Talk:World War Two in the Pacific

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Revision as of 15:33, 19 June 2008 by imported>Richard Jensen (honor)
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 Definition The part of World War II (1937-45) fought in Asia and the Pacific Ocean between Japan and the U.S., China, Britain, Australia, and other Allies. [d] [e]
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 Workgroup categories History and Military [Categories OK]
 Subgroup categories:  Pacific War and World War II
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Leyte

I added much more detail and used better sources, esp Halsey's memoir and Woodward's summary of interviews with Kurita.Richard Jensen 20:59, 18 June 2008 (CDT)

It is correct Halsey became enraged and changed his action due to a perceived insult from Nimitz, but Nimitz's actual message was a simple request for information. The series of errors by both the sending and receiving cryptographic errors caused the message given to Halsey to read quite differently than what Nimitz had written.
I cited Kahn as reasonably available, but you'll find the actual message, complete with handling errors, on numerous texts available through Google Books. It's a well-known example of how military communications procedures can fail; I watched my one-time boss, a former director of NSA, wince whenever I used it in a class for the Defense Information Systems Agency. Howard C. Berkowitz 22:06, 18 June 2008 (CDT)
I used the version in Halsey's memoir because it was the impact on Halsey that really mattered (Kahn gets its info fourth-hand). This is the kind of colorful and revealing detail that we can shift to the Halsey bio when it gets written. The point is that Halsey still did not realize he had been fooled by the Japanese decoys! That's what made him so angry: he says he was ordered away from his lifelong dream of a super victory when in fact he had been tricked.Richard Jensen 23:27, 18 June 2008 (CDT)
Well, I'm not writing purely for historical personalities and style alone, but also for military significance. The TF34 message problem is constantly emphasized in the study of military communications problems, and is as much a general lesson as an insight into Halsey's personality. That personality also led him to let dreams take over from strategic sense. Ozawa's force sinking -- which it did -- would have made no difference to the progress of the war, unless Kurita had broken through and devastated the invasion force. Halsey lost sight of what was actually important -- the invasion. From my perspective, it's far less significant that he didn't fulfill his dream than that he let the landing force be jeopardized -- that he didn't make sure San Bernadino Strait was guarded before chasing carriers, which he knew had no effective air wings. While I'm aware of the politics involved, this is one reason I find it tragic that the colorful Halsey got a fifth star, rather than the reliable Spruance.
I'm not sure what you mean by Kahn getting his material fourth-hand. I've personally seen official copies of the message traffic, although I can't remember if I saw it first at the National Cryptologic Museum or the Naval Operational Archives -- probably the latter, as I worked across the street from it in the Naval Command Systems Support Activity, where we had, for some odd reason, a great deal of interest in what could go wrong with naval communications. That, incidentally, was in 1970 or so, well before Kahn wrote about it, but I'd want a citation for the Operational Archives. Howard C. Berkowitz 00:07, 19 June 2008 (CDT)
well I agree--the main issue was Halsey's falling for the trick and pursuing a decoy. He fell for the trick in part (he says himself) because of that boyhood dream. The communications issue of importance was NOT Nimitz's message (that message was very clear, albeit insulting the way it came across). The main communications issue was the belief by everyone else (esp 7th fleet) that TF34 existed and was protecting the strait. That was a terrible misunderstanding, and the main reason is divided command. Note that Japanese communication problems were even worse: Kurita had a major victory but did not know the decoys had worked (the Japanese Army new but did not tell him). The #1 mistake was Kurita disobeyed clear orders to attack. This section was from Wikipedia and its full of useless detail, I will rerwrite it. We have out own CZ article that I think is better.Richard Jensen 08:42, 19 June 2008 (CDT)

Very nice rewrite of the U.S. command problems at Leyte; it sometimes seems the Pacific War was three-sided with the Allies, the Japanese, and Douglas MacArthur. :-)

Were you planning on any commentary about the Japanese fixation both on the "decisive battle" and their overcomplex plans that were unrealistic, tactically and technically, to expect to synchronize? I can certainly write something here if you like; C3I is one of my specialties. (If you haven't, take a look at my writeup, from a particular C3I paradigm, of Swarming (military)#Battle of Surigao Strait: Decisive swarming victory. Howard C. Berkowitz 12:12, 19 June 2008 (CDT)

thanks. re Japanese overcomplex plans that couldn't work. I was infiltrating it piecemeal into articles. It certainly appears at Midway, Philippine Sea and Leyte--but was that just a coincidence? Maybe it did not appear at Pearl Harbor, Singapore, Philippines, Guadalcanal, Iwo or Okinawa. My own strong preference it to avoid speculation in encyclopedia articles and save it for journal articles or books.Richard Jensen 13:46, 19 June 2008 (CDT)
Let's put it this way -- it's not considered coincidence in any historical background that I've either seen presented, or presented myself, in C3I seminars and monographs. The overcomplexity seemed a disease of the Navy, although the Army's tradition of gekokujo took it off in different bad strategic decisions. In several cases you cite, there definitely was a piecemeal approach and, where it was a multiservice operation, conflict between the Army and Navy. In the invasion of Singapore, there was an excellent commander on the Japanese side facing poor British planning. Yamashita seemed especially good at asserting unity of command.
In the Phillippines, however, Homma certainly did not have unity of command (well, before his relief). Had he shot Tsuji, he might have done a bit better. Guadalcanal was an absolute fiasco of random reinforcements (e.g., the Ichiki detachment) and purposeless, uncoordinated attacks (U'm thinking of the Tenaru; neither side had a clear air campaign). Iwo and Okinawa, the latter even considering the kikusui raids, was an Army operation. Howard C. Berkowitz 14:58, 19 June 2008 (CDT)
I think we're in agreement. In Guadalcanal the Japanese did NOT have a complex overall plan...no real plan at all. The IJN was strongly committed to Mahan's Big Battle, as were Halsey and King. Spruance, by contrast, was an incrementalist and also cared about the lives of his sailors. Unlike the Germans, IJN did not want subordinate officers making decisions, and that was a deep flaw, perhaps, leading to a) overplanning with very complex plans; b) little planning and the subordinates unable to think of what to do. (There's a great scene in "Letters from Iwo Jima" in which the 2nd in command, who has been separated, makes an independent decision and the top general is furious.) Richard Jensen 15:04, 19 June 2008 (CDT)
I'm not sure whether these should be in the main article, subpages of it, or separate articles, but there are several motivational points -- to some extent for both sides -- that are not often covered, and should be. For want of a better term, I'll tentatively call them institutional/cultural attitudes about human resources, and for that matter, as you mention with the Germans, directive versus mission orders.
Let me take your point about Japanese subordinates making decisions -- they often did not, but they did take responsibility at just the wrong time, such as Yamaguchi at Midway. Oh, I doubt the IJN could have done something as radical as was done in making the junior Arleigh Burke CNO, but Yamaguchi was not a commander to lose, even if he didn't replace Yamamoto. Speculation, of course. Ozawa, for that matter, would have been better than Koga.
Enough with the speculation, and on to at least one specific: pilot rotation and training. The early Japanese aviators extensively trained at the Misty Lagoon were superb, but the Japanese threw their experience away, as opposed to using them as trainers and leaders as did the USN. Howard C. Berkowitz 15:25, 19 June 2008 (CDT)
yes the honor was to die for your country. American aviators who wanted to stay in battle were allowed an extra tour (in Europe) then ordered home to be come trainers. All this I believe should go into an article on the Japanese Navy (this article should be event-oriented, I think.) I coedited a book a few year ago that looked at the Japanese military, among other topics, and found their logistics system was a disaster because they never got the word that privates talk about battles and generals talk about logistics. Richard Jensen 15:33, 19 June 2008 (CDT)