United States Mission to the Republic of Vietnam

Once the Republic of Vietnam was formed, the United States resident leadership was called the United States Mission to the Republic of Vietnam. Legally, although not always in political reality, it was headed by the Ambassador. The senior U.S. military officer, however, sometimes had comparable power.

The Central Intelligence Agency station chief also was extremely influential. At a somewhat lower level of power, but still important, were the public affairs and nonmilitary aid chiefs, respectively, from the United States Information Agency and Agency for International Development.

Some individuals, with varying titles and authority, had unusual amounts of power, such as Robert Komer, officially Deputy Ambassador with responsibility for Revolutionary Development, but who also insisted on having the status of a full general.

Ambassadors

There were various ambassadors while Vietnam was a French proto-state, but the first true Ambassador at a national level was G. Frederick Reinhardt, accredited when the RVN became a nation. He was succeeded by Elbridge Dubrow and Frederick Nolting Jr.. During their terms, Ngo Dinh Diem was President of South Vietnam.

Henry Cabot Lodge was ambassador during the Buddhist crisis and military coup of 1963, which ended with the overthrow and killing of Diem, followed by a series of military governments. Maxwell Taylor replaced him, but Lodge returned when Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lodge and Taylor were the chiefs of mission during the major U.S. ground combat phase. Ellsworth Bunker presided over Vietnamization.

Graham Martin left just before the fall of the RVN.

Notable Deputy Ambassadors

• Robert Komer

Military Commanders

Before the commitment of U.S. combat trops, the senior officer was the commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group.

The U.S. combat headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC-V), was under generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams.

CIA station chiefs

William Colby described a common United States Mission friction, not limited to Saigon.

In various

places a foreign leader might think that he could be dealing with CIA and have kind of a direct shot into the policy levels in Washington rather than going into the kind of more bureaucratic concept of the Department of State and the Foreign Service and all that. And [they thought] they would receive more of an understanding transmission of their ideas than might occur through the diplomatic channel. Now this can become a problem. It can either become a problem or it can be very useful, depending upon the attitude of the ambassador and the local chief of station and the head of CIA and whoever's the secretary of state. Because in some situations, if those four people have enough confidence in each other that they're going to play the same game, then the foreigner can be given the impression that he's getting this direct shot so that he's going to be perhaps more revealing of his ideas. And nobody will be out of sympathy, because everybody will be consulted and there'll be no feeling that something's going on behind his back. On the other hand, if the ambassador gets persnickety about his privileges, or if the chief of station begins to think he's

the ambassador, then you've got trouble and it doesn't work.

In 1962-1963, the station was under John Richardson. Richardson had developed an ability few had: communicating with Ngo Dinh Dhu. Lodge insisted Richardson be replaced, according to Neil Sheehan, not because he performed badly but to signal the U.S. rejection of Ngo.

• William Colby
• Lewis J. Lapham
• Thomas Polgar

Theodore Shackley held the job in 1968 through 1972. Tom Polgar was the last chief; Colby was then Director of Central Intelligence.