Compellence

Compellence is a set of actions or positions that force an opponent to take some action desired by the initial actor. It is the opposite of deterrence, in which the actions are intended to prevent an opponent from taking some action. It is compellence when the classic lawman threatens a suspect with death if he does not surrrender; it is deterrence that inhibits the offender from initiating the action that would draw suspicion.

The term is often attributed to Thomas Schelling:

There is typically a difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do something and a threat intended to keep him from starting something. The distinction is in the timing in who has to make the first move, and whose initiative is put to the test.

It is discussed in international relations theory, but, in general, is not common in widely available strategic literature. In a study at the United States Air Force, lieutenant colonel Michael Plehn observed the relative use of compellence and deterrence in U.S. policy documents:

Source	Compellence	Deterrence
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)	3	15
National Military Strategy	0	30
16 doctrinal documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military services	58	250

Plehn suggests that the disparity is an artifact of the Cold War, where nuclear deterrence was a necessity. He argues, however, that compellence is far more common in a multipolar world, in non-nuclear warfare, shows of force such as compelling the resignation of the Haitian junta in 1994, and in counterinsurgency.

Legal

As opposed to issuing a restraining order, a court may issue a writ of mandamus, ordering a party to take some actions.

Geostrategic actions

While much of the Vietnam War used variants of deterrence, Operation LINEBACKER II used a compellence model to force the North Vietnamese to return to the Paris Peace Talks.