Materialism

An historical world view regarded as an implication of the discoveries in science, materialism attributed to matter the status as the underlying constituent of nature, matter as material particles subject to fundamental forces that determined the shape, size, and motion of all objects in the natural world, and excluded any explanations of reality that could not be reduced to physics.

Materialism denies supernaturalism, in that it denies that independent spiritual or divine powers ever account for events, and holds that natural forces always explain events, even in instances where lack of knowledge precludes explanation (Joad 2005). It affirms determinism, in that it asserts that all events of the world result from preceding ones, and that knowledge of the state of the world at any given time can in principle predict the state of the world at a future time.

According to philosopher Jessica Wilson, however, materialism is no longer a viable philosophy (Wilson 2006):

Materialism, roughly formulated, is the thesis that all broadly scientific entities are nothing over and above material entities, where the latter are characterized as being extended, impenetrable, conserved, such as to (only) deterministically interact, and so on. The material entities ultimately supposed to serve as an ontological basis for all else are those existing at relatively low orders of constitutional complexity – entities that are, as I’ll put it, ‘‘relatively fundamental’’. But contemporary physics has reported that the relatively fundamental entities have few, if any, of the characteristics of the material; and thus materialism has been rendered a has-been (Wilson 2006)

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References

• Joad CEM. (1936, 1950) Guide to Philosphy. London: V. Gollancz, ltd. | Google Books preview 1950 ed.

• Wilson J. (2006) On Characterizing the Physical. Philosophical Studies 131:61-99.

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