Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

U.S. doctrine for providing military assistance to other countries will involve headquarters tailored to the specific situation, but, when the organization is to command U.S. combat troops as well as support to the Host Nation (HN), a Military Assistance Command may be established to control the full range of combat, technical assistance, training, supply, and other relationships. A Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is a smaller headquarters that is not prepared to direct combat forces.

The MAAG and MAC structure is especially appropriate for conventional warfare. When counterinsurgency is a large part of the mission, see the U.S. doctrine in Foreign Internal Defense.

Early U.S. military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, once it moved beyond the level of military attaches, started with a MAAG. There was a unit called the Saigon Military Mission that arrived in 1954, but that was a cover name for a Central Intelligence Agency covert action and intelligence collection unit.

MAAG-Indochina

Even before the French left, Military Assistance and Advisory Group-Indochina was established in September 1950, under Francis G. Brink, Thomas J. H. Trapnell, and John W. O'Daniel. They were involved in assessing the increasingly desperate situation, although direct missions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved in considering U.S. military relief to the besieged French base at Dien Bien Phu.

There was also covert assistance to the French, through CIA proprietaries such as Civil Air Transport. Several American transport pilots, including the legendary "Earthquake" McGoon, died in attempts to get supplies to Dien Bien Phu.

France had asked to borrow 25 B-26 medium bombers, excellent aircraft for battlefield air interdiction, and several hundred United States Air Force maintenance personnel who would stay out of the combat zone. "Eisenhower sent only 10 B-26s and 200 US airmen to maintain them. He also laid down the strict proviso that they would rotate out of Vietnam and be home by June 15, 1954.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur Radford had recommended massive U.S. assistance for Dien Bien Phu, including, on at least five occasions, the use of nuclear weapons; Eisemhower rejected each suggetion.

MAAG-Vietnam

Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam. They were Samuel T. Williams, Lionel C. McGarr, and Charles J. Timmes. These men served, in succession, from May 1954 to February 1962.

There appears to have been some communications intelligence capability in the MAAG in 1959. See SIGINT from 1945 to 1989#SIGINT in Southeast Asia, 1954-1960

While the arrival of the first U.S. units in Vietnam are usually set in 1961 or 1962 (e.g., with the first fatality in 1962 in the 3rd Radio ResearchUnit, a United States Army Special Forces training team came to Nha Trang in the summer of 1957 to set up a Vietnamese Special Forces school,, but, by 1960, they were training over 50 units of Vietnamese Rangers. "Although this aspect of the advisory experience began in the Eisenhower presidency, it was greatly expanded under the keen interest and direction of President Kennedy later."

MAC-Vietnam

In 1962, the command structure became known as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). It took control of units that came increasingly involved in combat, and eventually was the headquarters controlling four corps-sized units, usually called Field Forces to avoid confusion with the four Vietnamese corps, which were organized on geographic lines. A four-star U.S. Army Vietnam commander reported to the COMUSMACV, as well as three-star navy, marine, air force, and subordinate Army commands.

Other combat units included 5th Special Forces Group, Naval Forces Vietnam, and the Seventh Air Force, as well as specialized technical and civil development organizations

MAC-V also conmmanded an immense support organization.

Commanding generals, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Name	Dates
Paul Harkins	1962 to 1964
William Westmoreland	1964-1968
Creighton Abrams	1968-1972
Fred Weyand	1972-1973

While the MACV commander never had control of all forces, as the US commander of UN forces did during the Korean War, there were both joint and separate article; it was never a coalition command such as in the Gulf War or a United Nations Command as in Korea.

Power, among U.S. forces in Vietnam, shifted at the top. The major power influencers were the Ambassador (theoretically the Chief of Mission), the MACV commander, the CIA station chief, and, to a lesser extent, the Agency for International Development (foreign aid) and United Stats Information Serice (psychological warfare) groups. Occasionally, a special deputy would be named, such as Robert Komer for "revolutionary development."

Defense Attache Office

After U.S. combat troops left, a large Defense Attache Office, reporting on the war and, within restrictions, providing support and advice, stayed until the end in 1975.