User talk:Thomas Wright Sulcer/sandbox

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Tom, this should be User: Thomas Wright Sulcer/Sandbox, which lets the discussion be in User Talk: Thomas Wright Sulcer/Sandbox

Howard, yeah I think you're right, but I put it here following the WP guidelines about sandboxes. So there's no place for a talk page. How about we put the talk up here at the top of the page? But I'm working on other stuff now. Howard, do with this material whatever you want -- if you want to put it into an article, or chop it up, or whatever, be my guest. You know how the terrorism articles work better than I do.--Thomas Wright Sulcer 02:40, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

Howard let's float this article -- please post it and choose a title although I think the current title isn't so bad. --Thomas Wright Sulcer 10:40, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Tentative article title: Terrorism prevention strategies

Terrorism prevention strategies are means to discourage, prevent, and interrupt violence. There is strong consensus that prevention is more important than fighting terrorism for the overall purpose of safety.[1][2]

A key is correctly identifying terrorists as terrorists. When correct, preventing terrorism is straightforward. But when authorities can't make this identification, and guess incorrectly, non-terrorists are treated as terrorists, and a slew of new problems arise regarding civil liberties[3] as well as angering the public, lawsuits, possibly causing future terrorism, causing more "friction" within the system as the term was used by expert Brian Michael Jenkins, and weakening chances for future cooperation. For instance, inability to monitor only terrorists' phone calls means that agents must listen in on the private calls of law-abiding citizens, which violates privacy; this can lead to lawsuits as well as reluctance by phone companies to cooperate with authorities, and can result in battles in legislatures whether to grant immunity from lawsuits to phone companies.[4] It can lead to a general perception by the public that government is eavesdropping on all phone calls whether this happens or not. Government must spend huge resources when it can not identify who the terrorists are, what they're planning, and what their likely targets will be, and can lead to sharp criticism from reporters. Megan McArdle of The Atlantic wrote after a terrorist sneaked a bomb on a plane in 2009: "Every time they miss something, we have to give up more liberty."[5] If authorities can't figure out which potential airplane passengers are terrorists, then they have to frisk all passengers.

But the opposite effect can happen as well. Sometimes authorities are so protective of civil liberties that it interferes with their ability to prevent terrorism. Thomas Kean of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States said "I'm concerned about civil liberties as an excuse for not taking action to prevent terrorism." Kean described how FBI officers were afraid to get a search warrant to inspect the laptop computer of captured would-be 9/11 hijacker Zacharias Moussaoui because authorities felt they lacked probable cause.[6]

While some senses of the word terrorism encompass war, the term terrorism in this discussion will be limited to a more widely accepted sense of terrorism as acts by non-state actors. While some definitions include civil war since the slaughter meets criteria such as being intentional, politically motivated, and perpetrated by non-state groups,[7] this article will focus on a more widely accepted conception of terrorism.

Nature of the problem

The most serious problem involves weapons of mass destruction. While the danger of a nuclear bomb getting into the hands of terrorists remains a serious threat,[8] there are indications that nations have done a fairly good job of locking up stockpiles of dangerous weapons and components. It's conceivable that in the future, however, a government could give terrorists a nuclear bomb for a disruptive purpose,[9] or that terrorists could buy or steal nuclear weapons. A growing danger was biological terrorism.

The risk that a truck laden with anthrax moves through a heavily populated city may cause thousands of deaths, although a truck-based attempt by Aum Shinryo failed, for a variety of technical errors, to produce a single casualty in Tokyo. Similarly, the dangers from an outbreak of smallpox could kill millions of people if the infection spreads rapidly. One report from the White House suggested the risk of biological terrorism was unpredictable, dangerous, and evolving rapidly, as new capabilities kept growing in "unpredictable ways" while technical barriers fall and monetary costs decline.[10]

Further, there is an imbalance regarding the perception of a favorable outcome. Commission head Thomas Kean said: "it has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right 100 percent of the time and the terrorists only have to get lucky once."[11] Particularly regarding serious terrorism, there's a perceived imbalance in favor of the terrorists, since, according to a common view, terrorists can afford to make mistakes, get caught, but if a few of them succeed in pulling off a big attack, then terrorists are viewed as winning the war. As weapons and technology converge to increase the destructive potential of huge weapons, it only takes one slip up for huge loss of life to happen.

But the prospect of overreacting looms at many points. Since authorities generally have huge resources and much greater military might in terms of well-equipped police forces and paramilitary squads, there is a chance that authorities will over-react, possibly pushed by fear and adrenaline, and may kill innocents in an effort to try to kill terrorists. The 9/11 commission speculated that "an indiscriminate massive response could be portrayed by them as an assault on Islam and might provoke a huge backlash that would also advantage al Qaeda."[12] There is some speculation that terrorists deliberately try to provoke authorities into over-reacting.[12] There is also a huge risk of over-reacting financially, of failing to prioritize prevention methods, and spending recklessly out of fear. The 9/11 Commission reckoned that out-of-control spending on security measures would wreak huge costs on state and local governments.[13]

Terrorism keeps evolving. As authorities block or deter certain types of attacks, terrorists evolve new ones. Counter-terrorism needs to continually evolve as well.[14] Critics have charged that authorities are too focused on the last attack and that they don't think creatively enough; for example, Megan McArdle of The Atlantic described the TSA rules as "moronic".[5] She wrote: "The TSA's obsession with fighting the last war is so strong that I expect any day to see them building wooden forts at our nation's airports in order to keep the redcoats at bay."[5]

How well is terrorism being prevented? Generally experts examining efforts to prevent terrorism give mixed reviews; there are some pluses, some minuses, some strong points, some weak points. There are some indications of initial success in preventing terrorism, as Newsweek analyst Fareed Zakaria suggested that terrorist attacks have declined 40% since 2001.[15] But the risk of terrorists getting nuclear weapons remains "unacceptably high", according to one report.[16] Perhaps the biggest part of the problem is seeing the terrorists, identifying them, fleshing them out; when authorities can identify violent extremists, apprehension and justice are mere details.

Disrupting Terrorism at Different Stages

One way to approach terrorism prevention is to construct a model of how a person becomes a terrorist and decides to engage in terrorism, and look for places at each step of the process where authorities can intervene. The steps are roughly in this order: radicalization, networking, hiding, money, weapons, planning, target selection, deciding to attack, attacking, and escape, and at each step there are opportunities for authorities to discourage or dissuade or capture terrorists. The earlier in the cycle that terrorism is blocked, the better; it's much better to prune an attack long before it approaches the execution stage.[17] Overall, of course, the aim is to kill or capture the terrorists before they strike.[18] But former DHS Director Chertoff said in 2007 "the lesson from Iraq is to gather intelligence to disrupt the long chain of events needed to deliver a bomb–from recruiting terrorists to infiltrating them into the country, gathering bomb materials, and selecting targets and tactics."[19] In Israel, it's called the "three circles of security": first, getting intelligence before terrorists begin their operations;[20] second, checkpoints to delay attackers;[21] third, hardening targets such as restaurants and malls.[22]

Radicalization

See also: Self-radicalization

How does a person change from a so-called normal law-abiding member of society to a terrorist? How does radicalization happen? Can we identify particular persons susceptible to radicalization? Is it exposure to inflammatory material on the Internet? Are there connections to an aggrieved group of persons abroad? Answers to these questions, even partial answers, can be particularly helpful in helping enable prevention strategies. Limiting the supply of new terrorist recruits is a big part of winning the battle against terrorism.[14] If authorities can profile a likely terrorist, then it may be possible to put precious resources into more intensive scrutiny of their actions and connections. What thought processes inside a person's head lead them to becoming terrorists? Is there a moment when a person decides to become a terrorist? How do terrorists see themselves?

The task of understanding how radicalization happens is fraught with difficulty. Some studies suggest that a tiny number of persons, often Muslims, are prone to becoming extremists; but officials concede that they don't understand how this process works.[23] What pathways lead to Jihadi terrorism? One theorist in Islam Review speculated that risk factors predisposing some persons towards extremism exist based on psychological factors.[24] There is speculation that Al Qaeda is a mindset which sees Islam on the defensive with its existence threatened by secular societies and globalization.[25] One suggestion is to focus prevention efforts on reaching out at the local level with outreach programs using community policing.[26]

Recruitment, as well, is a point in which authorities can intervene.[27] Sometimes recruitment happens by media appeals. Al-Qaeda makes propaganda videos which encourage viewers to become radicalized, but it's not clear how effective these appeals are.[28] It may be possible to make counter-propaganda which might disrupt the radicalization process; counter-terrorism experts suggest that this is an area where governments could do a much better job, and which would yield excellent results.[29]

Some theories suggest radicalization can't happen just by exposure to Internet web sites in themselves, but that contact between a would-be radical and a mentor, a facilitator, or a inciter is required.[30] In 2009, a U.S. army major named Nidal Hasan went on a shooting rampage, killing 13 people at Fort Hood, and it was learned later that Hasan had been in "close contact" with a U.S.-born radical Muslim cleric living in Yemen; officials are trying to determine if the cleric had a role in the attack.[31] Expert Bruce Hoffman explored whether the Fort Hood attack was an example of 21st century terrorism if Hasan was inspired by propaganda to take up the cause of terrorism without any training or money from abroad.[32] One study suggested the best time to intervene is before an individual boards a plane to fly to a radical training camp, since experiences in those camps can "harden their commitment towards al-Qaida and associated movements" according to one source; but a huge obstacle is that in most cases, a person has broken no law, and there are no grounds for arrest.[33]

But profiling likely terrorists is problematic since there obviously isn't a "typical profile of a homegrown terrorist."[34] There don't appear to be clear patterns pointing to likely recruits; intense religious affiliations do not seem to predict likely terrorist involvement.[34] There's consensus that profiling is difficult.[35] And if authorities focus on a particular group, it's possible for recruiters to adjust their strategy to target other groups; what's important is being flexible to new developments.[36] Identifying terrorist leaders is especially difficult.[37] Terrorists don't look like terrorists, of course.[38] The 9/11 commission asked:

Militants pose themselves as ordinary citizens and immigrants here in the United States. They appear so clean cut, they could fit in on any golf course. And they do this to remain undetected until they carry out their terrorist goals. If we're lucky, they're dressed in their customary dress, they're wearing their traditional non-Western clothing ... As long as we allow groups to be protected from racial profiling, how can we win this new war?[38]

Authorities have suggested that a counter-narrative can help deter global radicalism, but one report in 2006 suggested this effort has been ineffective.[39] A counter-narrative might try to undermine the reputation and credibility of terrorists within the larger community of Muslims, for example; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker wrote in The New York Times that "if the seeds of doubt can be planted in the mind of Al Qaeda’s strategic leadership that an attack would be viewed as a shameful murder of innocents–or, even more effectively, that it would be an embarrassing failure–then the order may not be given."[40] Most deaths in terrorists attacks involve non-combatants or innocents, according to one analyst.[41] In a bi-partisan report about the 9/11 attacks, Thomas H. Kean reprimanded the cruelty of the act in moral terms:

Those who perished in those attacks or those who were wounded had done nothing to warrant it. They were going about their business. They were doing their jobs. They were flying to see family or to conduct business or to spend time with loved ones or going or returning from vacations. They didn't personally know their assassins. Those who attacked them had no particular human target in mind. They just wanted to kill as many people as possible. They didn't care who the victims were. All they had to do to warrant their killing and maiming, they wanted to target buildings or certain airplanes.[42]

Greater cultural awareness can help too. Linguists with excellent analytical skills and cultural awareness can help authorities spot problems and possibly identify terrorists.[43] There is a greater call for more speakers of Arabic to work as investigators, case officers, interrogators, interpreters and translators.[44]

Further, it's important to paint terrorists as terrorists. Terminology can have a big impact. One report criticized a policy of labeling prevention efforts as a war on terrorism since it implies that terrorists are holy warriors; rather, terrorists should be painted as criminals.[45] Many efforts, however, describe terrorism as a "war"; even the head of the 9/11 investigatory commission, Thomas H. Kean described the 9/11 attacks as the beginning of a war.[46]

Re-education programs, as well, are a way to help re-assimilate would-be terrorists into society, and provide a counter-narrative to persons considering violent extremism. The government of Saudi Arabia claimed that it took 4,000 militants and put them through a rehabilitation program which included "psychological counseling, vocational training, art therapy, sports, and religious reeducation, and helped "rehabilitated" terrorists find jobs and even wives.[47] The post-release program held family members responsible if there were repeated acts of violence, as well as surveillance.[47]

Networking

After a person has become radicalized, the next step is hooking up with other terrorists, unless, of course, terrorists caused the radicalization. It is important for authorities to understand how networking among terrorists happens, and take steps to interfere with these efforts. How can terrorists determine that they trust each other?

If a terrorist can't connect with others, they're described as a [[self-radicalized|self-radicalized] lone wolf terrorist. Examples of supposed lone wolf terrorists have been Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, although whether he was consistently regarded as a "terrorist" has been subject to debate. Lone wolf terrorists are harder to find, since they don't interact with others, but at the same time, authorities generally believe they're the least dangerous and most inept, since they can't swap information about such skills as bomb-making,[48] although this wasn't the case with Kaczynski who killed three people with homemade bombs.

One way to interfere with terrorists' ability to network is electronic surveillance. If terrorists communicate by phone, email, or letter, it's possible to intercept these communications; provisions in the United States of the Patriot Act authorize extensive domestic surveillance.[49] Since terrorists use the Internet extensively to share information, plan, and discuss methods, intercepts are possible and potentially highly fruitful. Terrorists, as well, use the Internet to learn how to build bombs since "information and expertise now flow in all directions."[50] Sites which detail the making of explosives can be tracked by authorities. As in many other areas, when authorities use surveillance to spy on vast swaths of the public, this activity can generate concerns about civil liberties.[43]

Nevertheless, picking up signals between terrorists is vital; U.S. president Bush said in 2008 "we need to know who the terrorists are talking to, what they're saying and what they're planning."[4] Authorities depend on private firms such as phone and Internet companies to intercept messages, but this usually involves listening in on non-terrorist communications, that is, violating the privacy of citizens.[4] Some citizens have sued the phone companies for these violations, but the government is seeking to grant immunity from these lawsuits.[4]

Authorities have built fake websites. Since cyberspace is a place where terrorists recruit, share information, train, and identify each other, authorities have mounted stealth campaigns to plant "bogus e-mail messages and Web site postings, with the intent to sow confusion, dissent and distrust among militant organizations," according to one report.[51]

Intelligence agencies are vital to help disrupt terrorist networks and capture leaders.[52] There have been significant improvements.[53] In the United States, Congress passed legislation to improve coordination among intelligence agencies.[54] Sharing intelligence is widely seen as a positive development, although problems remain.[55]

Infighting between terrorist groups can provide new opportunities for authorities. If there's a way to encourage power struggles or infighting, it helps prevent terrorism. One analyst suggested infighting between groups was one cause for a decline in terrorist activity during the first decade of the 21st century.[56] One suggestion is, with great publicity, to free terrorists with the thanks of the United States, cynically called "trap, neuter and release." In the case of radical Islamist groups, having their actions described as heresy, by competent jurists, also is a countermeasure.

Organizing

See also: Clandestine cell system

After being radicalized and networking, terrorists organize themselves into a structure. A top-down hierarchical structure brings centralization of control but leaves the group more vulnerable to exposure, so that if one person is caught, everybody is caught. A looser cell-based structure is harder to catch but lacks coordination. A decentralized arrangement makes it more difficult for intelligence agencies to bust apart whole rings, since terrorists in one cell may not know which persons are members of another cell.[57]

Bin Laden and Zawahiri don't control each individual operation. When you have four or five different guys planning operations, perhaps of a smaller magnitude than 9/11, it's harder to follow.[57]

Authorities try to infiltrate terrorist groups to prevent terrorism at this stage. This is highly risky for the agent doing the infiltrating, since if his or her purpose is discovered, it often leads to their death. But infiltration can be effective when done right, since it allows authorities to understand who terrorists are and what they're planning long before an attack.[58] When cells are smaller and affiliated loosely with other cells, infiltration is more difficult.[58][59] Israel has infiltrated some terrorist groups which led to arrests long before any bombings happened.[58] Efforts to kill terrorist leaders have been effective on some occasions, although as of 2009, bin Laden and Zawahiri are still at large.[59] There have been calls to explore links between terrorists and leaders of organized crime.[60] The 9/11 Commission suggested it was important to understand how Al Qaeda works and understanding their "terrorist-attack mode."[61]

A related strategy is denying sanctuary to terrorists. A report in 2006 suggested it was good to deprive Al-Qaeda of sanctuary in Afghanistan.[59][62]

Hiding

See also: Counterintelligence

After networking and organizing, terrorists must keep their locations and purpose hidden. Authorities can take different actions to expose terrorist hideouts.

Sometimes police agencies resort to wide sweeps of people in the hope of picking up terrorists in the net. For example, police in France have periodically done these in the hope of ensnaring terrorists; but their efforts have been criticized.[3] The idea is to arrest and interrogate large numbers of people in the hope of catching a terrorist, but the drawback is that the innocent detainees are arrested without cause, and can put French authorities "on the wrong side of the law."[63] Even a suspect's friends and family members can be interrogated with few requirements.[64] But French authorities justify sweeps as sometimes necessary to "catch terrorists before they act."[65][66] But legal matters can ensue; the French judicial system has been criticized for giving suspects only "only minimal access to legal counsel."[67]

Seemingly random police convergences are a variant of the sweeps tactic. This has been done in New York City in the U.S.. Police converge, seemingly randomly, on a particular area. The idea is to "keep extremists guessing as to when and where a large police presence may materialize at any hour" and, as a result, throw terrorists off balance.[68]

When the larger community becomes opposed to terrorism, it becomes harder for terrorists to hide within them. Therefore, efforts to discredit terrorism among Arab publics can make hiding more difficult. The 9/11 Commission suggested that Al Qaeda was a system for "transforming the discontents of Islam into a violent expression of jihad."[69] To counter this, authorities try to discredit terrorism as a way to bolster religion. Newsweek analyst Fareed Zakaria wrote that the Muslim world has shown an "extraordinary drop in support for Islamist terror organizations" and, as a result, it's more difficult for terrorists to hide, find safe haven, and get financial support.[56]

Israeli counterterrorism experts have developed strategies to discover where terrorists might hide explosives.[70] Finding a weapons cache can save lives. Police have shared information about how terrorists try to disguise explosives.[71]

In the U.K., investigators believe there may be up to 1600 potential terrorists hiding inside the nation, possibly planning an attack. But authorities can't monitor the activities of all of these people all of the time; they have to guess which ones are the most dangerous, and monitor those.[50] So another technique to break up terrorism is selective monitoring.

Money

See also: Financial intelligence
See also: Informal value transfer system
See also: Transnational spillover from weak and failed states

Disrupting financing of terrorist activity is a key; there have been indications of success in this regard.[72][59][73] Terrorist financing methods have continued to evolve, and some funds are moved about using trust-based systems such as Hawallah, large transfers of cash, or even PayPal.[73] Deterring the "support network" including financial supporters is vital.[74] A more coordinated approach to uncovering terrorist financing was suggested by the 9/11 Commission.[75]

Weapons

See also: Weapons of mass destruction
See also: Radiological weapon
See also: Chemical weapon
See also: Biological weapon
See also: Nuclear weapon

Terrorism prevention efforts try to make it difficult for terrorist to get weapons, explosives, poisons, and other dangerous materials. It is particularly difficult for terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons, although some analysts speculate that the increasing ease of technological innovation works against this. For the most part, up to 2009, governments have been skillful at keeping nuclear technology away from terrorists, although it's possible that terrorists could bribe a public official, steal a bomb, or make one from scratch. Locking up biological weapons is perhaps more difficult, since there are numerous unprotected laboratories with a wide variety of toxins and pathogens.[76]

Authorities try to lock up and keep an account of dangerous materials. For example, there are thousands of places where radioactive waste is stored, but it is difficult to keep track of them; one government agency tries to collect materials which could be used to manufacture a so-called dirty bomb but has a backlog of uncollected materials.[77] There is a focus on locking up this material.[78]

There have been efforts to disrupt networks of nuclear bomb makers. Authorities have disrputed the A.Q. Khan "black market nuclear network" and persuaded the government of Libya to end programs of building WMDs, although nations such as Iran and North Korea continue efforts to build atomic weaponry as well as missiles.[16] Israeli counterterrorism efforts have emphasized a disruption of "bomb supply lines."[79]

Governments have threatened those who supply weapons to terrorists. U.S. president George W. Bush pledged to hold "fully accountable" any nation that shares nuclear weapons with another state or terrorists.[80] To do this, however, it is vital to fully trace the path of nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists, and this may be difficult to do, although the U.S. and other nations are developing new technologies which try to identify the source of unconventional weapons.[80] And it's informing other nations that it has increasing capability to identify these sources.[80]

Planning

Counterintelligence helps disrupt planning. Professor Erik Dahl at the Naval Postgraduate School suggested that the "most effective intelligence is gathered close to home, as a result of local, on-the-ground domestic intelligence efforts."[81] There are ways to try to gather "deeper intelligence", suggests one report.[82] Sometimes there is sufficient evidence to arrest and try suspected terrorist leaders. But as an overall strategy, the 9/11 commission thought it was "absurd" to attempt to do this.[83]

Selecting a target

Selecting a target. Which target is chosen? Where and why?

  • Walls and barriers. Physical barriers such as strong secured walls at embassy compounds can deter truck bombers, but they also deny public access as well; a 2006 report criticized embassies for being overbuilt with a "fortress mentality" which "stifles public access and outreach."[39]

Deciding to attack

Deciding to attack. Eighth, how does a group decide to attack? Is there thinking about the likelihood of getting caught? Does this deter them? How do they plan for escape afterwards?

  • Deterrence. If terrorists can be persuaded there's a reasonable chance they'll get caught, they may be deterred. This is part of the logic of plane-side searches. But searches must be frequent enough to have a deterrent value.[84]
  • Pre-emption. This is the doctrine that when authorities have enough indication of a likely attack, that it's permissible for them to strike first, and prevent the attack, rather than wait for it to unfold.[85] This is a controversial doctrine. Inevitably, errors will happen, and sometimes innocent civilians will be killed by mistake. But attacks upon likely terrorists using unmanned Predator drones, for example, have been effective in killing some terrorist leaders.

Traveling to the place of attack

  • Screening. Steven Levitt suggested it makes sense to try to screen "risky people" from entering the country as well as tracking questionable or dubious persons after entering the country; he wrote "if someone enters on a student visa and isn’t enrolled in school, for instance, he is worth keeping under close surveillance."[86] There is a risk that too much screening can be seen as paranoia, and matters such as visa frustrations, and preventing legitimate port managers such as Dubai Ports from operating U.S. ports, can undermine efforts at public diplomacy.[39] But border controls and immigration policies were seen as uneven.[87] A report in 2008 by DHS Secretary Chertoff suggested the tighter U.S. screening procedures were having the effect of shifting terrorist focus to Europe which was perceived as a "more open target."[88] Making borders more secure has been closely identified with preventing future attacks.[89] Sometimes dogs trained at sniffing explosives are used, although training standards are not uniform which makes cooperation between different squads very difficult.[90] Some police experts have developed guidelines to help screeners spot a potential suicide bomber.[91] At the same time, screening is imperfect; in 2009, a terrorist slipped explosives on to an airliner, but was prevented from detonating the bomb by alert passengers.[92] This caused huge embarrassment for the TSA and a call for an investigation by president Obama and a statement from Attorney General Janet Napolitano saying "the system worked", but with an article in The Atlantic by author Megan McArdle countering "the system failed."[92] McArdle wrote terrorists are "bound to get through airport security if they really want" and also have the option to "blow up the crowds of people patiently waiting in line to go through airport security."[93] McArdle wrote that "our elaborate system of security theater is probably next to useless."[93] Before 9/11, data showed the 19 terrorists filed missing and incomplete information on their visa applications; some terrorists described themselves as "student" but failed to name which school they were supposedly attending.[94]
  • Tough decisions. If authorities know that an attack is imminent but can't pinpoint the terrorists or target, then they face an agonizing choice particularly if they have a few clues. Suppose a cell of terrorists has acquired a nuclear bomb and plans to detonate it in a few hours, but authorities have one of the members of the cell in custody; is it proper to use methods such as torture to try to extract information about the impending attack that may save tens of thousands of lives? This is a tough moral dilemma. While authorities such as Dennis C. Blair have made pledges saying "I believe strongly that torture is not moral, legal, or effective,"[95] he might find himself rethinking that decision when confronted by a crisis.

see Interrogation and human-source intelligence for a broader, less moralistic discussion

A general pattern that emerges is that authorities, when faced with the prospect of imminent or devastating attacks, are pressed to do anything they can to stop the attack, including violate civil liberties, invade privacy, conduct warrantless wiretaps, and even resort to torture.

Attacking

Attacking. How do terrorists get to their place of attack?

  • Airliners are particularly vulnerable to different forms of attack. If terrorists slip on board an airliner, there are many ways to bring the airliner down, such as starting a fire in a lavatory. Explosives slipped through security can be devastating. And a downed airliner can be particularly expensive and costly in terms of lives lost, damage, and fear created. So it is understandable that much effort has gone into screening passengers. But there are huge difficulties involved. In the United States alone, there are about 450 major airports and 28,000 daily flights; screening every passenger for every flight is a monumental task.[96] There are no reliable machines to screen for combustible liquids; so, as a result, liquids over a certain amount are banned.[97] But screening procedures are imperfect, delay boarding, and inconvenience passengers.[98] Explosive sniffing dogs at airports, however, is often seen as a last line of defense; one writer in Time Magazine criticized governments for investing too much time and money in this last line of defense, rather than using resources more effectively, and arresting terrorists before the execution stage.[17]
Governments still tend to focus much of their time and money on our last lines of defense–explosives sniffers at airports and haz-mat suits for firefighters. That's the equivalent of building a really deep castle moat and waiting for the invaders to arrive.[17]

One firm markets an Internet-based communications network as an alternative to air travel, and suggests the way to prevent terrorism is simply for people to fly less.[99]

  • Improvised explosive devices (IEDs). One report from the White House suggested the U.S. was particularly vulnerable to IEDs.[100] And preparedness varies by municipality; Los Angeles has 28 full-time explosives technicians and an $8 million downtown headquarters, while Washington has only 10 technicians in portable trailers.[101] But these after-the-fact efforts to cope with bombs, whether real or imagined, has been criticized as less effective than efforts to detect and disrupt bomb plots in advance.[102]
  • Physical barriers. It's possible to place large concrete blocks in front of building entrances. Most American embassies are surrounded by thick sturdy walls. Even the cockpit doors of the flight crew have been hardened.[103]
  • Low-tech terror. Freakonomics author Steven Levitt in The New York Times suggested that "incredibly simple strategies" such as sniper shootings offered a "virtually infinite array" of means of attack.[105] He believed that there is no effective means to prevent a campaign of "low-grade, low-tech terror" and that authorities are powerless to prevent such terrorism.[106] His strategy? "Don't be afraid; get on with life."[107]
  • Airport security. In 2006 Glasgow airport installed high-tech license-plate recognition systems to control a barrier at an airport entrance; the system would only admit recognized buses and taxis; but according to one report, this high-tech system was defeated with a simple method– merely tailgating behind a registered bus or taxi was enough to get inside the barrier.[108]
  • Damage controlIndividual protection. One way authorities can try to control damage is by instructing citizens how to cope with large-scale terrorist attacks such as chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological events. For example, a study by the Rand Corporation offers advice to citizens about individual efforts to cope with one of these emergencies.[109]
    • chemical attack: In a chemical attack, citizens are urged to "find clean air quickly."[110]
    • radiological attack: If a dirty bomb has been detonated, avoid inhaling radioactive dust; if outdoors, move indoors, cover your nose and mouth and stay indoors; close windows and shut down ventilation systems and await instructions.[111]
    • nuclear attack"Avoid radioactive fallout: evacuate the fallout zone quickly or, if not possible, seek best available shelter."ref>RAND MR-1731, p. xviii</ref>
    • biological attack "Get medical aid and minimize further exposure to agents."[112]
      • if it's smallpox, and if there's any suspicion of contagion, get vaccinated quickly.[113][114] The White House urged the public to be prepared for large-scale disasters.[115] The U.S. White House has promulgated efforts to "promote global health security", so that if a smallpox epidemic breaks out, then global health agencies may be better prepared to cope with it.[116] The U.S. White House urged citizens to prepare for possible disasters, and be ready with extra food and essentials.[117]
  • Killing terrorists. Once an attack is set in motion, the fact of the attack is, in itself, a semi-win for the terrorists. The battling causes fear and mayhem. Authorities generally have much greater firepower and will prevail, but terrorists have the advantages of selecting the time and place of attack. So authorities are often trying to play catch up. For example, after the 9/11 planes were hijacked, but before they were crashed into buildings, there was an opportunity for authorities to summon fighter planes to shoot down the hijacked planes; but to have done this would have required quick timing.[118] In the case of a potential suicide bomber, authorities have been trained to shoot for the head and not the chest, since a shot in the chest may cause a detonation.[119] But it calls on police officers to make split-second decisions in a very dangerous situation, and mistakes are not only possible, but deadly.
  • Focus only on high-damage targets. Some suggest it's simply not possible to prevent most kinds of attacks, and the best that can be done is to focus funds and guns on preventing only those terrorist events which could involve a huge loss of life; a Time Magazine reporter suggested efforts should focus on preventing a truck bomb laden with "old-school fertilizer" which could kill thousands in Times Square rather than trying to prevent "an airplane from being taken down by liquid explosives," which is much harder to detect, and likely to be much less damaging.

Escaping

Escaping. When terrorists escape after an attack, they need to avoid detection and retreat to a hideout or fortified location. If this happens, terrorists can execute more attacks in the future. So it is important for authorities to prevent such escapes, possibly by identifying escape routes or taking other measures to prevent subsequent attacks.

  • Apprehending terrorists prevents future attacks. So it's important to catch terrorists before they strike again. One concern is that with hard-to-detect attacks, such as biological attacks, it's possible for terrorists to repeatedly strike cities without getting caught.[120]
  • Returning to normalcy fast. Authorities in Israel have learned that it's important to clean up a bomb site fast, since it helps people get back to "business as usual" and lessen overall trauma.[121] While in America a bombsite may be roped off for days, in Israel it's cleared quickly, sometimes within hours.[121] Steps involved alerting the public, assisting victims, getting people to the hospital, and cleaning the blood-splattered pavement.[122] "The longer the scene is left there, the more traumatizing it becomes," said one official.[123]

General strategies to prevent terrorism

While an interference model can focus efforts to prevent terrorism at particular stages, general strategies help authorities lessen terrorism. These efforts may not be tied to a particular interference point but can thwart terrorism nevertheless.

Overall strategy

Some analysts see a basic choice of model dealing with terrorism: a criminal law approach, and a war approach.[124] There are plusses and minuses with each model. In some respects, the United Nations has been seen as preferring to describe terrorism as a criminal law problem since has defined terrorism as a "crime", rather than an international security approach, according to one theorist.[124]

Military force

One terrorism expert suggested, in most cases, that military force was not the best means to thwart terrorism.[125] It can be like trying to kill a malaria-bearing mosquito with a hammer; there is too much risk of collateral damage. A 2006 report criticized an overemphasis by the U.S. on military solutions which created "substantial drains on forces."[62]

Cyber Warfare

See also: Information operations
  • Disrupting cyberoperations. When authorities recover the hard disk drives of terrorist cells, they can use that information to countermessage for the purpose of "instailling doubt". [126]

Psychological warfare

See also: Information operations
  • Counter-propaganda. American efforts have released videotapes of terrorists "teaching children to kidnap and kill" to expose terrorist tactics as merciless and cruel.[127] Authorities have also released letters, whether captured or fake, between terrorist leaders, which describe the terrorists' spirit as "weak" and "plagued by poor morale."[127] Other efforts seek to undermine the perceived theological legitimacy of terrorism by having clerics renounce "violent jihad on legal and religious grounds."[127]

Spending

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. defense establishment spending much more money.[128] But it is easy to overspend; author Steven Levitt suggested that spending huge amounts of money trying to prevent an on-board explosive filled in a tube of toothpaste was unwise since the risk of a detonation was small; he suggested funds should be diverted to preventing terrorism which was more likely and more devastating, such as preventing planes from being shot down by shoulder-launched missiles.[129] There have been repeated examples of how once government grows, it's difficult to shrink it back after it's no longer needed. Efforts to give foreign aid to foreign governments to help them prevent insurgencies can be effective.[39]

Winning the battle of ideas

See also: Information operations
  • Bolstering credibility of moderate Muslims. Analyst Brian Michael Jenkins suggests it's important to support moderate persons in Arab countries to stand up to extremists.[29] There are reports that American diplomats are urging prominent Islamic clerics to amplify their speeches and writings with respect to renouncing violence.[130] Understanding is key; one report suggests that Israeli counterterrorism experts were sharing insights into Islamic fundamentalism with U.S. police departments.[131]

Protecting the public

Government has been making increasing efforts to hire safety experts, particularly in areas such as biological warfare and expertise in the life sciences.[132] There is increased sense of vulnerability in the area of biological terrorism, and stepped up efforts to alert the biological sciences community about a need for vigilance and awareness. A commission sponsored by the U.S. Congress suggested that academics and biologists with access to dangerous technologies should be alerted about the risks of "potentially dangerous knowledge falling into the wrong hands."[133] A danger with biological terrorism is repeated attacks, especially if perpetrators are not caught; one report suggested that with "a biological attack, terrorists can strike a city, reload the aerosol can, and come back a week later with the same agent and attack again."[120] As a result, authorities have made greater efforts to inform the life sciences community about the importance of biosecurity.[134] In addition, tougher laws have been proposed for regulations securing high-risk toxins and pathogens.[76]

Government, as well, has focused efforts on improving methods of public identification. There were arguments that better detection of counterfeit travel documents would have been helpful to prevent the 9/11 attacks.[135] Identity theft, as well, promotes terrorism, so tighter standards on identities has been recommended as a helpful prevention method; many of the 9/11 hijackers entered the U.S. under pseudonyms.[136]

Risk-based prioritization

A 2006 study called for greater emphasis on allocating resources based on a model of risk and damage, so that funds were used efficiently to protect the most vulnerable targets in sensible ways.[87] Expert Richard C. Clarke urged an effort to secure major cities and critical facilities, including computer networks.[137] Even the 9/11 Commission called for abandoning "unrealistic expectations of total security" and a more realistic acceptance of risk.[138] This means that sometimes terrorist attacks will succeed, but if infrastructure is built strong and resilient, with backup systems, when some attacks succeed it won't shut society down.[138] One analyst argued that the highest priorities for protection should be civilian populations against weapons of mass destruction, but that critical infrastructure, government functions, and national symbols all need protection.[139]

Promoting democracy

  • Democracy has been promoted as a solution to terrorism by U.S. president George W. Bush.[140] Bush suggested democracy entails "suffocation" for terrorists, and that leaders of Al-Qaeda such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were working hard to prevent democracy from taking root in Iraq.
    In 2004, we intercepted a letter from Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden. In it, Zarqawi expressed his concern about, "the gap that will emerge between us and the people of the land." He declared, "Democracy is coming." He went on to say, "This will mean suffocation" for the terrorists. Zarqawi laid out his strategy to stop democracy from taking root in Iraq.
    [140] Democracy as a solution to terrorism, as well, was mentioned by Thomas Kean in the 9/11 commission hearings who said "I believe that we'll never be safe from Islamic extremism until the Arab Muslim countries begin to experience democracy."[141] However, there is considerable concern among academics and foreign policy experts about the transition period. A tightly-controlled nation led by a monarch or dictator, which permits free elections and the free movement of people and ideas, can find itself embroiled in serious conflict which permit chances for a wide range of terrorism. Some analysts suggest that democracy can not be achieved overnight or imposed by a foreign power, since successful democratic functioning requires the evolution of economic institutions and law and a habit of peaceful acceptance of change. They point to case studies of nations which have undergone severe upheaval during such a transformation, and the results are often negative or counter-productive.
  • Unilateralism counter-productive. A 2006 report suggested that the go-it-alone foreign policy of the U.S. during the Bush administration undermined public diplomacy.[39]

Improving intelligence gathering

Information sharing is a key to improved intelligence. After 9/11, the U.S. federal government established one agency with overall authority to prevent terrorism: the Department of Homeland Security.[142] It had over 200,000 employees in 2007.[143] Nevertheless, despite this framework, getting different government agencies to cooperate is often difficult since the nature of intelligence work is to safeguard secret. Information-in-progress is the life-blood of these agencies, and they're often loathe to share secrets lest they compromise an ongoing investigation. Differing agencies, as well, compete for scarce federal dollars as well as power and prestige; minimizing so-called turf wars is important.[144] The New York City police department sends liaison officers to foreign capitals such as London, Tel Aviv, Amman and elsewhere to build relationships with foreign police forces and gather data about threats.[145] Some efforts to ensure inter-agency cooperation were written into legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, although one critic suggested the role of the CIA remained confused.[146] A 2006 report suggested there wasn't sufficient coordination between agencies such as the FBI and DHS and DoD,[87][147] although it found greater centralized leadership after the creation of the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).[43] The DNI's task is to integrate a wide range of intelligence coming from people, machines, satellites, intercepted communications, and other sources.[148] Unified terrorism databases help agencies share information when data is in common formats.[149]

Ideally a database would combine disparate information; even data about stock purchases may offer some clues about a possible attack. For example, in the week before 9/11, there were stock transactions involving millions of dollars in which some investors guessed that United Airlines and American Airlines would drop sharply in value; both of these airlines lost aircraft in the attacks of that day, and their stock did drop in value. The 9/11 commission noted these details but it was unclear who made these purchases or why. But investigators armed with this information might have new leads to study possible impending attacks.[150] But a continuing problem is how to intelligently mine through huge volumes of information to find that one important clue.[151]

Sometimes authorities appeal to the public for tips. One report from the U.S. White House called for "empowering an informed, involved, and observant citizenry" and encouraging people to provide tips when they observe "suspicious activities."[152] There can be a downside here, as well, particularly since most tips are well-meaning but confused pieces of non-information.

Police departments, as well, share information. Departments in different countries do this too; for example, experts from Israel have been visiting police departments in the U.S. and sharing methods; this not only expands the available pool of law enforcement know-how, but cements relations with allied nations as well.[153] Police in the U.S., U.K., Northern Ireland, and Arabian nations have shared information.[154] Sometimes U.S. police chiefs travel to Israel to study methods intensively, but these training trips can cost $5000–$7000 per person per trip.[155]

Surveillance is a general strategy. Britain, particularly London, has a "wondrous surveillance system" with "cameras all over London," according to U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman.[156] Cameras have many functions; they seem particularly useful after an attack, since they can help investigators trace who did what, and allow investigators to see the faces of particular people and license plates of vehicles.[157] As a result, cameras make it easier for authorities to apprehend terrorists after an attack, but they have yet to prove themselves valuable in preventing the attack in the first place.[156] In the U.S., DHS gave $40 million to states to invest in video security systems; but despite the investment, the police in metropolitan Washington have not arrested anybody because of the information from the cameras.[157] Freakonomics author Steven Levitt questioned the value of putting cameras everywhere and suggested it is "very anti-American" and wouldn't work politically, but saw value in helping authorities identify perpetrators.[158]

Since counter-intelligence agencies must keep some data secret from other parts of government, it is sometimes difficult winning cooperation and funding and speaking candidly with oversight committees. In general, secrecy is at odds with transparency.[159] But this makes it harder, at times, to win public support and keep funding from diminishing.[159]

International cooperation

There's an important foreign policy dimension to any effort to prevent terrorism, particularly if foreign governments fund terrorism or provide safe harbor, or secretly encourage it while pretending to be against terrorism.[160] American errors in foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, have caused huge discontent, particularly within the Arab world; even Thomas H. Kean of the 9/11 commission criticized U.S. foreign policy for turning a "turned a blind eye to the expansion of settlements in the West Bank," and actions such as these fuel Arab anger.[161] Sometimes perceived American weakness, as well, can cause terrorists to escalate their war. Kean suggested that bin Laden was encouraged to ramp up his terrorism campaign after seeing the U.S. retreat from Somalia and Lebanon after attacks caused the deaths of American soldiers.[162] While the United Nations can make resolutions, there has been criticism of its effectiveness in being able to prevent terrorism; it has been criticized for failing to come up with an adequate definition of terrorism, and has been described by some critics as being "impotent."[163]

There was speculation that stationing troops in foreign territory, particularly Western troop in the Middle East, was counter-productive, since it angered Arab opinion, and encouraged radicals to become violent. One study by a University of Chicago professor suggested that the single best predictor of terrorism was having troops stationed abroad.[158]

Aiding troubled nations has been mentioned as a deterrence strategy. In 2009 Secretary of State Clinton said "we cannot stop terrorism or defeat the ideologies of violent extremism when hundreds of millions of young people see a future with no jobs, no hope, and no way ever to catch up to the developed world," and this reflects a policy of helping troubled nations economically.[164] This approach is based on a view that poor economic conditions spawn desperate actions such as violent extremism, and that improving the jobs outlook will lessen the risk of terrorism.[164]

Analysis of effectiveness

Here is an analysis in 2006 by an expert agency of U.S. efforts to prevail against terrorism.

Accomplishments

  • Deprived al Qaeda of sanctuary in Afghanistan
  • No subsequent catastrophic attack on American territory
  • Eliminated significant al Qaeda leadership
  • Forged strong international intelligence cooperation
  • Constrained terrorist financing
  • Elevated democracy promotion on U.S. foreign policy agenda
  • Organized State Department to strengthen public diplomacy
  • Created Millennium Challenge Corporation & increased foreign assistance funding
  • Launched “Transformational Diplomacy”
  • Created new department to coordinate homeland security
  • Strengthened commercial aviation security
  • Expanded local and state capacity for homeland security operations
  • Increased significantly prevention & response in the private sector
  • Improved ability to recognize & address biological threats
  • Centralized leadership under Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
  • Established National Counterterrorism Center to focus collection, analysis, and operational planning
  • Increased information sharing among intelligence agencies, particularly FBI and CIA
  • Strengthened international cooperation with intelligence and security agencies
  • Led international coalition to evict al Qaeda from Afghanistan
  • Launched the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container Security Initiative
  • Pursued stronger, harmonized counterterrorism laws and practices globally
  • Strengthened counterterrorism cooperation and technical assistance with many countries
  • Identified and incapacitated A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network
  • Negotiated end of Libyan WMD programs
  • Established principle of sovereign accountability (no “safe harbor”) for terrorists
  • Renewed DoD emphasis on counterterrorism and irregular warfare
  • Increased Special Operations Forces capabilities, cultural awareness, linguists
  • Raised priority for building foreign capacity
  • Created State Department Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Continuing Challenges

  • Rise of autonomous “self-starter” cells
  • Metastasized jihadist threat
  • Bin Laden and Zawahiri still at large
  • Failure to create enduring security in Afghanistan and Iraq
  • Public diplomacy undermined by perceived U.S. unilateralism
  • U.S. moral authority & image eroded by Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, etc.
  • Public diplomacy weakened by domestic security paranoia (visa frustrations, Dubai Ports, etc.
  • Democracy and development assistance agendas viewed skeptically in many countries
  • Fortress mentality at embassies stifles public access and outreach
  • Failure to create counternarrative to global radicalism
  • No risk-based approach to prioritization, resource allocation, and long-range planning
  • Department of Homeland Security is a holding company, not an integrated department
  • Absence of clear national architecture and road map for preparedness
  • Inadequate coordination between DoD and DHS and FBI
  • Most security enhancements are slapped on, not built in
  • Border and immigration controls uneven and troubled
  • Weak, ineffective oversight from Congress
  • Serious internal contradictions mar intelligence reform, inhibiting DNI’s authority
  • Ambiguous roles and authorities among defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security
  • Analytic emphasis on tactical and near-term at the expense of strategic and long-term
  • Deficient personnel language, cultural awareness, and analytical skills
  • No common information-sharing environment
  • Unresolved tension between civil liberties and increased domestic surveillance
  • Intelligence cooperation remains largely bilateral
  • Failure to slow or end nuclear weapon and missile programs in Iran and North Korea
  • Counterterrorism mandates generate fatigue among allies and partners
  • “War” rhetoric and emphasis on military dimensions limit cooperation
  • Risk of WMD acquisition by terrorists remains unacceptably high
  • No grand strategy or interagency concept of operations for the “long war”
  • Overemphasis on use of military, creating substantial strains on forces
  • Insufficient deployable operational capacity in civilian agencies
  • No master plan to coordinate “soft power” programs
  • Chronically weak interagency coordination, planning, and operations

Source:Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 2006.[165]

References

  1. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... what can be done to prevent future terrorist attacks of this scale and how can we make this country safer for all its people...”
  2. Jean Paul Laborde. COUNTERING TERRORISM: NEW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVES: 132ND INTERNATIONAL SENIOR SEMINAR VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS, United Nations, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Protection by law thus demands legal measures to interrupt and interdict preparations for terrorist violence, not merely the identification and punishment of the perpetrators after a fatal event.”
  3. 3.0 3.1 Elaine Sciolino. France’s Terrorism Strategy Faulted, The New York Times: Europe, July 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “France’s much-praised system of using sweeping arrests and aggressive interrogations and prosecutions to combat terrorism prevents suspects from receiving a fair trial...”
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. Chertoff: Terrorism Prevention Efforts Successful, Washington Post, March 6, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “"To stop new attacks on America, we need to know who the terrorists are talking to...”
  5. 5.0 5.1 5.2 Megan McArdle. TSA Fails to Intercept Terrorist; We Pay the Price, The Atlantic, 28 Dec 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “...moronic new rules the TSA is apparently putting into place in order to "prevent" future such occurances. ...”
  6. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “I'm concerned about civil liberties as an excuse for not taking action to prevent terrorism. ... At the time FBI investigators could not obtain a criminal search warrant to inspect the laptop computer of Zacharias Moussaoui because supervisors in Washington D.C. thought there was no probable cause”
  7. Fareed Zakaria. The Only Thing We Have to Fear ... If you set aside the war in Iraq, terrorism has in fact gone way down over the past five years., Newsweek, Jun 2, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, ... and elsewhere have, like Iraq, been notorious for the number of civilians killed. But although the slaughter in these cases was intentional, politically motivated, and perpetrated by non-state groups—and thus constituted terrorism as conceived by MIPT, NCTC, and START...”
  8. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “He said in a Harvard commencement ceremony last year, and I quote, "The terrorist attacks on the United States of last September 11th were not nuclear, but they will be."”
  9. Steven Monblatt (2010-01-13). Transatlantic Security. British American Security Information Council. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... Today, state support to terrorist groups is more discreet, yet, in an age of nuclear proliferation, potentially much more deadly. ...”
  10. "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats", White House, 2009-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... biological threats ... (1) the risk is evolving in unpredictable ways; (2) advances in the enabling technologies will continue to be globally available; and (3) the ability to exploit such advances will become increasingly accessible to those with ill intent as the barriers of technical expertise and monetary costs decline.”
  11. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “With regard to the 9/11 attacks, it has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right 100 percent of the time and the terrorists only have to get lucky once.”
  12. 12.0 12.1 Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “On the other hand, an indiscriminate massive response could be portrayed by them as an assault on Islam and might provoke a huge backlash that would also advantage al Qaeda”
  13. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... State and local governments are being crushed by the incremental security costs.”
  14. 14.0 14.1 Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “That's the reality of terrorism: it adapts, mutates and constantly challenges our preconceptions. So counterterrorism strategies should do the same thing. That's the best way to limit the damage terrorists can inflict and, ultimately, reduce the supply of new recruits.”
  15. Fareed Zakaria. The Only Thing We Have to Fear ... If you set aside the war in Iraq, terrorism has in fact gone way down over the past five years., Newsweek, Jun 2, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “In both the START and MIPT data, non-Iraq deaths from terrorism have declined by more than 40 percent since 2001.”
  16. 16.0 16.1 [newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/files/9_11_csis.pdf Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments & Continuing Challenges], Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Failure to slow/end nuclear weapon and missile programs in Iran and North Korea ...”
  17. 17.0 17.1 17.2 Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... "Unless you can arrest [terrorists] before they get to execution stage, your chances of averting bloodshed and death come down to luck," ...”
  18. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Their preferred way to combat terrorism remains to capture or kill extremists, and the new emphasis on deterrence in some ways amounts to attaching a new label to old tools.”
  19. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. IEDs Seen As Rising Threat in The U.S., Washington Post, October 20, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Chertoff said the lesson from Iraq is to gather intelligence to disrupt the long chain of events needed to deliver a bomb -- from recruiting terrorists to infiltrating them into the country, gathering bomb materials, and selecting targets and tactics. ...”
  20. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “the Israelis describe how they work in three circles of security. ...”
  21. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “Second, they set up checkpoints or other ways to delay attackers. ...”
  22. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “If a bomber gets through the checkpoints, the Israelis have "hardened" their restaurants and malls, where shoppers are searched with a magnetometer. ...”
  23. Kevin Whitelaw. U.S. Ponders How To Stop Homegrown Terrorism, NPR, December 16, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... U.S. intelligence officials and outside terrorism experts alike concede that they still don't understand the process by which a tiny number of Muslims become radicalized toward violent acts. ...”
  24. Dr. Babu Suseelan. Pathways to Jihadi Terrorism, Islam Review, 2010-01-13. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “it is important to focus on the cognitive and behavioral variables acting as pathways for Jihadi terrorism. Empirically based investigations of psychological factors of Jihadi terrorism have been helpful in identifying risk factors, thinking errors, and criminogenic needs of Jihadi terrorists. These risk factors, and the deadly Islamic ideology, which transforms Muslims into terrorists and suicide bombers should be part of any effective harm reduction and terrorism prevention policy and plan.”
  25. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Al Qaeda also reflects a mindset, a mindset that really transcends the specific members that we may label as members of al Qaeda. Its members believe, as others, that Islam is on the defensive... Islam's very existence is threatened ... by the secular nature of our society, by our vast commercial and cultural power, by the destructive effects they see in globalization, by their own marginalization in the world, in their own societies, in the countries to which they and their parents have migrated...”
  26. Kevin Whitelaw. U.S. Ponders How To Stop Homegrown Terrorism, NPR, December 16, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been studying radicalization, but a number of experts say that prevention efforts have to be focused on the local level with outreach programs and community policing.”
  27. Steven Monblatt (2010-01-13). Transatlantic Security. British American Security Information Council. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “How are terrorists recruited? Until we can interrupt the terrorist recruitment process, more terrorists will continue to be created than we can ever capture or kill. We do not know enough about how or why individuals move from a sense of injustice, or powerlessness, to membership in actual terrorist groups or the commission of free-lance terrorist acts.”
  28. Kevin Whitelaw. Spy Agencies' Quest: What Makes A Terrorist?, NPR, November 18, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The al-Qaida terrorist network has worked hard to build and maintain an active media arm, which pumps out propaganda videos, training materials and other exhortations across the Internet. Much of it is aimed at inspiring extremists across the globe to join the cause, but it remains unclear how effective the messages are.”
  29. 29.0 29.1 Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The ultimate goal, of course, is to disrupt the radicalization and recruitment of terrorists to begin with–to fight motives, not just methods. That, most counterterrorism experts agree, is a job we could be doing much better right now by, for example, monitoring and swiftly responding to radical propaganda online. The long-term challenge facing the U.S. and its allies is harder but even more crucial: bolstering the credibility of those within the Muslim world willing to stand against the forces of extremism. Otherwise, says the Rand Corp.'s Brian Jenkins, "we are condemned to stepping on cockroaches one at a time. This will be endless."”
  30. Kevin Whitelaw. Spy Agencies' Quest: What Makes A Terrorist?, NPR, November 18, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “"Generally speaking, there needs to be an intermediary — someone who helps you along the path to radicalization," says the senior intelligence official. "For the actual embrace of the global jihad, you can be launched on that path by your own research on the Internet, but in most cases, you do need some kind of a guide." In the Fort Hood case, investigators are looking into Hasan's correspondence with radical Yemeni American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who used to deliver sermons at a Northern Virginia mosque that Hasan attended.”
  31. Kevin Whitelaw. U.S. Ponders How To Stop Homegrown Terrorism, NPR, December 16, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... Army Maj. Nidal Hasan allegedly killed 13 people, ... he was in close contact with a radical U.S.-born Muslim cleric living in Yemen. Investigators are still trying to understand what role the cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, might have played in Hasan's decision-making.”
  32. Bruce Hoffman, Steve Inskeep (host). Experts Explore How To Define Terrorism Act, NPR, November 25, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... terrorist groups like al-Qaida have learned they don't need to finance or train would-be terrorists directly; instead, they can motivate them to commit terrorism on their own. ... in 21st century terrorism.”
  33. Kevin Whitelaw. U.S. Ponders How To Stop Homegrown Terrorism, NPR, December 16, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... "Our research suggests that it would be best to intervene before the individuals depart the United States for training camps abroad, because experiences in those camps tend to harden their commitment towards al-Qaida and associated movements," Cragin said. "Yet, in many instances, individuals have not engaged in illegal activities prior to their departure."”
  34. 34.0 34.1 Kevin Whitelaw. Spy Agencies' Quest: What Makes A Terrorist?, NPR, November 18, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... Game and his two accomplices do not fit the typical profile of a homegrown terrorist. "They were only moderately involved in local religious activities," ...”
  35. Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Trying to profile would-be terrorists based on metrics like education or income can be counterproductive. French authorities say they continually come across new radicals whose backgrounds give absolutely no reason to suspect an embrace of extremism. ...”
  36. Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The more that authorities target a particular group, the more terrorist groups will recruit outside that category.”
  37. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... it is far harder to pinpoint the location of a terrorist group’s leaders than it was to identify the Kremlin offices of the Politburo bosses, making it all but impossible to deter attacks by credibly threatening a retaliatory attack.”
  38. 38.0 38.1 Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... they could fit in on any golf course. ...”
  39. 39.0 39.1 39.2 39.3 39.4 [newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/files/9_11_csis.pdf Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments & Continuing Challenges], Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... Failure to create counternarrative to global radicalism”
  40. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... , if the seeds of doubt can be planted in the mind of Al Qaeda’s strategic leadership that an attack would be viewed as a shameful murder of innocents–or, even more effectively, that it would be an embarrassing failure–then the order may not be given, according to this new analysis.”
  41. Steven Monblatt (2010-01-13). Transatlantic Security. British American Security Information Council. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Most victims of terrorism are innocent bystanders who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.”
  42. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Those who perished in those attacks or those who were wounded had done nothing to warrant it. ...”
  43. 43.0 43.1 43.2 [newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/files/9_11_csis.pdf Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments & Continuing Challenges], Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “ACCOMPLISHMENTS • Centralized leadership under Director of National Intelligence (DNI) • Established National Counterterrorism Center to focus collection, analysis, and operational planning • Increased information sharing among intelligence agencies, particularly FBI and CIA • Strengthened international cooperation with intelligence and security agenciesCONTINUING CHALLENGES• Weak, ineffective oversight from Congress• Serious internal contradictions mar intelligence reform, inhibiting DNI’s authority• Ambiguous roles and authorities among defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security • Analytic emphasis on tactical and near-term at the expense of strategic and long-term• Deficient personnel language, cultural awareness, and analytical skills • No common information-sharing environment • Unresolved tension between civil liberties and increased domestic surveillance”
  44. Steven Monblatt (2010-01-13). Transatlantic Security. British American Security Information Council. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “US lacks sufficient numbers of native speakers of Arabic to work, not only as interpreters and translators, but as investigators, case officers, and interrogators as well.”
  45. Joby Warrick. Strategy Against Al-Qaeda Faulted: Report Says Effort Is Not a 'War', Washington Post, July 30, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “"Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors," ...”
  46. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “All became the first casualties of what has become a war against the United States”
  47. 47.0 47.1 Jessica Stern. Mind of Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists, Foreign Affairs, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... According to the Saudi government, since 2004, more than 4,000 militants have gone through its rehabilitation programs, and the graduates have been reintegrated into mainstream society much more successfully than ordinary criminals. ...”
  48. Kevin Whitelaw. Spy Agencies' Quest: What Makes A Terrorist?, NPR, November 18, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12.
  49. Kevin Whitelaw. U.S. Ponders How To Stop Homegrown Terrorism, NPR, December 16, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12.
  50. 50.0 50.1 Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12.
  51. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “A primary focus has become cyberspace, ... the government has mounted a secret campaign to plant bogus e-mail messages and Web site postings, with the intent to sow confusion, dissent and distrust among militant organizations, officials confirm.”
  52. Joby Warrick. Strategy Against Al-Qaeda Faulted: Report Says Effort Is Not a 'War', Washington Post, July 30, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... a greater reliance on law enforcement and intelligence agencies in disrupting the group's networks and in arresting its leaders.”
  53. Matthew B. Stannard. U.S. intelligence chief touts improved security, San Francisco Chronicle, September 16, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The nation's tools for collecting, analyzing and sharing information have improved so greatly over the past eight years...”
  54. Matthew B. Stannard. U.S. intelligence chief touts improved security, San Francisco Chronicle, September 16, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The strategy was prepared in response to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed by Congress in 2004, ...”
  55. "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats", White House, 2009-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12.
  56. 56.0 56.1 Fareed Zakaria. The Only Thing We Have to Fear ... If you set aside the war in Iraq, terrorism has in fact gone way down over the past five years., Newsweek, Jun 2, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... extraordinary drop in support for Islamist terror organizations in the Muslim world over the past five years ...”
  57. 57.0 57.1 Kevin Whitelaw. Spy Agencies' Quest: What Makes A Terrorist?, NPR, November 18, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “It's no longer the centralized, hierarchical organization it was in the 9/11 era ...”
  58. 58.0 58.1 58.2 Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12.
  59. 59.0 59.1 59.2 59.3 [newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/files/9_11_csis.pdf Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments & Continuing Challenges], Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... Deprived al Qaeda of sanctuary in Afghanistan ...”
  60. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “to expose and incapacitate the financial networks used by terrorists, ... multilingual financial analysts, and accountants ... follow how the finance flows in ... We have to focus and we have to look at the nexus not only between terrorism but also between organized crime.”
  61. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... we also need to understand how al Qaeda works,...”
  62. 62.0 62.1 [newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/files/9_11_csis.pdf Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments & Continuing Challenges], Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... Overemphasis on use of military, creating substantial strains on forces ...”
  63. Elaine Sciolino. France’s Terrorism Strategy Faulted, The New York Times: Europe, July 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “French practices result in too many arrests and convictions based on scanty evidence, putting the country “on the wrong side of the law.” ...”
  64. Elaine Sciolino. France’s Terrorism Strategy Faulted, The New York Times: Europe, July 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... even a suspect’s family members, friends, neighbors and casual acquaintances can be detained. ...”
  65. Elaine Sciolino. France’s Terrorism Strategy Faulted, The New York Times: Europe, July 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... the chief of France’s domestic and police intelligence service ... make it possible to neutralize, before they go into action, any group or individual liable to perpetrate an attack in France...”
  66. Elaine Sciolino. France’s Terrorism Strategy Faulted, The New York Times: Europe, July 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... We can catch terrorists before they act ...”
  67. Elaine Sciolino. France’s Terrorism Strategy Faulted, The New York Times: Europe, July 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... giving suspects only minimal access to legal counsel ...”
  68. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “In New York City, as many as 100 police officers in squad cars from every precinct converge twice daily at randomly selected times and at randomly selected sites, like Times Square or the financial district, ...”
  69. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “It (Al Qaeda) is a system, a process for transforming the discontents of Islam into a violent expression of jihad...”
  70. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “... discover where terrorists might hide explosives.”
  71. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “The police officials went out on midnight police patrols, met with bomb technicians and learned how terrorists disguise explosives.”
  72. Joby Warrick. Strategy Against Al-Qaeda Faulted: Report Says Effort Is Not a 'War', Washington Post, July 30, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Addressing the U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda, the study noted successes in disrupting terrorist financing...”
  73. 73.0 73.1 Steven Monblatt (2010-01-13). Transatlantic Security. British American Security Information Council. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Arguably, restraining terrorist financing is the area in which the international community has made the greatest progress. ...”
  74. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13.
  75. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “countering terrorism finance. Now more resources need to be expended in a more coordinated fashion on the financial front in the war against terrorism.”
  76. 76.0 76.1 "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats", White House, 2009-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Optimizing our domestic laws, regulations, policies and practices for securing high-risk pathogens and toxins and providing detailed guidance for improved compliance; Improving use of mechanisms to report theft or loss or release from laboratories holding dangerous pathogens and toxins to appropriate public health and law enforcement agencies;”
  77. Staff writer. Recovering Potential Dirty Bomb Material, The New York Times, March 12, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... It has a backlog of 8,800 known items. ...”
  78. Staff writer. Recovering Potential Dirty Bomb Material, The New York Times, March 12, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... make a dirty bomb. One reason we’re so scared is there is a lot of this material around the United States.”
  79. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “... interrupt bomb supply lines ...”
  80. 80.0 80.1 80.2 Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “President Bush has declared that the United States will hold “fully accountable” any nation that shares nuclear weapons with another state or terrorists. ...”
  81. Staff writer. Troubled Budgets and Homeland Security, The New York Times, March 12, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... The record of failed terrorist plots tells us that the most effective intelligence is gathered close to home, as a result of local, on-the-ground domestic intelligence efforts.”
  82. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “Seminars teach the Americans how to gather deeper intelligence,”
  83. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “The notion that criminal prosecution could bring a terrorist group like al Qaeda to justice is absurd.”
  84. Fred H. Cate. Plane-side TSA searches aren't worth the trouble, USA Today, April 08, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The final reason plane-side searches don't work is that they are too infrequent to serve any deterrent value. ...”
  85. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Where grave threats are present, state responsibility exists and the need for the use of preemptive force is demonstrable, even if not imminent”
  86. Steven D. Levitt. Terrorism, Part II, The New York Times: Opinion, August 9, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “If the threat is from abroad, then we can do a good job screening risky people from entering the country. That, too, is obvious. Perhaps less obvious is that we can do a good job following potential risks after they enter the country.”
  87. 87.0 87.1 87.2 [newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/files/9_11_csis.pdf Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments & Continuing Challenges], 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “ACCOMPLISHMENTS • Created new department to coordinate homeland security • Strengthened commercial aviation security • Expanded local and state capacity for homeland security operations • Increased significantly prevention/response in the private sector • Improved ability to recognize/address biological threatsCONTINUING CHALLENGES• No risk-based approach to prioritization, resource allocation, and long-range planning • Department of Homeland Security is a holding company, not an integrated department • Absence of clear national architecture/road map for preparedness• Inadequate coordination between DoD and DHS and FBI • Most security enhancements are slapped on, not built in • Border/immigration controls uneven and troubled”
  88. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. Chertoff: Terrorism Prevention Efforts Successful, Washington Post, March 6, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Improvements in U.S. traveler screening and border security have shifted the focus of al-Qaeda operatives and sympathizers to Europe, which is perceived as a more open target, ...”
  89. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. Chertoff: Terrorism Prevention Efforts Successful, Washington Post, March 6, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Listing a number of steps he said his administration has taken to prevent future terrorist attacks, Bush asserted that "we have made our borders more secure," ...”
  90. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. IEDs Seen As Rising Threat in The U.S., Washington Post, October 20, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... Among the shortcomings identified in the report: Explosives-sniffing dogs are trained differently by various federal agencies, making collaboration between squads "difficult if not impossible." ...”
  91. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “how to spot a suicide bomber.”
  92. 92.0 92.1 Megan McArdle. TSA Fails to Intercept Terrorist; We Pay the Price, The Atlantic, 28 Dec 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Janet Napolitano saying "the system worked" when what she means is "the system failed, but smart passengers proved that the system is unnecessary"”
  93. 93.0 93.1 Megan McArdle. TSA Fails to Intercept Terrorist; We Pay the Price, The Atlantic, 28 Dec 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Terrorists are bound to get through airport security if they really want, or do something worse, like blow up the crowds of people patiently waiting in line to go through airport security.”
  94. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... Some of the terrorists listed their means of support as simply "student" failing to then list the name and address of any school or institution”
  95. Dennis C. Blair. Text: Statement of Dennis C. Blair, The New York Times, January 22, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... I believe strongly that torture is not moral, legal, or effective. Any program of detention and interrogation must comply with the Geneva Conventions, the Conventions on Torture, and the Constitution.”
  96. Fred H. Cate. Plane-side TSA searches aren't worth the trouble, USA Today, April 08, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The TSA has a difficult job securing more than 450 airports and the more than 28,000 daily flights. Accomplishing this task requires intelligent, strategic leadership, not a return to a practice already shown not to work.”
  97. Fred H. Cate. Plane-side TSA searches aren't worth the trouble, USA Today, April 08, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... the TSA reports that the biggest threat to aviation security today is liquids that can be combined to create explosives. But we have no efficient, reliable way to test liquids outside of a laboratory. ...”
  98. Fred H. Cate. Plane-side TSA searches aren't worth the trouble, USA Today, April 08, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... inspections during the boarding process are not often rigorous. They can't be; there isn't time. ...”
  99. Bruce Nussbaum. Terrorism Is Changing The Dynamic of Air Travel. Take The Halo, Not the Plane., BusinessWeek, August 14. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “You can see and hear people across the world as if they were across a window. And you can exchange data by simply writing on screens as you talk. Halo is one innovation that can deal with terrorism.”
  100. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. New Security Strategy Emphasizes Disaster Preparedness, Washington Post, October 10, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... "We remain particularly concerned about the employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)" in the United States, the report says...”
  101. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. IEDs Seen As Rising Threat in The U.S., Washington Post, October 20, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... In contrast, the D.C. police bomb squad's 10 technicians handle about 700 calls a year, but they are housed in portable trailers and must also perform crime patrols.”
  102. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. IEDs Seen As Rising Threat in The U.S., Washington Post, October 20, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Experts and officials have struggled in reaching a consensus that the government should invest more in efforts to detect and disrupt bomb plots in advance, and not just pay for equipment and training that could keep specific devices from exploding in metropolitan regions or reaching other targets.”
  103. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... years of GAO recommendations to secure cockpit doors...”
  104. Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Since 1970, terrorists of one stripe or another have deployed at least 756 vehicle bombs around the world, according to research ...”
  105. Steven D. Levitt. Terrorism, Part II, The New York Times: Opinion, August 9, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... The point is this: there is a virtually infinite array of incredibly simple strategies available to terrorists.”
  106. Steven D. Levitt. Terrorism, Part II, The New York Times: Opinion, August 9, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... If terrorists want to engage in low-grade, low-tech terror, we are powerless to stop it. That is the situation in Iraq right now, and, to a lesser degree, in Israel. That was also more or less the situation with the IRA a while back.”
  107. Steven D. Levitt. Terrorism, Part II, The New York Times: Opinion, August 9, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... The actual cost of this low-grade terrorism in terms of human lives is relatively small, compared to other causes of death like motor-vehicle crashes, heart attacks, homicide, and suicide. It is the fear that imposes the real cost.”
  108. Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “In June 2006, Glasgow Airport ... however, they simply tailgated behind a registered car and sped past before the barrier closed.”
  109. Lynn E. Davis, Tom LaTourrette, David E. Mosher, Lois M. Davis, David R. Howell. Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, and Biological Terrorist Attacks, RAND Corporation, 2010-01-12, pp. 198. MR1731. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. , p. 7
  110. RAND MR-1731, p. xv
  111. RAND MR-1731, p. xvii
  112. RAND MR-1731, p. xvii
  113. Lynn E. Davis, Tom LaTourrette, David E. Mosher, Lois M. Davis, David R. Howell. Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, and Biological Terrorist Attacks, Rand Corporation, 2010-01-12, pp. 198. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “In the case of smallpox, ... individuals “in contact” with those persons receive a smallpox vaccination as quickly as possible.”
  114. Lynn E. Davis, Tom LaTourrette, David E. Mosher, Lois M. Davis, David R. Howell. Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, and Biological Terrorist Attacks, Rand Corporation, 2010-01-12, pp. 198. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Chemical Attack: Find clean air quickly. Radiological Attack: Avoid inhaling dust that could be radio­active. Nuclear Attack: Avoid radioactive fallout—evacuate the fallout zone quickly or, if not possible, seek best available shelter. Biological Attack: Get medical aid and minimize further expo­sure to agents.”
  115. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. New Security Strategy Emphasizes Disaster Preparedness, Washington Post, October 10, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The White House yesterday updated the nation's homeland security strategy ... acknowledging the need to prepare for catastrophic natural disasters as well as the "persistent and evolving" threat of terrorism.”
  116. "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats", White House, 2009-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Promote global health security...”
  117. "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats", White House, 2009-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Individuals and Families ... keeping supplies of food and other materials at home—as recommended by authorities—to support essential needs of the household for several days if necessary...”
  118. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Had the belatedly scrambled fighter jets flown at their maximum speed of engagement, they would have reached New York City and the Pentagon within moments of their deployment, intercepted the hijacked airliners before they could have hit their targets, and undoubtedly saved lives...”
  119. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “After returning from Israel, Gainer retrained his officers to shoot a potential suicide bomber in the head rather than aim for the chest, as they were originally taught, because shooting the chest could detonate a suicide vest.”
  120. 120.0 120.1 Alex Kingsbury. Slew of Warnings on Nuclear, Biological Terrorism Prompt Worries of Fearmongering, US News & World Report, December 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “"With a nuclear attack, it's a one-shot deal," says James Talent, a former congressman and vice chair of the panel. "With a biological attack, terrorists can strike a city, reload the aerosol can, and come back a week later with the same agent and attack again." The prospect of weaponizing organisms is now greater than ever, the report said, particularly given the explosion in the number and quality of advanced biotech labs at the world's colleges and universities. (Biology is routinely one of the hottest majors in college.)”
  121. 121.0 121.1 Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “A Palestinian policeman on a bus detonated a bomb packed with shrapnel, killing himself and 10 others ... "It's very important to them to clear a crime scene quickly and get back to business as usual,"...”
  122. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “Lanier also was taken aback by the speed and efficiency with which the Israeli police notified the public, assisted the victims, rushed them to hospitals and cleaned their blood-spattered bombing scenes.”
  123. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “"They told us that the longer the scene is left there, the more traumatizing it becomes," Lanier said. "They clean and clear as quickly as they can. The suicide bomber is dead. There's not this meticulous combing for evidence in every case."”
  124. 124.0 124.1 Jean Paul Laborde. COUNTERING TERRORISM: NEW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVES: 132ND INTERNATIONAL SENIOR SEMINAR VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS, United Nations, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “By defining terrorism as a crime rather than as an international security issue, the General Assembly has chosen a criminal law approach rather than a war model of fighting terrorism.”
  125. Joby Warrick. Strategy Against Al-Qaeda Faulted: Report Says Effort Is Not a 'War', Washington Post, July 30, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “"In most cases, military force isn't the best instrument," said Jones, a terrorism expert and the report's lead author.”
  126. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... specially trained teams have recovered computer hard drives used by terrorists and are turning the terrorists’ tools against them. ...”
  127. 127.0 127.1 127.2 Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Other American efforts are aimed at discrediting Qaeda operations, including the decision to release seized videotapes showing members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a largely Iraqi group with some foreign leaders, training children to kidnap and kill, as well as a lengthy letter said to have been written by another terrorist leader that describes the organization as weak and plagued by poor morale.”
  128. David Wood. Defense will become even costlier, Newark Star-Ledger, 2001-09-13. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Defense strategists, soberly regrouping in a cratered Pentagon, are in surprising agreement: Much more money but not a major shift in strategy is needed for the war on terrorism. ... Pressure is growing on the Bush administration to establish a single agency to end a decade of bureaucratic confusion in U.S. efforts against terrorism.”
  129. Steven D. Levitt. Terrorism, Part II, The New York Times: Opinion, August 9, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The alternative interpretation is that the terror risk just isn’t that high and we are greatly overspending on fighting it, or at least appearing to fight it. For most government officials, there is much more pressure to look like you are trying to stop terrorism than there is to actually stop it. The head of the TSA can’t be blamed if a plane gets shot down by a shoulder-launched missile, but he is in serious trouble if a tube of explosive toothpaste takes down a plane. Consequently, we put much more effort into the toothpaste even though it is probably a much less important threat.”
  130. Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker. U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists, The New York Times, March 18, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “American diplomats are quietly working behind the scenes with Middle Eastern partners to amplify the speeches and writings of prominent Islamic clerics who are renouncing terrorist violence.”
  131. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “Classes include the history of Islamic fundamentalism”
  132. "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats", White House, 2009-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Ensuring appropriate Federal investments in “technology watch” initiatives that provide cutting edge insight and analysis from those currently engaged in the science; Reviewing and, as appropriate, updating our regulatory requirements and guidance on export controls to reflect the current state of the life sciences; Promoting the continued expansion of opportunities for employment within the Federal Government for those with life science expertise; ... Defining, integrating, focusing, and enhancing existing IC capabilities dedicated to current and strategic biological threats, whether from states, groups, or individuals;”
  133. Alex Kingsbury. Slew of Warnings on Nuclear, Biological Terrorism Prompt Worries of Fearmongering, US News & World Report, December 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The congressionally mandated WMD Commission, which spent six months studying the threat, did offer some concrete counterterrorism recommendations, including a plea for greater emphasis on biological terrorism. The biological sciences community, in particular, should be more attuned to the risks of potentially dangerous knowledge falling into the wrong hands, the report concluded.”
  134. Alex Kingsbury. Slew of Warnings on Nuclear, Biological Terrorism Prompt Worries of Fearmongering, US News & World Report, December 3, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “... "sensitizes researchers to biosecurity issues and concerns."”
  135. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. Chertoff: Terrorism Prevention Efforts Successful, Washington Post, March 6, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Listing a number of steps he said his administration has taken to prevent future terrorist attacks, Bush asserted that ... improved the detection of counterfeit travel documents.”
  136. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... it's the issue of identity theft. And we saw some of those 9/11 hijackers utilizing that in order to not only gain entry into the United States but also to garner requisite resources.”
  137. Spencer S. Hsu. Democrats Move Cautiously on DHS Appointment, Washington Post, 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “In 2006, Beers and former Clinton and Bush counterterrorism adviser Richard C. Clarke recommended that Homeland Security concentrate on securing major cities and coordinating the private sector to protect critical facilities and computer networks.”
  138. 138.0 138.1 Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “We cannot rely in our strategy of homeland security on a gates-and-guards approach. We must design security that is effective and efficient. We must build critical infrastructure that is strong and resilient, able to suffer damage and continue to function. Above all, we must abandon unrealistic expectations of total security and instead adopt a more realistic acceptance of risk. We must not allow terrorist attacks or fears of terrorist attack to shut us down”
  139. Steven Monblatt (2010-01-13). Transatlantic Security. British American Security Information Council. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Notionally, the most important priority is protecting civilian populations against chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons, but it is not the only priority. Critical infrastructure, government functions, and national symbols all need protection, even if in practice they must be prioritized.”
  140. 140.0 140.1 George W. Bush (CQ Transcriptions). President Bush Speaks on Terrorism, Washington Post, April 10, 2006. Retrieved on 2010-01-12.
  141. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13.
  142. David Wood. Defense will become even costlier, Newark Star-Ledger, 2001-09-13. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “creation of a Homeland Defense Agency that would rely heavily on the National Guard but also would gain control over the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, the Customs Service and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.”
  143. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. New Security Strategy Emphasizes Disaster Preparedness, Washington Post, October 10, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “208,000-worker Department of Homeland Security”
  144. Darrell Issa. CIA's Panetta, DNI Blair Must End Turf War and Switch Jobs, US News & World Report, June 18, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Regrettably, the internecine turf wars that formerly compromised our intelligence community show signs of new life. This time around, the conflict involves Adm. Dennis Blair, President Obama's national intelligence director and a highly-decorated Pacific fleet commander, and Leon Panetta, a seasoned and immensely competent Washington insider who now leads the Central Intelligence Agency.”
  145. Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “The NYPD has officers based in 10 cities around the world, including London, Tel Aviv, Amman, Paris and Lyon, France. By building relationships with other police forces, the NYPD hopes to gather data about threats before they show up in New York City. "What we have to do is get as much information as we can and respond accordingly," says Commissioner Ray Kelly.”
  146. David Bjerklie. How The CIA Can Be Fixed, Time Magazine, May 14, 2006. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “There's a piece of legislation--the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004--that was passed in December of 2004 and set up the office of the DNI [director of national intelligence] and Ambassador [John] Negroponte. In my mind it's a flawed piece of legislation. There is no strategic blueprint for the intelligence community. And therefore there's confusion over roles and responsibilities. The CIA is caught up in that confusion.”
  147. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “... a large gap that existed between the gathering of intelligence domestically by the FBI and the overseas focus of the rest of the intelligence community. As a result of this gap, there was lack of sharing of information between those tracking radicals at home and those tracking radicals abroad”
  148. Dennis C. Blair. Text: Statement of Dennis C. Blair, The New York Times, January 22, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “The DNI needs to lead the integration of intelligence sources – human, signals, geospatial, measurement and signature, and open source. Such integration mutually empowers, and maximizes, the contribution of each intelligence source. The DNI needs to ensure that the whole of the national intelligence enterprise is always more than the sum of its parts.”
  149. Spencer S. Hsu and William Branigin. Chertoff: Terrorism Prevention Efforts Successful, Washington Post, March 6, 2008. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Listing a number of steps he said his administration has taken to prevent future terrorist attacks, ... unified terrorism databases...”
  150. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “In the week prior to September 11th both the SEC and U.S. intelligence agencies ignored one major stock-market indicator, one that could have yielded valuable information with regard to the September 11th attacks. On the Chicago Board Options Exchange during the week before September 11th, put options were purchased on American and United Airlines, the two airlines involved in the attacks. The investors who placed these orders were gambling that in the short term, the stock prices of both airlines would plummet. Never before on the Chicago Exchange were such large amounts of United and American Airlines options traded. These investors netted a profit of several million dollars after the September 11th attacks. Interestingly, the names of the investors remain undisclosed and the millions remain unclaimed in the Chicago Exchange account...”
  151. Steven Monblatt (2010-01-13). Transatlantic Security. British American Security Information Council. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “In today's information-rich societies, analysts face the challenge of sorting through vast quantities of data to find the significant fact. How can we use data-mining techniques to assist in this task, and how can civil liberties be protected against unwarranted government intrusion?”
  152. "National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats", White House, 2009-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Empowering an informed, involved, and observant citizenry ... We must seek to encourage the development of social networks that derive from positive and productive relationships among our law enforcement and security communities ... Establishing mechanisms for willing members of the vulnerable community to notify appropriate authorities of unusual or suspicious activities in a confidential manner.”
  153. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “Levy has been traveling across the United States with other Israeli security experts to share counterterrorism tactics with American law enforcement officials. They are briefing not only big-city cops but county sheriffs and police chiefs from such diverse locations as Gaithersburg and Knoxville, Tenn.”
  154. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “Over the years, U.S. law enforcement authorities have exchanged information with counterterrorism officials in Northern Ireland and London's Scotland Yard. Since 2001, the FBI also has sent more agents to work on counterterrorism with law enforcement authorities in Arab capitals, including Cairo, Riyadh, Amman and Abu Dhabi, according to Gary Bald, the FBI executive assistant director for counterterrorism and counterintelligence.”
  155. Sari Horwitz. Israeli Experts Teach Police On Terrorism, Washington Post, June 12, 2005. Retrieved on 2010-01-17. “Since the summer of 2002, the institute has sent 40 senior law enforcement officials to Israel, including the Los Angeles assistant police chief, the security chief of New York's Metropolitan Transit Authority and the police chiefs of Gaithersburg and Prince William County, at a cost of $5,000 to $7,000 a person.”
  156. 156.0 156.1 Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “And yet as the news of the car bombs broke, some politicians were more inclined to credit London's wondrous surveillance system. "The Brits have got something smart going. They have cameras all over London," said U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman. "I think it's just common sense to do that here much more widely."”
  157. 157.0 157.1 Amanda Ripley. Spotting the Terror Threat, Time Magazine, Jul. 05, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “So far, the Department of Homeland Security has given states more than $40 million to invest in video security systems. But in March, the Washington metropolitan police department admitted that the dozens of cameras it has had in place since 9/11 have so far netted zero arrests. What the surveillance cameras can do is help investigators piece together the details of plots after they are attempted, gather forensic evidence and identify suspects–all of which deepens their understanding of how terrorist networks operate. "Terrorism prevention is about information gathering and intelligence," says Richard Pildes, a co-director of New York University's Center on Law and Security. "It's not about defensive measures."”
  158. 158.0 158.1 Steven D. Levitt. Terrorism, Part II, The New York Times: Opinion, August 9, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “Another option is one the British have used: putting cameras everywhere. This is very anti-American, so it probably would never fly here. I also am not sure it is a good investment. But the recent terrorist attacks in the U.K. suggest that these cameras are at least useful after the fact in identifying the perpetrators. The work of my University of Chicago colleague Robert Pape suggests that the strongest predictor of terrorist acts is the occupation of a group’s territory. From that perspective, having American troops in Iraq is probably not helping to reduce terrorism — although it may be serving other purposes.”
  159. 159.0 159.1 Dennis C. Blair. Text: Statement of Dennis C. Blair, The New York Times, January 22, 2009. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Unlike many other parts of the government, the activities of intelligence officers must often be secret to be effective. Therefore, there is a special obligation for the leadership of the Intelligence Community to communicate frequently and candidly with the oversight committees, and as much as possible with the American people. There is a need for transparency and accountability in a mission where most work necessarily remains hidden from public view.”
  160. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “I think too many governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, but I think this applies to other Middle Eastern governments as well, who play a double game, who pretend to be our allies while secretly, or sometimes not so secretly, turning a blind eye to their citizens, funding terrorism,...”
  161. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “I support Israel, but we've turned a blind eye to the expansion of settlements in the West Bank and all of these things are interconnected. I'm not a blame-America-first advocate. This was the fault of the hijackers, and the hijackers were the fault of a dysfunctional society in the Arab Muslim countries...”
  162. Thomas H. Kean (chairman) et. al.. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, United States Government, 2003-03-31. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “Osama bin Laden fashioned his strategy on the basis of this passive policy. He became convinced the U.S. could be forced to leave Muslim countries and abandon Israel if he launched attacks that shed American blood.”
  163. Jean Paul Laborde. COUNTERING TERRORISM: NEW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVES: 132ND INTERNATIONAL SENIOR SEMINAR VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS, United Nations, 2007. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “The UN is often criticized for its action (or more accurately lack of action) on terrorism. “Lack of the definition” of terrorism, not addressing its “root causes”, “victims” and other issues are often cited by the critics to highlight UN impotence in dealing with this gravest manifestation of crime.”
  164. 164.0 164.1 AFP. Development aid key to terrorism fight: Clinton, Yahoo! News, 2010-01-06. Retrieved on 2010-01-13. “"We cannot stop terrorism or defeat the ideologies of violent extremism when hundreds of millions of young people see a future with no jobs, no hope, and no way ever to catch up to the developed world," she said in a speech at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Aides stressed earlier that Clinton's views come in the context of the critical need for improved conditions in countries beset by Islamist insurgencies, citing situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen as prime examples.”
  165. [newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/files/9_11_csis.pdf Five Years After 9/11: Accomplishments & Continuing Challenges], Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2006-09-11. Retrieved on 2010-01-12. “ACCOMPLISHMENTS ... CONTINUING CHALLENGES ...”