Talk:Russian Liberation Army: Difference between revisions
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz |
imported>Hayford Peirce (→Bob Willis (are you sure it isn't Bob Wills [Is Still the King])?: no, just the Russian stuff. Although it would have been nice if Bush and Rumsfeld had been aware of in 2002) |
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:Without suggesting the ideologies were comparable, I assume you refer to his comparisons of preparation for the post-invasion situation in two very different invasions? [[User:Howard C. Berkowitz|Howard C. Berkowitz]] 22:23, 7 March 2010 (UTC) | :Without suggesting the ideologies were comparable, I assume you refer to his comparisons of preparation for the post-invasion situation in two very different invasions? [[User:Howard C. Berkowitz|Howard C. Berkowitz]] 22:23, 7 March 2010 (UTC) | ||
::No, I stopped reading when he got to Iraq. I was referring to the Russian stuff only. I was aware of most of it a vague way, but had never read that much detail about it.[[User:Hayford Peirce|Hayford Peirce]] 22:29, 7 March 2010 (UTC) | |||
== General challenges of this article(s)== | == General challenges of this article(s)== | ||
There needs to be reasonably sourced, as well as synthesized, discussion of the German and Russian strategic thinking beyond the immediate invasion situation, not necessarily in this article. The development of Soviet wartime propaganda is a substantial area, from the initial and somewhat ineffective defense attitudes that led to the spontaneous uprising, to Ilya Ehrenburg late in the war. [[User:Howard C. Berkowitz|Howard C. Berkowitz]] 14:12, 7 March 2010 (UTC) | There needs to be reasonably sourced, as well as synthesized, discussion of the German and Russian strategic thinking beyond the immediate invasion situation, not necessarily in this article. The development of Soviet wartime propaganda is a substantial area, from the initial and somewhat ineffective defense attitudes that led to the spontaneous uprising, to Ilya Ehrenburg late in the war. [[User:Howard C. Berkowitz|Howard C. Berkowitz]] 14:12, 7 March 2010 (UTC) | ||
Revision as of 17:29, 7 March 2010
Rewrite needed
This does not read like an encyclopedic article. Rather it reads like an argument about the pro's and con's of fighting for or against the Nazi's. The "rationale" for why someone might fight for the RLM is apart from the history of the RLM. Would the author like me to try my hand? Will Nesbitt 06:18, 23 May 2007 (CDT)
- I have been meaning to do something about this. I am preparing a lecture on the topic, so maybe I should write a more straightforward encyclopedic article. --Morten Juhl Johansen 01:20, 16 November 2007 (CST)
- I'm completely replacing the 2007 content. Howard C. Berkowitz 21:11, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
Bob Willis (are you sure it isn't Bob Wills [Is Still the King])?
That's a *very* interesting monograph, although he is far from being a Wordsmith, that's fer sure! Hayford Peirce 02:55, 7 March 2010 (UTC)
- Monographs from SAMS, the advanced and optional phase of the Command and General Staff College, tend to be thoughtful if not wordsmithed. This is the spot in which very bright officers are encouraged to challenge the conventional wisdom. (closest I got was being my mother's study partner for the CGSC correspondence program, before SAMS existed)
- Without suggesting the ideologies were comparable, I assume you refer to his comparisons of preparation for the post-invasion situation in two very different invasions? Howard C. Berkowitz 22:23, 7 March 2010 (UTC)
- No, I stopped reading when he got to Iraq. I was referring to the Russian stuff only. I was aware of most of it a vague way, but had never read that much detail about it.Hayford Peirce 22:29, 7 March 2010 (UTC)
General challenges of this article(s)
There needs to be reasonably sourced, as well as synthesized, discussion of the German and Russian strategic thinking beyond the immediate invasion situation, not necessarily in this article. The development of Soviet wartime propaganda is a substantial area, from the initial and somewhat ineffective defense attitudes that led to the spontaneous uprising, to Ilya Ehrenburg late in the war. Howard C. Berkowitz 14:12, 7 March 2010 (UTC)