The Anti-Saloon League was the leading organization lobbying for Prohibition in the United States in the early 20th century. It was a key component of the Progressive Movement, and was strongest in the South and rural North, drawing heavy support from pietistic Protestant ministers and their congregations, especially Methodists, Baptists, Disciples and Congregationalists. It concentrated on legislation, and cared about how legislators voted, not whether they drank or not. Founded as a state society in Oberlin, Ohio in 1893, its influence spread rapidly. In 1895 it became a national organization and quickly rose to become the most powerful prohibition lobby in America, pushing aside its older competitors the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the Prohibition Party. Its triumph was nationwide prohibition locked into the Constitution with passage of the 18th Amendment in 1919. It was decisively defeated when prohibition was repealed in 1933.
Organizational structure and operation
Kerr (1980) and Odegard (1928) have explored its political innovations. The League was the first modern pressure group organized around one issue. Unlike earlier popular movements, it utilized bureaucratic methods learned from business to build a strong organization. The League's founder and first leader, Howard Hyde Russell (1855-1946), believed that the best leadership was selected, not elected. Russell built from the bottom up, shaping local leagues and raising the most promising young men to leadership at the local and state levels. This organizational strategy reinvigorated the temperance movement, which previously had been led part-time by Protestant ministers.
Lamme (2004) shows the League used a multitiered approach in its attempts to secure a dry (prohibition) nation through national legislation and congressional hearings, the Scientific Temperance Federation, and its American Issue Publishing Company. The ASLA also used emotion and cognition in the style of such issues related to World War I as anti-German sentiment, patriotism, and rationing. Lamme (2003) explores the public relations approach used by the League as it tried to mobilize public opinion in favor of a dry, saloonless nation. It invented many of the modern techniques of public relations. The founders saw themselves as preachers fulfilling their religious duty of eliminating liquor in America.
The League lobbied at all levels of government for legislation to prohibit the manufacture or import of spirits, beer and wine. Ware (1989) explores its operations in Phoenix, Arizona. Ministers had launched several efforts to close Arizona saloons after the 1906 creation of League chapters in Yuma, Tucson, and Phoenix. A League organizer from New York arrived in 1909, but the Phoenix chapter was stymied by local-option elections, whereby local areas could decide whether or not to allow saloons. League members pressured local police to take licenses from establishments that violated closing hours or served women and minors, and they provided witnesses to testify about these violations. One witness was Frank Shindelbower, a juvenile from a poor family, who testified several saloons had sold him liquor; as a result those saloons lost their licenses. However owners discovered that Shindelbower had perjured himself, and he was imprisoned. After the Arizona Gazette and other newspapers pictured Shindelbower as the innocent tool of the Anti-Saloon League, he was pardoned.
As the state level the League had mixed results, usually doing best in rural and southern states. It made little headway in larger cities, or among liturgical church members such as Catholics, Jews, Episcopalians and German Lutherans. Pegram (1990) explains its success in Illinois under William Hamilton Anderson. From 1900 and 1905 the League worked to obtain a local option referendum law and became an official church federation. Local Option was passed in 1907 and by 1910 40 of Illinois' 102 counties and 1,059 of the state's townships and precincts had become dry, including some Protestant areas around Chicago. Despite these successes, after the Prohibition amendment was ratified in 1919, social problems such as organized crime ignored by the League undermined the public influence of the single-issue pressure group, and it faded in importance. Pegram (1997) uses its failure in Maryland to explore the relationship between Southern Progressivism and national progressivism. The Maryland leader 1907-14 was William H. Anderson, but he was unable to adapt to local conditions, such as the large German element. The League failed to ally with local political bosses and attacked the Democratic Party. In Maryland, as in the rest of the South, Pegram concludes, traditional religious, political, and racial concerns constrained reform movements even as they converted Southerners to the new national politics of federal intervention and interest-group competition.
In 1909, the League moved its national headquarters from Washington, DC to Westerville, Ohio, which had a reputation for dryness. The American Issue Publishing Company, the publishing arm of the League, was also in Westerville. Ernest Cherrington headed the company, which printed millins of leaflets - over 40 tons of mail per month - or distribution through supportive churches.
The League used pressure politics, which it is credited with developing, in legislative battles. When it came to fighting wet candidates, especially as Al Smith in the presidential election of 1928, the League was less effective because its audience was already Republican. Unable to cope with the failures of prohibition, especially bootlegging and organized crime as well as reduced government revenue, the League failed to counter the repeal forces, led by prominent Democrats, which helped Franklin D. Roosevelt win in 1932. A new Constitutional amendment passed easily in 1933 to repeal the 18th amendment, and the League lost its power. From 1948 until 1950 it was renamed the Temperance League, from 1950 to 1964 the National Temperance League, from 1964 the American Council on Alcohol Problems.