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Gulf War/Iraqi OOB

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Special Republican Guard

Saddam's final military defense, of approximately 15,000 men. Never left Baghdad.

Republican Guard

LTG Ayad Futatih al-Rawi, commanding. [1] There appear to have been two corps headquarters.

  • Abed Infantry Division
  • Adnan Mechanized Division
  • Baghdad Infantry Division
  • Hammurabi Mechanized Division.
  • Medina Armoured Division, also called Medina Luminous
  • Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division

Three brigades were designated "Special Forces", but, in the Western sense, these were heliborne air assault units.

Regular Army

While the main army units were inferior to the Republican Guard, there was a distinct difference in quality between the "regular" armored and mechanized divisions, and the "conscript" infantry divisions.

After Kuwait was taken, the Republican Guard moved back to theater reserve duty. Ten conscript infantry divisions guarded the Saudi border and the coast, apparently organized as a large corps, with four heavy divisions in Corps reserve. [2]

III Corps was in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) and apparently served as the planning, if not control, headquarters for the attack on Khafji.

References

  1. Keegan, John (June 28, 2004), "The American Triumph", National Review Online
  2. Scales, Robert H. Jr (1994), Certain Victory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Brassey's p.67