Credit rating agency: Difference between revisions

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During 2007 and 2008 the Standard and Poor agency downgraded more than two-thirds of its investment-grade
During 2007 and 2008 the Standard and Poor agency downgraded more than two-thirds of its investment-grade
ratings, and the  Moodys agency  downgraded over 5,000 mortgage-backed securities, following rating errors referred to by the chairman of a Congressional Committee as a "story of colossal failure"
ratings, and the  Moodys agency  downgraded over 5,000 mortgage-backed securities, following rating errors referred to by the chairman of a Congressional Committee as a "story of colossal failure"
<ref>[http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/Credit_Agencies_Hearing_HAW_Statement_10.22.08.pdf Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman to the Committee On Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on the ''Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis'', October 22, 2008]</ref>, and the President of Standard  and Poor acknowledged that "the historical data we used and the assumptions we made significantly underestimated the severity of what has actually occurred"<ref>[http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/Deven_Sharma_Written_Statement_10_22_08.pdf Deven Sharma: testimony before The Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, The Committee On Oversight And Government Reform
<ref>[http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/Credit_Agencies_Hearing_HAW_Statement_10.22.08.pdf Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman to the Committee On Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on the ''Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis'', October 22, 2008]</ref>, and the President of Standard  and Poor acknowledged that "the historical data we used and the assumptions we made significantly underestimated the severity of what has actually occurred"<ref>[http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/Deven_Sharma_Written_Statement_10_22_08.pdf Deven Sharma: testimony before the United States House Of Representatives Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, October 22, 2008]</ref>
United States House Of Representatives Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, October 22, 2008]</ref>





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A credit rating agency provides independent assessments, in the form of credit ratings, of the probability of default of companies, governments and the providers of of a wide range of financial instruments. Credit ratings have major impact on the availability and cost of credit for borrowers.

"There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful"
      (Thomas L. Friedman, in an interview with Jim Lehrer on Newshour, PBS television, Feb. 13, 1996).


Introduction: credit ratings and rating agencies

The term "credit" is used in this context in its sense of trustworthiness, and refers to the extent to which its subject can be trusted to be willing and able to comply with the terms of a financial contract. Assessments of individual creditworthiness (usually stated as "credit scores") are not undertaken by organisations known as credit rating agencies, and are not further referred to in this article.

Credit rating agencies assess the creditworthiness of the issuers of debt instruments, including bonds issued by corporations and governments and mortgages and their derivatives, and they express their findings as alphabetically-coded "rating" categories such as AAA, AA, and BB. Credit ratings have been presented by the issuing agencies as statements of opinion, implying the absence of any legally-enforceable commitment to their reliability.

The major credit rating agencies are located in the United States and are regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission They undertake "solicited ratings" for a fee at the request of the issuers of debt instruments, basing their assessments upon data supplied to them by the issuers. They also undertake unsolicitated assessments at their own expense, using published data. Their credit ratings are freely available to investors.

The rôle of the agencies

As the light-hearted opening quotation implies, the credit rating agencies exert a powerful influence upon the financial system. Views differ concerning the source of that power, however. According to a spokesman of the United States Department of the Treasury it arises from the fact that rating agencies solve a basic market failure by providing information about the borrower that a lender would otherwise be unable to obtain. Especially in the capital markets, where a lender is likely purchasing just a small portion of the borrower’s debt in the form of a bond or asset-backed security – it can be inefficient, difficult and costly for a lender to get all the information they need to evaluate the credit worthiness of the borrower. In the absence of credit ratings, lenders would not lend as much as they could, and borrowers would have to offer higher rates to offset uncertainty. [1]. But, according to an eminent Professor of Law, they do not so much provide the market with information, so much as reflect the information that it already has; and they are not widely respected among sophisticated market participants. In an earlier study he refers to numerous academic studies that show that that the market anticipates ratings changes. (The fact that ratings are correlated with actual default experience – does not alter that conclusion because ratings can be both correlated with default and have little informational value ) [2]. Professor Partnoy believes that their influence stems almost entirely from their rõle in the regulatory system. Since 1973 credit ratings have been incorporated into hundreds of regulatory decisions, including decisions affecting securities, pensions, banking, real estate, and insurance. Some businesses are not permitted to hold assets rated below stipulated grade, and others are required to maintain reserve ratios that depend upon the ratings of their assets. Large numbers of businesses are consequently dependent upon recognised credit ratings to enable them to raise money on terms that they can afford [3]. There is evidence that all types of rating announcements – outlooks, reviews and rating changes, whether positive or negative – have a significant impact on the risk premiums that are embodied in the interest rates on bonds (as reflected in the prices of credit default swaps) [4].

Rating performance

During 2007 and 2008 the Standard and Poor agency downgraded more than two-thirds of its investment-grade ratings, and the Moodys agency downgraded over 5,000 mortgage-backed securities, following rating errors referred to by the chairman of a Congressional Committee as a "story of colossal failure" [5], and the President of Standard and Poor acknowledged that "the historical data we used and the assumptions we made significantly underestimated the severity of what has actually occurred"[6]



According to expert testimony to a Senate Committee they do not make any significant effort to verify that data [7].

Regulation of the agencies

the conditions required by that commission for their designation as "Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations" (NRSROs)[8].


Notes and references

  1. Michael S. Barr, Assistant Secretary-Designate for Financial Institutions, U.S. Department of the Treasury; Testimony before Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Examining Proposals to Enhance the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, Wednesday, August 5, 2009
  2. Frank Partnoy: How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-46, University of San Diego School of Law, 2006
  3. Lawrence J. White: Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing: Examining Proposals to Enhance the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, Wednesday, August 5, 2009
  4. Fabian Dittrich: The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation", Inaugural dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln 2007
  5. Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman to the Committee On Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on the Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis, October 22, 2008
  6. Deven Sharma: testimony before the United States House Of Representatives Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, October 22, 2008
  7. Testimony of Professor John H Coffee, given before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs hearing on Examining Proposals to Enhance the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, Wednesday, August 5, 2009]
  8. Amendments to the Rules Relating to the Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission, November 2009