February 26, 1936 Incident: Difference between revisions

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Perhaps the most serious coup attempt of Japan, before [[World War Two in the Pacific]], was the '''February 26, 1936 Incident''',  a classic incident of ritualized insubordination, or ''[[gekokoju]]''. Leaders killed by the radical Army Young Officers included killing Home Minister [[Makoto Saito]], Finance Minister [[Korekiyo Takayashi]], and Army [[Inspector General of Military Education]] [[Jotaro Watanabe]]. <ref name=NDL>{{citation
Perhaps the most serious coup attempt of Japan, before [[World War Two in the Pacific]], was the '''February 26, 1936 Incident''',  a classic incident of ritualized insubordination, or ''[[gekokoju]]''. Leaders killed by the radical Army Young Officers included Home Minister [[Makoto Saito]], Finance Minister [[Korekiyo Takayashi]], and Army [[Inspector General of Military Education]] [[Jotaro Watanabe]]. <ref name=NDL>{{citation
  | url = http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha4/description07.html
  | url = http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha4/description07.html
  | publisher = National Diet Library
  | publisher = National Diet Library
  | contribution = Chapter 4, Challenge to Constitutional government &mdash; The rise of the military: 4-7 The 2.26 Incident of 1936
  | contribution = Chapter 4, Challenge to Constitutional government &mdash; The rise of the military: 4-7 The 2.26 Incident of 1936
  | title = Modern Japan in Archives}}</ref>
  | title = Modern Japan in Archives}}</ref> They also killed a number of police, family members, and staff.


While it drew initial support, especially from officers associated with the [[Imperial Way Faction]], Emperor [[Hirohito]] took a strong position against the rebels, even threatening personally to lead troops against it. After three days, it collapsed.  This provided the basis for the [[Control Faction]] to purge the Imperial Way members from the military. It led to "unity" cabinets, and the end of [[Japanese party government before World War Two|political parties]] by 1940.  
While it drew initial support, especially from officers associated with the [[Imperial Way Faction]], Emperor [[Hirohito]] took a strong position against the rebels, even threatening personally to lead troops against it. After three days, it collapsed.  This provided the basis for the [[Control Faction]] to purge the Imperial Way members from the military. It led to "unity" cabinets, and the end of [[Japanese party government before World War Two|political parties]] by 1940.  

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Perhaps the most serious coup attempt of Japan, before World War Two in the Pacific, was the February 26, 1936 Incident, a classic incident of ritualized insubordination, or gekokoju. Leaders killed by the radical Army Young Officers included Home Minister Makoto Saito, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takayashi, and Army Inspector General of Military Education Jotaro Watanabe. [1] They also killed a number of police, family members, and staff.

While it drew initial support, especially from officers associated with the Imperial Way Faction, Emperor Hirohito took a strong position against the rebels, even threatening personally to lead troops against it. After three days, it collapsed. This provided the basis for the Control Faction to purge the Imperial Way members from the military. It led to "unity" cabinets, and the end of political parties by 1940.

Theory

Ikki Kita, wrote, in his book A Plan for the Reorganization of Japan, that the land should follow "state socialism", in which landowners, industrialists, and even some aristocrats were usurpers, interfering with a "gospel of the sword" that could unify "our seven hundred million brothers in China and India", led by Japan.[2]

1931 preamble

Kita's disciple Mitsugi Nishida was a military officer, but resented the materialistic influence of the Three Crows. He supported what the British Embassy termed "the realization of a system of Fascist dictatorship, based on aggressive militarism, chauvinism, and the destruction of all liberal principles of government." He formed a group called the Young Officers, who made their first action in the March 1931 Incident, with the intent of making Sadao Araki the Prime Minister. Araki was head of the Imperial Way faction.

1935 events

Another organization, the National Principle Group organized by two former Army comrades and containing mostly lieutenants and captains, had, in May 1935, sent a pamphlet to Army Chief of Staff (Japan) Prince Kanin, charging that Nagata was involved in the March incident. Kanin, on 30 July 1935, sent War Minister Hayashi to as Hirohito's permission to expel the two leaders from the Army, as opposed to the usual punishment of transfer to the reserves. [3] Prince Chichibu had been monitoring the situation for the Palace, and the plotters felt they had encouraged them.

The defense counsel of Saburo Aizawa, assassin of Tetsuzan Nagata, said at his trial, "If the court fails to understand the spirit which guided Colonel Aizawa, a second Aizawa, and even a third, will appear." Aizawa himself said he was motivated to commit a murder, under gekokujo, because

I came to realize that the senior statesmen, those close to the Throne, powerful financiers and bureaucrats, were attemptimg gradually to corrupt the government and the Army to their selfish interests. "[4]

Prime Minister Okabe, in trying to control the situation, rejected the organ theory of government. Still, this was insufficient for some who wanted radical reform, including constitutional interpretation. Government changes did not satisfy them.[5]

1936 operation

They felt most encouraged by Gen. Tomiyuki Yamashita, a member of Imperial Way and then assigned to the Palace, to investigate the Strike-North Faction. He had agreed to meet with them on December 22, but did not. After the meeting, several members stopped at a police station and gave a report on their own activities. While this might seem odd in Western eyes, it was quite customary, and even regarded as privileged, for radicals to keep the police informed, as part of the maintenance of civil order. Marquis Kido noted some of the plans in his diary:[6]

  • 1st Company, 1st Infantry Regiment: capture the Home Minister's residence
  • 3rd Company, 3rd Infantry Regiment: kill Prime Minister Keisuke Okada
  • 2nd Company, 1st Infantry Regiment: kill the Lord Privy Seal

The plotters were angry that sympathetic General Jinzaburo Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education had been replaced by Jotaro Watanabe.

Final planning

On the evening of February 22, the leaders met at the home of Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara and reviewed the target list:[7]

The strike

Twenty-two junior officers, part of the plot, commanded over 1,400 soldiers in carrying out the operation. They immediately took control of the Army Ministry and Metropolitan Police Headquarters, and killed Makoto, Takahash, and Watanabe, and wounded Suzuki. Five policemen, and several family and staff members, died in the attacks.

Baroness Suzuki mollified the assassins, when they were about to give him a coup de grace, by saying "If you consider it necessary, let me do it." Okada's secretary and brother-in-law, Colonel Denzo Matsuo, ran at the rebels, shouting "Long live the emperor", and was killed instantly — but they thought they had killed the Prime Minister. Makino's bodyguards fought the mutineers long enough for him to escape. [8]

From a tactical standpoint, their immediate failures included not cutting the Palace's communications, and not considering the Navy as a counterforce. The commander of the Yokusuka Naval Base, Rear Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, guarded the Navy Ministry and gathered warships and landing forces for a counterattack. [9]

Hirohito's reaction

Emperor Hirohito, in spite of the Imperial Way's idealization of the throne, strongly disapproved and ordered counteraction. He had been informed, at 05:40, that an uprising was underway.

Dressed in an Army uniform, he met accused General Shigeru Honjo of prior knowledge. Honjo had received a warning from his son-in-law at 5 AM that day, and ordered him to call it off. He also notified the chief of the kempetai and the duty imperial aide-de-camp.

Shortly after 0600, however, Hirohito said to him, "Only you, Chief Aide-de-Camp, worried beforehand there might be such an outbreak." He replied,

The young officers only mean to find a place for their sense of righteousness as individuals in the all-encompassing righteousness of the Emperor. They wish a little fresh air for their ideas to bloom in.[10]

According to the Harrises, Hirohito responded,"Why should we forgive them when these brutal officers kill our right-hand advisers? ... All my most trusted retainers are dead and [the mutineers'] actions are aimed directly at me." In an unprecedented statement for an Emperor traditionally behind the scenes, (emphasis added) he continued, "We ourselves will lead the Imperial Guards and suppress them.[11]

Kido quickly determined what the Imperial Guards would do if the mutineers moved into the palace, and made it his priority to be sure no provisional cabinet would be formed until the mutiny was over.

Army Minister Yoshiyuki Kawashima met with rebels, at 0700, who occupied the lower floor of his residence. They gave him their manifesto of demands, and recommended that he consult with several officers: Strike-North Faction leader Mazaki, vice-minister of war Lieutenant General Furusho Mikio, and Major General Tomiyuki Yamashita. They did not know Yamashita had been reporting their discussions to the Palace.[12] Presenting the rebel manifesto, which Bergamini interprets as having a veiled message of avoiding further foreign entanglement, and focus on domestic reform and preserving traditional virtues, rejecting his expansionist policies. [13] Kawashima encouraged Hirohito to form a cabinet to "clarify the kokutai', stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense." Hirohito sent him off to suppress the rebellion, and also sent away Chief of Staff (Imperial Japanese Navy) Prince Fushimi, who also wanted to know what the Emperor would do about a new cabinet. [14]

At 0800, Mazaki, of the Imperial Way Faction (kodo-ha) "whom a court-martial was later to credit with advanced knowledge of the uprising", visited the Army Minister, congratulated them, and then discussed a solution. They agreed, without consulting anyone else in the army, to forward a recommendation that a "strong cabinet" be formed. [12] Mazaki was the rebels' candidate for Prime Minister. On April 5, 1935, he had issued an instruction to the Army to clarify kokutai, explaining Japan was a holy land ruled over sacred emperors who were living deities. He was a member of Kokuhonsha.[15]

The Emperor told the members of the Supreme War Council that the Army must suppress the revolt. At noon, Kawwashima sent Yamashita to the rebel command post with an answer, which, in formal language, told the six leaders they had lost. "The Emperor has been told your intentions; the war minister recognizes the sincerity of your motives; the Supreme War Council has met and decided to uphold the national prestige." They said they would die fighting; Yamashita called the palace, and kept talking, reinforced with Teiichi Suzuki and the commander of the rebels' regiment.

Hirohito, meanwhile, refused to appoint a new prime minister, considering that a sign of success by the rebels. Eventually, the Cabinet appointed a temporary administrator. The Supreme War Council acknowledged that they had been heard, and then ordered the Tokyo Defense Plan put into effect. After the Emperor met with the Privy Council, they recommended the imposition of martial law.[16]

The second day

Loyal troops took positions, by 10:30, facing the rebels and securing the open areas of the palace. Prince Chichibu, who was known as a friend of the rebels, was enroute to Tokyo, and was escorted to the palace for dinner awhen he arrived at 17:17. Joined by other princes, two decisions were made: have Prince Kanin come to Tokyo and stand in support of Hirohito. Chichibu also sent a personal note to the highest-ranking rebel, asking him, as a personal favor, to withdraw. That individual, Captain Nonaka, shot himself the next day.

Generals Mazaki, Noboyuki Abe, and Yoshikazu Nishi told the five surviving leaders that they should submit. The rebels were in radio contact with Ikki, who encouraged them to continue.

The third day

Collapse of the revolt

Hirohito refused to send a Palace witness to the ritual suicides of some of the leaders.

Aftermath

The leading officers, as well as two civilian theorists, Ikki Kita and Mitsugi Nishida, were executed. [1]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 , Chapter 4, Challenge to Constitutional government — The rise of the military: 4-7 The 2.26 Incident of 1936, Modern Japan in Archives, National Diet Library
  2. Merion and Susie Harris (1991), Soldiers of the Sun: the Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army, Random House, p. 177
  3. David Bergamini (1971), Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, Morrow, pp. 621-622
  4. John Toland (1970), Chapter 1: Gekokoju, The Rising Sun: the Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1935, vol. Volume 1, Random House, pp. 14-15
  5. Herbert P. Bix (2001), Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, Harper Perennial, ISBN 978-0060931308, pp. 292-293
  6. Bergamini, p. 323
  7. Harris & Harrs, p. 184
  8. Bergamini, pp. 634-636
  9. Bix, pp. 297-298
  10. Bergamini, pp. 638-639
  11. Harris & Harris, p. 190
  12. 12.0 12.1 Harris & Harris, p. 190
  13. Bergamini, p. 642
  14. Bix, p. 299
  15. Bix, pp. 288-299
  16. Bergamini, pp. 643-645