Operations security: Difference between revisions
Pat Palmer (talk | contribs) (PropDel) |
mNo edit summary |
||
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown) | |||
Line 11: | Line 11: | ||
| year = 1988}}</ref></blockquote> | | year = 1988}}</ref></blockquote> | ||
==History== | ==History== | ||
During the [[Vietnam War]], a December 1969 capture of a Viet Cong | During the [[Vietnam War]], a December 1969 capture of a Viet Cong communications intelligence center and documents revealed that they had been getting a huge amount of information using simple technology and smart people, as well as sloppy U.S. communications security. <ref name=Fiedler>{{citation | ||
| journal = Army Communicator | | journal = Army Communicator | ||
| date = Spring, 2003 | | date = Spring, 2003 | ||
Line 23: | Line 23: | ||
| url = http://www.nsa.gov/public/purple_dragon.pdf}}</ref> | | url = http://www.nsa.gov/public/purple_dragon.pdf}}</ref> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}}[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]] |
Latest revision as of 07:01, 29 September 2024
This article may be deleted soon. | ||
---|---|---|
Operations Security (OPSEC) is both a planning discipline, and a set of procedures and techniques, that begins by determining what adversary wants to know about one's plans. The analytic process identifies how the opponent may obtain that information, and how to frustrate the collection of this information. While this is closely related to counterintelligence, it is more specifically focused at protecting specific resources and the manner in which they will be, or are used. It complements, but does not replace, other forms of security.
HistoryDuring the Vietnam War, a December 1969 capture of a Viet Cong communications intelligence center and documents revealed that they had been getting a huge amount of information using simple technology and smart people, as well as sloppy U.S. communications security. [2] This specific discovery was by U.S. Army infantry, with interpretation by regular communications officers rather than security specialists; the matter infuriated GEN Creighton Abrams — at the communications specialists. Before and after, there had been a much more highly classified, and only now available in heavily censored form, National Security Agency analysis of how the Communists were getting their information, which has led to a good deal of modern counterintelligence and operations security. [3] References
|