI, and the PCB. On 8 January 1964, the CIA [deleted] discussed the request for additional funds with Assistant Secretary Edwin W. Martin [for Inter-American Affairs] and it was mutually agreed that an increase in the subsidy was justified. A discussion of this plan is contained in a January 9 memorandum prepared by J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division in CIA (DDP) The United States Ambassador was informed that Special Group approval would be requested at the earliest possible date.[18]

Bolivia 1965

According to a 303 Committee memo, "Barrientos, due to his popularity and power position, appears to have the best chance for organizing behind him a national consensus which would provide the needed unity to proceed with the development of Bolivia. [deleted] this sum of money will expedite and help other negotiations currently being undertaken by the Embassy and the AID program. Barrientos has requested U.S. Government help in his election campaign. [deleted] The Embassy in La Paz, the Department of State, and the CIA all concur that in the present circumstances the best possibility for stability in Bolivia is the ascendency to the Presidency of Barrientos with a return to constitutionality."[19] The 303 Committee approved the recommendation by a vote by telephone on February 5. According to a February 10 memorandum [text not declassified] to ARA, Barrientos was informed on that date of the decision and of the U.S. Government view "that relations between sovereigns should be based upon dignity and mutual respect rather than financial considerations; but in order to dispel any doubts" in Barrientos’ mind "of our attitude toward him, his request was approved as a one-shot affair. It is proposed to provide in appropriate stages the total sum of CIA supplies USD 1,000,000 to support election of President René Barrientos

Bolivia 1967

In a July 5, 1967, memorandum to Special Assistant Walt Rostow, William Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff summarized the current U.S. military training role in Bolivia: "DOD is helping train and equip a new Ranger Battalion. The Bolivian absorption capacity being what it is, additional military assistance would not now seem advisable. [deleted]" Bowdler recommended that "a variable of the Special Strike Force acceptable to the Country Team be established. It might be part of the new Ranger Battalion." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Guerrilla Problem in Latin America) The Country Team objections were transmitted in telegram 2291 from La Paz, May 24. The team stated that a strike force would be viewed by the Bolivians as a "magical solution" and a "substitute for hard work and needed reform."[20] "As the training of the Ranger battalion progressed, weaknesses in its intelligence-collecting capability emerged. The CIA was formally given responsibility for developing a plan to provide such a capability on July 14...Although the team was assigned in an advisory capacity, CIA "expected that they will actually help in directing operations." The Agency also contemplated this plan "as a pilot program for probable duplication in other Latin American countries faced with the problem of guerrilla warfare." (Memorandum for the Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division)"

Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms reported, to State, Defense, and White House Officials in a memo drafted by W.V. Broe and [deleted] in the Western Hemisphere Division and approved by Thomas H. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.

"1. You are aware of the published accounts concerning the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara which were based in essence on the Bolivian Army press conference on 10 October attributing Guevara's death to battle wounds sustained in the clash between the Army and the guerrillas on 8 October 1967.On October 9 Rostow informed President Johnson the "tentative information" that the Bolivian unit trained by the U.S. "got Che Guevara," but that information was inconclusive and based primarily on press reports from Bolivia. Guevara was said to be in a coma when captured and to have died shortly thereafter, the heat of battle having prevented early or effective treatment by Bolivian soldiers.

"2. [deleted] contrary information from [deleted]probably Felix Rodriguez the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion, the army unit that captured Guevara. According to [deleted] Guevara was captured on 8 October as a result of the clash with the Cuban-led guerrillas. He had a wound in his leg, but was otherwise in fair condition. According to the text of a message sent by [deleted] on the scene, Guevara’s fate would be decided on October 9 by the highest Bolivian military authorities. "I am managing to keep him alive," he reported, "which is very hard." He was questioned but refused to give any information. Two Bolivian guerrillas, "Willy" and "Aniceto," were also captured.

"3. At 1150 hours on 9 October the Second Ranger Battalion received direct orders from Bolivian Army Headquarters in La Paz to kill Guevara. These orders were carried out at 1315 hours the same day with a burst of fire from an M-2 automatic rifle. In an October 11 memorandum informing President Johnson of the killing of Che Guevara, Rostow remarked: "I regard this as stupid, but it is understandable from a Bolivian standpoint, given the problems which the sparing of French Communist and Castro courier Regis Debray has caused them." Rostow pointed out that the death of Che Guevara would have a strong impact in discouraging further guerrilla activity in Latin America. He also noted: "It shows the soundness of our ‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency-it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered and got him." On October 13 Rostow informed Johnson of confirmation that Che Guevara was dead.

Copies of this memorandum in CIA files indicate that it was drafted by Broe and [deleted] in the Western Hemisphere Division and approved by Karamessines. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS, Operational Group, Job 78-06423A, U.S. Government-President)[deleted] was an eye witness to Guevara’s capture and execution.

Felix Rodriguez, a CIA officer on the team, with the Bolivian Army that captured and shot Guevara. Che Guevara by the Bolivian Army in October 1967[21] Rodriquez said that after he received a Bolivian presidential execution order, he told "the soldier who pulled the trigger to aim carefully, to remain consistent with the Bolivian government's story that Che had been killed in action during a clash with the Bolivian army." Rodriguez said the US government had wanted Che in Panama, and "I could have tried to falsify the command to the troops, and got Che to Panama as the US government said they had wanted," said Mr Rodriguez.

He chose to "let history run its course" as desired by Bolivia.[22]

In a supplementary memo drafted by Broe and [deleted], approved by Karamessines, and signed by Helms, Guevara refused to be interrogated but permitted himself to be drawn into a conversation with [deleted] during which he made the following comments:

a. Cuban economic situation: Hunger in Cuba is the result of pressure by United States imperialism. Now Cuba has become self-sufficient in meat production and has almost reached the point where it will begin to export meat. Cuba is the only economically self-sufficient country in the Socialist world.
b. Camilo Cienfuegos: For many years the story has circulated that Fidel Castro Ruz had Cienfuegos, one of his foremost deputies, killed because his personal popularity presented a danger to Castro. Actually the death of Cienfuegos was an accident. Cienfuegos has been in Oriente Province when he received a call to attend a general staff meeting in Havana. He left by plane and the theory was that the plane became lost in low-ceiling flying conditions, consumed all of its fuel, and crashed in the ocean, and no trace of him was ever found. Castro had loved Cienfuegos more than any of his lieutenants.
c. Fidel Castro Ruz: Castro had not been a Communist prior to the success of the Cuban Revolution. Castro's own statements on the subject are correct.
d. The Congo: American imperialism had not been the reason for his failure there but, rather, the Belgian mercenaries. He denied ever having several thousand troops in the Congo, as sometimes reported, but admitted having had "quite a few".
e. Treatment of Guerrilla Prisoners in Cuba: During the course of the Cuban Revolution and its aftermath, there had been only about 1,500 individuals killed, exclusive of armed encounters such as the Bay of Pigs. The Cuban Government, of course, executed all guerrilla leaders who invaded its territory. . . . (He stopped then with a quizzical look on his face and smiled as he recognized his own position on Bolivian soil.)
f. Future of the Guerrilla Movement in Bolivia: With his capture, the guerrilla movement had suffered an overwhelming setback in Bolivia, but he predicted a resurgence in the future. He insisted that his ideals would win in the end even though he was disappointed at the lack of response from the Bolivian campesinos. The guerrilla movement had failed partially because of Bolivian Government propaganda which claimed that the guerrillas represented a foreign invasion of Bolivian soil. In spite of the lack of popular response from the Bolivian campesinos, he had not planned an exfiltration route from Bolivia in case of failure. He had definitely decided to either fall or win in this effort.

4. According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] when Guevara, Simon Cuba, and Aniceto Reynaga Gordillo were captured on 8 October, the Bolivian Armed Forces Headquarters ordered that they be kept alive for a time. A telegraphic code was arranged between La Paz and Higueras with the numbers 500 representing Guevara, 600 meaning the phrase "keep alive" and 700 representing "execute". During the course of the discussion with Guevara, Simon Cuba and Aniceto Reynaga were detained in the next room of the school house. At one stage, a burst of shots was heard and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] learned later that Simon Cuba had been executed. A little later a single shot was heard and it was learned afterward that Aniceto Reynaga had been killed. When the order came at 11:50 a.m. from La Paz to kill Guevara, the execution was delayed as long as possible. However, when the local commander was advised that a helicopter would arrive to recover the bodies at approximately 1:30 p.m., Guevara was executed with a burst of shots at 1:15 p.m. Guevara's last words were, "Tell my wife to remarry and tell Fidel Castro that the Revolution will again rise in the Americas." To his executioner he said, "Remember, you are killing a man."

The [deleted] on site, reporting on Guevara’s execution, indicated that "it was impossible keep him alive."

5. At no time during the period he was under [deleted] observation did Guevara lose his composure.

A National Intelligence Estimate of September 14 stated:[23] "The present insurgency in Bolivia is organized and supported by Cuba. Its seriousness lies in the possibility that the insurgents may eventually provide a rallying point for many disaffected elements which hitherto have been unable to coalesce. The threat posed is more a function of the inherent fragility of Bolivia’s political, economic, and social structure than of the insurgents’ own strength and capabilities."

The estimate held that neither the Barrientos government nor the insurgency would gain clear control. There were concerns that this continued stalemate would impair the development of Bolivia and lead to increasing dependence on U.S. aid, but Barrientos would resist military intervention by the Organization of American States (OAS), Bolivia's neighboring states, or the United States.

Brazil

Brazil 1964

With increasing warning of the impending coup against President João Goulart, US President Lyndon Baines Johnson, according to an audio tape, directed taking "every step that we can" to support overthrow of Goulart, who had been democratically elected but followed an independent foreign policy: he was opposed both to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The US Ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, in consultations with the President, asked for covert preparation to assist the revolutionaries, who installed a military dictatorship. [24] Gordon's cables "also confirm CIA covert measures "to help strengthen resistance forces" in Brazil. These included "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business." Four days before the coup, Gordon informed Washington that "we may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future." He also requested that the U.S. send tankers carrying "POL"-petroleum, oil and lubricants-to facilitate the logistical operations of the military coup plotters, and deploy a naval task force to intimidate Goulart's backers and be in position to intervene militarily if fighting became protracted."

Intelligence collection

Prior to the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état coup, an information cable from the Sao Paolo CIA station [25] predicted a military coup against President João Goulart within the week; the coup started the following night.

Overt and Covert Action

A naval task force was sent but not needed, and the CIA covert action resources were not used.

Chile

The CIA, led by the National Intelligence Council, filed an informative report in response to requirements of Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Hinchey Amendment). Reviewed were relevant CIA records of the period predominantly from recent document searches; Congressional reports about US activities in Chile in the 1960s and 1970s; memoirs of key figures, including Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger; CIA’s oral history collection at the Center for the Study of Intelligence; and consulted with retired intelligence officers who were directly involved. From this information, a retrospective report about CIA activities in Chile was written. [15] For further details, see CIA activities in Chile.

Colombia

Colombia 1991

As part of transnational counterdrug activity, the CIA financed a military intelligence network in Colombia in 1991.[26] Speaking on behalf of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, David Carey, director of the DCI Crime and Narcotics center, spoke about

  • trends in transnational criminal activity
  • the impact of crime and corruption on political and economic stability in foreign countries
  • expanding international networks and cooperation among criminal organizations.

Carey described that the illicit drug trade could spill over into other areas, including the smuggling of illegal aliens. "Although organized crime groups appear to be only peripherally involved in the gray arms market--which is dominated by freelance brokers, corrupt exporters, and import front companies--conflicts in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union have encouraged Italian and Russian criminal organizations in particular to expand their involvement in arms trafficking.

"As criminal organizations grow in sophistication and expand their networks, they could become increasingly involved in supporting proliferation and terrorist activities. Their networks and mechanisms for illicit financial deals could also make them greater players in international sanctions violations.

Dr. Bruce Michael Bagley, of the University of Miami, found that US counterdrug policy in Colombia was counterproductive.[27]

This essay examines the impact of U.S. and Colombian government drug control policies on the evolution of drug cultivation, drug trafficking, and political violence in Colombia during the1990s. Its central thesis is that the Washington/Bogota-backed war on drugs in Colombia over the decade did not merely fail to curb the growth of the Colombian drug trade and attendant corruption, but actually proved counterproductive. Among the most important unintended consequences were the explosion of drug cultivation and production activities, the dispersion and proliferation of organized crime, and the expansion and intensification of political violence and guerrilla warfare in the country. As a result, Colombia at the outset of 2000 faced more serious threats to its national security and political stability than it had in 1990. ... the massive escalation of the flawed anti-drug strategies of the past decade proposed by the Clinton administration in January 2000 is more likely to worsen Colombia’s ongoing problems of spiraling violence and insecurity than to resolve them.

One author, independent journalist Frank Smythe, writing in The Progressive, a journal with a pronounced leftist perspective, alleged that CIA counter-narcotics efforts were linked with covert support for right-wing death squads:[28]

In the name of fighting drugs, the CIA financed new military intelligence networks there in 1991. But the new networks did little to stop drug traffickers. Instead, they incorporated illegal paramilitary groups into their ranks and fostered death squads. These death squads killed trade unionists, peasant leaders, human-rights monitors, journalists, and other suspected "subversives." The evidence, including secret Colombian military documents, suggests that the CIA may be more interested in fighting a leftist resistance movement than in combating drugs.

Colombia, like many Latin American countries, has problems with violent groups on the left and right. "This wasn't a romantic act -- it was a realistic one," said Fernando Cubides, a sociology professor, while applauding the squads' disarmament, doubt that their motives are altruistic[29] "He explained that a series of death-squad leaders had been killed, beginning with the shooting in July of Gonzalo Perez, founder of the so-called civilian self-defense groups. Mr. Perez's son Henry, who became acting leader, was killed two weeks later, and two other sons died in an October attack. The Perez family, with army approval, helped create the organizations in the 1960's and 70's in the Magdalena Valley in central Colombia. In those days they were simple peasant bands, protecting each other from guerrillas who kidnapped land owners."

The Times article continued,"..in the 1980's, drug traffickers began buying huge tracts of land in the region and poured money into these armed groups so that their interests, too, would be safeguarded. The peasant bands turned into private armies...Human rights organizations believe that in their zeal to rid the area of guerrillas and their supporters, these private armies have carried out some of the worst massacres in recent Colombian history.

A Human Rights Watch article[30]from 1994 does speak of very real abuses in Colombia, but does not mention non-Colombian sources.

Most individuals have few defenses against crime. Far from being seen as society's protectors, Colombian police are often viewed as hoodlums. Repeatedly, government investigators and human rights groups have found evidence tying police to crimes and human rights violations.In Bogotá, a study by the mayor's Oficina Permanente de Derechos Humanos (Permanent Human Rights Office) found that one quarter of the complaints they received between March 1993 and March 1994 involved police, implicated in attempted murders, beatings, and illegal searches.

In that HRW article, however, there is no mention of any non-Colombian participation. The article describes a real problem in Colombia, but speaks of the abuses as coming from Colombians, sometimes anonymous, and also speaks of the failure of the Colombian government to control the abuses.

Smyth said,

But the CIA remains a Cold War institution. Many officers, especially within the clandestine operations wing, still see communists behind every door. They maintain warm relationships with rightist military forces worldwide that are engaging in." Later in the article, he gives a disclaimer that In 1994, Amnesty International accused the Pentagon of allowing anti-drug aid to be diverted to counterinsurgency operations that lead to human-rights abuses. U.S. officials including General Barry R. McCaffrey, the Clinton Administration drug czar who was then in charge of the U.S. Southern Command, publicly denied it.But back at the office, McCaffrey ordered an internal audit.

There is a reference to McCaffrey in a rather detailed paper by a University of Miami professor, Bruce Michael Bagley.[27] He introduces his article with

This essay examines the impact of U.S. and Colombian government drug control policies on the evolution of drug cultivation, drug trafficking, and political violence in Colombia during the1990s. Its central thesis is that the Washington/Bogota-backed war on drugs in Colombia over the decade did not merely fail to curb the growth of the Colombian drug trade and attendant corruption, but actually proved counterproductive. Among the most important unintended consequences were the explosion of drug cultivation and production activities, the dispersion and proliferation of organized crime, and the expansion and intensification of political violence and guerrilla warfare in the country. As a result, Colombia at the outset of 2000 faced more serious threats to its national security and political stability than it had in 1990. The essay concludes that the massive escalation of the flawed anti-drug strategies of the past decade proposed by the Clinton administration in January 2000 is more likely to worsen Colombia’s ongoing problems of spiraling violence and insecurity than to resolve them.

He concludes,

Clearly, Washington’s current strategy towards Colombia fully satisfies neither the hard-liners nor the reformers. In effect, it seeks to straddle the line between them. The drug war remains the formal priority and human rights monitoring a condition of U.S. aid. Yet the bulk of U.S. assistance will be channeled into the Colombian military rather than into socio-economic and institutional reforms. This "two track" strategy may well prove capable of propping up the Colombian political regime at least for the next few years, but it is unlikely to foster either lasting peace or enduring political stability in the coming decade.

Returning to Smyth's article,

It found that thirteen out of fourteen Colombian army units that Amnesty had specifically cited for abuses had previously received either U.S. training or arms.

According to Smyth, Amnesty made these documents public in 1996. There is no reference to them on Amnesty International's site. There was a 1999 annual report about death squads in Colombia,[31] but it did not mention any non-Colombian involvement, other than the UN Commission on Human Rights. "Some of these concerns were addressed in a statement by the Chairman of the Commission which expressed concern about the gravity and scale of human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law and, inter alia, urged the government to take steps to end impunity and to take effective action to prevent internal displacement. The Commission welcomed the agreement with the Colombian government to extend the mandate of the office of the un High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia until April 1999." The situation described by Amnesty, however, was:

More than 1,000 civilians were killed by the security forces or paramilitary groups operating with their support or acquiescence. Many victims were tortured before being killed. At least 150 people disappeared. Human rights activists were threatened and attacked; at least six were killed. Death squad-style killings continued in urban areas. Several army officers were charged in connection with human rights violations; many others continued to evade accountability. Armed opposition groups were responsible for numerous human rights abuses, including deliberate and arbitrary killings and the taking of hundreds of hostages. Conservative Party candidate Andrés Pastrana Arango was elected President and assumed office in August. He immediately announced his willingness to negotiate with armed opposition groups to end decades of armed conflict. During the presidential campaign both principal armed opposition groups – the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (farc), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (eln), National Liberation Army – expressed their willingness to enter into talks with the incoming government.

Colombia 1999

When the Colombian military seized some rifles in mid-1999, the CIA helped trace them, and found they had been diverted from a that they had come from the Jordanian shipment to Colombia in 1998. That discovery was promptly reported to White House, State Department and Defense officials.

Colombia 2002

According to a report in the Los Angeles Times, CIA has provided, to US policymakers, reports, not fully confirmed, the head of Colombia's U.S.-backed army, Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe cooperated with right-wing militias that Washington considers terrorist organizations, including a militia headed by one of the country's leading drug traffickers.[32][33]

The article says "Disclosure of the allegation about army chief comes as the high level of U.S. support for Colombia's government is under scrutiny by Democrats in Congress." Colombia is the third-largest recipient of US foreign aid, and, if the allegations are established, it could heighten pressure to reduce or redirect that aid because Montoya has been a favorite of the Pentagon and an important partner in the U.S.-funded counterinsurgency strategy called Plan Colombia.

According to the CIA document provided to the reporters, from an anonymous source an allied Western intelligence agency reported the existence of such links during a 2002 Medellín offensive carried out against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) (FARC) under the title of "Operation Orion".

While the operation was considered a success, there were allegations that over 40 people had disappeared during the operation and that the impending power vacuum was filled by paramilitary forces. The Western intelligence agency mentioned in the report considered that, the source of the claim was yet-unproven. A Defense attaché to the United States Embassy in Bogotá told the Los Angeles Times that "this report confirms information provided by a proven source."[34][35][36]

General Mario Montoya was commander of the area police force during the operation. The report cites an informant who claimed that plans for the attack were signed by General Montoya and paramilitary leader Fabio Jaramillo, who was a subordinate of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, also known as Don Berna. Don Berna became known for taking over the drug trade around Medellín after drug kingpin Pablo Escobar was killed.[32]

President of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe (no relation to Montoya Uribe), has denied any links between his government and paramilitary forces.[35][34]

Colombia 2005
Intelligence analysis

As part of testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 2005, Porter Goss mentioned that extremist groups in Colombia, with FARC heading the list, were of concern to the US. Pointing out that there would be an election in 2006, he warned that "progress against counternarcotics and terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership, may be affected by the election."[8]

Colombia 2007

Reports on the 2002 event were not associated with the CIA, so it would appear that the funding does not come directly from the CIA, but from State or Defense. On April 16, according to HRW, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice certified that the Colombian government and armed forces are making progress on human rights.[37] Until allegations of Montoya's possible collaboration are confirmed or denied, several organizations recommendthat the US Congress should maintain a hold on military assistance to Colombia until alleged links between paramilitary groups and state officials are thoroughly investigated, Amnesty International USA, the Center for International Policy, Human Rights Watch, the US Office on Colombia and the Washington Office on Latin America.

On April 16, the US Congress put a hold on the remaining fiscal year 2006 funding to the Colombian Armed Forces. Congress has apparently placed the remaining funding of $55.2 million on hold out of concern about alleged links between the head of the Colombian Army and the rightist paramilitary group known as United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a US-designated foreign terrorist organization. Its major opponents, also on the US list of terrorist organizations, are the leftist FARC and ELN.

Peru

Further information: CIA Activities in Peru

Venezuela

Venezuela 2002

Ed Vulliamy of the British newspaper, The Observer, wrote that Washington approved and supported a coup against the democratically-elected Venezuelan government, acting through senior officials of the U.S. government, including Special Envoy to Latin America Otto Reich and convicted Iran-contra affair figure and George W. Bush "democracy 'czar'" Elliott Abrams. Vulliamy said both have long histories in the U.S. backed "dirty wars" of the 1980s in Central America, as well as links to U.S.-supported death squads working in Central America at that time.[38] In Vulliamy's article, he makes no mention of the CIA.

Former U.S. Navy intelligence officer Wayne Madsen, told the British newspaper the Guardian that American military attaches had been in touch with members of the Venezuelan military to explore the possibility of a coup. "I first heard of Lieutenant Colonel James Rogers [the assistant military attache now based at the U.S. embassy in Caracas] going down there last June [2001] to set the ground," Mr. Madsen reported, adding: "Some of our counter-narcotics agents were also involved." He claims the United States Navy assisted with signals intelligence as the coup played out and helped by jamming communications for the Venezuelan military, focusing on jamming communications to and from the diplomatic missions in Caracas. The U.S. embassy dismissed the allegations as "ridiculous".[39]Madsen made no reference to the attaches being associated with the CIA, although he did mention that the Navy may have provided SIGINT assistance, normally an NSA function.

In the year leading up to the coup the U.S. also funded groups, opposed to President Hugo Chavez, including the labor group whose protests sparked off the coup. The funds were provided by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED),[39] a nonprofit organization whose roots, according to an article in Slate trace back to the late 1960s when the public learned of CIA machinations to covertly fund parties and activists opposing the Soviets. Congress created the NED in 1983 which disburses money to pro-democracy groups around the globe and do so openly.[40] The State Department is now examining whether one or more recipients of the NED money may have actively plotted against the Venezuelan government.[41]

Bush Administration officials and anonymous sources acknowledged meeting with some of the planners of the coup in the several weeks prior to April 11, but have strongly denied encouraging the coup itself, saying that they insisted on constitutional means.[42] The BBC article makes no reference to the CIA.

Because of allegations, Sen. Christopher Dodd requested a review of U.S. activities leading up to and during the coup attempt. The OIG report found no "wrongdoing" by U.S. officials either in the State Department or in the U.S. Embassy.[43]

Venezuela 2005

In Porter Goss' statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee, he said "President Hugo Chavez is consolidating his power by using technically legal tactics to target his opponents and meddling in the region, supported by Fidel Castro."[8]

Venezuela 2007

Venezuela claimed that the US embassy had sent a memo on Operation Pliers to the CIA, on November 26, 2007, which provided details on the activity of a CIA unit engaged in covert action to destabilize the national constitutional referendum This unit was also alleged to be coordinating the civil and military overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Venezuela.

The memo, entitled "Advancing to the Last Phase of Operation Pincer," was sent by Michael Middleton Steere addressed to the Director of CIA, Michael Hayden.[44] The US has called Venezuelan accusations of a CIA conspiracy "ridiculous".[45] Having an operations officer, such as Middleton, bypass several levels of management is not unprecedented, as with some of the Bay of Pigs operations bypassing the Western Hemisphere Division chief in the Directorate of Plans (now the National Clandestine Service). Nevertheless, that is unusual, and even in the Cuba case, the division chief was directly informed, but the addressee was the Deputy Director for Plans. See a description or the information flow on the Cuban operation. While the NCS organization is not public information, from past examples, it would not be unreasonable for this report to bypass a station chief in Caracas, the Venezuela branch, the Western Hemisphere Division (however currently organized), and possibly some immediate deputies of Hayden.[46]

Benjamin Ziff, an embassy spokesman said:[47] "We reject and are disappointed in the Venezuelan government's allegations that the United States is involved in any type of conspiracy to affect the outcome of the constitutional referendum." A CIA spokesman called the memo "a fake", while independent analysts and researchers doubt its authenticity. Jeremy Bigwood, an independent researcher in Washington, agreed:"I find the document quite suspect. There's not an original version in English, and the timing of its release is strange. Everything about it smells bad."

References

  1. ↑ , The threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume X Cuba, 1961-1962, 17 January 1962, Special National Intelligence Estimate 80-62
  2. ↑ Kornbluh, Peter, ed. (April 1, 2002), Secret Cuban Documents on History of African Involvement, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 67, George Washington University National Security Archive
  3. ↑ Justice Department Memo, 1975; National Security Archive
  4. ↑ CIA "Family Jewels" Memo, 1973 (see page 434) Family jewels (Central Intelligence Agency)
  5. ↑ Rostow, Walt (June 24, 1967), Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, xxxi: 59
  6. ↑ Rostow, Walt, Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, xxxi: 61
  7. ↑ Central Intelligence Agency (12 May 1963), Memorandum for the record documenting meeting about Haiti, vol. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, FRUS XII-383
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Goss2005-02-16
  9. ↑ Doyle, Kate, CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents, Electronic Briefing Book No. 4, George Washington University National Security Archive
  10. ↑ , NIE 87.2–66 Guyana(British Guiana), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, April 28, 1966, XXXII: 418, NIE 87.2-1966
  11. ↑ , Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee: Support to Anti-Jagan Political Parties in Guyana, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, March 17, 1967., XXXII: 418
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 CIA Inspector General (August 27, 1997). "Report of Investigation: Selected Issues Relating to CIA Activities in Honduras in the 1980s". George Washington University National Security Archive. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "NSAEBB27-4" defined multiple times with different content
  13. ↑ Lemoyne, James. Honduras Army linked to death of 200 civilians, May 2, 1987.
  14. ↑ Human Rights Watch. Honduras: Human Rights Developments.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 National Intelligence Council (September 18, 2000), CIA Activities in Chile
  16. ↑ Dolly M. E. Filartiga and Joel Filartiga, v. Americo Norberto Pena-Irala,  630 F.2d 876 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 30 June 198-)
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 , XI. The Role of the United States, Argentina: Reluctant Partner. The Argentine Government's Failure to Back Trials of Human Rights Violators, December 2001
  18. ↑ , Memorandum for the 5412 Special Group: Increase of Subsidy Provided to the Bolivian Government to support its Covert Action Projects designed to break the power of the National Revolutionary Movement of the left (MNRI) and the Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB), Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, March 10, 1964, XXXI: 148
  19. ↑ Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico (January 29, 1965).
  20. ↑ , Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, July 5, 1967, XXXI: 166
  21. ↑ Grant, Will. CIA man recounts Che Guevara's death, 8 October 2007.
  22. ↑ Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico (Washington, October 13, 1967).
  23. ↑ Central Intelligence Agency (September 14, 1967), National Intelligence Estimate 92-67: The Situation in Bolivia, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, XXXI: 166
  24. ↑ Kornbluh, Peter, ed., Brazil marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup; Declassified Documents Shed Light on US Role, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 118
  25. ↑ Sao Paolo Station, Central Intelligence Agency (30 March 1964), Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minais Gerais
  26. ↑ Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee on International Organized Crime by David Carey, Director, DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, January 31, 1996
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 Bagley, Bruce Michael (February 7, 2001), Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 1990s Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Bagley2001-02-07" defined multiple times with different content
  28. ↑ Still Seeing Red: The CIA fosters death squads in Colombia. Third Word Traveler.
  29. ↑ "Gunmen Yield in Colombia; Is It Altruism or Necessity?", New York Times, December 10, 1991
  30. ↑ Human Rights Watch, Bogotá
  31. ↑ Amnesty International (Annual) Report 1999, Colombia. "This report covers the period January to December 1998", 1999
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 Richter, Paul & Greg Miller (March 25, 2007), "Colombia army chief linked to outlaw militias", Los Angeles Times
  33. ↑ Simon, Richard & Maura Reynolds (May 3, 2007), "Uribe seeks to allay concerns", Los Angeles Times
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 Romero, Simon (March 26, 2007), "Colombia Rejects Paramilitary Report", New York Times
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 Evans, Michael (April 4, 2007), "'Para-politics' Goes Bananas", The Nation Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Nation2007-04-04" defined multiple times with different content
  36. ↑ Markey, Patrick & Gilbert Le Gras (Mar 25, 2007), "Colombia army chief linked to militias: report", Reuters
  37. ↑ Human Rights Watch (Colombia: Congress Should Maintain Hold on Military Aid), April 18, 2007
  38. ↑ Vulliamy, Ed. Venezuela coup linked to Bush team, April 21, 2002.
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 Campbell, Duncan (April 29, 2002), "American navy 'helped Venezuelan coup'", The Guardian
  40. ↑ Koerner, Brendan I. (22 January 2004), "Bush Aims To Raise Whose Budget? The skinny on the National Endowment for Democracy.", Slate
  41. ↑ Campbell, Duncan, "American navy 'helped Venezuelan coup'", The Guardian
  42. ↑ "US denies backing Chavez plotters", BBC News
  43. ↑ US Department of State and Board of Broadcasting Governors, Office of Inspector General (July 2002), A Review of US Policy toward Venezuela, November 2001-April 2002, 02-OIG-003
  44. ↑ Petras, James. "Counterattack as Fateful Referendum Looms: CIA Venezuela Destabilization Memo Surfaces,", November 28, 2007.
  45. ↑ Venezuela waits for reform result, BBC News, 3 December 3 2007.
  46. ↑ Golinger, Eva (28 November 2007), "CIA Operation "Pliers" Uncovered in Venezuela: Psyop aims to destabilize Venezuela and overthrow President Chavez", Global Research
  47. ↑ Romero, Simon. In Chávez territory, signs of dissent, 30 November 2007.
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