RIM-161 Standard SM-3
This article may be deleted soon. | ||
---|---|---|
A U.S. naval anti-ballistic missile]] (ABM) with demonstrated capability against satellites. It is fired from the vertical launch system]] of ships equipped with the AEGIS battle management system]] and SPY-2|AN/SPY-2 ABM radar]]. As opposed to having the high-explosive warhead of SM-2 anti-air missiles, it kills an incoming warhead]] or orbiting satellite by colliding directly with the target, a collision with sufficient kinetic energy to vaporize the target and the interceptor. The missile is the actual kill mechanism of the Navy theater ballistic missile]] defense (TBMD) system. It is deployed aboard 3 Ticonderoga-class]] cruiser]]s and 15 Burke-class]] destroyer]]s. It is being sold, along with the associated radars and computers, to Japan for use aboard Kongo-class]] destroyer]]s, which are a Japanese-manufactured version of the Burke class. It is considered a midcourse interceptor, although it would engage in the ascent and descent subphases of the midcourse part of the trajectory; there may be some boost phase and some terminal phase capability. The Missile Defense Agency]] has said the SM-2 has terminal defense capability against short range ballistic missile]]s (SRBM). Operational useSM-3 equipped U.S. ships were deployed in the Sea of Japan]] during North Korea]]n intercontinental ballistic missile]] tests. Later, in December 2007, An SM-3 was fired successfully from the Japanese destroyer JDS Kongo, hitting its target. Japan sees the system as a deterrent against North Korea and China. While Japan and South Korea have license-built Burke-class]] destroyers with the AEGIS battle management system]], South Korea has not yet bought the SM-3. It has been argued that regional BMD is a natural trilateral relationship among Japan, South Korea, and the US.[1] In February 2008, a SM-3 fired from USS Lake Erie (CG-70)]] successfully destroyed a U.S. reconnaissance satellite whose orbit was decaying. The U.S. explanation was that if the satellite had entered and not burned up, as intended, during atmospheric reentry]], toxic station-keeping propellants on the satellite could be a hazard to people on Earth. It may have been a response to a Chinese test of an anti-satellite system. General characteristicsBlock IA
Block IIA
Relationship to other BMD sensorsWhile the SM-3 proper is reported not to be fast enough to kill an intercontinental ballistic missile]] (ICBM) atmospheric reentry#warheads|reentry vehicle]], the associated electronics (SM-3 upgrades to AEGIS) are speed of light. In somewhat confusing terminology, the national-level ground-based midcourse defense system, using a different interceptor than the SM-3, does have some internetworked modes called "launch on SM-3" and "engage on SM-3". [4] The SPY-2|AN/SPY-2]] radar interoperates with overall ballistic missile defense control, just as land-based sensors can talk to AEGIS. Possible variantsIsrael expressed interest about a land-based SM-3, which would complement its Arrow-2 and PAC-3. One rationale is the SM-3 gives would give them national coverage, the medium-range Arrow (missile)|Arrow-2]] area coverage at 50-60 miles, and PAC-3 for point defense. [2] They have also acquired the TPY-2|AN/TPY-2]] radar and is considering the THAAD]] missile, which would operate in the range between SM-3 and Arrow. Japan has also acquired the AN/TPY-2 radar and is considering the THAAD]] missile, although if it deployed a multilayered system, the SM-3 would remain at sea. AN/TPY-2 and AN/SPY-2 interoperate as part of a BMD system. References
|