Analytic-synthetic distinction: Difference between revisions
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The target here was an interpretation of Carnap's work as saying that synonymy was not just a logical matter, but a matter of usage; stipulation could be extended to certain sense perceptions.<ref name=Carnap/> Such a view seems to propose the matter of 'analyticity' is one not of logic, but of confirmation.<ref name=Ryan/> | The target here was an interpretation of Carnap's work as saying that synonymy was not just a logical matter, but a matter of usage; stipulation could be extended to certain sense perceptions.<ref name=Carnap/> Such a view seems to propose the matter of 'analyticity' is one not of logic, but of confirmation.<ref name=Ryan/> | ||
It is doubtful whether this interpretation of Carnap was accurate. Carnap was closer to Lewis in thinking that analytic statements were hypothetical and, while tautologically true within their formal structure, could be considered to have some empirical validity only by comparison with experiments.<ref name=Lewis/> Their truth was not an undeniable consequence of analyticity within their formal structure, but a probabilistic matter dependent upon pragmatic considerations about utility of the formal structure.<ref name=Carnap2/> In this respect, Carnap and Lewis agree with Hawking/Mlodinow's proposal of [[model-dependent realism]].<ref name=Hawking/> | It is doubtful whether this interpretation of Carnap was accurate. Carnap introduced two types of 'truth' which he called ''L''-truth and ''F''-truth. ''L''-truth was truth by virtue of semantical rules of an adopted language alone and is his definition of 'analytic' truth. On the other hand, ''F''-truth is what Carnap calls synthetic truth and is also described by him as 'contingent' truth, requiring the 'observation of facts'. He points out explicitly that for a statement phrased within a language to be useful, its analytic truth is necessary but has no bearing upon its synthetic truth.<ref name=Carnap3/> | ||
Carnap was closer to Lewis in thinking that analytic statements were hypothetical and, while tautologically true within their formal structure, could be considered to have some empirical validity only by comparison with experiments.<ref name=Lewis/> | |||
Their truth was not an undeniable consequence of analyticity within their formal structure, but a probabilistic matter dependent upon pragmatic considerations about utility of the formal structure.<ref name=Carnap2/> In this respect, Carnap and Lewis agree with Hawking/Mlodinow's proposal of [[model-dependent realism]].<ref name=Hawking/> | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
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{{cite journal |author=Rudolf Carnap |title=Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology |url=http://www.ditext.com/carnap/carnap.html |journal=Revue Internationale de Philosophie |volume=4 |year=1950 |pages=pp. 40-50}} | {{cite journal |author=Rudolf Carnap |title=Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology |url=http://www.ditext.com/carnap/carnap.html |journal=Revue Internationale de Philosophie |volume=4 |year=1950 |pages=pp. 40-50}} | ||
</ref> | |||
<ref name=Carnap3> | |||
See ''Meaning and Necessity'', Chapter 1, §2, p. 12. | |||
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Revision as of 17:03, 15 July 2013
The analytic–synthetic distinction is a distinction used in philosophy to divide an ontology into two parts: an analytic part consisting of terms related by synonymy, and a synthetic part concerning connections between such terms and 'real' objects.[1]
Analyticity and empiricism
In several books and papers, Quine challenged the analytic–synthetic distinction.[2] Quine argued that although there are trivial situations in which analyticity prevails (those circumstances which simply replace some elaborate sequence of terms by a tautological equivalent), all interesting propositions in an ontology (all that do not involve simple use of definitions) are synthetic in nature, that is, they inevitably bring forward some empirical fact.
According to Putnam, Quine's position on analyticity is:
| ‘ | “A statement is analytic if it can be turned into a truth of formal logic by substituting synonyms for synonyms.”[3] | ’ |
—Hilary Putnam, ‘Two Dogmas’ revisited | ||
The issue then turns upon whether 'synonym' has a meaning beyond simple tautology. An example involving simple tautology is that All bachelors are unmarried, which holds true simply because, by stipulation, someone is a bachelor if and only if they are unmarried. Quine argued there were no other kinds of analytic statements, and any attempt to extend 'synonymy' beyond such kinds of examples was doomed to failure. Analyticity is possible only by stipulation.
The target here was an interpretation of Carnap's work as saying that synonymy was not just a logical matter, but a matter of usage; stipulation could be extended to certain sense perceptions.[4] Such a view seems to propose the matter of 'analyticity' is one not of logic, but of confirmation.[1]
It is doubtful whether this interpretation of Carnap was accurate. Carnap introduced two types of 'truth' which he called L-truth and F-truth. L-truth was truth by virtue of semantical rules of an adopted language alone and is his definition of 'analytic' truth. On the other hand, F-truth is what Carnap calls synthetic truth and is also described by him as 'contingent' truth, requiring the 'observation of facts'. He points out explicitly that for a statement phrased within a language to be useful, its analytic truth is necessary but has no bearing upon its synthetic truth.[5]
Carnap was closer to Lewis in thinking that analytic statements were hypothetical and, while tautologically true within their formal structure, could be considered to have some empirical validity only by comparison with experiments.[6]
Their truth was not an undeniable consequence of analyticity within their formal structure, but a probabilistic matter dependent upon pragmatic considerations about utility of the formal structure.[7] In this respect, Carnap and Lewis agree with Hawking/Mlodinow's proposal of model-dependent realism.[8]
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Frank X Ryan (2004). “Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic”, John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds: American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Psychology Press, 36-39. ISBN 020349279X.
- ↑ Perhaps the most famous of these is: Willard Van Orman Quine (1980). “Chapter 2: Two dogmas of empiricism”, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-philosophical Essays, 2nd. Harvard University Press, pp. 20 'ff. ISBN 0674323513. See this on-line version.
- ↑ Hilary Putnam (1985). “Chapter 5: ‘Two Dogmas’ revisited”, Hilary Putnam, ed: Philosophical Papers: Volume 3, Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press, pp. 87 ff. ISBN 0521313945.
- ↑ Rudolf Carnap (1946). Meaning and Necessity. Chicago University Press.
- ↑ See Meaning and Necessity, Chapter 1, §2, p. 12.
- ↑ Clarence Irving Lewis (1991). Mind and the world-order: Outline of a theory of knowledge, Reprint of Charles Scribner's 1929. =Dover. ISBN 0486265641.
- ↑ Rudolf Carnap (1950). "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4: pp. 40-50.
- ↑ Hawking SW, Mlodinow L. (2010). The Grand Design, Kindle edition. New York: Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-90707-0.