Pearl Harbor (World War II): Difference between revisions

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imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
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===United States===
===United States===
==The attack==
==The attack==
[[Image:Japanese view of Pearl Harbor attack.jpg|thumb|left|300px|Japanese perspective approaching Battleship Row]]
===Preliminaries===
===Preliminaries===
[[Image:Japanese Kate in Pearl Harbor attack.jpg|thumb|250px|Japanese torpedo bomber taking off to attack Pearl Harbor]]
[[Image:Japanese Kate in Pearl Harbor attack.jpg|thumb|250px|Japanese torpedo bomber taking off to attack Pearl Harbor]]
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===Second wave air attack===
===Second wave air attack===
===Arguments for and against a possible third strike===
===Arguments for and against a possible third strike===
==Aftermath==
==Aftermath==
===Changes in Command===
===Changes in Command===
===Effect on naval doctrine===
===Effect on naval doctrine===

Revision as of 21:52, 25 August 2010

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This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

For the geographic area, see Pearl Harbor

On December 7, 1941, units of the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted air and submarine operations against American forces in the Battle of Pearl Harbor. This battle was a key element in the major Japanese escalation of what they call the Pacific War.

While the United States had intelligence suggesting a high probability of Japanese attacks in December 1941, and some specific information that either did not reach the Pearl Harbor commanders, Admiral Husband Kimmel (Navy) or Lieutenant General Walter Short (Army), the attack was a tactical surprise.

Few battles, and the circumstances leading to them, have been studied as extensively as this one. Many concepts of the discipline of intelligence and warning resulted from this action.

Japanese operational concept

U.S. intelligence and planning

Communications intelligence

Threat assessment

Sabotage vs. air attack

Short was convinced that the major threat to his aircraft was sabotage by residents of Japanese ancestry, so he had them parked in close formation for ease in guarding them against ground attack. This made them dense targets for strafing and bombing.

Implications of the Battle of Taranto

In 1940, the Royal Navy, at the Battle of Taranto, delivered a devastating night attack, by torpedo aircraft, to battleships in a harbor. The U.S. Navy, in spite of knowing the details of that attack, still believed its ships were safe from aerial torpedoes in a harbor, although Taranto was as shallow as Pearl.

Order of battle

Japan

United States

The attack

Japanese perspective approaching Battleship Row

Preliminaries

Japanese torpedo bomber taking off to attack Pearl Harbor

First wave air attack

Second wave air attack

Arguments for and against a possible third strike

Aftermath

Changes in Command

Effect on naval doctrine