U.S. intelligence activities in Russia and Eurasia
- 1 European regional
- 2 Western Europe
- 2.1 Belgium
- 2.2 France
- 2.2.1 France 1950
- 2.2.2 France 1992
- 2.2.3 France 1993
- 2.2.4 France 1995
- 2.2.5 France 2006
- 2.3 Germany
- 2.4 Greece
- 2.5 Italy
- 2.6 Netherlands
- 2.7 United Kingdom
- 3 Eastern Europe
- 3.1 Albania
- 3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 3.3 Croatia
- 3.4 Hungary
- 4 Soviet Union and Post-Soviet states
- 4.1 Soviet Union
- 4.1.1 Soviet Union 1950
- 4.1.2 Soviet Union 1952
- 4.1.3 Soviet Union 1953
- 4.1.4 Soviet Union 1954
- 4.1.5 Soviet Union 1956
- 4.1.6 Soviet Union 1958
- 4.1.7 Soviet Union 1959
- 4.1.8 Soviet Union 1960
- 4.1.9 Soviet Union 1965
- 4.1.10 Soviet Union 1969
- 4.1.11 Soviet Union 1974
- 4.1.12 Soviet Union 1975
- 4.1.13 Soviet Union 1981
- 4.1.14 Soviet Union 1984
- 4.1.15 Soviet Union 1985
- 4.1.16 Russia 2005
- 4.2 Ukraine
- 4.1 Soviet Union
- 5 References
This article deals with activities of the United States intelligence community, in the jurisdiction generally associated with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia, National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. While the exact geographic organization of intelligence operations agencies is classified, this senior function, as well as the geographic coverage of the United States European Command in the U.S. Department of Defense and the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs in the U.S. Department of State should suggest the intelligence structure.
Radio Free Europe ( gray psychological operations)
It was founded in 1950 by the National Committee for a Free Europe. This Free Europe Committee, headed by John Foster Dulles, was an instrument of the CIA until RFE received its funds from the Congress of the United States and until 1971 they were passed to RFE through the CIA. During the earliest years of Radio Free Europe's existence, the CIA and the U.S. State Department issued broad policy directives, and a system evolved where broadcast policy was determined through negotiation between the CIA, the U.S. State Department, and RFE staff.
This system continued until the controversy surrounding Radio Free Europe's broadcasts to Hungary during the 1956 revolt. There is some evidence, however, that the CIA did involve itself in RFE projects at least through the mid-1950's.
The CIA funding of RFE ended in 1971 at which point the organization was rechartered in Newton as a non-profit corporation, oversight was moved to the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB), and the budget was moved to open appropriations.In 1990, RFE shared European offices with the Voice of America. In contrast to the Cold War days when both were jammed by the Soviets,
On a recent morning, about 30 staff members of Radio Moscow were waiting in the entrance lobby, which like all United States Government offices abroad is carefully guarded against terrorist attacks, to be taken on a tour of the building and meet Radio Liberty's broadcasters. Inside, three Czechoslovak journalism students are serving an internship, writing theses about the station for Prague University and contributing broadcast scripts.
Where they once relied on underground reports material from other publications, and reports from other publications, RFE now has 19 bureaus throughout Europe, as well as 750 independent reporters. 
After World War II, there was serious concern that the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union, would attack and overrun Western Europe. From 1945 to 1948, there were ad hoc military stay-behind plans (see Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action). In 1948, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was formed, under interagency but not CIA direction, to run behind-the-lines operations, probably including covert action behind the Iron Curtain. The separate Office of Special Operations had intelligence-gathering responsibilities.
A clandestine "stay-behind" operation was set up to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, using US and UK unconventional warfare specialists in the NATO participants. "Gladio" specifically referred to the network in Italy. Various Wikipedia articles assert the creation of Gladio-linked operations, see the articles for Belgian stay-behind network (Belgium), François de Grossouvre (France), Column 88 (UK), Grey Wolves (Turkey), and Projekt-26 (Switzerland).
In 1952, the CIA Directorate of Plans was formed from the merger of OPC and OSO. United States Army Special Forces were established in June 1952, with the 10th Special Forces Group deploying to Bad Tölz, West Germany, in September. Special Forces had stay-behind unconventional warfare as one of their basic missions.
In 1967 it was revealed that the Congress of Cultural Freedom, founded in 1950, had been sponsored by the CIA. It published literary and political journals such as Encounter (as well as Der Monat in Germany and Preuves in France), and hosted dozens of conferences bringing together some of the most eminent Western thinkers; it also gave some assistance to intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA states that, "Somehow this organization of scholars and artists — egotistical, free-thinking, and even anti-American in their politics — managed to reach out from its Paris headquarters to demonstrate that Communism, despite its blandishments, was a deadly foe of art and thought".
On 24 January 2006, Dick Marty, the Council of Europe (CoE) Rapporteur on alleged secret detentions and transport of terrorist suspects by the CIA, delivered his interim report concluding that European countries were almost certainly aware of CIA activities in Europe. On 22 February, the CoE Secretary General Terry Davis announced that most Member States had replied to his questions concerning alleged CIA activities in Europe and that he would present his analysis on 1 March.
Clandestine intelligence collection
The CIA had been obtaining computer-readable information from Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication(SWIFT), searching for terrorist financial intelligence (FININT). Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt announced that Belgium's Data Privacy Commission found that that SWIFT had improperly turned over data from millions of global financial transactions to U.S. anti-terrorism investigators. "SWIFT said in a statement that it had relinquished data to the U.S. Treasury Department only after it had been "subject to valid and compulsory subpoenas" from U.S. authorities."
The Prime Minister called the anti-terrorist monitoring "an absolute necessity" and said U.S. and European negotiators should find a way to bring it into compliance with European law. "The Bush administration has called its secret international banking surveillance program a vital tool in uncovering terrorist networks. When newspapers first reported the program's existence in June, President Bush called the disclosure "disgraceful."
"The program was begun without congressional or court approval shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. With SWIFT's cooperation, U.S. investigators tapped records from the cooperative's banks, a total of millions of transactions, looking for suspicious patterns and links to terrorists...The prime minister added, "Fundamental differences exist between the E.U. and the U.S.A. concerning legislations and the principles governing the treatment of personal data, mainly in the domain of the level of protection, which is higher in Europe..."
Unconventional warfare preparation
According to Admiral Pierre Lacoste, the CIA supported the French Gladio and the OAS right wing extremist organization to attack Charles DeGaulle. Gladio, however, was a specifically Italian operation; whether this was being used as a synonym for another stay-behind operation is unclear.
The CIA is suspected to have infiltrated the French Communist party and worked to support the growth of non-revolutionary communists within France to offset the Soviet influence on the more radical elements within the French Communist Party
The CIA is suspected to have been involved in supporting the student riots against Charles DeGaulle to retaliate against his withdrawal from NATO and his Francophile policies. "Charles De Gaulle undertook covert operations in Quebec using nationalist and separatist movements in Quebec, under the rubric of "Assistance et Cooperation Technique" or "Operation Ascot." Jacques Foccart dispatched SDECE agents to Quebec to develop and foment the growth of separatist movements."
Clandestine intelligence collection
"According to the Director of Central Intelligence, Bob Gates, at least 20 nations from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America are involved in intelligence activities that are detrimental to our economic interests. Some of the specific cases are shocking. According to a New York Times article by Peter Schweizer, `between 1987 and 1989, French intelligence planted moles in several U.S. companies, including IBM. In the fall of 1991, a French intelligence team attempted to steal `stealth' technology from Lockheed.' Other accounts report that French intelligence units conduct 10 to 15 break-ins every day at large hotels in Paris to copy documents that belong to businessmen, journalists, and diplomats. According to other accounts, the French have been hiding listening devices on Air France flights in order to pick up useful economic information from business travelers. 
Clandestine intelligence collection
"In 1993, R. James Woolsey, then a new Director of Central Intelligence, publicly announced that economic intelligence was now a CIA program. French intelligence had been aggressively going after information from American executives. Woolsey said "No more Mr. Nice Guy."
Shortly afterwards, the CIA Paris station had at least five officers working on understanding French national trade policy, and countering French economic espionage against the US. Four were under diplomatic and one under nonofficial cover. 
Clandestine intelligence collection
The CIA Inspector General delivered a report on CIA clandestine service (CS) work on economic intelligence, which is likely to end the careers of several officers, including Paris station chief Dick Holm, European CS division chief Joseph DeTrani, and at least four case officers.
France's Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, revealed the problem in February 1995. The officer under nonofficial cover as a foundation representative made two errors in cooperative posing as a foundation representative made fundamental mistakes: communicating too openly with the CIA station and communing too secretly with her target, a French official. Mr. Holm, the station chief, found out about the love affair she was conducting with the official. It was clear that the romance could compromise the operation. Holm convinced his chief to continue the operation.
The French, however, broke the usual agreement among Western services and announced what they had learned, expelling the embassy-based officer "incompatible with their diplomatic status." Controversy flared over questions about whether spying on allies for economic data is a worthy pursuit for the CIA, even if the allies do it to the US, or if other missions have a higher priority.  While there were tragicomic aspects, the issue of what espionage is tolerable among nominal allies remains complex, especially when involving clear security issues as with Jonathan Pollard.
Rendition and clandestine intelligence collection
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the League of Human Rights (LDH) filed a complaint urging the French Public Prosecutor to investigate the alleged use of French airports by secret CIA flights transporting terrorist suspects. On 19 February, the UK National Air Traffic Services acknowledged that three CIA jets had travelled through the UK on a number of occasions, indicating that the UK authorities were aware of the so-called CIA torture flights. The UK police have reportedly started inquiries into the allegations. 
Clandestine intelligence collection
The former head of German intelligence for the Eastern Front, Reinhard Gehlen, approached US intelligence, in which the CIA did not yet exist. Gehlen offered to continue his operations against the Soviet Union. Gehlen, who had played a minor part in the 20 July Plot to kill Hitler, was not considered a political Nazi. In 1945-6, he went to work with US and allied organizations, forming the Gehlen Organisation to penetrate the Iron Curtain. Gehlen also informed the US of certain Office of Strategic Services personnel who worked for the USSR. The CIA recruited Nazi scientists, many of whom were war criminals to work on the US Army /CIA MKULTRA Operation based at Fort Detrick , Maryland. . 
See Operation Gold.
Clandestine intelligence collection
The Organisation moved to German control, as the core Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND or Federal Intelligence Service)
Clandestine intelligence collection and counterintelligence
President Harry S. Truman authorized the pre-CIA Office of Policy Coordination to support aid to Greek anti-communists in cooperation with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service. The US Army Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) also provided personnel, and successfully resisted the takeover attempt.
Attacks on CIA personnel
"The Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) was named after a 1973 uprising of students and workers. The group's doctrine represents a more traditional form of terrorism. Rather than applying coercive pressure on governments through indiscriminate violence, 17N's strategy has been to target symbolic elements of government, foreign, and business interests in an attempt at promoting a climate of insurrection. Added to the U.S. State Department's official list of foreign terrorist organizations in the mid 1980s, the group first launched its Marxist campaign in 1975 with the assassination of Richard Welch, the CIA's station chief in Athens. Its leaders blamed America, and especially the CIA, for supporting the Greek junta that had collapsed only a year earlier. It was also highly nationalistic and opposed to NATO, as well as for the expulsion of U.S. military bases from Greek soil, the removal of Turkish forces from Cyprus, and the withdrawal of Greece from all supranational institutions
Attacks on CIA personnel
On May 4, a Greek appeals panel upheld the 2003 terrorism conviction of Alexandros Yiotopoulos, who led a Marxist terrorist group for 27 years. The group, 17 November, named after a 1973 student uprising that was suppressed by a military junta that ruled Greece, assassinated Welch as their first act, in 1975. 
At this time, the CIA proper did not have control of covert action or clandestine intelligence. It had coordination authority over the quasi-autonomous groups with those responsibilities, the Office of Policy Coordination and the Office of Special Operations. Some of the confusion that resulted is illustrated by a seemingly simple request to have the two organizations make their divisions based on geography be consistent.
Allen W. Dulles [Director of Central Intelligence] suggested the alignment of the geographic organization was a simple first step to integration. Mr. Wisner [Director of OPC] said that this might prove difficult in certain instances and cited Italy as an example. He said that O/PC in Italy falls naturally into the Western Hemisphere bloc, whereas in O/SO it is in the Mediterranean-Balkan area. It was pointed out that [less than 1 line not declassified]. It was concluded that this matter would be studied and that there probably would be adjustments necessary on both sides. 
Clandestine political action
Covert action and unconventional warfare preparation
Covert paramilitary action
Italian government officials agree that a stay-behind network called Operation Gladio had been formed against the contingency of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Italy, but not terminated until 1990. It is disputed, however, if this network was involved in a series of "false flag" fascist terrorist actions in Italy that were blamed on the "Red Brigades" and other Left-wing political groups in an attempt to politically discredit the Italian Left wing.
When Venetian magistrate Felice Casson, while investigating a 1970s car bombing in Peteano, uncovers references to Gladio while searching through files at SISMI, the Italian intelligence service. Time magazine quotes Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti admits Gladio existed due to the climate of the times and chided the opposition for "insinuating suspicions." He insisted that although Gladio had a military structure, "it had never been involved in terrorist activities." http://www.cambridgeclarion.org/press_cuttings/gladio.parliamentary.committee_indep_1dec1990.html}}</ref> . According to Charles Richard, reporting for The Independent, General Paolo Inzerilli, SISMI chief of staff, said the network was shut down in the previous week of November 1990. A parliamentary committee on intelligence, looking into the Gladio affair heard testimony from three former prime ministers: Amintore Fanfani, Ciriaco De Mita and Bettino Craxi. Richards said General Gerardo Serravalle, head of Gladio from 1971 to 1974, told a television reporter that he now thought the explosion aboard the plane Argo 16 on 23 November 1973 was probably the work of Gladio members who were refusing to hand over the weapons they had obtained from Gladio. Until then it was widely believed the sabotage was carried out by Mossad, the Israeli foreign secret service, in retaliation for the pro-Libyan Italian government's decision to expel, rather than try, five Arabs who had tried to blow up an Israeli air-liner. The Arabs had been spirited out of the country on board the Argo 16.
Covert action and international law aspects
The Abu Omar Case (or Imam Rapito affair - "Kidnapped Imam affair") refers to the abduction and transfer to Egypt of the Imam of Milan Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, also known as Abu Omar. The legal issues of the case deal with extraordinary rendition carried out by the CIA in the context of the global war on terrorism.
On 23 December 2005, a judge issued a European arrest warrant against 22 CIA agents for allegedly abducting an Egyptian terrorist suspect. On 22 January 2006, the Italian Foreign Minister forwarded to the US authorities a request for legal assistance.
There is a long history of close cooperation between the US and United Kingdom intelligence services; see Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for World War II and subsequent relationships. There are permanent liaison officers of each country in major intelligence agencies of the other, such as CIA and SIS, FBI and Security Service (MI5), and National Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet military intelligence colonel who was a defector in place, was a joint US-UK espionage operation. Much of Penkovsky's product is available online at the CIA FOIA Reading Room (http://www.foia.cia.gov/) by searching on the code name IRONBARK.
A major source of tension between the two countries was Kim Philby, a senior UK SIS officer who was a Soviet agent. Philby, at one point, was the SIS liaison officer resident in the US. James Jesus Angleton, head of CIA counterintelligence, was surprised by Philby's activity, and, as a consequence, began molehunts within CIA.
United Kingdom 2004
United Kingdom 1999
 An indication of the United States' close operational cooperation is the creation of a new message distribution label within the main US military communications network. Previously, the marking of NOFORN (i.e., NO FOREIGN NATIONALS) required the originator to specify which, if any, non-US countries could receive the information. A new handling caveat, USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL EYES ONLY, used primarily on intelligence messages, gives an easier way to indicate that the material can be shared with Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand. There is also a marking for US/UK access only.
See the collection of intelligence reports about the former Yugoslavia collected by the National Intelligence Council at http://www.dni.gov/nic/foia_yugoslavia_chrono.html
In October, 1949, Frank Wisner, head of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), in conjunction with British intelligence, sent two small commando teams into Albania. At the time, CIA did not have its own covert action capability. Insertion of these agents, recruited among exiled Albanians, would continue until 1952 in spite of a total lack of success resulting in the death of in all about 200 agents. Wisner had hoped to build an armed resistance movement against the rule of Enver Hoxha inside Albania.All of these operations were betrayed to the Soviet Union by Kim Philby.
OPC was an interim organization before it was absorbed by the CIA when the CIA Directorate of Plans was formed. See Clandestine HUMINT and Covert Action for the history of the OPC and how it became part of CIA, under DCI Walter Bedell Smith. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
On July 13, 1995, Serbs kill an estimated 8,000 Bosniak boys and men in Srebrenica, [Bosnia and Herzegovina]]. An American satellite captures the execution in preparation, but is not analyzed. Two weeks later, a CIA U-2 photographed the graves at the site. Three weeks later, the photos were analyzed, and on August 4, 1995, a CIA report on the photos is sent to the White House.
According to an intelligence memorandum, prepared by the Office of National Estimates with the Office of Current Intelligence, Tito believed his actions in Croatia prevented civil war and, in particular, unwanted Soviet intervention. CIA suggested that while his public statements might be exaggerated, he truly saw the situation as a crisis. 
The crisis began in November 1971, with a strike of students at the University of Zagreb, protesting that Croatia was not getting its fair share of foreign exchange revenues. Tito, the report suggested, treated this as a resurgence of Croatian nationalism. This strike, as well as other protests, was endorsed by the liberal wing of the Croatian Communist Party.
In late November, having seen Croatian unrest developing since autumn, Tito returned early from a visit to Romania, and called a meeting of Croatian leaders, at his hunting lodge in Karadjordjevo, to discuss their concerns. While he found about two-thirds in agreement with his policy, he discovered a nucleus of defiance around Croatian Party President Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and a Croatian representative on the Yugoslav Party Executive Bureau.
On 12 December, he made his observations public, saying the Croatian party "had ample warning of the protests" but did not act to prevent actions by "counterrevolutionary forces". In part, he charged the Soviets of contacting people in Croatia and fomenting unrest, which the CIA believed was true. While he was concerned about separatism throughout Yugoslavia, he intended to act only with respect to Croatia. Dabcevic-Kucar and several close associates resigned, 14 student leaders were arrested, and the Chief of Staff of The Zagreb Military District was suspended. A wave of resignations, mostly in protest, followed.
Tito apparently judged public opinion and support correctly by focusing action on the student leaders, and generally clamping down on university protest. There was no widespread public indignation about his actions against the students. He raised alarm about Soviet involvement, and spoke to the need for Yugoslav unity.
CIA found that the key factor in Tito's management of the crisis is that with the exception of the one suspended general,he enjoyed complete military endorsement of his actions. The new Croatian government approved by Tito still has to deal with liberal sentiment. Tito wanted his federated system to continue, and believed Croatian liberals often had supported him.
One result is that he asserted control of the Party, which he had previously tried to guide rather than command. He is now juggling the centralized national Party,and the military, against significant local parties. CIA saw this as inherently conflicted.
The CIA, however, estimated the chances as "better than even" that a single Yugoslavian state would continue after Tito's death.
Gray psychological operations
Clandestine intelligence collection
CIA had one officer, Geza Katona, in Hungary from 1950 to 1957 period, and for several years that person spent "95 percent" of his time on "cover duties." "He mailed letters, purchased stamps and stationery ...," among other "support tasks," the history noted. At the time of the Revolution in fall 1956, he was preoccupied with official contacts, maintaining diplomatic cover, and doing interviews with Hungarian visitors.
CIA was completely surprised by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A CIA Clandestine Service (CS) report of the events, written in 1958, said "This breath-taking and undreamed-of state of affairs not only caught many Hungarians off-guard, it also caught us off-guard, for which we can hardly be blamed since we had no inside information, little outside information, and could not read the Russians' minds."
After the revolt broke out, Katona asked for policy guidance regarding arms and ammunition. On October 28, Headquarters responded, "we must restrict ourselves to information collection only [and] not get involved in anything that would reveal U.S. interest or give cause to claim intervention...it was not permitted to send U.S. weapons in." In fact, the implication in the histories is that transferring arms was never seriously contemplated: "At this date no one had checked precisely on the exact location and nature of U.S. or other weapons available to CIA. This was done finally in early December" of 1956.
Did a US-sponsored group play a part in the revolution? From the CS Histories, they did not. "Small psychological warfare and paramilitary units came into being in the early 1950s, (including the Hungarian National Council headed by Bela Varga), and occasional reconnaissance missions took place at that time, the prospects for penetrating into Hungary deteriorated by 1953 when stepped up controls by Hungarian security forces and `the meager talent available' among potential agents made cross-border operations essentially untenable."
CS historians observe "The authors sarcastically write that `If we [the CIA] were in no position to act efficiently... the military is, was, and always will be even worse off.' ... in the future the CIA [should] keep the military `at arm's length' and only do what's necessary `to keep them happy.'"
"Moscow was also taken by surprise by the Revolution despite the thousands of Soviet soldiers, KGB officers, and Party informants present in Hungary. Rather than understanding the sources of the discontent, it was easier for Soviet operatives and even the leadership to cast woefully misdirected blame on the CIA for the unrest. Kliment Voroshilov remarked at the October 28 Presidium session: `The American Secret Services are more active in Hungary than Comrades Suslov and Mikoyan are,' referring to the two Party leaders sent to Budapest to negotiate a modus vivendi with the new Nagy government. At that moment, the two Soviet Presidium had more active members in Budapest outnumbering the single CIA case officer there."
After a few days of independence, the Soviet Union moved in with massive force, crushed the revolution, and later executed the Communist but rebel head of government, Imre Nagy, and the head of the military, Pal Maleter.
Gray psychological operations
- There was a massive increase in CIA-controlled Radio Free Europe broadcasts directed toward Hungary, supporting the revolutionaries, encouraging violent resistance against the occupying Soviet troops.
- Radio Free Europe attacked Imre Nagy, the head of the National Government brought to power by the revolution, as a Soviet ally and favored Cardinal József Mindszenty as the new leader of Hungary.
- The CIA amplified and rebroadcast low-wattage radio transmissions from Hungarian fighters back into Hungary.
The CIA disputes this account, stating in a review of Weiner's book that
"There is sloppy scholarship at the very least in the recounting of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which in Weiner’s hands becomes a tragicomedy, with Frank Wisner ordering Radio Free Europe (RFE) to incite violence against the communist regime and against invading Soviet troops—only to see the uprising crushed. One of Weiner’s major sources for his assertion of CIA’s culpability is an RFE New York memo, allegedly the result of Wisner’s “exhortations” to violence, telling the radio’s Hungarian staff in Munich that “All restraints have gone off. No holds barred.” It’s a significant problem for Weiner’s thesis that Wisner in 1956 actually had no direct involvement in RFE and that the memo was produced after the uprising was effectively over and dealt with rhetoric, not violence.
"Weiner also points to an RFE broadcast that predicted the United States would come to the aid of Hungarian freedom fighters, without acknowledging that the broadcaster was doing a press review after the Soviet invasion and was quoting—by name—a London Observer editorial, and that even so this was a violation of RFE policy, or that this was the sole example of an implicit hint of assistance in two weeks of continuous broadcasting to Hungary. The idea that RFE was fomenting violence at the behest of Frank Wisner is not supported either by Weiner’s sources or by other sources he failed to cite."
Edward Lee Howard, one of the most damaging CIA defectors, was expelled from Hungary at US request. Howard, a fugitive from the FBI, was expelled over protests by the KGB. "We asked them to expel him and they did it," said a United States official. "There was no quid pro quo."
Director of Central Intelligence William Webster said, in a speech at the National Press Club about changes in relations between the US and Eastern Europe, "I can think of one instance, and I'll not mention a name because it may be classified, in which a prominent defector from the United States was finally permanently expelled from a bloc country which had provided him comfort and sanctuary. And that would have been contrary to the wishes of the K.G.B. So we are seeing some indications of independence."
Soviet Union and Post-Soviet states
Due to the breakup of the Soviet bloc and individual countries thereof, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, it can be challenging to track CIA analysis from, say, Yugoslavia to Bosnia. There is a collection, by the National Intelligence Council, the estimative group now under the DNI, of a number of analytic reports on Yugoslavia, including at least one by a CIA critic: http://www.dni.gov/nic/foia_yugoslavia_chrono.html
With Europe stabilizing along the Iron Curtain, the CIA tried to limit the spread of Soviet influence elsewhere around the world. Much of the basic model came from George Kennan's "containment" model from 1947, a foundation of US policy for decades
Soviet Union 1950
In December 1950, with the Korean War in progress, National Intelligence Estimate 15 was issued: "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation".  It began with the estimate that "USSR-Satellite treatment of Korean developments indicates that they assess their current military and political position as one of great strength in comparison with that of the West, and that they propose to exploit the apparent conviction of the West of its own present weakness." At this time, there was no assumption that China and the USSR would differ on any policy "Moscow, seconded by Beijing with regard to the Far East, has disclosed through a series of authoritative statements that it aims to achieve certain gains in the present situation:
- a. Withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and of the Seventh Fleet from Formosan waters.
- b. Establishment of Communist China as the predominant power in the Far East, including the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.
- c.Reduction of Western control over Japan as a step toward its eventual elimination.
- d. Prevention of West German rearmament.
"It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western moves looking toward negotiations, assuming virtual Western surrender is not involved, the Kremlin plans a continuation of Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of the UN is complete. A determined and successful stand by UN forces in Korea would, of course, require a Soviet re-estimate of the situation." Such a stand did take place, and the war ended in a stalemate.
"The scope of Soviet bloc preparations and the nature and extent of Soviet Communist official statements and propaganda raise the' question of Soviet or Satellite moves in other areas. The points that appear most critical are Berlin and Germany, Indochina, Yugoslavia, and Iran.
Regarding what was to become Vietnam: "An intensification of Communist efforts to secure Indochina is to be expected, regardless of development elsewhere. The Viet Minh has clearly indicated that its objective is to drive the French from Indochina at the earliest possible date. The Chinese Communists have at the same time repeatedly expressed their support of the Viet Minh. They have, moreover, officially claimed that Western resistance to the Viet Minh is directed against Chinese Communist security. The Chinese Communists are already furnishing the Viet Minh with material, training, and technical assistance. If this assistance proves inadequate to enable the Viet Minh to accomplish its objectives, it is estimated that it will be supplemented, as necessary, by the introduction of Chinese Communist forces into the conflict, possibly as "volunteers." The extent of this Chinese Communist intervention, and whether it takes overt form, will probably depend on the degree of outside assistance furnished the French and the extent of Chinese Communist commitments elsewhere."
Covert and clandestine action
See CIA activities in Asia-Pacific#Korea 1950 for the extensive war-related activity.
Soviet Union 1952
In operation HTLINGUAL CIA intercepted mail from the U.S. to the Soviet Union, from 1952 to 1973.
Soviet Union 1953
A March 1953 report on what was known about the Soviet bloc bluntly said that the level of confidence ranged greatly; some things were known with firmness and accuracy, while other information ranged from inadequate to nonexistent. In particular, "We have no reliable inside intelligence on the thinking inside the Kremlin." Balancing this was high confidence on the information about the Soviet Navy. Current intelligence, supporting military operations in Korea was considered excellent. 
There was reasonable confidence in knowing the size of the Soviet fission bomb inventory, but much less confidence about estimates of the biological and chemical warfare capabilities. The report observed, however, that a good deal of information could be derived from knowledge of Soviet science in disciplines that supported biological and chemical warfare. Concern was expressed about knowledge of their progress of their thermonuclear weapon development program Joe-4, their first test, took place in August of the same year] and their rate of uranium 235 production.
While the CIA was confident on its knowledge of Soviet electronic warfare capabilities, there were gaps in the knowledge about the electronic order of battle in the Soviet air defense network. Information on missiles was also weak, and some was simply extrapolation of German technology the Soviets were known to have captured.
As far as economic intelligence, the highest confidence was in basic industry output, as with metals, petroleum and transportation. It was observed that Soviet official announcements in these areas tended to be true. Data on agriculture and highly technical industries was weak. With respect to parts of the Soviet Bloc, the information on East Germany was thought best, fair on Poland, and worst on China.
Military intelligence was good on land and sea forces, but there were gaps in coverage of air capabilities. Knowledge of their strategic intentions was "practically nonexistent", and not thought likely to improve.
Soviet Union 1954
While the 1953 survey said that there was little knowledge about thinking inside the Kremlin, a 1954 NIE on soviet strategy stated substantial confidence in the stability of the Soviet government under its new leadership [[[Joseph Stalin]] had died in March 1953]. China was described as more of an ally than a satellite.
Economic growth was seen to be slowing, with agriculture the weakest component. The overall size of the military was expected to stay the same, but to improve in efficiency with greater numbers of nuclear weapons, missiles, and jet aircraft. The level of training, especially for strategic mobility, was considered weak.
It was expected that both the Soviets and Chinese would avoid general war, unless critical interests were at stake. They will, however, put great emphasis on weakening and destabilizing non-Communist nations, and reducing those states' commitment to the West. Slowing German and Japanese rearmament is a priority, while they rearm the satellites.
They will consider supporting anticolonialist and nationalist movements. The Intelligence Community believes their area of greatest interest will be Southeast Asia, although they probably will not insert Chinese Communist regular troops.
The US considered Guatemala, and the coup there, an important proxy engagement with the Soviet Union. CIA has declassified 5210 documents on Guatemala,  which will need considerable analysis to understand how it fitted with the Cold War.
Soviet Union 1956
Clandestine intelligence collection
The Soviets put down a revolution in Hungary, using considerable force. There was one CIA case officer in Hungary, which greatly limited collection capability.
Soviet Union 1958
Following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the USSR put increased pressure on its satellite countries, and made it clear to the West that it did not want interference. This 1958 estimate by the IC, under CIA, explored the US understanding of the Soviet policy and actions.
"We believe the basic motivation behind Moscow's current tough line to be its grave concern over its power position in Eastern Europe, where it considers revisionism to have developed to dangerous proportions/Note 1. This concern has led the USSR to attack Tito [of Yugoslavia] and to cause the execution of Imre Nagy [the rebel Hungarian leader]--measures intended, at least in part, to put pressure on Gomulka [leader of Poland]. We believe that the Soviets will exert greater efforts to obtain Gomulka's compliance with Bloc requirements or, failing that, perhaps even to replace him. The analysts felt the USSR has not abandoned the idea of peaceful coexistence with the West, but it probably believes there is little chance for East-West negotiations favorable to it. If, however, these events reflect " differences within the Soviet leadership and a degree of Communist Chinese influence. If this is so, it may portend a new and stiffer policy towards the West as well as the Satellites."
"We believe that recent events do not indicate that the USSR has ceased to desire a conference at the summit or lower level negotiations on matters in which the Soviet leaders have an interest. At the same time, the Soviet leaders may have concluded prior to undertaking their recent moves that, since the chances of an early summit conference on their terms were waning, they could more easily accept the political losses they would suffer in international affairs by pursuing a harder policy in Eastern Europe." 
Soviet Union 1959
Clandestine intelligence collection
GRU officer Dmitri Polyakov walked in to offer his services to the US. He transmitted information to the US until his retirement, as a Soviet general in 1980, although he was compromised, probably by Aldrich Ames , and executed in 1986.
Intelligence estimation and clandestine collection
A November 1959 NIE, with the benefit of U-2 imagery, identified Soviet ground-to-ground missile capabilities from 75 nmi to intercontinental range. The ICBM, with a CEP of 3 nmi, was expected to reach operational status in January 1960. 
Soviet Union 1960
Covert action 1960 (history)
On the covert action front, a 1969 memorandum requesting 303 committee support of a  covert action program against the Soviet Union. It is first mentioned here because it gives historical background of earlier activities
A request for additional funding for covert action, written in 1969 (see below), reviewed prior covert action in the Soviet Union. In accordance with a previous authorization, NSC 5502/1, Cite error: Invalid
invalid names, e.g. too many as revalidated on 10 November 1960, CIA sponsors a covert action program which supports media3 and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union.
1960 U-2 incident (clandestine intelligence collection)
On May 1, 1960, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, operated by the CIA was shot down over the US, and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, captured, in what became known as the U-2 incident. At first, the CIA claimed it was a lost weather plane.
In speaking with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles said that Powers, the U-2 pilot, "had been with CIA four years and before that had been with the Air Force for six years. He had been selected for this mission because of his knowledge of Arctic navigation. The President said that when reconnaissance over-flights had been explained to him, he had been told that the pilots on such flights were taught to destroy the plane rather than to let it fall into Soviet hands. The President believed that the blunder of our first statement...[assumed] the plane was destroyed, Accordingly, we thought the story that a NASA weather reconnaissance plane was missing was a good cover story." 
Later in May, the President met with Congressional leaders. During that breakfast discussion, he said, " He said that intelligence and espionage were distasteful for many Americans, but that he as President … had to make decisions based on what was right for the United States concerning the fundamental intelligence knowledge that we had to have...Nevertheless the President has to accept responsibility for these decisions and also keep the knowledge of such activities in the fewest possible hands. Only a few people in State, Defense and CIA knew of this... The President said that he was responsible for the directive for the U-2... "There is no glory in this business," he said. "If it is successful, it can't be told."" 
Eisenhower expressed concern that Congress "would try to dig into the interior of the CIA and its covert operation. Such attempt would be harmful to the United States and he was sure that the leaders of the Congress would realize this. He repeated that the Administration people would cooperate with the inquiry--he called it "investigation" several times.
Senator Mike Mansfield asked "What would the President think if there were to be established in the Congress a joint Congressional Committee which would oversee the activities of the CIA." Eisenhower objected "that the operation of the CIA was so delicate and so secret in many cases that it must be kept under cover, and that the Executive must be held responsible for it. He said that he would agree to some bipartisan group going down occasionally and receiving reports from the CIA on their activities, but that he would hate to see it formalized--indeed would be against the proposal made by Senator Mansfield."
Senator Richard B. Russell "said that they do have a Congressional group that periodically went over reports. He said that they knew the U - 2 planes were under construction a long time ago. The Senator added that he was not afraid of the Senators on security matters but that he was afraid of staff leaks."
Charles E. Bohlen, special assistant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Menshikov about Soviet policy toward Cuba, with the response "he had said to Senator Fulbright that Senator Johnson's statement about a submarine base was completely out of this world and provocative; the Soviet Union had no intention of establishing bases or any military arrangements in Cuba."
Soviet Union 1965
See Vietnam 1965: General Non-Communist Reactions for the US assessment of the USSR's reaction to an escalation in Vietnam.
Soviet Union 1969
Authorization of covert action
A request for additional funding for covert action reviewed prior covert action in the Soviet Union.  It asked for 303 Committee approval of continuation of the covert action program "directed primarily at the Soviet intelligentsia and reaffirm the approval it has given in the past to the program generally and the individual projects specifically."
The proposal mentioned "the program supports media and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union." Media activities were approved separately, and executed by Radio Liberty Committee and Free Europe, Inc., were approved by higher authority on 22 February 1969 and outside this request's scope.
The Radio Liberty Committee, successor organization to the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, is composed of three major divisions:
- Radio Liberty which broadcasts via short wave to the Soviet Union 24 hours a day in 18 languages
- a book publication and distribution program designed to provide Soviet citizens with books not normally accessible to the Soviet public;
- [material not declassified] which produces research papers and publications targeted at the developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. [material not declassified]
"The total cost of this program is $766,000. The program as a whole was discussed with and endorsed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Swank and Soviet Union Country Director Dubs on 21 October and 6 November 1969. The individual projects had been approved by the 303 Committee in 1967 and 1968.
"The primary objective is to stimulate and sustain pressures for liberalization and change from within the Soviet Union.... A secondary objective is to enlighten important third-country elites, especially political leaders and the public opinion shaping professions, about the repressive nature of the Soviet system and its imperialistic and self-aggrandizing foreign policy.An alternative approach was stated:
The United States could follow a policy of encouraging more vigorous émigré activities by more forthcoming identification by United States officials with émigré objectives, the extension of subsidies for émigré activities or organizations not presently receiving assistance from the United States Government, and adoption of a policy of open support for the independence of national minority areas such as the Ukraine. Substantial intensification of émigré propaganda activities might result in stimulating dissension inside the USSR, inducing defections and improving the collection of intelligence; identification with the independence of national minority groups could strengthen ethnic nationalist resistance to Russian domination.
On the other hand, a more vigorous emigration probably would strengthen the forces of conformity and repression would retard the process of evolution in popular and leadershipattitudes which the program is trying to promote.
Soviet Union 1974
Project Jennifer (clandestine intelligence collection)
Project Jennifer was a clandestine technical collection operation to salvage the sunken Russian sub K-129. While the submarine broke apart during the lift and the hoped-for complete recovery did not happen, the fact that the US was able to show the Russians the at-sea burial of K-129 sailors clearly indicated the US recovered, at least, the bodies. If the bodies were recovered, it is a reasonable assumption that other things may have been recovered as well.
Soviet Union 1975
Review of Soviet space systems (intelligence analysis)
Certain Soviet space programs are important to the overall Soviet system. The systems fall into three classes:
- Scientific and national prestige
- Economic benefit
- Military and intelligence, which have been the role 75% of Soviet satellites, with missions in intelligence collection, mapping, weather, and communications. Some mission were for developing an anti-satellite weapon, which also indicates the significance they attach to space systems.
To understand Soviet dependence on a particular system, consider:
- Dependence: systems for which there is no substantial alternative that is not space-based, and also perform critical functions
- Degradation: space systems that have no terrestrial alternative, but whose functions are important, but not critical to the overall Soviet Union
Current development priorities include ocean surveillance and missile launch detection. The most critical function may shift to communications satellites after 1985, especially because the Soviets need to use Moliyna-orbit satellites to have reliable communications from their Arctic installations.
Space systems that can degrade include photographic imaging and satellite interception.. Radar calibration satellites are essential if the Soviets deploy and need to test an anti-ballistic missile defense system.
It was estimated that even though they have a satellite interceptor, they will generally practice a non-interference policy toward other nations' satellites 
Soviet Union 1981
It was the judgment of CIA and the IC that the Soviets were deeply committed to "revolutionary violence worldwide". They see this as a basic part of destabilizing their adversaries.
The USSR has different policies toward different groups, depending on the goals of the groups, their methods, and presumably their security. Terrorist tactics, per se, do not offend Soviet scruples. The Soviets simply determine if those tactics are helpful or harmful to Soviet objectives. Not all groups accept Soviet control, and the Soviets deal with this on a case-by-case basis.
There is compelling evidence that the Soviets have sponsored a number of revolutionary and separatist-irredentist groups, especially in El Salvador, where they directly delivered arms.
Soviet operations in this area are under the direction of the International Department organization of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, not the security organs (i.e., KGB) or military. The International Department, however, tasks the KGB, GRU, and 10th Department of the General Staff to provide training and other support. They also use proxies, in the form of allies such as Libya, South Yemen, and Cuba, which directly support revolutionary groups.
The policy of the Soviet Union toward nihilistic terrorist groups remains unclear. There is some evidence of Soviet support, but not coordination of activities. At times, they have labeled certain of these groups "criminal", and counseled other groups to shun them.
There is no possibility the Soviet Union could be persuaded to join with the West in a comprehensive antiterrorist program.
It was emphasized that revolutionary violence, in the Third World, is not synonymous with terrorism, and that violent revolution would be an issue with which the United States will have to deal for the indefinite future. 
The Farewell Dossier in 1981 revealed massive Soviet espionage on Western technology. A successful counter-espionage program was created which involved giving defective technologies to Soviet agents.
Soviet Union 1984
The Cooperative Research Project website gives a photo of Casey touring Afghanistan and cites Steve Coll's 7/19/1992 Washington Post article asserting that "Casey wanted to ship subversive propaganda through Afghanistan to the Soviet Union's predominantly Muslim southern republics."
Soviet Union 1985
Covert action (paramilitary)
While the actual document has not been declassified, National Security Decision Directive 166 of 27 March 1985, "US Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan" defined a US policy of using established the US goal of driving to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available". Initially, this involved close cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence to assist mujahideen groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan. Indeed, it was evident to residents in Islamabad and Peshawar in the 1980's that large numbers of Americans were present and involved in mysterious activities. This created linkages among hardened Muslim fighters worldwide.  At first, the US supported the effort cautiously, concered that the Soviet Union would act against Pakistan. "Some time into the war, however, the US began to take a much more overt position and US supplied technology played a key role in defeating the Soviet war machine in Afghanistan.
Porter Goss, who served as both the last Director of Central Intelligence and the first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified in March 2005 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Presented here are the parts of "Global Intelligence Challenges 2005", prepared in mid-February, which apply to this geographic region.
The CIA believes Putin perceived that his policies toward Ukraine have not unfolded as he will like, so he is likely "to redouble his efforts to defend Russian interests abroad while balancing cooperation with the West. Russia's most immediate security threat is terrorism, and counterterrorism cooperation undoubtedly will continue. Separatism, and radical Islamic movements crossing borders into Southern Russia, "threaten stability in Southern Russia." He expects more Chechen terrorist attacks in Russia, at both civilian and military targets.
While Putin says there is a role outside powers to play with the CIS, "we believe he is nevertheless concerned about further encroachment by the US and NATO into the region.
Putin will use increases in the military budget to "help Russia create a professional military by replacing conscripts with volunteer servicemen". His priority appears to be keeping strategic weapons in good condition, and modernizing where possible. .
"Russia remains an important source of weapons technology, materials and components for other nations. The vulnerability of Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion is a continuing concern."
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