Deflation: Difference between revisions

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==Policy responses==
==Policy responses==
The consensus view among central bank policy makers recommends early preemptive action to avert the danger of deflation because it is difficult to devise effective policies to counter it once it has taken hold. The principle precautionary weapon is a rapid relaxation of monetary policy by reductions in interest rates, preferably reinforced by a temporary fiscal stimulus. <ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021121/default.htm Ben Bernanke: ''Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here'' (Remarks made at the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C. November 21, 2002) Federal Reserve Board 2002]</ref> <ref>[http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/sp081125.en.html Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, (Member of the Executive Board of the ECB): ''Careful with (the "d") words!'', speech to the  European Colloquia Series, Venice, 25 November 2008, European Central Bank 2008]</ref>The need to supplement monetary action with short-term fiscal measures is considered to be increasingly important as interest rates approach zero because the ''liquidity trap'' then renders conventional monetary policy ineffective <ref>[http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/bpea_jp.pdf Paul Krugman: ''It’s Baaack! Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap'']</ref>. It is recognised, however, that such remedies can be costly and difficult to manage. Delay is likely to reduce their effectiveness but hurriedly-devised public expenditure projects are apt to be uneconomic. The intention would be to remove the stimulus once it had served it purpose, but public awareness of that intention could reduce its effectiveness (a quandary that prompted the economist Paul Krugman to suggest that "the way to make monetary policy effective, then, is for the central bank to credibly promise to be irresponsible" <ref>[http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/japtrap.html Paul Krugman: ''Japan's Trap" May 1998]</ref>). .
Central bank policy makers generally, recommend early preemptive action to avert the danger of deflation on the grounds that  it is difficult to devise effective policies to counter it once it has taken hold. The principle precautionary weapon is a rapid relaxation of monetary policy by reductions in interest rates, preferably reinforced by a temporary fiscal stimulus. <ref>[http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021121/default.htm Ben Bernanke: ''Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here'' (Remarks made at the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C. November 21, 2002) Federal Reserve Board 2002]</ref> <ref>[http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/sp081125.en.html Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, (Member of the Executive Board of the ECB): ''Careful with (the "d") words!'', speech to the  European Colloquia Series, Venice, 25 November 2008, European Central Bank 2008]</ref> Most economists advocate  supplementing  monetary action with short-term fiscal measures, especially when  interest rates approach zero and the ''liquidity trap'' renders conventional monetary policy ineffective <ref>[http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/bpea_jp.pdf Paul Krugman: ''It’s Baaack! Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap'']</ref>. There is also a case for supplementing interest rate cuts with direct action to increase the money supply by "printing money" (otherwise known as "''quantitative easing''"<ref> For an explanation of quantitative easing, see the article on [[banking]]). It is recognised, however, that such remedies can be costly and difficult to manage. Delay is likely to reduce their effectiveness but hurriedly-devised public expenditure projects are apt to be uneconomic. The intention would be to remove the stimulus once it had served it purpose, but public awareness of that intention could reduce its effectiveness (a quandary that prompted the economist Paul Krugman to suggest that "the way to make monetary policy effective, then, is for the central bank to credibly promise to be irresponsible" <ref>[http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/japtrap.html Paul Krugman: ''Japan's Trap" May 1998]</ref>. On the other hand, failure to reverse policy as recovery commences creates a danger of inflation. The success of an anti-deflation policy thus depends upon accurate diagnosis and rapid response to change.


==Historical experience==  
==Historical experience==  

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Defined as a sustained fall in the general level of prices, deflation is not necessarily harmful, but there there is a danger that it could have disastrous economic consequences.

The causes of deflation

Deflation is in almost all cases a side effect of a collapse of aggregate demand--a drop in spending so severe that producers must cut prices in order to find buyers.The economic effects of a deflationary episode, for the most part, are similar to those of any other sharp decline in aggregate spending--namely, recession, rising unemployment, and financial stress.

The effects of deflation

First-round effects

Deflation tends to make consumers reduce their purchases in the expectation of being able to buy more cheaply at a later date. That can have a depressing effect upon demand and lead to a reduction of output. Another potentially important effect is to require borrowers to repay more than they had borrowed (for example, if prices declined by 20 percent, a farmer who had previously borrowed £100 to buy ten pigs would have to repay the equivalent of twelve pigs). The resulting loss to borrowers may be balanced by gains to lenders, but if borrowers are forced to default, the resulting disruption can lead to a further reduction in output. Another effect is to require employers to pay their employees the same wages despite a reduction in income from their employees' output. Unless there is a compensating wage reduction, that may result in a reduction in employment and another reduction in output.

Second-round effects : the "deflationary spiral"

A sudden and unexpected deflation can result in output losses that feed upon themselves by reinforcing the tendencies that produced them. For example the output loss from the deferrment of purchases could lead to an increase in unemployment, which could prompt a further reduction in spending and thus a further increase in unemployment.

Policy responses

Central bank policy makers generally, recommend early preemptive action to avert the danger of deflation on the grounds that it is difficult to devise effective policies to counter it once it has taken hold. The principle precautionary weapon is a rapid relaxation of monetary policy by reductions in interest rates, preferably reinforced by a temporary fiscal stimulus. [1] [2] Most economists advocate supplementing monetary action with short-term fiscal measures, especially when interest rates approach zero and the liquidity trap renders conventional monetary policy ineffective [3]. There is also a case for supplementing interest rate cuts with direct action to increase the money supply by "printing money" (otherwise known as "quantitative easing"Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag. On the other hand, failure to reverse policy as recovery commences creates a danger of inflation. The success of an anti-deflation policy thus depends upon accurate diagnosis and rapid response to change.

Historical experience

[4].


[5]