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Political beginnings of Hitler

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While Adolf Hitler was not the sole creator of the Nazi Party, he was present at its creation, and most historians agree it would not have formed without him. He joined its predecessor, the German Workers' Party (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP)), and then encouraged it to be renamed the German National Socialist Workers' Party, whose German acronym is NDSAP. It was abolished with the end of the war.

This article focuses on his role between his involvement with the NDSAP's predecessor in 1919, after his World War I service and his preparing to take control of government in 1933 as Weimar Chancellor.

  • His entry into political affairs (1919-1924)
  • Movement to a national party (1925-1929)
  • Joining government (1930-1932)

This article ends with Hitler's becoming Chancellor and taking control of government on 30 January 1933.

Political beginnings 1919-1923

Hitler, who had finished the war in a military hospital after suffering a poison gas attack at the front, had returned to Munich in November 1918. After the war he remained in the army amd assigned to the Information Department, which included both troop education and intelligence collection. He began by taking anti-Bolshevik political education courses, with instructors including the historian Karl Alexander von Miller and the engineer-economist Gottfried Feder. Feder introduced him to international economics. Von Miller found him an effective speaker to fellow students, but less comfortable with one-to-one conversation.[1]

In August 1919, he was an instructor in a political course for troops at Lechfeld, at which he was pleased to discover he could "speak...I could bost of some success: in the course of my lectures I led many hundreds, indeed thousands, of comrades back to their people and fatherland. I 'nationalized' the troops." This was confirmed by independent observers. He became the Information Department expert on Jewry.[2] His first recorded comment on Jewry is in a 16 September 1919 letter, in which he used a biological metaphor, "racial tuberculosis", and rejected "antisemitism on purely emotional grounds" leading to simple pogroms, to an eliminationist "antisemitism of reason...its final aim must be removal of the Jews altogether." [3]

In this capacity he was sent to monitor the German Workers' Party (DAP)s activities.

Joining the DAP

He found the DAP reflected his core views of intense antisemitism and pan-German nationalism. In September 1919 Adolf Hitler joined the DAP, which was soon renamed the NSDAP or Nazi Party. Nazi" is a short form of “Nationalsozialist,” representing the German pronunciation of the first two syllables of the word “national,” in "National Socialist German Workers' Party". (German: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei)" It was formed analogously with “Sozi,” the long-established nickname for the Social Democratic Party (SPD). [4]

Hitler always claimed to be the seventh member, but Anton Drexler, generally accepted as the founder of the DAP, disagreed, although Eckhart's statement needs clarification. In January 1940, Drexler wrote, "No one knows better than yourself, my Fuehrer, that you were never the seventh member of the party, but at best the seventh member of the committee, which I asked you to join as membership director. [5] Drexler claimed that Hitler changed his membership number from 555 to 7, but it must be understood that the party began numbering from 501. [6]

Starting with a draft written by Hitler, and edited with Drexler,[7] with some contributions from Feder, the Party issued a 25 point Programme on 24 February 1920.[8] Its provisions included repudiation of the peace treaties, pan-German unification into Greater Germany, actions against Jews, nationalization of business trusts and the introduction of profit-sharing, and the "creation of a strong state power for the Reich", eliminating the state parliaments.[9]

Drexler, in 1921, tried to build a larger movement, merging with the German Socialist Party, which had a complementary presence in northern Germany. Feder thought Hitler's rabble-rousing style would be less powerful in the merged movements. Hitler, however, would threaten to resign in April 1921, and the party, in a general meeting on 29 July, made him Party chairman with "dictatorial powers."

Dietrich Eckhart first attracted him intellectually in the party, and mentored him. He was to meet Houston Stewart Chamberlain in 1923, who influenced much of his thinking.

A rally too far

For more information, see: Beer Hall Putsch.

Political tensions had been rising, both in the Weimar Republic generally and in Bavaria specifically, in 1922 and 1923. Hitler was sentenced to three months' imprisonment in 1922, of which he served four weeks for an incident in which he led Nazis to disrupt a meeting or the Bavarian League and beating its leader. He was carried to the podium on hs first public appearance after release. The local police, previously headed by a Nazi sympathizer, but now by Eduard Nortz, banned a rally in early 1923.

Roehm and von Epp met with General Gustav von Lossow, the Reichswehr commander in Bavaria. The military commander, although dubious about Hitler's personality, said he would consider "the suppression of the nationalist organizations unfortunate for security reasons", Nortz requested the NDSAP to reduce the number of rallies, but Hitler, seeming to agree, ignored it. [10]

The Army, generally, had been marginal in its compliance with the Weimar Republic. It was not clearly subordinate to the Reichstag and the Cabinet. The French occupied the Ruhr in January 1923, and hyperinflation had begun. Hitler saw this as a time of opportunity. [11]

On November 8, Hitler and the Nazis, significantly without giving General Erich Ludendorff an opportunity to coordinate with them, sent a large force into a meeting, at a beer hall used for assemblies, being addressed by Gustav von Kahr, Prime Minister of Bavaria, who, with Army commander von Lossow and state police chief Hans von Seisser, ruled Bavaria. The three made promises, under duress, to Hitler, but quickly left.

The next day, Hitler and Ludendorff led a march on the War Ministry, here Ernst Rohm had been held. It is unclear which side fired first, but sixteen Nazis and three police died. Ludendorff was arrested on the scene, while the wounded Hitler and other Nazis escaped.


The Nazis involved were put on treason on 25 February 1924. Hitler was sentenced to five years imprisonment, which he spent, in comfort, in Landsberg Prison, along with associates. He wrote Mein Kampf during that time, and was released after serving nine months.

During this time, the party was banned, but a proxy movement was run by Alfred Rosenberg.

Transformation to national movement

In this period, Hitler changed his focus from the committed far right, to a sympathetic but not necessarily committed audience. He was not yet, however, trying to build a true national movement.

His message and emphasis would change for specific groups. When speaking to industrialists, he would emphasize stability, and when speaking to the regular military, respect their traditional role.


1924 was a very mixed year for the Nazis, with their leadership imprisoned, but having candidates, under a proxy name for the banned party, run for national elections. They did poorly at the national level, winning 6.5% in the May election but 3% in the November runoff. Nevertheless, the growing regional prominence of splinter parties the Nazis could exploit, and a general pattern of polarization and loss of centrist votes, would be to their long-term benefit. This polarization would be to their favor in the Great Depression.[12]

Did Hitler warn?

While Mein Kampf, in retrospect, should have served as a warning of the ambitions of Hitler, it may have been underestimated, in the English-speaking countries, by poor translations. German studies were the first academic field of Emily Overend Lorimer, possibly best known as a WWI analyst of the Middle East, assisting her British diplomat husband, David Lorimer. Unusually for a woman of her time, she studied German culture before she was married.[13] In her opinion, the first English translations of Mein Kampf, which left out many of the sections on Hitler's ideas of foreign relations. [14] When it was the British conventional wisdom that Hitler and his followers were not a serious threat, she concentrated on Nazi writings and came to a very different conclusion. In 1939, she published the book, What Hitler Wants. [15]

Mein Kampf and ideas

By 1924, certain elements of Hitler's worldview (Weltanschauung) had fully crystallized, namely his concept of history as a racial struggle and the threat of Marxism. He considered Communism to be a Jewish conspiracy, and often referred to "Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars"; the Commissar Order for the Russian Front was an even more certain death sentence for Communist leaders than for Jews.

He was developing a variant on traditional socialism, in which race replaced class. Hitler wrote his autobiographical Mein Kampf ("My Struggle") while imprisoned after the Beer Hall Putsch; its two volumes were published in 1925 and 1926. He dictated it to Rudolf Hess. Although most critics believe it desperately required editing, Father Bernhard Stempfle did help in this area.

After discussing his youngest days, he presented the political program of the Nazi movement both theoretically and in terms of German history and the German sociopolitical situation of 1925. His first goal is pan-German nationalism, realizing the German nation's destiny by uniting all Germans geographically and politically into one Reich that is rid of all non-German elements. Geographically he envisions a German homeland that obtains land (Lebensraum) to the East, taking it as necessary from Slavs and other residents. For Hitler, the German nation -- the volkisch nation -- comprises only those of pure German blood.

The race of Slavs naturally competes with and impinges on the German nation, threatening and constraining its development; Hitler, however, designated the Jews as a singularly vile and cultureless race bent on world destruction through Communism.


To exploit regional voting patterns, he reorganized the Party into regions: [16]

  1. Prussia, East Prussia, Brandenburg, Silesia, Berlin
  2. Middle Germany (Thuringia)
  3. Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Oldenburg
  4. Westphalia, Rhineland, Hesse, Platz
  5. Bavaria
  6. Baden-Wurtemburg


While Hitler worked on the second volume of Mein Kampf in early 1925, after a public speaking ban was put into effect, he sent Gregor Strasser to organize the party in Northern Germany. Strasser disliked three of the Bavarian leaders that Kershaw called "detested" in the North: Max Ammann, Hermann Esser, and Julius Streicher. The north also objected to Philip Bouhler's desire for centralized control.

Some of the northerners, such as Joseph Goebbels, were more socialistic and thus Strasser was sympathetic. While Strasser was antisemitic, he was not seen as a reactionary. [17] Others, while they recognized Hitler as the party leader, were concerned he was developing a cult of personality. The Working Association of the North and West was not intended as a challenge to him, but it became so — Strasser and Goebbels saw it as a way to replace the Party's 1920 Programme. [18]


At the end of February 1926, he was allowed to speak to a private gathering of the Hamburg National Club, principally to seek financial support. His delivery was aimed at the solid citizen, and only after he connected with them on logic, did he become emotional about the need to destroy Marxism. [19] He told them that the masses did not want intellectual ideas, implying he was speaking to an elite. "The broad masses of people are blind and stupid and don't know what they are doing...The masses have a primitive view. What abides is the feeling of hatred."[20] His unsaid message was that he could connect to this hatred.

The North

Gregor Strasser and Goebbels had held a 22 November 1925 meeting to do away with Hitler's "reactionary" 25-point platform of 1920. They formed, in January 1926, the Working Association of the North and West, led by Gregor Strasser, Otto Strasser, and Joseph Goebbels, formed to balance the Munich faction and push back the 1920 platform, which it considered reactionary. It was not an immediate challenge to the leadership of Adolf Hitler, but Hitler did hold a countermeeting in Bamberg on 14 February 1926. [21] It had considered joining with the Communists to expropriate royal properties. This infuriated Hitler, as he had received contributions from those past leaders, as well as conservative industrialists. The Bamberg meeting gave the first clear indication that the Nazis would base their approach on the Fuehrer, rather than a platform.[22]

By June 1926, Hitler had captivated Goebbels. Goebbels was to join the headquarters in November, headed by Hess as secretary, Franz Xavier Schwarz as treasurer, and Bouhler as secretary general. After the Bamberg meeting, however, Goebbels became increasingly loyal to Hitler, and broke with Strasser in August 1928.[23]

Hitler recruited Franz Pfeffer von Salomon to head the SA, replacing Roehm, and presenting a new image:
In order to prevent the SA to taking on any secret character from the start, it should not be hidden and should march under a bright sky to destroy all myths that it is a 'secret organization'...we must show the Marxists that the future boss of the streets is National Socialism, just as National Socialism will be the boss of the state.[24]

1927 campaigns

Hitler had been a natural orator with small groups, but Hanfstaengl and others coached him in improving his delivery. In March 1927, Saxony was the first large state to allow him to speak in public, with the understanding it not be in Munich. His first speech indeed was well away, but he spoke there three days later. A police reporter covering him in Munich thought the he applause was directed to the speaker, not the speech. [25]

After the 1927 election, in which the Nazis did poorly although did send 11 delegates to the Reichstag, he began his relationship with Geli Raubal. Whatever the circumstances, there is no question that her 1931 death had an enormous effect on him. During this time, he also wrote what became known as Hitler's Secret Book, which would not appear for 32 years. It was more intensely antisemitic than Mein Kampf, and may have been an even stronger warning of The Holocaust.


1928 was the first year in which identified Nazis ran for Reichstag election. They did poorly, receiving 2.6% of the popular vote and gaining 12 seats of 491. The Nazis would recover in provincial elections in the next year, but this was embarrassing. [26]

Hitler's message

Hitler's message, the notion of Lebensraum (living space) and the idea of a heroic Führer, underdeveloped in 1924, became fully crystallized by 1928. Hitler offered only "distant goals" not a "blueprint for rule." There is scant evidence to support the notion that he was a conscious modernizer; his goal was to destroy Marxism and re-create the Volksgemeinschaft (folk community) that supposedly existed in the past. This community concept was the basis for much propaganda, but "But propaganda alone could not have sustained the Nazi Party and its ideology over a period of 12 years. There is now considerable evidence to suggest that Nazi policies and propaganda reflected many of the aspirations of large sections of the population." [27]


He spent his time working on the second volume of Mein Kampf, leaving Strasser organize, because he was not interested in day-to-day issues. but in expressing a long-term goal. [28] The book reflected a considerable understanding of crowd psychology, for which Toland believes he drew upon Sigmund Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Hitler had also changed his foreign policy; he had regarded France as the principal enemy of Germany after the First World War, but wrote "we stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze upward to the land in the east." He meant Russia, under the "yoke of the Jew".

In a Christmas celebration, he said "Christ was the greatest early fighter in the battle against the world enemy, the Jews." Hitler did not consider Jesus a Jew, but, due to immaculate conception, only a nonpracticing half Jew. Modestly, he observed "The work that Christ started but could not finish, I — Adolf Hitler — will conclude."[29]

Apparently recalling the heroic cancer treatment of his mother, he used it as a metaphor for foreign policy.
If a man appears to have cancer and is unconditionally doomed to die, it would be senseless to refuse an

operation, because the percentage of the possibility of success is slight, and because the patient, even should it be successful, will not be a hundred percent healthy. It would be still more senseless were the surgeon to perform the operation itself only with limited or partial energy in consequence of these limited possibilities. But

it is this senselessness that these men expect uninterruptedly in domestic and foreign policy matters.[30]

In this period, he consulted with a Party member psychiatrist, to allay "a fear of cancer.[31]

National appeal

Hitler now began to concentrate on becoming a plausible national leader. After breaking an electoral threshold in 1929, Hitler began to ask for provincial ministries. In 1930, he called for unity. With growing electoral results, he met with the President and the Chancellor in 1932, but no compromises were reached.


After breaking the 10 percent barrier in the provincial elections in Thuringia, tripling its vote from 1928, Hitler had nominated Wilhelm Frick for two provincial ministries, Interior and Education, saying "He controls both these ministries and ruthlessly and persistently exploits his power in them can achieve extraordinary things." The DVP first rejected him because he had been convicted of reason in the Beer Hall Putsch, but Hitler threatened to demand new elections if Frick were not accepted; Hitler had strong support from industrialists in the area. [32]


His 1930 appeal was for unity, unless one was a Communist or a Jew. The class distinctions of conventional socialism were not invoked.

Conflict with Otto Strasser

After Gregor Strasser joined with Hitler in Munich, Otto Strasser remained the chief editorial writer for the three newspapers of the Kampferlag. [33] Otto Strasser himself was expelled from the Party in May 1930, demanding that the Nazis support some trade union strikes, and the nationalization of industry. and formed the Black Front as an alternative. It was strongly socialist, welcomed ex-Nazis, and was not antisemitic. The Black Front, however, had little impact. [34]


In the 14 September election, the Nazis polled second, in the election, with over 18%. Communists also gained; the centrist parties lost. 107 Nazi deputies marched into the Reichstag, wearing brown shirts and answering the roll call with "Present, Heil Hitler! [35]

The 1930 election, however, presented internal problems as well. The SA had demanded to put three of its leaders onto the Reichstag ballot. Walter Stennes, the SA leader in eastern Germany, had gone to Munich to see Hitler, who refused. Stennes' staff in Berlin resigned and refused to carry out party duties. [36]

After that election, Chancellor Heinrich Bruening refused to consider taking the Nazis into a coalition, but was willing to consider cooperation if the party operated legally. It was his hope that they would become a "loyal opposition", and support his goal of obtaining a large international loan. Such support meant that Hitler would not persist in repudiating reparations payments. They met on 5 October, but soon found there were no grounds for cooperation. Bruening said, as had others, Hitler's fundamental rule was "First power, then politics". [37]


Roehm returned, in January 1931, to become Chief of Staff of the SA. Roehm, according to William Shirer, joined four other men as Hitler's most powerful followers: Gregor Strasser in second place as leader of the Political Organization (PO), Roehm, Goering, Goebbels and Wilhelm Frick. Strasser's PO supervised the provincial and local leaders, with whom he had much warmer personal interactions than Hitler. Indeed, some in the Army and Presidency thought he might succeed Hitler. Strasser had said, however, that the tension of the time "All that serves to precipitate the catastrophe...good, very good, for us and our German revolution." [38]

Goebbels had replaced Strasser as head of propaganda, and remained Gauleiter of Berlin. While he was distrusted by the other top leaders, Hitler was not at all displeased to see strife there, because it kept them from banding together against him.

Frick, the least well known member of the top echelon, was a civil servant by background. He was the first Nazi to hold provincial office, and then became the leader of the Nazis in the Reichstag. His calm style worked well with government officials, although his gaining the Interior Ministry of Thuringia, in 1929, had not been a smooth matter.

SA rebellion

Walter Stennes had conducted a rebellion in August 1930, causing Hitler remaining Supreme Leader but Pfeffer resigning. August Schneidhueber, deputy for the South, complained on 19 September that Hitler did not spend enough time with the SA. In February 1931, Hitler ordered the SA and SS to stop street fighting, and he accepted a government decree for police preapproval of all rallies. Stennes called a meeting in opposition on 31 March, and his followers staged a less than 1 day rebellion, broken up by the SS. Stennes resigned, on grounds he wanted to serve a party, not an individual, but "Whoever goes with me has a hard road. I recommend, however, that you stay with Hitler for the sake of the Nationalist idea which we do not want to destroy." Nevertheless, Hitler write editorials condemning "buffoons of salon-bolshevism and salon-socialism", one of whom was Stennes, who wanted "to introduce into the SA a series of concepts that, that, accurately, belong to the continuously seditious requisites of the Communists."

Hanfstaengl went with Hitler on an April trip calming the SA, and met with Stennes, who blamed Goebbels for "egging them on to demonstrate in the streets." Hitler replaced Stennes with an SS man. [39]

Death of Geli Raubal

For more information, see: Geli Raubal.

On 18 September, Geli Raubal died. While there are questions about the manner of her death, there is no question that it had a profound effect on him.

Meeting Hindenburg

Hitler first met with President Hindenburg on 10 October, also having met with Bruening. Bruening had had a plan to use a parliamentary procedure to extend Hindenburg's term for two years, deferring the 1932 Presidential elction, and then voting in a monarchy. This would keep Hitler from becoming elected President, a likely event if the then 85-year-old Hindenburg were elected for another term, and died in office. While Hitler did not answer directly, his comments indicated that he would not support the plan, fairly obviously intended to stop the Nazis from taking control.

Hindenburg was not impressed with Hitler, to whom he gave a rambling harangue. Unimpressed with the man he called a "Bohemian corporal", he told Schleicher that such a man could never become Chancellor. While it was suggested that Hitler was still unsure of himself after Geli's death, he was sufficiently focused to go to a meeting, the next day, to form a "National Opposition" with the Nazis. Franz Seldte, head of the Stahlhelm, and Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the DNVP, met with him at Bad Harzburg, and also included Hjalmar Schacht in the formation of the "Harzburg Front". [40]

November elections and coalition

The Nazis obtained state-level majorities in Hamburg in September and Hessen in November, making them a necessary part of any coalition from the right.


Allying with the DNVP was a step to getting a broader base than the middle class, although it would set up conflict with the economic socialists in the Party. Nevertheless, the Harzburg Front broke down quickly, although both Huegenberg and Hitler refused Bruening's plan for extending Hindenburg's term. On January 12, Hitler was subtle enough not to reply to Bruening, but to tell Hindenburg directly that he considered the proposal unconstitutional. He said he would support Hindenburg's reelection. Otto Meissner suggested that he would support Hindenburg if he forced Bruening out of office, named a new government, and called for new parliamentary elections.

During this time, he made a major speech that declared Germany had charge of her own destiny; it was not determined by foreign events. This was yet another appeal to what the people wanted to hear, and gained him additional popularity. [41]

Presidential election

Since the idea of an extended term seemed dead, Hitler had to decide whether to run against Hindenburg. Goebbels' diaries showed Hitler oscillated between declaring or not, until Hindenburg announced his candidacy on 15 February. Hitler then declared he would run for President on 22 February. He had to deal with the relevant point that he was not yet a citizen of Germany, which was arranged when the Nazi Minister of the Interior of Brunswick, on 25 February, named him a representative of Brunswick in Berlin, thus making him a citizen of Brunswick and hence Germany.

On the first ballot on 13 March, Hindenburg received 49.6% of the vote, insufficient for election. Hitler took 30.1%. In a 10 April runoff election, in which Duesterberg withdrew, throwing his support to Hitler, Hindenburg received the required 53%, Hitler took 36.8%, and Ernst Thaelmann, the Communist, took 10.2%. A few days later, Bruening issued a decree banning the SA and SS.

Papen steps in

In May, Hitler secretly met with Schleicher, who offered to have the ban removed if Hitler would not attack a new right-wing government. [42] Hitler agreed, and Schleicher recommended that Franz von Papen replace Bruening.

Hindenburg named von Papen as Chancellor on 31 May. Schleicher believed that even with a weak Chancellor, the Army could control the Nazis. Hitler had promised not to attack, but he also had not promised support. He offered support only if Papen would, in addition to lifting the ban, would dissolve the Reichstag.[43] While Papen had only slight political experience, he was attractive to industrialists and the Army. He was not a supporter of parliamentary government. Meeting Hitler after he had taken office, he wrote
I could detect no inner quality which might explain his extraordinary hold on the masses...As he talked about his party's aims, I was struck by the fanatical insistence with which he presented his arguments. I realized that the fate of my Government would depend to a large extent on the willingness of this man and his followers to back me up, and this would be the most difficult problem with which I would have to deal. He made it clear that he would not be content for long with a subordinate role and intended in due course to demand plenary powers for himself."I regard your Cabinet only as a temporary solution, and will continue my efforts to make my party the strongest in the country. The Chancellorship will then devolve on me."[44]

Reichstag election

More polarization was evident in the November elections for the Reichstag. While the Nazis lost a few seat, their 196 delegates were far more than the 121 of the runner-up, the left-center SPD. Unnervingly to some centrists and certainly to non-Nazi rightists, the Communists went from 77 seats in 1928 election, to 89 in the July 1932 election to 100 in the November election.

A brief chancellorship

On 19 November, Hitler met with Hindenburg. The President suggested that Hitler negotiate with other parties to form a coalition, which both knew would fail due to DNVP opposition.

Hindenburg made Kurt von Schleicher the chancellor. He was an unpopular choice and his government soon fell, opening the way for Hitler's appointment in early 1933.

While Schleicher had negotiated previously with Gregor Strasser, Hitler hardened his position against Schleicher. On 8 December, Strasser resigned from the Reichstag. [45]


  1. Joachim Fest (1973), Hitler, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, pp. 119-120
  2. Ian Kershaw (1998), Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris, W.W. Norton, ISBN 0-393-04671-0, pp. 124-125
  3. Richard J. Evans (2003), The Coming of the Third Reich, Penguin, ISBN 1-59420-004-1, p. 169
  4. Kershaw, Hubris, p. 135
  5. Kershaw, Hubris, p. 127
  6. Evans, p. 170
  7. Toland, p. 96
  8. Robert Ley, ed. (24 February 1920), The program of the NSDAP, "Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume 4", Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham University
  9. Evans, pp. 179-180
  10. Fest, pp. 168-170
  11. William Shirer (1960), Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Simon and Schuster, pp. 60-62
  12. Ronnie S. Landau (2006), The Nazi Holocaust, I.B.Tauris, p. 96
  13. Dan Stone (2008), "The "Mein Kampf Ramp" : Emily Overend Lorimer and Hitler Translations in Britain", German History 26 (4), p. 505
  14. E.O. Lorimer, "Hitler’s Germany" , John O’London’s Weekly (11 Nov. 1933), quoted in Stone 2008
  15. Stone, pp. 507-509
  16. John O'Laughlin, Colin Flint, Luc Anselin (1994), "The Geography of the Nazi Vote: Context, Confession and Clas in the Reichstag Election of 1930", Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84 (3): 351-380, pp. 355 (figure 1) & 357
  17. Toland, p. 214
  18. Kershaw, Hubris , pp. 270-273
  19. Toland, pp. 216-217
  20. Ian Kershaw (2008), Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, Yale University Press and Yad Vashem, ISBN 978-0-300-12427-9, p. 56
  21. Joseph Nyomarkay (1967), Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 81-82
  22. Kershaw 2008, p. 51
  23. Shirer, pp. 126-128
  24. Toland, pp. 218-220
  25. Kershaw, Hubris, p. 292
  26. Kershaw, Hubris, pp. 258-259
  27. David Welch (2004), "Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community", Journal of Contemporary History 39 (2), DOI:10.1177/0022009404042129, p. 213
  28. Kershaw, Hubris, p. 290
  29. Toland, pp. 221-222
  30. Adolf Hitler, "Hitler's Secret Book" (not formally titled), p. 24
  31. Toland, pp. 231-232
  32. Kershaw, Hubris, p. 319
  33. Toland, pp. 239-240
  34. Shirer, p. 147
  35. Toland, pp. 242-244
  36. Kershaw, Hubris, p. 347
  37. Kershaw, Hubris, pp. 338-339
  38. Shirer, pp. 146-149
  39. Toland, pp. 249-250
  40. Kershaw,Hubris, pp. 355-356
  41. Hitler's speech in Dusseldorf, Industry Club, 27 January 1932
  42. John Toland (1976), Adolf Hitler, Ballantine, p. 211
  43. Toland, Ballantine ed., p. 212
  44. Kershaw, Hubris, pp. 367-368
  45. Francis Ludwig Carsten (1973), The Reichswehr and politics, 1918 to 1933, University of California Press, pp. 384-385