Determinism: Difference between revisions

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imported>John R. Brews
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imported>John R. Brews
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<font face="Gill Sans MT">"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>  —Ernest Nagel ''Alternative descriptions of physical state'', p. 292 </font>
<font face="Gill Sans MT">"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."<ref name=Nagel/>  —Ernest Nagel ''Alternative descriptions of physical state'', p. 292 </font>
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The idea of 'cause-and-effect' is replaced with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events.<ref name=Russell/> There is no implication here of 'cause' and 'effect', but merely the theoretical implication that certain 'states' are connected to other 'states', which may be earlier or later in time.  These physical states may be described in various ways, for example, using wavefunctions that determine the probabilities of observable events involving individual 'elementary' particles, or using the specification of gross variables, like temperature and pressure, that have meaning only for numbers of particles large enough to allow a statistical interpretation.  
The idea of 'cause-and-effect' is replaced with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events.<ref name=Russell/> There is no implication here of 'cause' and 'effect', but merely the theoretical implication that certain 'states' are connected to other 'states', which may be earlier or later in time.  These physical states may be described in various ways, for example, using wavefunctions that determine the probabilities of observable events involving individual 'elementary' particles, or using the specification of gross variables, like temperature and pressure, that have meaning only for numbers of particles large enough to allow a statistical interpretation. Such logical implication is a far cry from the rigid determinism envisioned by [[Pierre-Simon Laplace]], who had classical physics in mind.<ref name=Hahn/>


The philosophical position can be interpreted to be independent of the precise form of the 'laws of nature', although any reference to "the past" may be problematic, and any supposed implication of 'causation' is to be replaced by something closer to 'association' via an empirically grounded theoretical apparatus.  
The philosophical position can be interpreted to be independent of the precise form of the 'laws of nature', although any reference to "the past" may be problematic, and any supposed implication of 'causation' is to be replaced by something closer to 'association' via an empirically grounded theoretical apparatus.  
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==References==
==References==
{{reflist|refs=
{{reflist|refs=
<ref name=Hahn>
Apparently, Laplace's view was enunciated earlier by Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de [[Condorcet]] in correspondence with [[Jean d'Alembert]]: {{cite book |title=Pierre Simon Laplace, 1749-1827: A Determined Scientist |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=ROu0P-pYQekC&pg=PA52 |pages=p. 52 |author=Roger Hahn |isbn=0674018923 |year=2005 }publisher=Harvard University Press}}
</ref>
<ref name=Russell>
<ref name=Russell>
The notion of cause introduces unnecessary complications best avoided as done here. For example, see {{cite journal |author=Bertrand Russell |title=On the notion of cause |url=http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4543833?uid=3739824&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101590170351 |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series) |volume=13 |year=1912-1913 |pages=pp. 1-26}}   
The notion of cause introduces unnecessary complications best avoided as done here. For example, see {{cite journal |author=Bertrand Russell |title=On the notion of cause |url=http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4543833?uid=3739824&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101590170351 |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series) |volume=13 |year=1912-1913 |pages=pp. 1-26}}   

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Determinism as a philosophical position is summarized in the "consequence argument":

Consequence Argument: "If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us."[1] —Peter van Inwagen An Essay on Free Will, p. 16

From a scientific standpoint, determinism takes the form of physical determinism. A law of nature is deterministic if its theoretical formulation connects certain physical states ineluctably to others. Physical determinism is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory:

"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."[2] —Ernest Nagel Alternative descriptions of physical state, p. 292

The idea of 'cause-and-effect' is replaced with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events.[3] There is no implication here of 'cause' and 'effect', but merely the theoretical implication that certain 'states' are connected to other 'states', which may be earlier or later in time. These physical states may be described in various ways, for example, using wavefunctions that determine the probabilities of observable events involving individual 'elementary' particles, or using the specification of gross variables, like temperature and pressure, that have meaning only for numbers of particles large enough to allow a statistical interpretation. Such logical implication is a far cry from the rigid determinism envisioned by Pierre-Simon Laplace, who had classical physics in mind.[4]

The philosophical position can be interpreted to be independent of the precise form of the 'laws of nature', although any reference to "the past" may be problematic, and any supposed implication of 'causation' is to be replaced by something closer to 'association' via an empirically grounded theoretical apparatus.

References

  1. Peter van Inwangen (1986). “The problems and how we shall approach them”, An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press, p. 16. ISBN 0198249241. 
  2. Ernest Nagel (1999). “§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state”, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, 2nd. Hackett, pp. 285-292. ISBN 0915144719. 
  3. The notion of cause introduces unnecessary complications best avoided as done here. For example, see Bertrand Russell (1912-1913). "On the notion of cause". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series) 13: pp. 1-26.
  4. Apparently, Laplace's view was enunciated earlier by Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet in correspondence with Jean d'Alembert: Roger Hahn (2005 }publisher=Harvard University Press). Pierre Simon Laplace, 1749-1827: A Determined Scientist, p. 52. ISBN 0674018923.