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An historical world view regarded as an implication of the discoveries in science, '''materialism''' attributed to [[Matter (chemistry)|matter]] the status as the underlying constituent of nature, matter as material particles subject to fundamental forces that determined the shape, size, and motion of all objects in the natural world, and excluded any explanations of reality that could not be reduced to physics.
A world view regarded as an implication of the discoveries in science, '''materialism''' attributed to [[Matter (chemistry)|matter]] the status as the underlying constituent of nature, matter as material particles subject to fundamental forces, their interactions determining the shape, size, and motion of all objects in the natural world.


Materialism denies supernaturalism, in that it denies that independent spiritual or divine powers ever account for events, and holds that natural forces always explain events, even in instances where lack of knowledge precludes explanation (Joad 2005). It affirms determinism, in that it asserts that all events of the world result from preceding ones, and that knowledge of the state of the world at any given time can in principle predict the state of the world at a future time.
Originating with the ancient Greek atomists and flourishing for three centuries since time of Isaac Newton, materialism excluded any explanations of reality that could not be reduced to the physics of the time.


According to philosopher Jessica Wilson, however, materialism is no longer a viable philosophy (Wilson 2006):
Materialism denied supernaturalism, in that it denied that independent spiritual or divine powers ever account for events, and held that natural forces always explain events, even in instances where lack of knowledge precluded explanation (Joad 2005). It affirmed determinism, in that it asserted that all events of the world result from preceding ones, and that knowledge of the state of the world at any given time can in principle predict the state of the world at a future time. It was a philosophy of mechanism and determinism in respect of workings of the natural world. 
 
Philosopher Jessica Wilson emphasizes that materialism is no longer a viable philosophy (Wilson 2006):


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A world view regarded as an implication of the discoveries in science, materialism attributed to matter the status as the underlying constituent of nature, matter as material particles subject to fundamental forces, their interactions determining the shape, size, and motion of all objects in the natural world.

Originating with the ancient Greek atomists and flourishing for three centuries since time of Isaac Newton, materialism excluded any explanations of reality that could not be reduced to the physics of the time.

Materialism denied supernaturalism, in that it denied that independent spiritual or divine powers ever account for events, and held that natural forces always explain events, even in instances where lack of knowledge precluded explanation (Joad 2005). It affirmed determinism, in that it asserted that all events of the world result from preceding ones, and that knowledge of the state of the world at any given time can in principle predict the state of the world at a future time. It was a philosophy of mechanism and determinism in respect of workings of the natural world.

Philosopher Jessica Wilson emphasizes that materialism is no longer a viable philosophy (Wilson 2006):

Materialism, roughly formulated, is the thesis that all broadly scientific entities are nothing over and above material entities, where the latter are characterized as being extended, impenetrable, conserved, such as to (only) deterministically interact, and so on. The material entities ultimately supposed to serve as an ontological basis for all else are those existing at relatively low orders of constitutional complexity – entities that are, as I’ll put it, ‘‘relatively fundamental’’. But contemporary physics has reported that the relatively fundamental entities have few, if any, of the characteristics of the material; and thus materialism has been rendered a has-been (Wilson 2006)

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