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The [[United States Department of Defense]] held '''Combatant Status Review Tribunals''' (CSRT) from August 2004 through January 2005, to confirm whether the detainees they had been holding at [[Guantanamo detention camp]] were [[enemy combatant]]s.


The [[United States Department of Defense]] held '''Combatant Status Review Tribunals''' from August 2004 through January 2005, to confirm whether the detainees they had been holding at [[Guantanamo detention camp]] were [[enemy combatant]]s.
In the summer of 2004 [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]] announced that the detainees would be given an annual [[Adminstrative Review Board]] hearing, similar to CSRTs, but with a slightly different mandate.  While the reviews of late 2004, early 2005 were to determine whether the detainees were '''illegal combatants''', the annual reviews would determine if the detainee still represented a threat.


==Background==
==Background==


The [[Fourth Geneva Convention]] require combatants to fulfill certain requirements in order enjoy the rights of POW status.  But it requires belligerents to continue grant the rights of POW status to those prisoners suspected of failing to fulfill the conditions that would afford them POW status, until the belligerent had convened a '''competent tribunal'''. to make a determination as to their status.
The [[Third Geneva Convention]] require combatants to fulfill certain requirements in order enjoy the rights of POW status.  It requires belligerents to continue grant the rights of POW status to those prisoners suspected of failing to fulfill the conditions that would afford them POW status, until the belligerent had convened a '''competent tribunal'''. to make a determination as to their status.
 
The Geneva Conventions oblige belligerents to convene the competent tribunals in a timely fashion.
 
The interpretation of the [[George W. Bush|Bush administration]] was that the Geneva Conventions obliged belligerents to convene a competent tribunal to review the combatant status of prisoners only when their status was in any doubt.
 
Various legal challenges were mounted on behalf of the detainees.  Most of those legal challenges ruled against the [[Executive Branch]], and when the Executive Branch's opportunities to appeal were exhausted they were finally forced to convene tribunals in early July of 2004.
 
Although the Geneva Conventions oblige belligerents to convene the tribunals in a timely fashion most of the Guantanamo Bay detainees had been held for over two and a half years.  During that time they had not been able to communicate with their families, or have legal advice.


==The manner in which the tribunals were conducted==
==The manner in which the tribunals were conducted==
All the tribunals convened in a room, with space the three officers presiding over the tribunal, a clerk to keep a record, an officer familiar with the detainees case, possibly the detainee and his translator, and up to three three observers.  37 of the 572 Tribunals were observed by a member of the Press.
===The role of the presiding officers===
The DoD kept the identity of the presiding officers, and the rules to guide their decisions, confidential.


Tens of thousands Americans service members, and their families, live at Guantanamo Bay. Guantanamo Bay has been described as being like a small US city. It has lots of structures where the tribunal could convene.
A paper from the Seton Hall University School of Law, entitled "No-hearing hearings", revealed that some Guantanamo captives had second or third Combatant Status Review Tribunals convened when their first Tribunal determined that they had not been enemy combatants after all.<ref name="No-hearing_hearings">
{{cite web
| url=http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf
| title=No-hearing hearings
| page=page 17
| author=[[Mark Denbeaux]], [[Joshua Denbeaux]], David Gratz, John Gregorek, Matthew Darby, Shana Edwards, Shane Hartman, Daniel Mann, Megan Sassaman and Helen Skinner
| publisher=[[Seton Hall University]] School of Law
| accessdate=2007-04-02
}}</ref>


In the event all the tribunals convened in a small temporary facility, which had room for  the three officers presiding over the tribunal, a clerk to keep a record, an officer delegated to be familiar with the detainees case, possibly the detainee and their translator, and the three observers. The captive was shackled . 37 of the 572 Tribunals were observed by a member of the Press.
[[Lieutenant colonel|Lieutenant Colonel]] [[Stephen Abraham]] came forward and swore an affidavit,<ref name=Affidavit>{{cite web
| url=http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf
| title=Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Reserve, June 14th, 2007
| publisher=[[United States Supreme Court]]
| date=June 14 2007
| accessdate=2007-06-25
}}</ref> describing his experience sitting on Al Ghazzawi's Tribunal.<ref name=Cbs20070623>
{{cite news
| url=http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/23/world/main2970288_page2.shtml
| title=Gitmo Panelist Slams Hearing Process: Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham Is First Member Of Military Panel To Challenge Guantanamo Bay Hearings
| date=June 23, 2007
| publisher=[[CBS]]
| accessdate=2007-06-23
}}</ref>


[[Image:Room in which CSR Tribunals were held - Guantanamo.jpg|thumb|200px|CSRT hearing room]]
===The role of the presiding officers===
The DoD kept the identity of the presiding officers confidential.  The instructions the presiding officers used to guide their decisions was confidential. 
===The role of the detainee's representative===
===The role of the detainee's representative===
Each detainee's case file was the responsibility of a detainee's representative.  Detainee's were informed that the role of the representative was not to serve as their advocate.  Nothing told to him was confidential.  He had no obligation to present their case in the best light.  If the detainee was not present during their tribunal, the representative would present their case without their co-operation.
Detainees were informed that the role of the representative was not to serve as their advocate.  Nothing told to him was confidential.  He had no obligation to present their case in the best light.  If the detainee was not present during their tribunal, the representative would present their case without their co-operation.
 
===The role of the detainee during the tribunal===
===The role of the detainee during the tribunal===


Detainees who did attend their tribunals were, generally given an opportunity, if they wished, to explain why they should not be considered an unlawful combatant.  However, if they were given this opportunity, they would have to guess why they were being held, in the first place.  Unlike prisoners in the criminal justice system, they were all being held without charge.  The evidence against them was classified.
Detainees who did attend their tribunals were, generally given an opportunity, if they wished, to explain why they should not be considered an unlawful combatant.  They did not have access to specific details of the the classified reasons why they were held, so a precise rebuttal was not likely.   
 
Detainees were not allowed to attend their own tribunals, unless they signed a long, complicated agreement, wherein they agreed to waive rights.  Half or more of the detainees declined to sign the agreement, without independent legal advice. 
===The role of the observers in the tribunal===
 
The DoD experienced ongoing confusion about the presence of observers.  It now seems that portions of all the tribunals were supposed to be held in public -- public in the sense that representatives from a short list of reporters would be advised of the date of tribunals, and invited to attend.  All of the first several dozen tribunals went unobserved apparently because the DoD had not figured out who was responsible for advising the reporters on the approved list, and issuing them an invitation.  Overlooking the issuing of invitations remained an ongoing problem.  The list of approved reporters was short.  The procedure for getting to the tribunal's trailer was difficult, and many of the tribunals went unobserved.
 


Detainees were not allowed to attend their own tribunals, unless they signed a agreement, wherein they agreed to waive rights.  Half or more of the detainees declined to sign the agreement, without independent legal advice.
==Results==
==Results==
 
'''NLEC''' is an abbreviation for '''No Longer Enemy Combatant''', a term the [[George W. Bush Administration]] used for prisoners at the [[Guantanamo Bay detention camp]]  whose [[Combatant Status Review Tribunal]] determined they should not have been classified as "[[enemy combatant]]s".<ref name=Afps31063>
The tribunal determined that 38 of the detainees had never been combatants, and never should have been held.  Four of those 38 detainees have been released. 
 
==Documents==
Courts ordered the [[U.S. Department of Defense]] to comply with [[Freedom of Information Act]] requests, to release information about the captives.
*In 2005 the DoD released 517 [[Summary of Evidence (CSRT)|Summary of Evidence memo]]s, which each summarized the allegations justifying the detention of a single captive.  However, they were in obfuscated order, and had their names redacted, so readers couldn't tie individual memos to individual captives.
 
On March 3rd 2006 The DoD released summarized transcripts, and other documents, from the unclassified sessions of 360 captives Tribunals.  These documents were also released in obfuscated order, and only identified by the captives ID number, so readers couldn't tie individual transcripts to individual captives.  However, on April 20th 2006 the DoD released a list of the names, nationalities and ID numbers of the 558 captives who had their combatant status reviewed by a Tribunal.<ref name=DoDList>[http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detainee_list.pdf list of prisoners (.pdf)], ''[[US Department of Defense]]'', [[April 20]] [[2006]]</ref>
 
 
==Annual reviews==
 
In the summer of 2004 [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]] announced that the detainees would be given an annual review, similar to these status reviews, but with a slightly different mandate.  While the reviews of late 2004, early 2005 were to determine whether the detainees were '''illegal combatants''', the annual reviews would determine if the detainee still represented a threat.
 
== U.S. Judicial Branch Appeals==
 
Originally the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] [[United States President|Presidency]] asserted that the captives had no right to appeal.<ref name=USNewsAndWorldReport20070830>
{{cite news
{{cite news
| url=http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2007/08/30/justice-department-lawyers-refuse-detainee-cases.html
| url=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31063
| title=Justice Department Lawyers Refuse Detainee Cases: Some lawyers in the civil appeals division object to the government's policies on Guantánamo Bay
| title=38 Guantanamo Detainees to Be Freed After Tribunals
| publisher=[[US News and World Report]]
| author=[[Kathleen T. Rhem]]
| author=[[Emma Schwartz]]
| publisher=[[American Forces Press Service]]
| date=[[August 30]], [[2007]]
| date=March 30, 2005
| accessdate=2007-08-30
| accessdate=2007-09-01
}}</ref>
}}</ref>
Captives who had "[[next friend]]s" willing to initiate the [[habeas corpus]] process filed appeals before the [[United States Judicial Branch]].  [[Rasul v. Bush]] was the first appeal to make its way to the [[Supreme Court of the United States]].  The creation of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals was a side effect of Rasul v. Bush.


Through the [[Detainee Treatment Act of 2005]] and the [[Military Commissions Act of 2006]] the [[United States Congress]] moved to first limit, and then completely curtail the captive's ability to file habeas corpus appeals.<ref name=USNewsAndWorldReport20070830/>
Thirty-eight detainees were classified as "NLECs".<ref name=WapoNlec>
[http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/nlec/ Guantanamo Bay Detainees Classifed as "No Longer Enemy Combatants"], ''[[Washington Post]]''</ref>
A study from Seton Hall University School of Law said that an additional three Combatant Status Review Tribunals determined that captives should not have been determined to have been enemy combatants, only to have their recommendation overturned.<ref name="No-hearing_hearings" />
None of the detainees who were determined not to have been enemy combatants were immediately released.  Ten of the NLECs were allowed to move to the more comfortable [[Camp Iguana]].  Others, such as [[Sami Al Laithi]], remained in solitary confinement.


The Military Commission Act does provide a process where captives can appeal the Combatant Status Review Tribunal had properly followed OARDEC's own rules when it confirmed their enemy combatant status.<ref name=USNewsAndWorldReport20070830/>
The delay in the release of some of the detainees was due to considerations of the detainees safety. Under the ''refoulement'' provision of the [[Convention against Torture]], a country may not send an individual to a country where he may be tortured.
If and when captives are able to file these appeals they would be heard before the [[U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit]].


[[Emma Schwartz]], in the  
Some of the detainees could not be returned to their home countries, out of fears of retaliation from their fellow citizens, or the governments of their countries.  Some, like Al Laithi, were returned to their home countries after the U.S. secured a promise that they would not be punished by their home countries.  Others, like five of [[Uighur detainees in Guantanamo]], were released when the U.S. found a third country which would accept them.<ref name=Bbc060506>
''[[US News and World Report]]'',
{{citation
on [[August 30]], [[2007]], reported that her sources told her: ''"...Up to one fourth of the department's own civil appellate staff has recently opted out of handling the government's cases against detainee appeals."<ref name=USNewsAndWorldReport20070830/>
| url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4979466.stm
| title = Albania takes Guantanamo Uighurs
| journal = BBC
| date = May 6, 2006
}}</ref>Three further captives who had been determined not to have been enemy combatants, who had been occupants of Camp Iguana since May 2005, were released in Albania in November 2006.<ref name=MiamiHerald061117>
[http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/guantanamo/story/756756.html Pentagon sends Guantánamo captives to Albania], ''[[Miami Herald]]'', November 17 2006
</ref>


==References==
==References==
<references/>
<references/>

Revision as of 10:09, 30 May 2009

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The United States Department of Defense held Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) from August 2004 through January 2005, to confirm whether the detainees they had been holding at Guantanamo detention camp were enemy combatants.

In the summer of 2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the detainees would be given an annual Adminstrative Review Board hearing, similar to CSRTs, but with a slightly different mandate. While the reviews of late 2004, early 2005 were to determine whether the detainees were illegal combatants, the annual reviews would determine if the detainee still represented a threat.

Background

The Third Geneva Convention require combatants to fulfill certain requirements in order enjoy the rights of POW status. It requires belligerents to continue grant the rights of POW status to those prisoners suspected of failing to fulfill the conditions that would afford them POW status, until the belligerent had convened a competent tribunal. to make a determination as to their status.

The manner in which the tribunals were conducted

All the tribunals convened in a room, with space the three officers presiding over the tribunal, a clerk to keep a record, an officer familiar with the detainees case, possibly the detainee and his translator, and up to three three observers. 37 of the 572 Tribunals were observed by a member of the Press.

The role of the presiding officers

The DoD kept the identity of the presiding officers, and the rules to guide their decisions, confidential.

A paper from the Seton Hall University School of Law, entitled "No-hearing hearings", revealed that some Guantanamo captives had second or third Combatant Status Review Tribunals convened when their first Tribunal determined that they had not been enemy combatants after all.[1]

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham came forward and swore an affidavit,[2] describing his experience sitting on Al Ghazzawi's Tribunal.[3]

The role of the detainee's representative

Detainees were informed that the role of the representative was not to serve as their advocate. Nothing told to him was confidential. He had no obligation to present their case in the best light. If the detainee was not present during their tribunal, the representative would present their case without their co-operation.

The role of the detainee during the tribunal

Detainees who did attend their tribunals were, generally given an opportunity, if they wished, to explain why they should not be considered an unlawful combatant. They did not have access to specific details of the the classified reasons why they were held, so a precise rebuttal was not likely.

Detainees were not allowed to attend their own tribunals, unless they signed a agreement, wherein they agreed to waive rights. Half or more of the detainees declined to sign the agreement, without independent legal advice.

Results

NLEC is an abbreviation for No Longer Enemy Combatant, a term the George W. Bush Administration used for prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal determined they should not have been classified as "enemy combatants".[4]

Thirty-eight detainees were classified as "NLECs".[5] A study from Seton Hall University School of Law said that an additional three Combatant Status Review Tribunals determined that captives should not have been determined to have been enemy combatants, only to have their recommendation overturned.[1] None of the detainees who were determined not to have been enemy combatants were immediately released. Ten of the NLECs were allowed to move to the more comfortable Camp Iguana. Others, such as Sami Al Laithi, remained in solitary confinement.

The delay in the release of some of the detainees was due to considerations of the detainees safety. Under the refoulement provision of the Convention against Torture, a country may not send an individual to a country where he may be tortured.

Some of the detainees could not be returned to their home countries, out of fears of retaliation from their fellow citizens, or the governments of their countries. Some, like Al Laithi, were returned to their home countries after the U.S. secured a promise that they would not be punished by their home countries. Others, like five of Uighur detainees in Guantanamo, were released when the U.S. found a third country which would accept them.[6]Three further captives who had been determined not to have been enemy combatants, who had been occupants of Camp Iguana since May 2005, were released in Albania in November 2006.[7]

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Mark Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux, David Gratz, John Gregorek, Matthew Darby, Shana Edwards, Shane Hartman, Daniel Mann, Megan Sassaman and Helen Skinner. No-hearing hearings. Seton Hall University School of Law. Retrieved on 2007-04-02.
  2. ↑ Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Reserve, June 14th, 2007. United States Supreme Court (June 14 2007). Retrieved on 2007-06-25.
  3. ↑ Gitmo Panelist Slams Hearing Process: Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham Is First Member Of Military Panel To Challenge Guantanamo Bay Hearings, CBS, June 23, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-06-23.
  4. ↑ Kathleen T. Rhem. 38 Guantanamo Detainees to Be Freed After Tribunals, American Forces Press Service, March 30, 2005. Retrieved on 2007-09-01.
  5. ↑ Guantanamo Bay Detainees Classifed as "No Longer Enemy Combatants", Washington Post
  6. ↑ "Albania takes Guantanamo Uighurs", BBC, May 6, 2006
  7. ↑ Pentagon sends Guantánamo captives to Albania, Miami Herald, November 17 2006
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