Vicksburg Campaign: Difference between revisions
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Grant set his first mission the capture of Vicksburg, one of two Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi. For half a year every strategy he could devise failed. At one point he even tried digging a new channel for the river so the fortress would be left high and dry. Aware that political enemies in Washington might get him recalled, Grant kept on the move. Grant's supply lines, based a railroad from Columbus, Kentucky, grew longer and more vulnerable the further south he moved. At least he had supply lines; the Confederates had to live off the land, and also leave enough for their civilians to survive. In December, one rebel cavalry raid cut the railroad from Columbus and another captured Grant's main supply depot at Holly Springs, Mississippi. Grant was forced to pull back to Memphis, rely on the river for supplies, and rethink his strategy. He tried waterborne attacks, which also failed. | Grant set his first mission the capture of Vicksburg, one of two Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi. For half a year every strategy he could devise failed. At one point he even tried digging a new channel for the river so the fortress would be left high and dry. Aware that political enemies in Washington might get him recalled, Grant kept on the move. Grant's supply lines, based a railroad from Columbus, Kentucky, grew longer and more vulnerable the further south he moved. At least he had supply lines; the Confederates had to live off the land, and also leave enough for their civilians to survive. In December, one rebel cavalry raid cut the railroad from Columbus and another captured Grant's main supply depot at Holly Springs, Mississippi. Grant was forced to pull back to Memphis, rely on the river for supplies, and rethink his strategy. He tried waterborne attacks, which also failed. | ||
==New strategy== | ==New strategy== | ||
Finally in spring, 1863, he realized that his supply lines were a handicap; defending them tied down half his army, and their very existence told the enemy where he would be. He could live off the land too (leaving civilians only two months worth of food) and use freed slaves as laborers. In the most audacious move of the war, Grant circled around Vicksburg from the south and east, and cut loose from his supply lines. He would win the campaign or lose his entire army. Passing Vicksburg was a challenge accepted by the Navy's | Finally in spring, 1863, he realized that his supply lines were a handicap; defending them tied down half his army, and their very existence told the enemy where he would be. He could live off the land too (leaving civilians only two months worth of food) and use freed slaves as laborers. In the most audacious move of the war, Grant circled around Vicksburg from the south and east, and cut loose from his supply lines. He would win the campaign or lose his entire army. | ||
Passing Vicksburg was a challenge accepted by the Navy's Acting Rear Admiral [[David Porter]]. The heart of his fleet, six "City-class" Eads ironclads, had a reliable top speed of six knots, and the swollen river had a four-knot current. While a combined ten-knot speed would help the fleet dash past the batteries, the ironclads would be too vulnerable if they tried to return upstream at two knots; it was a one-way trip. Vicksburg's riverine defenses mounted 34 heavy guns and 16 field pieces dispersed along a 3.5-mile front. The Rebel gunners had dug their most powerful guns into the sides of the river bluff so that they fired from elevations 30 to 40 feet above the water. Wartime experience to date had proven that plunging shot could wreak fearful damage on Union ironclads. Experience also showed, however, that well-prepared and well-led vessels could race past shore batteries. Single vessels already had managed to pass Vicksburg, but an entire fleet composed of seven ironclads and three transports was something else. Porter ordered each ironclad to lash coal-filled barges to her port side to protect the hull from enemy fire. Sailors stacked hay, cotton bales, or sandbags around machinery and magazines. On April 16, under cover of darkness Porter slipped the Yankee fleet past the 31 heavy guns of Vicksburg, dodging one shell every ten seconds, and absorbing one a minute. All were hit repeatedly, but were saved by their thick iron armor (one sank). Cannon fire from the heavy guns was surprisingly ineffective. The shells for the 10-inch Columbiads weighed 128 pounds, but the rate of fire was slow. The ironclads' own broadsides provided concealing smoke, causing most of the Rebel shots to miss high. Confederate munitions were seldom of satisfactory quality, so that their hits lacked penetrating power.<ref>James R. Arnold, "Rough Work on the Mississippi." ''Naval History'' 1999 13(5): 38-43. Issn: 1042-1920 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref> A week later a flotilla of Army steamers made the same run (manned by soldiers, as the civilian crews declined the job.) Grant's army marched south in roundabout fashion, then 22,000 men and their supplies were ferried by Porter to the east bank of the Mississippi in the greatest amphibious operation in American history up to that date. | |||
===Manuevers=== | ===Manuevers=== | ||
In a masterful display of strategic maneuver against a divided enemy, Grant marched 130 miles in ten days, won four battles, and laid a tight siege on Vicksburg. Grant had systematically destroyed railroads and bridges behind him, so that Johnston's Confederate army could not relieve the siege. Washington assisted by rushing in reinforcements hurriedly pulled off garrison and anti-guerrilla duty. Vicksburg, under siege for 48 days, was on the verge of starvation; it surrendered on July 4, 1863, with 30,000 prisoners. Grant paroled the prisoners, many of whom promptly rejoined the rebel army; other had enough and went home to stay. | When Grant sent 1,700 cavalry under Colonel Grierson on a hugely successful 600-mile raid through the length of Mississippi, the Confederates lost their telegraph, their railroads and their knowledge of where Grant's army was. | ||
In a masterful display of strategic maneuver against a divided enemy, Grant marched 130 miles in ten days, won four battles, and laid a tight siege on Vicksburg. Grant had systematically destroyed railroads and bridges behind him, so that Johnston's Confederate army could not relieve the siege. Washington assisted by rushing in reinforcements hurriedly pulled off garrison and anti-guerrilla duty. Vicksburg, under siege for 48 days, was on the verge of starvation; it surrendered on July 4, 1863, with 30,000 prisoners. Grant paroled the prisoners, many of whom promptly rejoined the rebel army; other had enough and went home to stay.<ref> This was the last major paroile of the war; afterwards prisoners went to prisoner of war camps for the duration. Terry Whittington, "In the Shadow of Defeat: Tracking the Vicksburg Parolees." ''Journal of Mississippi History'' 2002 64(4): 307-330. Issn: 0022-2771</ref> | |||
Five days later [[Port Hudson]], the last fortress on the Mississippi, surrendered after a 47 day siege of its own, and the Confederacy was cut in twain. | Five days later [[Port Hudson]], the last fortress on the Mississippi, surrendered after a 47 day siege of its own, and the Confederacy was cut in twain. | ||
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Lincoln understood that Grant had the answer. He first gave Grant command in the west, then in early 1864 demoted Chief of Staff Halleck to clerical chores and put Grant in overall charge of military strategy, with Sherman in command of the western theater. | Lincoln understood that Grant had the answer. He first gave Grant command in the west, then in early 1864 demoted Chief of Staff Halleck to clerical chores and put Grant in overall charge of military strategy, with Sherman in command of the western theater. | ||
==Memory and Image== | |||
Confederate general Stephen Dill Lee worked tirelessly in the 1880s-1890s to create a national military park at Vicksburg, Mississippi, a shrine to commemorate the campaign and the men on both sides who fought in it. Lee's motives were to honor the soldiers of both sides, which would help ease the pain of defeat for the Confederates and also serve as a step toward national reconciliation. A tight-fisted Congress repeatedly refused to fund the project, however, until the conclusion of the Spanish-American War loosened purse strings and encouraged patriotic sentiments. Lee served as the first supervisor of the Vicksburg National Military Park, a position that required him to acquire land, correspond with veterans of the battle, and plan the placement of monuments, cannons, and other attractions.<ref>Terrence J. Winschel, "Stephen D. Lee and the Making of an American Shrine." ''Journal of Mississippi History'' 2001 63(1): 17-32. Issn: 0022-2771 </ref> | |||
==Bibliography== | ==Bibliography== | ||
* Arnold, James R. ''Grant Wins the War'' (1997) | * Arnold, James R. ''Grant Wins the War'' (1997) | ||
Revision as of 11:09, 15 June 2008
The Vicksburg Campaign 1862-63 was the major action in the western theater of the American Civil War. It climaxed on Jul y4, 1863, with the surrender of the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg to Union General Ulysses S. Grant. The victory cut off the western parts of the Confederacy, and made the Mississippi River the basic transportation route for the further invasion of the Confederacy. The campaign has long been studied by military theorists as Grant outmaneuvered four enemy armies and rewrote the rule of warfare, especially regarding logistics and supply lines, while ensuring his choice of overall Union commander.
Strategy
The western theater stretched not two hundred miles across Virginia, but a thousand miles from Cincinnati to New Orleans. The first western strategic goal of the Union was to seize full control of the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, and state of Tennessee. The second goal was to use the Tennessee River to launch an attack at the rebel heartland in Georgia. The Mississippi River was of less strategic value, but control was a high priority because the "Father of Waters" was central to the image of nationhood held by westerners. Furthermore, control would completely knock Texas and Arkansas out of the war without the need to defeat the strong armies there. Throughout the war, Washington and Richmond both tended to ignore the west; they sent inadequate soldiers and supplies.
The two national governments, and their respective media and influential elites, were oriented toward the East front, which they mistakenly assumed would prove decisive. Responsibility for the various armies (and Union Navy) out west was divided on both sides. But while the Federals learned to cooperate under the brilliant consensus-oriented leadership of Grant, the Confederates squabbled continually, and failed to communicate and cooperate. Grant thus beat them piecemeal.
Climate
Grant's biggest challenge was geography and nature itself. The Union armies were challenged by swamps and mud, by the twists and turns of the rivers and bayous that hid a hundred bushwhackers, by the insufferable heat, and especially by diseases that northerners were unaccustomed to. Lee believed that the Yankees would be wiped out by malaria, so there was no need to ship a portion of his troops west. Indeed, every year doctors treated 900 cases of malaria per thousand of Grant's soldiers (victims usually were recorded multiple times, most men never caught the disease). The Yankees, however, had ample supplies of quinine, and kept the death rate to 4 per 1000 effectives per year. The Confederates, short of quinine, doctors, hospitals and food, suffered much more.
1862-63
Grant set his first mission the capture of Vicksburg, one of two Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi. For half a year every strategy he could devise failed. At one point he even tried digging a new channel for the river so the fortress would be left high and dry. Aware that political enemies in Washington might get him recalled, Grant kept on the move. Grant's supply lines, based a railroad from Columbus, Kentucky, grew longer and more vulnerable the further south he moved. At least he had supply lines; the Confederates had to live off the land, and also leave enough for their civilians to survive. In December, one rebel cavalry raid cut the railroad from Columbus and another captured Grant's main supply depot at Holly Springs, Mississippi. Grant was forced to pull back to Memphis, rely on the river for supplies, and rethink his strategy. He tried waterborne attacks, which also failed.
New strategy
Finally in spring, 1863, he realized that his supply lines were a handicap; defending them tied down half his army, and their very existence told the enemy where he would be. He could live off the land too (leaving civilians only two months worth of food) and use freed slaves as laborers. In the most audacious move of the war, Grant circled around Vicksburg from the south and east, and cut loose from his supply lines. He would win the campaign or lose his entire army.
Passing Vicksburg was a challenge accepted by the Navy's Acting Rear Admiral David Porter. The heart of his fleet, six "City-class" Eads ironclads, had a reliable top speed of six knots, and the swollen river had a four-knot current. While a combined ten-knot speed would help the fleet dash past the batteries, the ironclads would be too vulnerable if they tried to return upstream at two knots; it was a one-way trip. Vicksburg's riverine defenses mounted 34 heavy guns and 16 field pieces dispersed along a 3.5-mile front. The Rebel gunners had dug their most powerful guns into the sides of the river bluff so that they fired from elevations 30 to 40 feet above the water. Wartime experience to date had proven that plunging shot could wreak fearful damage on Union ironclads. Experience also showed, however, that well-prepared and well-led vessels could race past shore batteries. Single vessels already had managed to pass Vicksburg, but an entire fleet composed of seven ironclads and three transports was something else. Porter ordered each ironclad to lash coal-filled barges to her port side to protect the hull from enemy fire. Sailors stacked hay, cotton bales, or sandbags around machinery and magazines. On April 16, under cover of darkness Porter slipped the Yankee fleet past the 31 heavy guns of Vicksburg, dodging one shell every ten seconds, and absorbing one a minute. All were hit repeatedly, but were saved by their thick iron armor (one sank). Cannon fire from the heavy guns was surprisingly ineffective. The shells for the 10-inch Columbiads weighed 128 pounds, but the rate of fire was slow. The ironclads' own broadsides provided concealing smoke, causing most of the Rebel shots to miss high. Confederate munitions were seldom of satisfactory quality, so that their hits lacked penetrating power.[1] A week later a flotilla of Army steamers made the same run (manned by soldiers, as the civilian crews declined the job.) Grant's army marched south in roundabout fashion, then 22,000 men and their supplies were ferried by Porter to the east bank of the Mississippi in the greatest amphibious operation in American history up to that date.
Manuevers
When Grant sent 1,700 cavalry under Colonel Grierson on a hugely successful 600-mile raid through the length of Mississippi, the Confederates lost their telegraph, their railroads and their knowledge of where Grant's army was.
In a masterful display of strategic maneuver against a divided enemy, Grant marched 130 miles in ten days, won four battles, and laid a tight siege on Vicksburg. Grant had systematically destroyed railroads and bridges behind him, so that Johnston's Confederate army could not relieve the siege. Washington assisted by rushing in reinforcements hurriedly pulled off garrison and anti-guerrilla duty. Vicksburg, under siege for 48 days, was on the verge of starvation; it surrendered on July 4, 1863, with 30,000 prisoners. Grant paroled the prisoners, many of whom promptly rejoined the rebel army; other had enough and went home to stay.[2]
Five days later Port Hudson, the last fortress on the Mississippi, surrendered after a 47 day siege of its own, and the Confederacy was cut in twain.
Defying Jomini
In defying the strategic law that armies had to maintain and protect their supply lines, Grant not only ignored Halleck in Washington and disregarded the advice of his top aid General Sherman, he violated one of the geometrical principles of warfare as expounded by the leading European theorist, Baron Antoine Jomini. [3] (Grant admitted he had never bothered to read Jomini.) Jomini depicted warfare primarily as a matter of capturing key localities and winning battles by maneuver and timing. His mathematical models fascinated smart engineers like Halleck (3rd out of 31 in his West Point class), McClellan (2nd out of 59) Lee (2/46) and Sherman (6/42); luckily for Grant, he graduated so low in his West Point class (21/39) that he was ineligible to join the engineers.
Jomini's principles ignored the broader political question of national ability and will to fight, and downplayed practical matters of manpower, training, intelligence, logistics and weaponry. Grant concluded instead that, "there are no fixed laws of war which are no subject to the conditions of the country, the climate, and the habits of the people." The epiphany hit Sherman on May 18, when he stood with Grant overlooking the Mississippi; they had circled Vicksburg and reestablished their supply line. Sherman became an avid convert to Grant's radical methods. To win the war, they decided, they had to break the Confederacy's ability and will to resist, while winning enough battles to maintain morale in the army and on the homefront.
Lincoln understood that Grant had the answer. He first gave Grant command in the west, then in early 1864 demoted Chief of Staff Halleck to clerical chores and put Grant in overall charge of military strategy, with Sherman in command of the western theater.
Memory and Image
Confederate general Stephen Dill Lee worked tirelessly in the 1880s-1890s to create a national military park at Vicksburg, Mississippi, a shrine to commemorate the campaign and the men on both sides who fought in it. Lee's motives were to honor the soldiers of both sides, which would help ease the pain of defeat for the Confederates and also serve as a step toward national reconciliation. A tight-fisted Congress repeatedly refused to fund the project, however, until the conclusion of the Spanish-American War loosened purse strings and encouraged patriotic sentiments. Lee served as the first supervisor of the Vicksburg National Military Park, a position that required him to acquire land, correspond with veterans of the battle, and plan the placement of monuments, cannons, and other attractions.[4]
Bibliography
- Arnold, James R. Grant Wins the War (1997)
- Ballard, Michael B. Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi, (2004). excerpt and text search
- Bearss, Edwin C., The Vicksburg Campaign, 3 volumes, (1991), ISBN 0-89029-308-2.
- Carter, Samuel III, The Final Fortress: The Campaign for Vicksburg, 1862-1863 (1980)
- Foote, Shelby. The Beleaguered City: The Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863 (1995), part of his three volume history of the war excerpt and text search
- Grant, Ulysses S. Memoirs (1885) online edition
- Hoehling, A. A. Vicksburg: 47 Days of Siege (1996) excerpt and text search
- Martin, David G. The Vicksburg Campaign: April 1862-July 1863 (1994) excerpt and text search; also online edition
- Miers, Earl Schenck., The Web of Victory: Grant at Vicksburg. 1955.
- Shea, William L. and Winschel, Terrence J. Vicksburg is the Key: The Struggle for the Mississippi River. (2003). 232 pp. online edition
- Simpson, Brooks D. Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865, (2000), ISBN 0-395-65994-9. first volume of major scholarly biography excerpt and text search
- Smith, Timothy B. Champion Hill: Decisive Battle for Vicksburg (2006) excerpt and text search
- Winschel, Terrence J. Vicksburg: Fall of the Confederate Gibraltar (1999) online edition
- Woodworth, Steven E. Grant's Lieutenants: From Cairo to Vicksburg (2001) excerpt and text search
See also
notes
- ↑ James R. Arnold, "Rough Work on the Mississippi." Naval History 1999 13(5): 38-43. Issn: 1042-1920 Fulltext: Ebsco
- ↑ This was the last major paroile of the war; afterwards prisoners went to prisoner of war camps for the duration. Terry Whittington, "In the Shadow of Defeat: Tracking the Vicksburg Parolees." Journal of Mississippi History 2002 64(4): 307-330. Issn: 0022-2771
- ↑ Jomini's other principles included concentrating superior numbers (which Grant understood well), the advantage of short interior lines of communication over longer exterior lines (which Grant ignored, since he had a much larger source), and the advantage of turning (sideways) movements over frontal assaults (ignored by Grant). Grant would have agreed wholeheartedly with Jomini's admonitions about the psychological value of surprise and the danger of passivity (except at Shiloh, Grant always attacked first.)
- ↑ Terrence J. Winschel, "Stephen D. Lee and the Making of an American Shrine." Journal of Mississippi History 2001 63(1): 17-32. Issn: 0022-2771