Peter Singer

Peter Albert David Singer (born July 6, 1946) is an Australian moral philosopher. His philosophy focuses on issues of practical ethics, and he is most well-known for his book Animal Liberation, an important reference point for the movement that shares its name. Singer has also applied his thoroughgoing preference utilitarianism to other issues like infanticide, abortion and euthanasia. These views have been both widely influential and controversial, with his most severe critics accusing him of devaluing human life. He is currently the Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University, and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne.

Life

Singer was born in Melbourne, Australia. His parents were Viennese Jews who had fled from Austria 1938 and settled in Australia. Three of Singer's grandparents, however, were Holocaust victims. His paternal grandparents were taken by the Nazis to the Łódź ghetto, and were never heard from again, while his maternal grandfather died in Theresienstadt. After completing his secondary schooling, Singer studied law, history and philosophy at the University of Melbourne. He gained his BA (Hons) in 1967 and obtained a further MA degree from the same institution in 1969. He was then able to obtain a scholarship to study at the University of Oxford under R.M. Hare, a prominent utilitarian philosopher who arguably influenced Singer's own thought. He completed his B.Phil thesis in 1971, which would later be published as Democracy and Disobedience in 1973. After working briefly at Oxford and New York, Singer published Animal Liberation and returned to Melbourne, initially as part of La Trobe University before settling into various long-term roles at Monash University.

He unsuccessfully ran as a Green candidate for the Australian Senate in the 1996 Federal Election. He has been working at Princeton University since 1999, and since 2005 has divided his time between Princeton and the University of Melbourne.

Thought

Animal Liberation

Singer has published extensively on our moral relationship with animals, most notably in Animal Liberation, which has been adopted as a central text of the current animal liberation movement. In general terms, Singer opposes an attitude which he terms “speciesism”, an irrational form of discrimination that serves to justify exploitative behavior against members of other species. The overall project of Singer's animal liberation philosophy is to show that membership of a particular species is inadequate grounds to claim moral superiority. Singer analyses animal liberation from a preference utilitarianism perspective, suggesting that an equal consideration of interests is the only reasonable moral approach to the issue. He argues that the fact that animals have demonstrable preferences in regard to avoiding pain, expressing natural behaviour and protecting their own life means that we should weigh these preferences equally alongside our own. Mere membership of a certain species is not a rational basis for counting one organism's preferences as being more morally relevant than another's.

Singer focuses on what he sees as the two major abuses of animals; their use as food sources and their use in scientific experiments. In the first case, he argues that we ignore a number of animal interests in satisfying our taste for meat and dairy products. Farm animals endure great pain and are unable to express natural behaviour or live a happy life in a farm environment. Since Singer believes that meat is unnecessary for human nutrition, he suggests the only logical response to this situation is to adopt a vegetarian or vegan diet.

In the case of animal experimentation, Singer believes most animal experiments fall into one of two categories. In the first instance, they deal with trivial hypotheses that do not justify the harm or deprivation they cause to other species, or in the second instance they employ animals to test theorems which could be verified without their use. Singer also questions the scientific worth of animal testing and highlights a paradox that results from the advocacy of vivisection: it is scientifically sound to test animals because they are so similar to us, yet morally permissible to do so because of how different they are. As a utilitarian, Singer accepts that it is possible that to imagine experiments that could produce such great benefits that the use of animals would be justified. Regardless, he still maintains that such circumstances would be exceptional and that the scientific use of animals generally proceeds under a state of “conditioned ethical blindness” that encourages speciesism.

Singer warns against accepting religious or intuitive arguments that justify animal oppression, and places the animal liberation within the same humane tradition as feminism and the civil rights movement. He cautions us that the relatively recent developments that have improved racial and gender equality should remind us that it is necessary look critically at our largely unexamined relationship with animals. Although he discusses rights in a historical sense, Singer does not believe they are an adequate basis for a moral attitudes. Intrinsic rights that are based on, for example, intelligence can always be challenged by exceptional cases. We might want to give humans more significant rights based on their rational capacity, but then how does one account for the mentally handicapped or infants? Singer argues that to dismiss these exceptions and retain a morality founded on inherent rights is irrational and requires a naïve abstraction, stating that “if the demand for equality was based on actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality.” Through this, he implies that biological or psychological equality is not a prerequisite for equal moral consideration.