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Difference between revisions of "Guadalcanal campaign"

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{{Infobox Military Conflict
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{{subpages}}
|conflict=Guadalcanal campaign
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{{TOC|right}}
|partof=the [[Pacific War|Pacific Theater]] of [[World War II]]
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The '''Guadalcanal campaign''', also known as the '''Battle of Guadalcanal''' and as '''OPERATION WATCHTOWER''', was an American victory over Japan in 1942.  
|image=[[Image:Guadalcanal1.jpg|300px]]
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|caption=United States Marines rest in the field during the Guadalcanal campaign.
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|date=[[August 7]], [[1942]] – [[February 9]], [[1943]]
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|place=[[Guadalcanal (Pacific Ocean island)|Guadalcanal]] in the [[Solomon Islands]]
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|result=Allied strategic victory
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|combatant1=[[United States]]<br>[[Australia]]<br>[[New Zealand]]<br>[[United Kingdom]]<br>[[Tonga]]<ref>Vava'u Press Ltd, ''Matangi Tonga Online'', 2006 [http://www.matangitonga.to/scripts/artman/exec/view.cgi?archive=2&num=598] states that 28 Tongan soldiers fought on Guadalcanal, with two of them killed in action.</ref><br>[[Solomon Islands]]<ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 173-175 documents the participation by native Solomon Islanders in the campaign [http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Guadalcanal/USMC-M-Guadalcanal-C.html].  Guadalcanal and the rest of the Solomon Islands were technically under UK/Australian political control during World War II.</ref>
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|combatant2=[[Empire of Japan]]
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|commander1=[[Robert Ghormley]]<br>[[William Halsey, Jr.]]<br>[[Alexander Vandegrift]]<br>[[Alexander Patch]]<br>[[Richmond K. Turner]]
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|commander2=[[Harukichi Hyakutake]]<br>[[Isoroku Yamamoto]]<br>[[Nishizo Tsukahara]]<br>[[Jinichi Kusaka]]<br>[[Gunichi Mikawa]]
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|strength1=60,000 (ground forces)<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 57, 619-621 and Rottman, ''Japanese Army'', p. 64.  Approximately 20,000 Marines and 40,000 U.S. Army troops were deployed on Guadalcanal at different times during the campaign.</ref>
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|strength2=36,200 (ground forces)<ref>Rottman, ''Japanese Army'', p. 65.  31,400 [[Imperial Japanese Army]] and 4,800 [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] troops were deployed to Guadalcanal during the campaign.</ref>
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|casualties1=1,768 dead (ground),<br>4,911 dead (naval),<br>420 dead (aircrew),<br>4 captured,<br>29 ships sunk,<br>615 aircraft destroyed<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 598-618 and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal campaign'', p. 456.  Numbers include personnel killed by all causes including combat, disease, and accidents.  Four U.S. aircrew were captured by the Japanese during the [[Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands]] and survived their captivity.  A few other U.S. ground and aircrew personnel were captured by the Japanese during the campaign but didn't survive their captivity.  Ships sunk includes warships and auxiliaries.  Aircraft destroyed includes both combat and operational losses.</ref>
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|casualties2=24,600 dead (ground),<br>3,543 dead (naval),<br>1,200 dead (aircrew),<br>1,000 captured,<br>38 ships sunk,<br>683 aircraft destroyed<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 598-618.  Numbers include personnel killed by all causes including combat, disease, and accidents.  Many of the captured personnel were actually Korean construction workers, not Japanese military.  Ships sunk includes warships and auxiliaries.  Aircraft destroyed includes both combat and operational losses.</ref>
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}}
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{{Campaignbox Guadalcanal}}
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{{Campaignbox Solomons}}
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The '''Guadalcanal campaign''', also known as the '''Battle of Guadalcanal''', was fought between [[August 7]], [[1942]] and [[February 9]], [[1943]] in the Pacific theatre of [[World War II]]. This campaign, fought on the ground, at sea, and in the air, pitted [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] forces against Imperial [[Japan|Japanese]] forces, and was a decisive campaign of [[World War II]]. The fighting took place on and around the island of [[Guadalcanal]] in the southern [[Solomon Islands]] and was the first major offensive launched by Allied forces against the [[Empire of Japan]].
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It was the first major Allied offensive of [[World War Two in the Pacific]], and was fought between August 7, 1942 and February 9, 1943. This campaign pitted American air, naval and ground forces (later augmented by Australians and New Zealanders) against determined Japanese resistance. There were a succession of ground and naval battles.
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[[Image:Ww2-guadalcanal-1.jpg|thumb|left|450px]]
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Control of the [[Solomon Islands]], of which Guadalcanal was a part, was considered militarily vital by both sides. Both sides won some battles but both sides were overextended and logistical failures in a hostile physical environment hampered the abilities of combat forces to operate.   As happened time and again in the Pacific, the Japanese logistical support system failed. Only 20% of the supplies dispatched from Rabaul to Guadalcanal ever reached there. As a result the 30,000 Japanese troops lacked heavy equipment, adequate ammunition and even enough food, and were subjected to continuous harassment from the air.  10,000 were killed, 10,000 starved to death, and the remaining 10,000 were evacuated in February 1943, in a greatly weakened condition. In the end Guadalcanal was a major American victory as the Japanese inability to keep pace with the rate of American reinforcements proved decisive. Guadalcanal is an iconic episode in the annals of American military history, underscoring heroic bravery of underequipped individuals in fierce combat with a determined foe.
  
On August 7, 1942, Allied forces, predominantly composed of forces from the [[United States]], initiated landings on the islands of Guadalcanal, [[Tulagi]], and [[Florida Island|Florida]] in the southern Solomons with the objective of denying their use by Japanese forces as bases to threaten supply routes between the U.S., Australia, and New ZealandAlso, the Allies intended to use Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases to support a campaign to eventually isolate the major Japanese base of [[Rabaul]] on [[New Britain]].  The initial Allied landings overwhelmed the outnumbered Japanese defenders, who had occupied the islands in May, 1942, and captured Tulagi and Florida as well as an airfield (later named [[Henderson Field (Guadalcanal)|Henderson Field]]) that was under construction by the Japanese on Guadalcanal.
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==Summary==
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On August 7, 1942, [[United States Marine Corps|United States Marines]] made [[amphibious warfare|amphibious landings]] on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida in the southern Solomons with the objective of denying their use by Japanese forces as bases to attack supply routes between the U.S. and Australia.  The Allies further intended to use Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases to support a campaign to eventually isolate the major Japanese base of [[Rabaul]] on the island of New Britain.  The initial Allied landings overwhelmed the outnumbered and surprised Japanese defenders, who had occupied the islands in May, 1942, and captured an airfield that was under construction by the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Renamed [[Henderson Field]] after  Major [[Lofton Henderson]], a US Marine pilot killed at the [[Battle of Midway]] in June, the field was pressed into American service. [[U.S. Army]] forces later supplemented, and eventually relieved, the Marines.
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The Japanese made several attempts to retake Tulagi and Henderson Field, resulting in three major land battles as well as several smaller engagements, five large naval battles, and continuous, almost daily, aerial battles, culminating in the decisive [[Naval Battle of Guadalcanal]] in early November 1942, in which the last Japanese attempt to retake Guadalcanal and Henderson Field was defeated.
  
Surprised by the Allied offensive, the Japanese made several attempts between August and November to retake Tulagi and Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. These attempts resulted in several major engagements, including three major land battles as well as several smaller engagements, five large naval battles, and continuous, almost daily, aircraft battles, culminating in the decisive [[Naval Battle of Guadalcanal]] in early November 1942, in which the last Japanese attempt to retake Guadalcanal and Henderson Field was defeated. In December 1942, the Japanese abandoned further efforts to retake Guadalcanal and successfully evacuated their remaining forces from the island by February 7, 1943, leaving the island in Allied hands.
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The Guadalcanal campaign, lengthy by Pacific War standards, marked the first significant strategic combined arms victory by Allied forces over Japanese forces in the Pacific theater. For this reason, the Guadalcanal Campaign is often referred to as a "turning point" in the war. This campaign marked the beginning of the transition by Allied forces from defensive operations to the strategic offensive while the forces of Japan were thereafter forced to focus on strategic defense.
  
The Guadalcanal campaign marked the first significant strategic combined arms victory by Allied forces over Japanese forces in the Pacific theatre. For this reason, the Guadalcanal Campaign is often referred to as a "turning point" in the war. This campaign marked the beginning of the transition by Allied forces from defensive operations to the strategic offensive while the forces of Japan were thereafter forced to focus on strategic defense.
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There were major command changes during the campaign, when Vice Admiral [[William Halsey]] replaced Vice Admiral [[Robert Ghormley]] as head of the [[Pacific Ocean Areas|South Pacific Area]]. Halsey brought greater Navy support of the land operations.
  
==Background==
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==Strategy==
On December 7, 1941, [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|the Japanese attacked]] the U.S. Pacific fleet at [[Pearl Harbor]], [[Hawaii]]. The attack crippled much of the U.S. battleship fleet and led to a state of war between the two nations. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the American fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. Japanese forces also attacked and took control of the [[Philippines]], [[Thailand]], [[Malaya]], [[Singapore]], the [[Dutch East Indies]], [[Wake Island]], [[New Britain]], and [[Guam]].<ref>Murray, ''War to be Won'', p. 169-195</ref>
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===Japanese strategy===
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On December 7, 1941, expanding its earlier war in China, the Empire of Japan attacked the the U.S. Pacific fleet in the [[Battle of Pearl Harbor]], as part of a broader series of attacks on Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and elsewhere against American, British, Dutch and Australian bases. The attack crippled much of the U.S. [[battleship]] fleet and led to a state of war between the two nations. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the American fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. While their major territorial goals were in Southeast Asia and Oceania, Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]], [[Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet]], who opposed the overall war, was convinced the U.S. forces had to be neutralized to avoid intervention.
  
Two attempts by the Japanese to extend their defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific were thwarted in the battles of [[Battle of the Coral Sea|Coral Sea]] (May 1942) and [[Battle of Midway|Midway]] (June 1942).  These two strategic victories for the Allies provided an opportunity to take the initiative and launch an offensive against the Japanese somewhere in the Pacific.<ref>Murray, ''War to be Won'', p. 196.</ref>  The Allies chose the Solomon Islands, specifically the southern Solomon islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida.<ref>Loxton, ''Shame of Savo'', p. 3.</ref>
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Two attempts by the Japanese to extend their defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific were thwarted in the battles of [[Battle of the Coral Sea|Coral Sea]] (May 1942) and [[Battle of Midway|Midway]] (June 1942).  These two strategic victories for the Allies provided an opportunity to take the initiative and launch an offensive against the Japanese somewhere in the Pacific. Admiral [[Ernest J. King]], the US Chief of Naval Operations, chose the Solomon Islands, specifically the southern Solomon islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida.
  
[[Image:WWIIPacific1942.jpg|300px|thumb|left|The Pacific Ocean area in August, 1942.  Guadalcanal is located in the lower right center of the map.]]Allied strategists knew the Japanese [[Japanese Imperial Navy|Navy]] had [[Invasion of Tulagi (May 1942)|occupied Tulagi]] in May 1942 and had constructed a seaplane base near there. Concern grew when in early July 1942 the Japanese Navy began constructing a large airfield near [[Lunga Point]] on nearby Guadalcanal.  By August 1942, the Japanese had about 900 troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel (2,200 of whom were [[Korean people|Korean]] construction specialists) on Guadalcanal.  These bases, when complete, would protect Japan's major base at [[Rabaul]], threaten Allied supply and communication lines, and establish a staging area for possible future offensives against [[Fiji]], [[New Caledonia]], and [[Samoa]]. The Japanese planned to deploy 45 [[fighter aircraft|fighter]] and 60 [[bomber]] aircraft to Guadalcanal once the airfield was complete.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 23-31, 129, 628, Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 5, and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 39.</ref>
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===American strategy===
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In the spring and summer of 1942, Admiral King, fought hard in meetings of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff for a limited offensive in the Pacific. He was opposed by General [[George C. Marshall]], the Army's Chief of Staff, who believed strongly in a Germany-first policy and who did not want to divert any army or air force resources to support a Pacific offensive. Eventually, King threatened to go ahead on his own, using as his authority several ambiguous memoranda that had been approved earlier by President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]]. Thus, on 7 August 1942, the US invasion of Guadalcanal took place, and this soon became a battle of attrition in which neither side would quit. Marshall never gave his full support to the operation, but it continued and the US forces were finally successful.<ref> Buell, Thomas B. ''Master of Sea Power '' (1980)</ref>  
  
The Allied plan to attack the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral [[Ernest King]], Commander in Chief, [[United States Fleet]].  He proposed the offensive to deny the use of the southern Solomon islands by the Japanese as [[Military base|bases]] to threaten the [[materiel|supply]] routes between the U.S. and [[Australia]], and to use them as starting points for a [[Military campaign|campaign]] with the goal of isolating the major Japanese [[Military base|base]] at [[Rabaul]] while also supporting the Allied [[New Guinea campaign|New Guinea]] campaign, with the eventual goal of opening the way for the U.S. to retake the Philippines.<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 12.</ref>  U.S. Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], Allied commander in chief for Pacific forces, created the South Pacific theater, with U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley place in command on [[June 19]], 1942, to direct the Allied offensive in the Solomons.<ref>Murray, ''War to be Won'', p. 199-200 and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 5.</ref>
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The specific plan to attack the southern Solomons was conceived by King's planners in Washington, who proposed the offensive to deny the use of the southern Solomon islands by the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to use them as starting points for a campaign with the goal of isolating the major Japanese base at [[Rabaul]] while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign, with the eventual goal of opening the way for the U.S. to retake the Philippines.<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 12.</ref>  U.S. Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]], Commander in Chief, [[United States Pacific Command|United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas]],<ref name=CINCPAC-CINCPOA>{{citation
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| title = United States Naval Administration in World War II
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| contribution = Volume 149:Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas
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| url = http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/USN/Admin-Hist/149-CinCPac/index.html
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| author = Director of Naval History
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}}</ref> created the South Pacific theater, with U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley place in command on [[June 19]], 1942, to direct the Allied offensive in the Solomons.
  
[[Image:GuadHendersonJuly1942.gif|275 px|thumb|right|The airfield at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal under construction by Japanese forces in July, 1942.]]In preparation for the offensive, in May, 1942, U.S. Major General [[Alexander Vandegrift]] was ordered to move his [[U.S. 1st Marine Division]] from the U.S. to New Zealand.  Other Allied land, naval, and air force units were sent to establish bases in Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia.<ref>Loxton, ''Shame of Savo'', p. 5.</ref>  [[Espiritu Santo]] in New Caledonia was selected as the headquarters and main base for the impending offensive, codenamed ''Operation Watchtower,'' with the commencement date set for August 7, 1942. At first, the Allied offensive was planned just for Tulagi and the [[Santa Cruz Islands]], omitting Guadalcanal.  However, after Allied reconnaissance discovered the Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, capture of that airfield was added to the plan and the Santa Cruz operation was dropped.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 35-37, 53.</ref>
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Allied strategists knew the Japanese Navy had occupied Tulagi in May 1942 and had constructed a seaplane base near there. Concern grew when in early July 1942 the Japanese Navy began constructing a large airfield near Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal.  By August 1942, the Japanese had about 900 troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel (2,200 of whom were Korean construction workers) on Guadalcanal. These bases, when complete, would protect Japan's major base at [[Rabaul]], threaten Allied supply and communication lines, and establish a staging area for possible future offensives against Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa.  The Japanese planned to deploy 45 fighters and 60 bombers to Guadalcanal once the airfield was complete.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 23-31, 129, 628, Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 5, and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 39.</ref>
  
The Allied ''Watchtower'' expeditionary force of 75 warships and transports, which included vessels from both the U.S. and Australia, assembled near Fiji on July 26, 1942,<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 15.</ref> and engaged in one rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on July 31.<ref>McGee, ''The Solomons Campaigns'', p. 20-21.</ref> The on-scene commander of the Allied expeditionary force was U.S. Vice Admiral [[Frank Jack Fletcher]], whose flagship was the U.S. [[aircraft carrier]] [[USS Saratoga (CV-3)|''Saratoga'']].  The Allied commander of the amphibious transport force was U.S. Rear Admiral [[Richmond K. Turner]].  Vandegrift was the commander of the 16,000 Allied (primarily U.S. [[United States Marine Corps|Marine]]) ground forces involved in the landings.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 57, 619-621.</ref>
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In preparation for the offensive, in May, 1942, U.S. Major General [[Alexander Vandegrift]] moved his [[U.S. 1st Marine Division]] to New Zealand.  Other Allied land, naval, and air force units were sent to establish bases in Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. Espiritu Santo in New Caledonia became the headquarters and main base for the impending offensive, codenamed ''Operation Watchtower,'' with the commencement date set for August 7, 1942.  Invaluable information was obtained from [[coastwatcher]]s who, organised by the Australian naval authorities, had secreted themselves and their wireless sets in the jungle before the Japanese arrived. Essentially, the Coastwatchers carried out a [[special reconnaissance]] mission.
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More intelligence was added by observation from the air, but only by personal observation after landing was any really reliable and accurate detail possible.  The American [[ULTRA]] [[communications intelligence|cryptanalysts]] were able to read some of the Japanese radio traffic.  The invasion force worked from hastily prepared [[imagery intelligence|mosaics]] photographed from the air and assembled with speed.
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At first, the Allied offensive was planned just for Tulagi and the [[Santa Cruz Islands]], omitting Guadalcanal.  However, after Allied reconnaissance discovered the Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, capture of that airfield was added to the plan and the Santa Cruz operation was dropped.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 35-37, 53.</ref>
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The Allied ''Watchtower'' expeditionary force of 75 warships and transports, which included vessels from both the U.S. and Australia, assembled near Fiji on July 26, 1942, and engaged in one rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on July 31. The rehearsal went poorly.  The on-scene commander of the Allied expeditionary force was U.S. Vice Admiral [[Frank Jack Fletcher]], whose flagship was the U.S aircraft carrier ''Saratoga''.  The Allied commander of the amphibious transport force was U.S. Rear Admiral [[Richmond K. Turner]].  Vandegrift was the commander of the 16,000 Allied (primarily U.S. Marine) ground forces involved in the landings.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 57, 619-621.</ref>
  
 
==Landings==
 
==Landings==
[[Image:GuadTulagiLanding.gif|275 px|thumb|left|Routes of Allied amphibious forces for landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, August 7, 1942.]]Due to bad weather, the Allied expeditionary force arrived in the vicinity of Guadalcanal undetected by the Japanese on the morning of August 7.<ref>McGee, ''The Solomons Campaigns'', p. 21</ref> The landing force ships split into two groups, with one group assaulting Guadalcanal, and the other Tulagi, Florida, and nearby islands.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 60.</ref> Allied warships bombarded the invasion beaches while U.S. carrier aircraft bombed Japanese positions on the target islands and destroyed 15 Japanese seaplanes at their base near Tulagi.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', p. 46-47 and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 38.</ref>
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Due to bad weather, the Allied expeditionary force arrived in the vicinity of Guadalcanal undetected by the Japanese on the morning of August 7.  The landing force ships split into two groups, with one group assaulting Guadalcanal, and the other Tulagi, Florida, and nearby islands.  Allied warships bombarded the invasion beaches while U.S. carrier aircraft bombed Japanese positions on the target islands and destroyed 15 Japanese seaplanes at their base near Tulagi.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', p. 46-47 and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 38.</ref>
  
Tulagi, and the two nearby, small islands of [[Gavutu]] and Tamambogo were assaulted by 3,000 U.S. Marines on August 7.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 51.</ref>  The 886<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 50.</ref> [[Japanese Imperial Navy]] personnel manning the naval and seaplane bases on the three islands fiercely resisted the marine attacks.  With some difficulty, the U.S. Marines finally secured all three islands, Tulagi on August 8,<ref>Shaw, ''First Offensive'', p.8-9.</ref> and Gavutu and Tanambogo by August 9.<ref>McGee, ''The Solomons Campaigns'', p. 32-34.</ref> The Japanese defenders were killed almost to the last man while the marines suffered 122 killed.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 79.  Approximately 80 Japanese personnel escaped from the islands to Florida Island, where they were found and killed by Marine patrols over the next two months.</ref>{{Details|Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo}}
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Tulagi, and the two nearby, small islands of Gavutu and Tamambogo were assaulted by 3,000 U.S. Marines on August 7. The 886 Imperial Navy personnel on the three islands fiercely resisted the Marine attacks.  With some difficulty, the U.S. Marines finally secured all three islands, Tulagi on August 8, and Gavutu and Tanambogo by August 9.  All the Japanese defenders were killed as the Marines suffered 122 killed.  
  
[[Image:GuadLandingsLunga.jpg|300 px|thumb|right|U.S. Marines come ashore on Guadalcanal on the morning of August 7, 1942.]]In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance.  At 09:10 on August 7, General Vandegrift and 11,000<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 15.</ref> U.S. Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point.  Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered no resistance except for "tangled" rain forest, and halted for the night about 1,000 yards from the Lunga Point airfield.  The next day, again against little resistance, the Marines advanced all the way to the Lunga River, and secured the airfield by 16:00 on August 8.  The Japanese naval construction units had abandoned the airfield area, leaving behind food, supplies, and intact construction equipment and vehicles.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 61-62, 81.</ref>
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In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance.  At 09:10 on August 7, General Vandegrift and 11,000 Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point.  Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered no resistance except for "tangled" rain forest, and halted for the night about 1,000 yards from the Lunga Point airfield.  The next day, again against little resistance, the Marines advanced all the way to the Lunga River, and secured the airfield by 16:00 on August 8.  The Japanese naval construction units had abandoned the airfield area, leaving behind food, supplies, and intact construction equipment and vehicles.
  
During the landing operations on August 7 and 8, Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport ''George F. Elliot'' (which eventually sank two days later) and heavily damaging the U.S. destroyer [[USS Jarvis (DD-393)|''Jarvis'']].<ref>Loxton, ''Shame of Savo'', pp. 90–103.</ref>  In the air attacks over the two days, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, both in combat and to accident, including 14 carrier [[fighter]] aircraft.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 80.</ref>
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During the landing operations on August 7 and 8, Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport ''George F. Elliot'' (which eventually sank two days later) and heavily damaging the U.S. destroyer [[USS Jarvis (DD-393)|''Jarvis'']].<ref>Loxton, ''Shame of Savo'', pp. 90–103.</ref>  In the air attacks over the two days, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, both in combat and to accident, including 14 carrier [[fighter aircraft]].<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 80.</ref>
  
[[Image:GuadBettyAttack.jpg|275 px|thumb|left|Japanese [[Mitsubishi G4M]] "Betty" bombers attack Allied ships off Guadalcanal on August 8]]After these clashes, Fletcher was concerned about the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength,<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', p. 99.</ref> anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ship's fuel levels. Fletcher determined that he would withdraw from the Solomon Islands area with his carrier task forces the evening of August 8 to avoid further losses.<ref>Loxton, ''Shame of Savo'', pp. 104–5.  Loxton, Frank (''Guadalcanal'' p. 94), and Morison (''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 28) contend that Fletcher's fuel situation wasn't at all critical but that Fletcher implied it was in order to provide further justification for his withdrawal from the battle area.</ref>  Due to the loss of carrier air cover, Turner decided that he would have no choice but also to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal, even though less than half of the supplies and heavy equipment on the transport ships needed by the troops ashore had been unloaded.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', p. 100.</ref>  Turner intended to unload as many supplies as possible on Guadalcanal and Tulagi throughout the night of August 8 and then depart with his ships early on August 9.<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'' p. 31.</ref><br><br>
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After these clashes, Fletcher was concerned about the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength,<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', p. 99.</ref> anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ship's fuel levels. Fletcher determined that he would withdraw from the Solomon Islands area with his carrier task forces the evening of August 8 to avoid further losses.<ref>Loxton, ''Shame of Savo'', pp. 104–5.  Loxton, Frank (''Guadalcanal'' p. 94), and Morison (''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 28) contend that Fletcher's fuel situation wasn't at all critical but that Fletcher implied it was in order to provide further justification for his withdrawal from the battle area.</ref>  Due to the loss of carrier air cover, Turner decided that he would have no choice but also to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal, even though less than half of the supplies and heavy equipment on the transport ships needed by the troops ashore had been unloaded.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', p. 100.</ref>  Turner intended to unload as many supplies as possible on Guadalcanal and Tulagi throughout the night of August 8 and then depart with his ships early on August 9.<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'' p. 31.</ref><br><br>
That night, as the transports unloaded, two groups of Allied warships screening the transports were surprised and defeated by a single Japanese force of seven cruisers and one destroyer, commanded by Japanese Vice Admiral [[Gunichi Mikawa]].  Three U.S. and one Australian cruisers were sunk and one other U.S. cruiser and two destroyers were damaged in this lopsided Japanese victory.  Fortunately for the Allies, Mikawa, who was unaware that Fletcher had withdrawn with the U.S. carriers, immediately returned to his home ports of Rabaul and [[Kavieng]] without attempting to attack the now unprotected Allied transports.  Mikawa was concerned about U.S. carrier air attacks during daylight hours if he tarried in the southern Solomons area.  After this defeat, Turner withdrew all remaining Allied naval forces by the evening of August 9, leaving the Marines ashore without much of the heavy equipment, provisions, and troops still aboard the transports.{{Details|Battle of Savo Island}}
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That night, as the transports unloaded, two groups of Allied warships screening the transports were surprised and defeated by a single Japanese force of seven cruisers and one destroyer, commanded by Japanese Vice Admiral [[Gunichi Mikawa]].  Three U.S. and one Australian cruisers were sunk and one other U.S. cruiser and two destroyers were damaged in this lopsided Japanese victory.  Fortunately for the Allies, Mikawa, who was unaware that Fletcher had withdrawn with the U.S. carriers, immediately returned to his home ports of Rabaul and [[Kavieng]] without attempting to attack the now unprotected Allied transports.  Mikawa was concerned about U.S. carrier air attacks during daylight hours if he tarried in the southern Solomons area.  After this defeat, Turner withdrew all remaining Allied naval forces by the evening of August 9, leaving the Marines ashore without much of the heavy equipment, provisions, and troops still aboard the transports.
  
 
==Initial Operations==
 
==Initial Operations==
[[Image:GuadInitialLungaPerimeter.gif|300 px|thumb|right|Initial U.S. Marine defenses around the airstrip at Lunga Point, Guadalcanal, Aug 12, 1942.]] The Marines left ashore on Guadalcanal initially concentrated on forming a defense perimeter around the airfield, moving the landed supplies within the perimeter, and finishing the airfield.  Vandegrift placed his 11,000 troops on Guadalcanal in a loose perimeter around the Lunga Point area.  In four days of intense effort, the supplies were moved from the landing beach into dispersed dumps within the perimeter.  Work began on the airfield immediately, mainly using captured Japanese equipment.  On August 12, the airfield was named [[Henderson Field (Guadalcanal)|Henderson Field]] after Major [[Lofton Henderson]], a Marine aviator who had been killed at the [[Battle of Midway]].  By August 18, the airfield was ready for operation.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 14-15.  At this time there were exactly 10,819 Marines on Guadalcanal.</ref><ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 125-127.</ref>  Five days worth of food had been landed from the transports which, along with caputured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days worth of food.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 16-17.</ref>  To conserve the limited food supplies, the Allied troops were limited to two meals a day.<ref>Shaw, ''First Offensive'', p. 13.</ref> Allied troops encountered a "severe strain" of [[dysentery]] soon after the landings, with one in five Marines afflicted by mid-August.  Although some of the Korean construction workers surrendered to the Marines, most of the remaining Japanese and Korean personnel gathered just west of the Lunga perimeter on the west bank of the Matanikau river and subsisted mainly on coconuts.  A Japanese naval outpost was also located at Taivu Point, about 22 miles east of the Lunga perimeter.  On August 8, a Japanese destroyer delivered 113 naval reinforcement troops to the Matanikau position.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 20, 35-36.</ref>
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The Marines left ashore on Guadalcanal initially concentrated on forming a defense perimeter around the airfield, moving the landed supplies within the perimeter, and finishing the airfield.  Vandegrift placed his 11,000 troops on Guadalcanal in a loose perimeter around the Lunga Point area.  In four days of intense effort, the supplies were moved from the landing beach into dispersed dumps within the perimeter.  Work began on the airfield immediately, mainly using captured Japanese equipment.  On August 12, the airfield was named [[Henderson Field (Guadalcanal)|Henderson Field]] after Major [[Lofton Henderson]], a Marine aviator who had been killed at the [[Battle of Midway]].  By August 18, the airfield was ready for operation.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 14-15.  At this time there were exactly 10,819 Marines on Guadalcanal.</ref><ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 125-127.</ref>  Five days worth of food had been landed from the transports which, along with captured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days worth of food.  Allied troops encountered a "severe strain" of [[dysentery]] soon after the landings, with one in five Marines afflicted by mid-August.  Although some of the Korean construction workers surrendered to the Marines, most of the remaining Japanese and Korean personnel gathered just west of the Lunga perimeter on the west bank of the Matanikau river and subsisted mainly on coconuts.  A Japanese naval outpost was also located at Taivu Point, about 22 miles east of the Lunga perimeter.  On August 8, a Japanese destroyer delivered 113 naval reinforcement troops to the Matanikau position.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 20, 35-36.</ref>
  
On the evening of August 12, a 25-man U.S. Marine patrol, led by Lt. Col Frank Goettge and primarily consisting of [[military intelligence|intelligence]] personnel, landed by boat west of the Lunga perimeter, between Point Cruz and the Matanikau River, on a reconnaissance mission with a secondary objective of contacting a group of Japanese troops that the U.S. forces believed might be willing to surrender.  Soon after the patrol landed, a nearby [[platoon]] of Japanese troops attacked and almost completely wiped-out the group of Marines.<ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 58-60 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 35.  Only three members of the patrol made it back to the Allied Lunga Point perimeter.  Goettge was one of the first killed.  More details of the event are at:  [http://www.gnt.com/%7Ejrube/goettge.htm], [http://www.pacificwrecks.com/people/veterans/clark.html#patrol], [http://www.usmarineraiders.org/google.htm], [http://www.franklinfavorite.com/articles/stories/200211/07/guadalcanal11-7-02_features.html], [http://www.mca-marines.org/Leatherneck/Translator_MerleCory_Aug04.htm], and [http://www.guadalcanal.com.sb/60th%20Anniversary%20Program/page%2023%20-%2060th%20Anniversary%20Program.htm]</ref>
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On the evening of August 12, a 25-man U.S. Marine patrol, led by Lt. Col Frank Goettge and primarily consisting of intelligence personnel, landed by boat west of the Lunga perimeter, between Point Cruz and the Matanikau River, on a reconnaissance mission with a secondary objective of contacting a group of Japanese troops that the U.S. forces believed might be willing to surrender.  Soon after the patrol landed, a nearby platoon of Japanese troops attacked and almost completely wiped-out the group of Marines.  Goettge, whose body was never found, received a posthumous [[Medal of Honor]]. <ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 58-60 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 35.  </ref>
  
[[Image:GuadMatanikauAug19.gif|325 px|thumb|left|Chart showing the U.S. Marine attacks west of the Matanikau River on August 19.]]On August 19, Vandegrift sent three companies from the U.S. [[5th Marine Regiment]] to attack the Japanese troop concentration west of the Matanikau.  One Marine company attacked across the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau river while another company crossed the river 1,000 yards inland and attacked the Japanese forces located in Matanikau village.  The third Marine company landed by boat further west and attacked Kokumbuna village.  After briefly occupying the two villages, the three Marine companies returned to the Lunga perimeter, having killed about 65 Japanese soldiers while losing four themselves.  This action, sometimes referred to as the "First Battle of the Matanikau," was the first of several major actions that would take place in the Matanikau river area during the campaign.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 132-133 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 36-42.</ref>
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On August 19, Vandegrift sent three companies from the U.S. [[5th Marine Regiment]] to attack the Japanese troop concentration west of the Matanikau.  One Marine company attacked across the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau river while another company crossed the river 1,000 yards inland and attacked the Japanese forces located in Matanikau village.  The third Marine company landed by boat further west and attacked Kokumbuna village.  After briefly occupying the two villages, the three Marine companies returned to the Lunga perimeter, having killed about 65 Japanese soldiers while losing four themselves.  This action, sometimes referred to as the "First Battle of the Matanikau," was the first of several major actions that would take place in the Matanikau river area during the campaign.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 132-133 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 36-42.</ref>
  
On August 20, the U.S. [[Escort aircraft carrier|escort carrier]] [[USS Long Island (CVE-1)|''Long Island'']] delivered two squadrons of Marine aircraft to Henderson Field.  One squadron consisted of 19 [[Grumman F4F]] fighters and the other was a squadron of 12 [[SBD Dauntless]] dive bombers.  The aircraft at Henderson became known as the "[[Cactus Air Force]]" after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal.  The Marine fighters went into action the next day, attacking one of the Japanese bomber air raids that occurred almost daily.  On August 22, five U.S. Army [[P-400]] fighters (a variant of the [[P-39 Airacobra]]) and their pilots arrived at Henderson Field.<ref>Shaw, ''First Offensive'', p. 18.</ref>
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On August 20, the U.S. [[Escort aircraft carrier|escort carrier]] [[USS Long Island (CVE-1)|''Long Island'']] delivered two squadrons of Marine aircraft to Henderson Field.  One squadron consisted of 19 [[Grumman F4F]] fighters and the other was a squadron of 12 [[SBD Dauntless]] dive bombers.  The aircraft at Henderson became known as the "[[Cactus Air Force]]" after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal.  The Marine fighters went into action the next day, attacking one of the Japanese bomber air raids that occurred almost daily.  On August 22, five U.S. Army [[P-400]] fighters (a variant of the [[P-39 Airacobra]]) and their pilots arrived at Henderson Field.
  
 
==Battle of the Tenaru==
 
==Battle of the Tenaru==
{{Further|[[Battle of the Tenaru]]}}
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In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese [[Imperial General Headquarters]] assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a [[corps]]-sized command based at [[Rabaul]] and under the command of Lieutenant-General [[Harukichi Hyakutake]], with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces.  The 17th Army, currently heavily involved with the Japanese campaign in [[New Guinea campaign|New Guinea]], had only a few units available to send to the southern Solomons area.  Of these units, the 35th Infantry Brigade under Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi was at [[Palau]], the 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment was in the [[Philippines]] and the 28th (Ichiki) Infantry Regiment, under the command of [[Colonel]] Kiyonao Ichiki, was onboard transport ships near [[Guam]].  The different units began to move towards Guadalcanal immediately, but Ichiki's regiment, being the closest, would ultimately arrive first.  The "First Element" of Ichiki's unit, consisting of about 917 soldiers, landed from destroyers at Taivu Point, east of the Lunga perimeter, on [[August 19]].<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 88 and Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 141–143.  Japanese army regiments often took the name of their commanding officers, who frequently commanded the same units for years.  Thus, the names "Aoba" and "Ichiki" regiments.</ref>
[[Image:GuadTenaruSandbar.jpg|275px|thumb|right|Dead Japanese soldiers lie on the sandbar at the mouth of Alligator Creek, Guadalcanal after the [[Battle of the Tenaru]].]]In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese [[Imperial General Headquarters]] assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a [[corps]]-sized command based at [[Rabaul]] and under the command of Lieutenant-General [[Harukichi Hyakutake]], with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces.  The 17th Army, currently heavily involved with the Japanese campaign in [[New Guinea campaign|New Guinea]], had only a few units available to send to the southern Solomons area.  Of these units, the 35th Infantry Brigade under Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi was at [[Palau]], the 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment was in the [[Philippines]] and the 28th (Ichiki) Infantry Regiment, under the command of [[Colonel]] Kiyonao Ichiki, was onboard transport ships near [[Guam]].  The different units began to move towards Guadalcanal immediately, but Ichiki's regiment, being the closest, would ultimately arrive first.  The "First Element" of Ichiki's unit, consisting of about 917 soldiers, landed from destroyers at Taivu Point, east of the Lunga perimeter, on [[August 19]].<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 88 and Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 141–143.  Japanese army regiments often took the name of their commanding officers, who frequently commanded the same units for years.  Thus, the names "Aoba" and "Ichiki" regiments.</ref>
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Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, Ichiki's unit conducted a nighttime frontal [[attack|assault]] on Marine positions at Alligator Creek (often called the "Ilu River" on U.S. Marine maps) on the east side of the Lunga perimeter in the early morning hours of [[August 21]].  Ichiki's assault was defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese attackers in what became known as the [[Battle of the Tenaru]].  After daybreak, the Marine units counterattacked Ichiki's surviving troops, killing many more of them, including Ichiki.  In total, all but 128 of the original 900 of the Ichiki Regiment's First Element were killed in the battle.  The survivors of Ichiki's force returned to Taivu Point, notified 17th Army headquarters of their defeat in the battle, and awaited further reinforcements and orders from Rabaul.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 156-158 & 681 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 43.</ref>
 
Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, Ichiki's unit conducted a nighttime frontal [[attack|assault]] on Marine positions at Alligator Creek (often called the "Ilu River" on U.S. Marine maps) on the east side of the Lunga perimeter in the early morning hours of [[August 21]].  Ichiki's assault was defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese attackers in what became known as the [[Battle of the Tenaru]].  After daybreak, the Marine units counterattacked Ichiki's surviving troops, killing many more of them, including Ichiki.  In total, all but 128 of the original 900 of the Ichiki Regiment's First Element were killed in the battle.  The survivors of Ichiki's force returned to Taivu Point, notified 17th Army headquarters of their defeat in the battle, and awaited further reinforcements and orders from Rabaul.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 156-158 & 681 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 43.</ref>
  
 
==Battle of the Eastern Solomons==
 
==Battle of the Eastern Solomons==
[[Image:EasternSolomonsEnterpriseBurning.jpg|250 px|thumb|left|The U.S. [[aircraft carrier|carrier]] [[USS Enterprise (CV-6)|''Enterprise'']] under aerial attack during the [[Battle of the Eastern Solomons]].]]{{Further|[[Battle of the Eastern Solomons]]}}
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As the Tenaru battle was ending, more Japanese reinforcements were already on their way from Truk.  Departing Truk on August 16 were three slow transports carrying the remaining 1,400 soldiers from Ichiki's (28th) Infantry Regiment plus 500 naval troops from the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 33-34.</ref>  Guarding the transports were 13 warships commanded by Japanese Rear Admiral [[Raizo Tanaka]] who planned to land the troops on Guadalcanal on August 24.<ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 70; Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 159.</ref>  To cover the landings of these troops and provide support for the operation to retake Henderson Field from Allied forces, the Japanese Combined Fleet sortied from Truk on August 21 and headed towards the southern Solomon Islands with a force of three carriers and 30 other warships.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', 124–125, 157.</ref>
As the Tenaru battle was ending, more Japanese reinforcements were already on their way from Truk.  Departing Truk on [[August 16]] were three slow transports carrying the remaining 1,400 soldiers from Ichiki's (28th) Infantry Regiment plus 500 naval troops from the 5th Yokosuka [[Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces|Special Naval Landing Force]].<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 33-34.</ref>  Guarding the transports were 13 warships commanded by Japanese [[Rear Admiral]] [[Raizo Tanaka]] who planned to land the troops on Guadalcanal on [[August 24]].<ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 70.</ref><ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 159.</ref>  To cover the landings of these troops and provide support for the operation to retake Henderson Field from Allied forces, the Japanese Combined Fleet sortied from Truk on [[August 21]] and headed towards the southern Solomon Islands with a force of three carriers and 30 other warships.<ref>Hammel, ''Carrier Clash'', 124–125, 157.</ref>
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Simultaneously, the U.S. carrier task forces under Fletcher approached Guadalcanal to counter the Japanese offensive efforts.  On [[August 24]] and [[August 25|25]], the two carrier forces fought the [[Battle of the Eastern Solomons]] that resulted in the fleets of both adversaries retreating from the area after taking some damage, with the Japanese losing one aircraft carrier sunk.  Tanaka's convoy, after suffering heavy damage during the battle, including the sinking of one of the transports, was forced, due to the continued threat by U.S. aircraft based at Henderson Field, to divert to the [[Shortland Islands]] in the northern Solomons in order for the surviving troops to be transferred to destroyers for later delivery to Guadalcanal.<ref>Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 118-119</ref><ref>Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 293.  An unknown, but "large" number of the 5th Yokosuka troops were killed in the sinking of their transport ship.</ref>
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Simultaneously, the U.S. carrier task forces under Fletcher approached Guadalcanal to counter the Japanese offensive efforts.  On August 24 and August 25, the two carrier forces fought the ''Battle of the Eastern Solomons''' that resulted in the fleets of both adversaries retreating from the area after taking some damage, with the Japanese losing one aircraft carrier sunk.  Tanaka's convoy, after suffering heavy damage during the battle, including the sinking of one of the transports, was forced, due to the continued threat by U.S. aircraft based at Henderson Field, to divert to the Shortland Islands in the northern Solomons in order for the surviving troops to be transferred to destroyers for later delivery to Guadalcanal.<ref>Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 118-119; Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 293.  An unknown, but "large" number of the 5th Yokosuka troops were killed in the sinking of their transport ship.</ref>
  
 
==Air battles over Henderson Field and strengthening of the Lunga defenses==
 
==Air battles over Henderson Field and strengthening of the Lunga defenses==
[[Image:HendersonF4FIntercept.gif|225px|thumb|right|U.S. Marine [[F4F Wildcat]] fighters ascend from Henderson Field to attack incoming Japanese aircraft in late August or early September, 1942.]]Small numbers of U.S. aircraft and their crews, both fighters and bombers, continued to arrive at Guadalcanal.  By the end of August, 64 aircraft of all types were stationed at Henderson Field.<ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 74.</ref>  On [[September 3]], the commander of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, U.S. Marine Brigadier General [[Roy S. Geiger]], arrived with his staff and took command of all air operations at Henderson Field.<ref>Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 297.</ref>  Air battles between the Allied aircraft at Henderson and Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul continued, with almost daily engagements between the two adversaries in the skies over Guadalcanal.  Between August 26 and September 5, the U.S. lost about 15 aircraft while the Japanese lost approximately 19 aircraft.  More than half of the U.S. aircrews, however, were rescued while most of the Japanese aircrews weren't recovered.  The eight-hour round trip flight from Rabaul to Guadalcanal (about 1,120 miles total) seriously hampered Japanese efforts to establish air superiority over Henderson Field.  Also, Australian [[coastwatchers]] on [[Bougainville Island|Bougainville]] and [[New Georgia]] islands were usually able to provide Allied forces on Guadalcanal with advance notice of inbound Japanese air strikes, allowing the U.S. fighters time to take off and position themselves to ambush the Japanese bombers and fighters as they approached Henderson Field.  Thus, the Japanese were slowly losing an air war of attrition over Guadalcanal.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 194-213 and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 45.  In comparison to the 560 miles separating Lunga Point from Rabaul, Berlin was about 460 miles from Allied air bases in eastern [[England]].</ref>{{Details|Cactus Air Force}}
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Small numbers of U.S. aircraft and their crews, both fighters and bombers, continued to arrive at Guadalcanal.  By the end of August, 64 aircraft of all types were stationed at Henderson Field.<ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 74.</ref>  On September 3, the commander of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, U.S. Marine Brigadier General [[Roy S. Geiger]], arrived with his staff and took command of all air operations at Henderson Field.<ref>Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 297.</ref>  Air battles between the Allied aircraft at Henderson and Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul continued, with almost daily engagements between the two adversaries in the skies over Guadalcanal.  Between August 26 and September 5, the U.S. lost about 15 aircraft while the Japanese lost approximately 19 aircraft.  More than half of the U.S. aircrews, however, were rescued while most of the Japanese aircrews weren't recovered.  The eight-hour round trip flight from Rabaul to Guadalcanal (about 1,120 miles total) seriously hampered Japanese efforts to establish air superiority over Henderson Field.  Australian coastwatchers on Bougainville and New Georgia islands were usually able to provide Allied intelligence on Guadalcanal with advance notice of inbound Japanese air strikes, allowing the U.S. fighters time to take off and position themselves to ambush the Japanese bombers and fighters as they approached Henderson Field.  Thus, the Japanese were slowly losing an air war of attrition over Guadalcanal.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 194-213 and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 45.  </ref>
  
During this time, Vandegrift continued to direct efforts to strengthen and improve the defenses of the Lunga perimeter.  Between [[August 21]] and [[September 3]], he relocated three Marine battalions, including the [[Marine Raiders|1st Raider Battalion]], under U.S. [[Lieutenant Colonel]] [[Merritt A. Edson]] (Edson's Raiders), and the [[Paramarines|1st Parachute]] Battalion from Tulagi and [[Gavutu]] to Guadalcanal.  These units added about 1,500 troops to Vandegrift's original 11,000 men defending Henderson Field.<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 15.</ref><ref>Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 298.</ref>  The 1st Parachute battalion, which had suffered heavy casualties in the [[Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo]] in August, was placed under Edson's command.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 103 and Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 298.</ref>  One of the relocated battalions, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, was landed by boat west of the Matanikau near Kokumbuna village on [[August 27]] with the mission of attacking Japanese units in the area, much as in the first Matanikau action of [[August 19]].  In this case, however, the U.S. Marines were impeded by difficult terrain, hot sun, and well-emplaced Japanese defenses.  The next morning the Marines found that the Japanese defenders had departed during the night, so the Marines returned to the Lunga perimeter by boat.<ref>Zimmerman, ''The Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 78-79.</ref>  Losses in this action were 20 Japanese and 3 Marines killed.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 197.</ref>
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During this time, Vandegrift continued to direct efforts to strengthen and improve the defenses of the Lunga perimeter.  Between August 21 and September 3, he relocated three Marine battalions from Tulagi and Gavutu to Guadalcanal.  These units added about 1,500 troops to Vandegrift's original 11,000 men defending Henderson Field. The 1st Parachute battalion, which had suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo in August, was placed under Edson's command.  
  
Small Allied naval convoys arrived at Guadalcanal on [[August 23]], [[August 29]], [[September 1]], and [[September 8]] to provide the Marines at Lunga with more food, ammunition, aircraft fuel, and aircraft technicians.  The September 1 convoy also brought 392 U.S. Navy [[Seabee|construction engineers]] to maintain and improve Henderson Field.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 79, 91-92 & 94-95.</ref>
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Small Allied naval convoys arrived at Guadalcanal between August 23 and September 8 to provide the Marines at Lunga with more food, ammunition, aircraft fuel, and aircraft technicians.  The September 1 convoy also brought 392 U.S. Navy Seabees (construction engineers) to maintain and improve Henderson Field.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 79, 91-92 & 94-95.</ref>
  
 
==Tokyo Express==
 
==Tokyo Express==
[[Image:TokyoExpress.jpg|250px|thumb|left|Japanese troops load onto a destroyer for a "Tokyo Express" run to Guadalcanal.]]By August 23, Kawaguchi's 35th Infantry Brigade reached Truk and was loaded onto slow transport ships for the rest of the trip to Guadalcanal.  The damage done to Tanka's convoy during Battle of the Eastern Solomons caused the Japanese to reconsider trying to deliver more troops to Guadalcanal by slow transport.  Instead, the ships carrying Kawaguchi's soldiers were sent to Rabaul.  From there, the Japanese planned to deliver Kawaguchi's men to Guadalcanal by destroyers staging through a Japanese naval [[Military base|base]] in the [[Shortland Islands]].  The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make the round trip down "[[The Slot]]" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to Allied air attack.  However, delivering the troops in this manner prevented most of the soldier's heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them.  These high speed destroyer runs to Guadalcanal, which occurred throughout the campaign, were later called the "[[Tokyo Express]]" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 113 and Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 198-199, 205, and 266.</ref>  Due to either the inability or unwillingness of Allied naval commanders to challenge Japanese naval forces at night, the Japanese controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands during the nighttime.  However, any Japanese ship remaining within range of the aircraft at Henderson Field during the daylight hours (about 200 miles) was in great danger from damaging air attack.  This "curious tactical situation" would exist for the next several months during the campaign.<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 113-114</ref>{{Details|Tokyo Express}}
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By August 23, Kawaguchi's 35th Infantry Brigade reached Truk and was loaded onto slow transport ships for the rest of the trip to Guadalcanal.  The damage done to Tanka's convoy during Battle of the Eastern Solomons caused the Japanese to reconsider trying to deliver more troops to Guadalcanal by slow transport.  Instead, the ships carrying Kawaguchi's soldiers were sent to Rabaul.  From there, the Japanese planned to deliver Kawaguchi's men to Guadalcanal by destroyers staging through a Japanese naval base in the Shortland Islands.  The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make the round trip down "The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to Allied air attack.  However, delivering the troops in this manner prevented most of the soldier's heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them.  These high speed destroyer runs to Guadalcanal, which occurred throughout the campaign, were later called the "Tokyo Express" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 113 and Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 198-199, 205, and 266.</ref>  Due to either the inability or unwillingness of Allied naval commanders to challenge Japanese naval forces at night, the Japanese controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands during the nighttime.  However, any Japanese ship remaining within range of the aircraft at Henderson Field during the daylight hours (about 200 miles) was in great danger from damaging air attack.  This "curious tactical situation" would exist for the next several months during the campaign.<ref>Morison, ''Struggle for Guadalcanal'', p. 113-114</ref>
  
Between [[August 29]] and [[September 4]] various Japanese light [[cruiser]]s, destroyers, and [[patrol boat]]s were able to land almost 5,000 troops at Taivu Point, including most of the 35th Infantry Brigade, much of the Aoba (4th) Regiment, and the rest of Ichiki's regiment.  General Kawaguchi, who landed at Taivu Point on the August 31 Express run, was placed in command of all the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 201-203, Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 116-124, and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 87-112.</ref>  A barge convoy took another 1,000 soldiers of Kawaguchi's brigade, under the command of Colonel Akinosuka Oka, to Kamimbo, west of the Lunga perimeter.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 218-219.</ref>
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Between August 29 and September 4 various Japanese light cruisers, destroyers, and patrol boats landed almost 5,000 troops at Taivu Point, including most of the 35th Infantry Brigade, much of the Aoba (4th) Regiment, and the rest of Ichiki's regiment.  General Kawaguchi, who landed at Taivu Point on the August 31 Express run, was placed in command of all the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal.  A barge convoy took another 1,000 soldiers of Kawaguchi's brigade, under the command of Colonel Akinosuka Oka, to Kamimbo, west of the Lunga perimeter.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 201-203, 218-9 Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 116-124, and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 87-112.</ref>
  
 
==Battle of Edson's Ridge==
 
==Battle of Edson's Ridge==
{{Further|[[Battle of Edson's Ridge]]}}
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On September 7, Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to "route and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield."  Kawaguchi's attack plan called for his forces, split into three divisions, to approach the Lunga perimeter inland, culminating with a surprise night attack.  Oka's forces would attack the perimeter from the west while Ichiki's Second Echelon, now renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east.  The main attack would be by Kawaguchi's "Center Body," numbering 3,000 men in three battalions, from the south of the Lunga perimeter.By September 7, most of Kawaguchi's troops had departed Taivu to begin marching towards Lunga Point along the coastline.  About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard the brigade's supply base at Taviu.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 219-220 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 113-15, 121.</ref>  
[[Image:Edson.gif|175px|thumb|right|U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel [[Merritt A. Edson]] (here photographed as a [[brigadier general]]) who led Marine forces in the Battle of Edson's Ridge.]]On [[September 7]], Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to "route and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield."  Kawaguchi's attack plan called for his forces, split into three divisions, to approach the Lunga perimeter inland, culminating with a surprise night attack.  Oka's forces would attack the perimeter from the west while Ichiki's Second Echelon, now renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east.  The main attack would be by Kawaguchi's "Center Body," numbering 3,000 men in three battalions, from the south of the Lunga perimeter.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 219-220 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 113-115 & 243.  Most of the men in Ichiki's second echelon were from [[Asahikawa, Hokkaidō]].  "Kuma" refers to the [[brown bear]]s that lived in that area.</ref> By [[September 7]], most of Kawaguchi's troops had departed Taivu to begin marching towards Lunga Point along the coastline.  About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard the brigade's supply base at Taviu.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 220 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 121.</ref>
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Meanwhile, native island scouts under the direction of [[Martin Clemens]], a [[coastwatchers|coastwatcher]] and officer in the Solomon Islands [[Protectorate]] Defense Force, brought reports to the U.S. Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu, near the village of Tasimboko.  Edson planned a raid to "wipe-out" the Japanese troop concentration at Taivu.<ref>Zimmerman, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 80 and Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 125.</ref>  On [[September 8]], after being dropped-off near Taivu by boat, Edson's men captured Tasimboko as the Japanese defenders retreated into the jungle.<ref>Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 298-299, Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 221-222, Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 129 and Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 129-130.</ref>  In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered "vast stockpiles" of food, ammunition, medical supplies, and a powerful [[shortwave]] radio.  After destroying everything in sight, except for some documents and equipment carried back with them, the Marines returned to the Lunga perimeter.  The mounds of supplies, along with intelligence gathered from the captured documents, informed the Marines that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island and apparently planning an attack on the U.S. defenses.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 130-132, Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 221-222 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 130.</ref>
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Meanwhile, native island scouts brought reports to the U.S. Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu, near the village of Tasimboko.  Edson planned a raid to "wipe-out" the Japanese troop concentration at Taivu.<ref>Zimmerman, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', p. 80 and Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 125.</ref>  On September 8, after being dropped-off near Taivu by boat, Edson's men captured Tasimboko as the Japanese defenders retreated into the jungle. In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered "vast stockpiles" of food, ammunition, medical supplies, and a powerful shortwave radio.  After destroying everything in sight, except for some documents and equipment carried back with them, the Marines returned to the Lunga perimeter.  The mounds of supplies, along with intelligence gathered from the captured documents, informed the Marines that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island and apparently planning an attack on the U.S. defenses.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 130-132, Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 221-222 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 129-130; Hough, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 298-299, p. 129 and Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 129-130.</ref>  
  
Edson, along with Colonel Gerald Thomas, Vandegrift's operations officer, believed that the Japanese attack would come at a narrow, grassy, 1,000-yard-long, coral ridge that paralleled the Lunga River and was located just south of Henderson Field.  The unnamed ridge offered a natural avenue of approach to the airfield, commanded the surrounding area and, at that time, was almost undefended.  On [[September 11]], the 840 men of Edson's battalion deployed onto and around the ridge and prepared to defend it.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 223 & 225-226, Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 132 & 134-135 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 130-131, 138.</ref>
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Edson believed that the Japanese attack would come at a narrow, grassy, 1,000-yard-long, coral ridge that paralleled the Lunga River and was located just south of Henderson Field.  The unnamed ridge offered a natural avenue of approach to the airfield, commanded the surrounding area and, at that time, was almost undefended.  On September 11, the 840 men of Edson's battalion deployed onto and around the ridge and prepared to defend it.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 223 & 225-226, Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 132 & 134-135 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 130-131, 138.</ref>
  
[[Image:EdsonMap2.jpg|275px|thumb|left|Map of the Lunga perimeter on Guadalcanal showing the approach routes of the Japanese forces and the locations of the Japanese attacks during the battle.  Oka's attacks were in the west (left), the Kuma Battalion attacked from the east (right) and the Center Body attacked "Edson's Ridge" in the lower center of the map.]]On the night of [[September 12]], Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion attacked the Raider's between the Lunga River and ridge, forcing one Marine company to fall back to the ridge.  The next night, Kawaguchi faced Edson's 830 Raiders with 3,000 troops of his brigade, plus an assorment of light artillery.  The Japanese attack began just after nightfall, with Kawaguchi's 1st battalion assaulting Edson's right flank, just to the west of the ridge.  After breaking through the Marine lines, the battalion's assault was eventually stopped by Marine units guarding the northern part of the ridge.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 161-167.  The Marine defenders that finally defeated Kokusho's charge were most likely from the [[U.S. 11th Marine Regiment]] with assistance from the 1st Pioneer Battalion (Smith, p. 167 and Frank, p. 235).</ref>
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On the night of September 12, Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion attacked the Raider's between the Lunga River and ridge, forcing one Marine company to fall back to the ridge.  The next night, Kawaguchi faced Edson's 830 Raiders with 3,000 troops of his brigade, plus an assortment of light artillery.  The Japanese attack began just after nightfall, with Kawaguchi's 1st battalion assaulting Edson's right flank, just to the west of the ridge.  After breaking through the Marine lines, the battalion's assault was eventually stopped by Marine units guarding the northern part of the ridge.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 161-167.  The Marine defenders that finally defeated Kokusho's charge were most likely from the [[U.S. 11th Marine Regiment]] with assistance from the 1st Pioneer Battalion (Smith, p. 167 and Frank, p. 235).</ref>
  
Two companies from Kawaguchi's 2nd battalion charged up the southern edge of the ridge and pushed Edson's troops back to Hill 123 on the center part of the ridge.  Throughout the night, Marines at this position, supported by artillery, defeated wave after wave of frontal Japanese attacks.  Japanese units that infiltrated past the ridge to the edge of the airfield were also repulsed.  Attacks by the Kuma battalion and Oka's unit at other locations on the Lunga perimeter were also defeated by the Marine defenses.  On [[September 14]], Kawaguchi led the survivors of his shattered brigade on a five day march west to the Matanikau Valley to join with Oka's unit.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 162-193, Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 237-246, and Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 141-147.</ref>  In total, Kawaguchi's forces lost about 850 killed and the Marines 104.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 144 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 184-194.</ref>
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Two companies from Kawaguchi's 2nd battalion charged up the southern edge of the ridge and pushed Edson's troops back to Hill 123 on the center part of the ridge.  Throughout the night, Marines at this position, supported by artillery, defeated wave after wave of frontal Japanese attacks.  Japanese units that infiltrated past the ridge to the edge of the airfield were also repulsed.  Attacks by the Kuma battalion and Oka's unit at other locations on the Lunga perimeter were also defeated by the Marine defenses.  On September 14, Kawaguchi led the survivors of his shattered brigade on a five day march west to the Matanikau Valley to join with Oka's unit.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 162-193, Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 237-246, and Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 141-147.</ref>  In total, Kawaguchi's forces lost about 850 killed and the Marines 104.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 144 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 184-194.</ref>
  
On [[September 15]], General Hyakutake at Rabaul learned of Kawaguchi's defeat and forwarded the news to the Imperial General Headquarters in Japan.  In an emergency session, the top Japanese army and navy command staffs concluded that, "Guadalcanal might develop into the decisive battle of the war."  The results of the battle now began to have a telling strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of the Pacific.  Hyakutake realized that in order to send sufficient troops and materiel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal, he could no longer at the same time support the major Japanese offensive currently ongoing on the [[Kokoda Track campaign|Kokoda Track]] in [[New Guinea]].  Hyakutake, with the concurrence of the General Headquarters, ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within 30-miles of their objective of [[Port Moresby]], to withdraw until the "Guadalcanal matter" was resolved.  Hyakutake prepared to send more troops to Guadalcanal for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 197-198.</ref>
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On September 15, General Hyakutake at Rabaul learned of Kawaguchi's defeat and forwarded the news to the Imperial General Headquarters in Japan.  In an emergency session, the top Japanese army and navy command staffs concluded that, "Guadalcanal might develop into the decisive battle of the war."  The results of the battle now began to have a telling strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of the Pacific.  Hyakutake realized that in order to send sufficient troops and materiel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal, he could no longer at the same time support the major Japanese offensive currently ongoing on the Kokoda Track in [[New Guinea]].  Hyakutake, with the concurrence of the General Headquarters, ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within 30-miles of their objective of [[Port Moresby]], to withdraw until the "Guadalcanal matter" was resolved.  Hyakutake prepared to send more troops to Guadalcanal for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field.<ref>Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 197-198.</ref>
  
 
==Reinforcement==
 
==Reinforcement==
[[Image:USS Wasp (CV-7) brennt.jpg|275px|thumb|right|The U.S. carrier [[USS Wasp (CV-7)|''Wasp'']] burns after being hit by Japanese submarine torpedoes on [[September 15]], shortly before being abandoned and scuttled.]]As the Japanese regrouped west of the Matanikau, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses.  On September 14, Vandegrift moved another battalion, the [[3rd Battalion 2nd Marines|3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment]] (3/2), from Tulagi to Guadalcanal.  On [[September 18]], an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade (the [[U.S. 7th Marine Regiment]] plus a battalion from the [[U.S. 11th Marine Regiment]] and some additional support units), 137 vehicles, tents, aviation fuel, ammunition, rations, and engineering equipment to Guadalcanal.  These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on [[September 19]], to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter.  While covering this convoy, the U.S. aircraft carrier [[USS Wasp (CV-7)|''Wasp'']] was sunk by a Japanese submarine southeast of Guadalcanal, temporarily leaving only one Allied aircraft carrier ([[USS Hornet (CV-8)|''Hornet'']]) in operation in the South Pacific area.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 247-252, Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 156 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 198-200.</ref>  Vandegrift also made some changes in the senior leadership of his combat units, transferring several officers off the island that didn't meet his performance standards, and promoting junior officers who had "proved themselves" to take their places.  One of these was the recently promoted Colonel Merritt Edson, who was placed in command of the 5th Marine Regiment.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 263.</ref>
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As the Japanese regrouped west of the Matanikau, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses.  On September 14, Vandegrift moved another battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (3/2), from Tulagi to Guadalcanal.  On September 18, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade (the 7th Marine Regiment plus a battalion from the 11th Marine Regiment and some additional support units), 137 vehicles, tents, aviation fuel, ammunition, rations, and engineering equipment to Guadalcanal.  These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on September 19, to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter.  While covering this convoy, the U.S. aircraft carrier ''Wasp'' was sunk by a Japanese submarine southeast of Guadalcanal, temporarily leaving only one Allied aircraft carrier (''Hornet'') in operation in the South Pacific area. Vandegrift also made some changes in the senior leadership of his combat units, transferring several officers off the island that didn't meet his performance standards, and promoting junior officers who had "proved themselves" to take their places.  One of these was the recently promoted Colonel Merritt Edson, who was placed in command of the 5th Marine Regiment.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 247-252, 263; Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 156 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 198-200.</ref>  
  
A lull occurred in the air war over Guadalcanal, with no Japanese air raids occurring between [[September 14]] and [[September 27]] due to bad weather, during which both sides reinforced their prospective air units.  The Japanese delivered 85 fighters and bombers to their air units at Rabaul while the U.S. brought 23 fighters and attack aircraft to Henderson Field.  On September 20, the Japanese counted 117 total aircraft at Rabaul while the Allies tallied 71 aircraft at Henderson Field.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 264-265.</ref>  The air war resumed with a Japanese air raid on Guadalcanal on [[September 27]], which was contested by U.S. Navy and Marine fighters from Henderson Field.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 272.</ref>
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A lull occurred in the air war over Guadalcanal, with no Japanese air raids occurring between September 14 and September 27 due to bad weather, during which both sides reinforced their prospective air units.  The Japanese delivered 85 fighters and bombers to their air units at Rabaul while the U.S. brought 23 fighters and attack aircraft to Henderson Field.  On September 20, the Japanese counted 117 total aircraft at Rabaul while the Allies tallied 71 aircraft at Henderson Field.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 264-265.</ref>  The air war resumed with a Japanese air raid on Guadalcanal on [[September 27]], which was contested by U.S. Navy and Marine fighters from Henderson Field.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 272.</ref>
  
The Japanese immediately began to prepare for their next attempt to recapture Henderson Field.  The 3rd Battalion, 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment had landed at Kamimbo Bay on the western end of Guadalcanal on September 11, too late to join Kawaguchi's attack on the U.S. Marines.  By now, though, the battalion had joined Oka's forces near the Matanikau.  Tokyo Express runs on [[September 14]], [[September 20|20]], [[September 21|21]], and [[September 24|24]] by eight destroyers brought food and ammunition, as well as 280 men from the 1st Battalion, Aoba Regiment, to Kamimbo on Guadalcanal.  The Japanese 38th Division in the [[Dutch East Indies]] was notified to move to Rabaul in preparation for deployment to Guadalcanal.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 152, Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 224 & 266 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 132 & 158.</ref>
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The Japanese immediately began to prepare for their next attempt to recapture Henderson Field.  The 3rd Battalion, 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment had landed at Kamimbo Bay on the western end of Guadalcanal on September 11, too late to join Kawaguchi's attack on the U.S. Marines.  By now, though, the battalion had joined Oka's forces near the Matanikau.  Tokyo Express runs in mid-September by eight destroyers brought food and ammunition, as well as 280 more soldiers.  The Japanese 38th Division in the Dutch East Indies was notified to move to Rabaul in preparation for deployment to Guadalcanal.<ref>Griffith, ''Battle for Guadalcanal'', p. 152, Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 224 & 266 and Smith, ''Bloody Ridge'', p. 132 & 158.</ref>
  
 
==Action along the Matanikau==
 
==Action along the Matanikau==
On [[23 September]], the Marines began a drive to establish defensive positions along the [[Mantanikau River]]. A land attack was combined with a small amphibious landing on the flank, but the operation was repulsed by the Japanese.
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On 23 September, the Marines began a drive to establish defensive positions along the [[Mantanikau River]]. A land attack was combined with a small amphibious landing on the flank, but the operation was repulsed by the Japanese.
{{Details|Action along the Matanikau (September 1942)}}
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==Battle of Cape Esperance==
 
==Battle of Cape Esperance==
{{Further|[[Battle of Cape Esperance]]}}
 
{{Expand-section|date=January 2007}}
 
  
 
==Battleship bombardment of Henderson Field==
 
==Battleship bombardment of Henderson Field==
A lull in the fighting occurred as the Japanese prepared for a new attack. The Japanese Navy, led by battleships [[Japanese battleship Kongō|''Kongō'']] and [[Japanese battleship Haruna|''Haruna'']], bombarded the airfield with special fragmentation shells on 13 and 14 October in an attempt to suppress the aircraft operating from the base. The airfield suffered heavy damage, but was returned to service.
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A lull in the fighting occurred as the Japanese prepared for a new attack. The Japanese Navy, led by battleships ''Kongō'' and ''Haruna'', bombarded the airfield with special fragmentation shells on 13 and 14 October in an attempt to suppress the aircraft operating from the base. The airfield suffered heavy damage, but was returned to service.
  
 
==Battle for Henderson Field==
 
==Battle for Henderson Field==
{{Further|[[Battle for Henderson Field]]}}
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Finally on 23 October, with the addition of more troops, the Japanese made another attempt to capture Henderson Field] from the south. The newly arrived U.S. Army's 164th Infantry Regiment and the Marines' 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment repulsed the attack. The Japanese 29th Infantry Regiment lost 553 killed or missing and 479 wounded among its 2,554 men. Total American estimates for Japanese casualties on that ridge were 2,200.  
Finally on [[23 October]], with the addition of more troops, the Japanese made another attempt to capture [[Henderson Field (Guadalcanal)|Henderson Field]] from the south of the [[salient]]. The newly arrived [[United States Army|U.S. Army's]] [[U.S. 164th Infantry Regiment|164th Infantry Regiment]] and [[1st Battalion, 7th Marines|1st Battalion]], [[U.S. 7th Marine Regiment|7th Marines]] defended this position, and after a determined battle the attack was finally repulsed after committing the U.S. reserves.
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On [[October 25]] Platoon Sergeant [[Mitchell Paige]] and 33 marine riflemen emplaced four water-cooled .30-caliber [[M1917 Browning machine gun|Browning]] [[machine gun]]s on a ridge to defend Henderson Field. By the time the night was over the Japanese 29th Infantry Regiment had lost 553 killed or missing and 479 wounded among its 2,554 men. The Japanese 16th Regiment's losses were not accounted for but the 164th's burial parties handled 975 Japanese bodies. Total American estimates for Japanese casualties on that ridge were 2,200. All the men in Paige's platoon were either killed or wounded during the night of fierce fighting. Paige moved up and down the line placing dead and wounded troops back into foxholes and firing short bursts from each of the four Brownings to deceive the Japanese that a force still held the ridge. Paige was subsequently cited for a [[Medal of Honor]] for his actions that night.
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At dawn of the next day, battalion executive officer Major [[Odell M. Conoley]] reinforced Paige on the hill. It was decided that they would charge the remnants of the two Japanese regiments who were now regrouping. Conoley gathered his resources who consisted of "three enlisted communication personnel, several riflemen, a few company runners who were at the point, together with a cook and a few messmen who had brought food to the position the evening before."
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==Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands==
 
==Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands==
{{Further|[[Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands]]}}
 
{{Expand-section|date=January 2007}}
 
  
 
==Aola Bay, Koli Point, and Carlson's "Long Patrol"==
 
==Aola Bay, Koli Point, and Carlson's "Long Patrol"==
{{Expand-section|date=January 2007}}
 
  
 
==Naval Battle of Guadalcanal==
 
==Naval Battle of Guadalcanal==
{{Further|[[Naval Battle of Guadalcanal]]}}
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In November the Japanese sent reinforcements in the form of the 38th Infantry Division. During the [[Naval Battle of Guadalcanal]], however, the transports carrying this reinforcement were badly damaged and the division was reduced to the strength of a regiment.  Through November, American forces continued its offensive in an attempt to push the perimeter out beyond artillery range of the airfield. The Mantanikau River area was finally cleared after overcoming strong Japanese resistance.
In November the Japanese sent reinforcements in the form of the 38th Infantry Division. During the [[Naval Battle of Guadalcanal]], however, the transports carrying this reinforcement were badly damaged and the division was reduced to the strength of a regiment.  Through November, American forces continued its offensive in an attempt to push the perimeter out beyond artillery range of the airfield. The [[Mantanikau River]] area was finally cleared after overcoming strong Japanese resistance.
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==Final Allied offensives and Operation ''Ke''==
 
==Final Allied offensives and Operation ''Ke''==
By December the weary [[U.S. 1st Marine Division|1st Marine Division]] was withdrawn for recuperation, and over the course of the next month the [[U.S. XIV Corps]] took over operations on the island. This [[corps]] consisted of the [[U.S. 2nd Marine Division|2nd Marine Division]], the U.S. Army's [[25th Infantry Division (United States)|25th Infantry Division]], and the [[Americal Division]].
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By December the weary 1st Marine Division was withdrawn for recuperation, and over the course of the next month the Marines' XIV Corps took over operations on the island. This corps consisted of the 2nd Marine Division, the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division, and its Americal Division.
  
Japanese strength on the island waned due to [[attrition]] and shortages of supplies brought on by the build-up of Allied ships and aircraft. The [[U.S. XIV Corps]] began offensive operations on [[10 January]], [[1943]], and by [[8 February]] they had forced the remaining Japanese to be evacuated from [[Cape Esperance]]. American authorities declared Guadalcanal secure on [[9 February]], [[1943]], after more than six months of combat:  General [[Alexander Patch]] signaled his superiors: "[[Tokyo Express]] no longer has terminus on Guadalcanal."
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Japanese strength on the island waned due to attrition and shortages of supplies. Despite the vital role played by intercepted Japanese radio messages using [[ULTRA]], Allied intelligence completely failed to predict or detect the successful Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in February 1943. The Japanese inserted a deceptive element into the evacuation plan, but the mistaken assumption that the Japanese were about to mount an offensive led the Allies to believe the Japanese did not consider evacuation to be an option. As an episode in intelligence this shows that assumptions and preconceptions can inhibit the interpretation of data, resulting in this case in one of the worst Allied intelligence failures in the Pacific theater during World War II. The American XIV Corps began offensive operations on 10 January, 1943, but by 8 February they the remaining Japanese had been secretly evacuated.  
  
The lack of supply on both sides meant that combat was especially intense and characterized by extreme desperation. The Japanese used fear as a tactic by placing the severed heads of dead Americans on pikes and planting them around the Marine perimeter. Additionally, neither side took many prisoners. [[Disease]] also played a significant role in the ground campaign, as both the Japanese and American forces were weakened by [[malaria]] in the insect-infested [[jungle]]s. Both sides had difficulty maintaining their supplies to the island, the Japanese particularly, to the extent that island became also known as 'Starvation Island' to them.
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The lack of supply on both sides meant that combat was especially intense and characterized by extreme desperation. The Japanese used fear as a tactic by placing the severed heads of dead Americans on pikes and planting them around the Marine perimeter. Additionally, neither side took many prisoners. Disease also played a significant role in the ground campaign, as both the Japanese and American forces were weakened by malaria in the insect-infested jungles. Both sides had difficulty maintaining their supplies to the island, the Japanese particularly, to the extent that island became also known as 'Starvation Island' to them.
 
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[[Image:Guadalcanal2.gif|right|thumbnail|250px|Japanese [[POW]]s on Guadalcanal]]
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==Aftermath and historical significance==
 
==Aftermath and historical significance==
The [[Battle of Midway]] is widely considered to be the turning point in the Pacific theater, as it was a strategic naval victory which stopped Japan's eastern expansion toward Hawaii and the U.S. west coast. However, the Empire of Japan continued to expand in the southern Pacific, until receiving two decisive defeats at the hands of the Allies. Australian land forces had defeated Japanese [[Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces|Marines]] in New Guinea at the [[Battle of Milne Bay]] in September 1942, which was the first land defeat suffered by the Japanese in the Pacific. And, by the end of 1942, it was clear that Japan also had lost the Guadalcanal campaign, a more serious blow to Japan's strategic plans and an unanticipated defeat at the hands of the Americans.
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The [[Battle of Midway]] is widely considered to be the turning point in the Pacific theater, as it was a strategic naval victory which stopped Japan's eastern expansion toward Hawaii and the U.S. west coast. However, the Empire of Japan continued to expand in the southern Pacific, until receiving two decisive defeats at the hands of the Allies. Australian land forces had defeated Japanese marines in New Guinea at the [[Battle of Milne Bay]] in September 1942, which was the first land defeat suffered by the Japanese in the Pacific. And, by the end of 1942, it was clear that Japan also had lost the Guadalcanal campaign, a more serious blow to Japan's strategic plans and an unanticipated defeat at the hands of the Americans.
 
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The Guadalcanal campaign was costly to Japan both strategically and in material losses. Japan lost control of the Solomons Islands and the ability to interdict Allied shipping to Australia. Japan's major base at Rabaul was now directly threatened by allied air power. Most importantly, scarce Japanese land, air, and naval forces had disappeared forever into the Guadalcanal jungle and surrounding sea. The Japanese aircraft and ships destroyed and sunk in this campaign were irreplaceable, as were their highly-trained and veteran crews. It thus can be argued that this Allied victory was the first step in a long string of successes that eventually led to the surrender of [[Japan]] and the occupation of the [[Japanese Archipelago|Japanese home islands]].
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The Battle of Guadalcanal was one of the first prolonged campaigns in the Pacific. The campaign was a battle of attrition that strained the logistical capabilities of both sides. For the U.S. this need prompted the development of effective [[South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command|combat air transport]] for the first time. Japan was forced to rely on reinforcement by barges, destroyers, and submarines, with very uneven results. Early in the campaign the Americans were hindered by a lack of resources due to the "Germany First" policy of the United States. However, as the campaign continued, and the American public became more and more aware of the plight and perceived heroism of the American forces on Guadalcanal, more forces were dispatched to the area. This spelled trouble for Japan as its [[military-industrial complex]] was unable to match the output of American industry and manpower. Thus, as the campaign wore on the Japanese were losing irreplaceable units while the Americans were rapidly replacing and even augmenting their forces.
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After Guadalcanal the Japanese were clearly on the defensive in the Pacific. The constant need to reinforce Guadalcanal had weakened Japanese efforts in other theatres, contributing to a successful [[Australia]]n counteroffensive in [[New Guinea]] which culminated in the capture of the key bases of [[Battle of Buna-Gona|Buna and Gona]] in early 1943. In June, the Allies launched [[Operation Cartwheel]], which initiated a strategy of isolating the major Japanese forward base, at [[Rabaul]], and concentrated on cutting its [[sea lines of communication]]. This prepared the way for the [[island hopping]] campaigns of General [[Douglas MacArthur]] in the [[South West Pacific]] and Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]] in the [[Central Pacific]] towards Japan.
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According to U.S. historian Gerhard L. Weinberg, Guadalcanal's broader effect on the war has often been overlooked. Japan's leaders planned a major offensive in the Indian Ocean and so notified their German ally, but the ships and planes required for the undertaking were instead drained into the Guadalcanal quagmire. At the time Guadalcanal began, Britain was struggling to hold the [[Afrika Korps]] away from the [[Suez Canal]]. Resupply and reinforcements who contributed to the victory at [[Second Battle of El Alamein|El Alamein]] could be sent because the Indian Ocean was still open to Allied shipping.<ref>Weinberg, G. L.: ''Germany, Hitler and World War II'', pp. 208–209. Cambridge University Press, 1995.</ref>
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In addition, vital [[Lend-Lease]] supplies from the U.S were able to travel through the Indian Ocean and across Iran just as the Soviet Union was struggling to defeat Germany's [[Operation Blue]]. British power in [[India]] was at its weakest in 1942; the Axis' one and only chance of toppling the [[Raj]], and severing the last supply routes to Nationalist China, slipped away in the Southwest Pacific.<ref>''Ibid.'', pp. 209–210.</ref>
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==Popular culture==
+
*''[[The Thin Red Line (1998 film)|The Thin Red Line]]'' is a 1998 war film which tells the story of United States forces during the Battle of Guadalcanal in World War II. It was directed by [[Terrence Malick]], who adapted the screenplay himself from the [[James Jones (author)|James Jones]] novel of [[The Thin Red Line (1962 novel)|the same name]], which had previously been adapted in a [[The Thin Red Line (1964 film)|1964 film]].
+
*In the novel ''[[Cryptonomicon]]'', by [[United States|American]] author [[Neal Stephenson]], the character Bobby Shaftoe, a Marine, is injured during the Guadalcanal Campaign.
+
*In the [[United States|American]] [[television]] series, ''[[Charmed]]'', the '''Battle of Guadalcanal''' was mentioned in several episodes as the setting where the character [[Leo Wyatt]] died as a World War II [[medic]]. It was then featured in flashback form in episodes "[[Saving Private Leo (Charmed Episode)|Saving Private Leo]]" in season 4 as well as "[[Someone to Witch Over Me (Charmed Episode)|Someone to Witch Over Me]]" and "[[The Seven Year Witch (Charmed episode)|The Seven Year Witch]]" in season 7.
+
*The 1980s band [[Guadalcanal Diary (band)]] was named after the book documenting this campaign. 
+
 
+
== References ==
+
=== Notes ===
+
<br clear=all/>
+
<div class="references-small" style="-moz-column-count:2; column-count:2;">
+
<references/>
+
</div>
+
 
+
=== Books ===
+
* {{cite book
+
| last = Alexander
+
| first = Joseph H.
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 2000
+
| title = Edson's Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II
+
| publisher = Naval Institute Press
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 1-55750-020-7
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Bergerud
+
| first = Eric M.
+
| authorlink =
+
| year = 1997
+
| chapter =
+
| title = Touched with Fire : The Land War in the South Pacific
+
| publisher = Penguin
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 0-14-024696-7
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Dull
+
| first = Paul S.
+
| authorlink =
+
| year = 1978
+
| chapter =
+
| title = A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945
+
| publisher = Naval Institute Press
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 0-87021-097-1
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Frank
+
| first = Richard
+
| authorlink = Richard B. Frank
+
| year = 1990
+
| title = Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle
+
| publisher = Random House
+
| location = New York
+
| id = ISBN 0-394-58875-4
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Griffith
+
| first = Samuel B.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 1963
+
| chapter =
+
| title = The Battle for Guadalcanal
+
| publisher = University of Illinois Press
+
| location = Champaign, Illinois, USA
+
| id = ISBN 0-252-06891-2
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Hammel
+
| first = Eric
+
| authorlink = Eric M. Hammel
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 1999
+
| chapter =
+
| title = Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal & The Battle of the Eastern Solomons August 1942
+
| publisher = Zenith Press
+
| location = St. Paul, MN, USA
+
| id = 0760320527
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Hammel
+
| first = Eric
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 1999
+
| chapter =
+
| title = Carrier Strike: The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 1942
+
| publisher = Pacifica Press
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 0-935553-37-1
+
}}-Book review:[http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/000430.shtml]
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Loxton
+
| first =  Bruce
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors = Chris Coulthard-Clark
+
| year = 1997
+
| chapter =
+
| title = The Shame of Savo: Anatomy of a Naval Disaster
+
| publisher = Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd
+
| location = Australia
+
| id = ISBN 1-86448-286-9
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Lundstrom
+
| first = John B.
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 2005 (New edition)
+
| chapter =
+
| title = First Team And the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942
+
| publisher = Naval Institute Press
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 1-59114-472-8
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = McGee
+
| first = William L.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 2002
+
| chapter =
+
| title = The Solomons Campaigns, 1942-1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville--Pacific War Turning Point, Volume 2 (Amphibious Operations in the South Pacific in WWII)
+
| publisher = BMC Publications
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 0-9701678-7-3
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Miller
+
| first = Thomas G.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 1969
+
| chapter =
+
| title = Cactus Air Force
+
| publisher = Admiral Nimitz Foundation
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 0-934841-17-9
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Morison
+
| first = Samuel Eliot
+
| authorlink = Samuel Eliot Morison
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 1958
+
| chapter =
+
| title = The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943'', vol. 5 of ''[[History of United States Naval Operations in World War II]]
+
| publisher = [[Little, Brown and Company]]
+
| location = Boston
+
| id = ISBN 0-316-58305-7
+
}} Online views of selections of the book:[http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0785813063]
+
* {{cite book
+
| last = Murray
+
| first = Williamson
+
| coauthors = Allan R. Millett
+
| year = 2001
+
| title = A War To Be Won : Fighting the Second World War
+
| publisher = Belknap Press
+
| location = United States of America
+
| id = ISBN 0-674-00680-1
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Rottman
+
| first = Gordon L.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors = Dr. Duncan Anderson (consultant editor)
+
| year = 2005
+
| chapter =
+
| title = Japanese Army in World War II:  The South Pacific and New Guinea, 1942-43
+
| publisher = Osprey
+
| location = Oxford and New York
+
| id = ISBN 1-84176-870-7
+
}}
+
*{{cite book
+
| last = Smith
+
| first = Michael T.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| year = 2000
+
| chapter =
+
| title = Bloody Ridge: The Battle That Saved Guadalcanal
+
| publisher = Pocket
+
| location = New York
+
| id = ISBN 0-7434-6321-8
+
}}
+
* {{cite book
+
| last = Tregaskis
+
| first = Richard
+
| authorlink =
+
| year = 1943
+
| title = [[Guadalcanal Diary (book)|Guadalcanal Diary]]
+
| publisher = Random House
+
| location =
+
| id = ISBN 0-679-64023-1
+
}}
+
* {{cite book
+
| last = Twining
+
| first = Merrill B.
+
| authorlink =
+
| year = 1996
+
| title = No Bended Knee: The Battle for Guadalcanal
+
| publisher = Presidio Press
+
| location = Novato, CA, USA
+
| id = ISBN 0-89141-826-1
+
}}
+
  
=== Web ===
+
The Guadalcanal campaign was costly to Japan both strategically and in material losses. Japan lost control of the Solomon Islands and the ability to interdict Allied shipping to Australia. Japan's major base at Rabaul was now directly threatened by allied air power. Most importantly, scarce Japanese land, air, and naval forces had disappeared forever into the Guadalcanal jungle and surrounding sea. The Japanese aircraft and ships destroyed and sunk in this campaign were irreplaceable, as were their highly-trained and veteran crews. It thus can be argued that this Allied victory was the first step in a long string of successes that eventually led to the surrender of Japan.  
*{{cite web
+
| last = Anderson
+
| first = Charles R.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 1993
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-8/72-8.htm
+
| title = ''GUADALCANAL''
+
| format = brochure
+
| work =
+
| pages =
+
| publisher = U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-07-09
+
| accessyear =
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Cagney
+
| first = James
+
| year = 2005
+
| url = http://www.historyanimated.com/GuadalcanalPage.html
+
| title = ''The Battle for Guadalcanal''
+
| format = javascript
+
| work = HistoryAnimated.com
+
| accessdate = 2006-05-17
+
}}- Interactive animation of the battle
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Chen
+
| first = C. Peter
+
| year = 2004 - 2006
+
| url = http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=9
+
| title = Guadalcanal Campaign
+
| work = World War II Database
+
| accessdate = 2006-05-17
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Craven
+
| first = Wesley Frank
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors = James Lea Cate
+
| date =
+
| year =
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/index.html
+
| title = Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944
+
| format =
+
| work = The Army Air Forces in World War II
+
| pages =
+
| publisher = U.S. Office of Air Force History
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = Oct 20
+
| accessyear = 2006
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = de Vos
+
| first = M.E.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 2003 - 2006
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.mapsouthpacific.com/solomons/guadalcanal-map.html
+
| title = Map of Guadalcanal
+
| format =
+
| work =
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate =
+
| accessyear = 2006-05-17
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Donahue, Jr.,
+
| first = Jim
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 2005
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.guadalcanaljournal.com/index.htm
+
| title = Guadalcanal Journal
+
| format =
+
| work =
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-11-08
+
| accessyear =
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Flahavin
+
| first = Peter
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 2004
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.guadalcanal.homestead.com/index.html
+
| title = ''Guadalcanal Battle Sites, 1942-2004''
+
| format =
+
| work =
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-08-02
+
| accessyear =
+
}}- Web site with many pictures of Guadalcanal battle sites from 1942 and how they look now.
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Gillespie
+
| first = Oliver A.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 1952
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Paci-_N84545.html
+
| title = ''The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939–1945''; The Battle for the Solomons (Chapter 7)
+
| format =
+
| work =
+
| pages =
+
| publisher = New Zealand Electronic Text Center
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = July 11
+
| accessyear = 2006
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Hoffman
+
| first = Jon T.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 1995
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003130-00/index.htm
+
| title = ''FROM MAKIN TO BOUGAINVILLE: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War''
+
| format = brochure
+
| work = WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
+
| pages =
+
| publisher = Marine Corps Historical Center
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-08-29
+
| accessyear =
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Hoffman
+
| first = Jon T.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year =
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003147-00/index.htm
+
| title = SILK CHUTES AND HARD FIGHTING: US. Marine Corps Parachute Units in World War II
+
| format =
+
| work = Commemorative series
+
| pages = 1
+
| publisher = Marine Corps History and Museums Division
+
| language = English
+
| accessdate = December 26
+
| accessyear = 2006
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Hough
+
| first = Frank O.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors = Ludwig, Verle E., and Shaw, Henry I., Jr.
+
| date =
+
| year =
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/I/index.html
+
| title = ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal''
+
| format =
+
| work = History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-05-16
+
| accessyear =
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Mersky
+
| first = Peter B.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 1993
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-C-Aces/index.html
+
| title = Time of the Aces: Marine Pilots in the Solomons, 1942-1944
+
| format =
+
| work = Marines in World War II Commemorative Series
+
| pages =
+
| publisher = History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
+
| language = English
+
| accessdate = October 20
+
| accessyear = 2006
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Miller
+
| first = John Jr.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 1949
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/GuadC/GC-fm.htm
+
| title = ''GUADALCANAL: THE FIRST OFFENSIVE''
+
| format =
+
| work = UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-07-04
+
| accessyear =
+
}}
+
* {{cite web
+
| last = raku@chello.at (full author name not available)
+
| first =
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 2006
+
| month =
+
| url = http://members.chello.at/hnb/paz-gua1-e.htm
+
| title = Report of a Japanese soldier about the battle of Guadalcanal
+
| format =
+
| work =
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =  English and German
+
| accessdate = July 11
+
| accessyear = 2006
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Shaw
+
| first = Henry I.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 1992
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-C-Guadalcanal/index.html
+
| title = ''First Offensive:  The Marine Campaign For Guadalcanal''
+
| format =
+
| work = Marines in World War II Commemorative Series
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-07-25
+
| accessyear =
+
}}
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = U.S. Army Center of Military History
+
| first =
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year =
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P1/macarthurv2.htm#contents
+
| title = Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II - Part I
+
| format =
+
| work = Reports of General MacArthur
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-12-08
+
| accessyear =
+
}}- Translation of the official record by the Japanese Demobilization Bureaux detailing the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy's participation in the Southwest Pacific area of the [[Pacific War]].
+
*{{cite web
+
| last = Zimmerman
+
| first = John L.
+
| authorlink =
+
| coauthors =
+
| date =
+
| year = 1949
+
| month =
+
| url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Guadalcanal.html
+
| title = ''The Guadalcanal Campaign''
+
| format =
+
| work = Marines in World War II Historical Monograph
+
| pages =
+
| publisher =
+
| language =
+
| accessdate = 2006-07-04
+
| accessyear =
+
}}
+
  
===Audio/visual media===
+
The Battle of Guadalcanal was one of the first prolonged campaigns in the Pacific. The campaign was a battle of attrition that strained the logistical capabilities of both sides. For the U.S. this need prompted the development of effective [[South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command|combat air transport]] for the first time. Japan was forced to rely on reinforcement by barges, destroyers, and submarines, with very uneven results. Early in the campaign the Americans were hindered by a lack of resources due to the "Germany First" policy of the United States. However, as the campaign continued, and the American public became more and more aware of the plight and perceived heroism of the American forces on Guadalcanal, more forces were dispatched to the area. This spelled trouble for Japan as its military-industrial complex was unable to match the output of American industry and manpower. Thus, as the campaign wore on the Japanese were losing irreplaceable units while the Americans were rapidly replacing and even augmenting their forces.
*{{cite visual
+
| crew = Adams, M. Clay (Director)
+
| date = 1952
+
| url= http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0740031/
+
| title = Victory at Sea- Episode 6:  Guadalcanal
+
| medium = Video documentary
+
| location =
+
| distributor = National Broadcasting Company (NBC) Film
+
}} — One episode from a 26-episode series about naval combat during World War II.
+
*{{cite visual
+
| crew = Malick, Terrence (Director)
+
| date = 1998
+
| url= http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120863/
+
| title = The Thin Red Line
+
| medium = Feature-length film
+
| location =
+
| distributor = 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment
+
}} — Film adaptation of James Jones' fictional, dramatic novel of the same title set on Guadalcanal.
+
*{{cite visual
+
| crew = Ray, Nicholas (Director)
+
| date = 1951
+
| url= http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0043547/
+
| title = Flying Leathernecks
+
| medium = Feature-length film
+
| location =
+
| distributor = RKO Radio Pictures
+
}}- Fictional drama about U.S. Marine pilots involved in the Battle of Guadalcanal.
+
*{{cite visual
+
| crew = Seiler, Lewis (Director)
+
| date = 1943
+
| url= http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035957/
+
| title = Guadalcanal Diary
+
| medium = Feature-length film
+
| location =
+
| distributor = 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
+
}}- Film adaptation of Tregaskis' book referenced in "Books" section above.
+
  
==See also==
+
After Guadalcanal the Japanese were clearly on the defensive in the Pacific. The constant need to reinforce Guadalcanal had weakened Japanese efforts in other theatres, contributing to a successful Australian counteroffensive in [[New Guinea]] which culminated in the capture of the key bases of Buna and Gona in early 1943. In June, the Allies launched [[Operation Cartwheel]], which initiated a strategy of isolating the major Japanese forward base, at [[Rabaul]], and concentrated on cutting its sea lines of communication. This prepared the way for the island hopping campaigns of General [[Douglas MacArthur]] in the [[South West Pacific]] and Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]] in the [[Central Pacific]] towards Japan.
* [[Guadalcanal Order of Battle]]
+
* [[Tokyo Express]]
+
* [[Ironbottom Sound]]
+
* [[Cactus Air Force]]
+
* [[New Georgia Sound]]
+
  
[[Category:Pacific Ocean theater of World War II|Guadalcanal]]
+
According to Weinberg (1995), Guadalcanal's broader effect on the war has often been overlooked. Japan's leaders planned a major offensive in the Indian Ocean and so notified their German ally, but the ships and planes required for the undertaking were instead drained into the Guadalcanal quagmire. At the time Guadalcanal began, Britain was struggling to hold the Germans away from the [[Suez Canal]]. Resupply and reinforcements who contributed to the victory at El Alamein could be sent because the Indian Ocean was still open to Allied shipping.<ref>Gerhard Weinberg, ''Germany, Hitler and World War II'', (1995) pp. 208–209.</ref>
[[Category:History of the Solomon Islands]]
+
[[Category:Battles involving Japan|Guadalcanal]]
+
[[Category:Battles involving the United States|Guadalcanal]]
+
  
[[Category:CZ Live]]
+
In addition, vital [[Lend Lease]] supplies from the U.S were able to travel through the Indian Ocean and across Iran just as the Soviet Union was struggling to stop the German invasion.
 +
==References==
 +
{{reflist |2}}

Latest revision as of 04:48, 27 October 2013

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The Guadalcanal campaign, also known as the Battle of Guadalcanal and as OPERATION WATCHTOWER, was an American victory over Japan in 1942.

It was the first major Allied offensive of World War Two in the Pacific, and was fought between August 7, 1942 and February 9, 1943. This campaign pitted American air, naval and ground forces (later augmented by Australians and New Zealanders) against determined Japanese resistance. There were a succession of ground and naval battles.

Ww2-guadalcanal-1.jpg

Control of the Solomon Islands, of which Guadalcanal was a part, was considered militarily vital by both sides. Both sides won some battles but both sides were overextended and logistical failures in a hostile physical environment hampered the abilities of combat forces to operate. As happened time and again in the Pacific, the Japanese logistical support system failed. Only 20% of the supplies dispatched from Rabaul to Guadalcanal ever reached there. As a result the 30,000 Japanese troops lacked heavy equipment, adequate ammunition and even enough food, and were subjected to continuous harassment from the air. 10,000 were killed, 10,000 starved to death, and the remaining 10,000 were evacuated in February 1943, in a greatly weakened condition. In the end Guadalcanal was a major American victory as the Japanese inability to keep pace with the rate of American reinforcements proved decisive. Guadalcanal is an iconic episode in the annals of American military history, underscoring heroic bravery of underequipped individuals in fierce combat with a determined foe.

Summary

On August 7, 1942, United States Marines made amphibious landings on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida in the southern Solomons with the objective of denying their use by Japanese forces as bases to attack supply routes between the U.S. and Australia. The Allies further intended to use Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases to support a campaign to eventually isolate the major Japanese base of Rabaul on the island of New Britain. The initial Allied landings overwhelmed the outnumbered and surprised Japanese defenders, who had occupied the islands in May, 1942, and captured an airfield that was under construction by the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Renamed Henderson Field after Major Lofton Henderson, a US Marine pilot killed at the Battle of Midway in June, the field was pressed into American service. U.S. Army forces later supplemented, and eventually relieved, the Marines.

The Japanese made several attempts to retake Tulagi and Henderson Field, resulting in three major land battles as well as several smaller engagements, five large naval battles, and continuous, almost daily, aerial battles, culminating in the decisive Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in early November 1942, in which the last Japanese attempt to retake Guadalcanal and Henderson Field was defeated.

The Guadalcanal campaign, lengthy by Pacific War standards, marked the first significant strategic combined arms victory by Allied forces over Japanese forces in the Pacific theater. For this reason, the Guadalcanal Campaign is often referred to as a "turning point" in the war. This campaign marked the beginning of the transition by Allied forces from defensive operations to the strategic offensive while the forces of Japan were thereafter forced to focus on strategic defense.

There were major command changes during the campaign, when Vice Admiral William Halsey replaced Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley as head of the South Pacific Area. Halsey brought greater Navy support of the land operations.

Strategy

Japanese strategy

On December 7, 1941, expanding its earlier war in China, the Empire of Japan attacked the the U.S. Pacific fleet in the Battle of Pearl Harbor, as part of a broader series of attacks on Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and elsewhere against American, British, Dutch and Australian bases. The attack crippled much of the U.S. battleship fleet and led to a state of war between the two nations. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the American fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. While their major territorial goals were in Southeast Asia and Oceania, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, who opposed the overall war, was convinced the U.S. forces had to be neutralized to avoid intervention.

Two attempts by the Japanese to extend their defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific were thwarted in the battles of Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway (June 1942). These two strategic victories for the Allies provided an opportunity to take the initiative and launch an offensive against the Japanese somewhere in the Pacific. Admiral Ernest J. King, the US Chief of Naval Operations, chose the Solomon Islands, specifically the southern Solomon islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida.

American strategy

In the spring and summer of 1942, Admiral King, fought hard in meetings of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff for a limited offensive in the Pacific. He was opposed by General George C. Marshall, the Army's Chief of Staff, who believed strongly in a Germany-first policy and who did not want to divert any army or air force resources to support a Pacific offensive. Eventually, King threatened to go ahead on his own, using as his authority several ambiguous memoranda that had been approved earlier by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Thus, on 7 August 1942, the US invasion of Guadalcanal took place, and this soon became a battle of attrition in which neither side would quit. Marshall never gave his full support to the operation, but it continued and the US forces were finally successful.[1]

The specific plan to attack the southern Solomons was conceived by King's planners in Washington, who proposed the offensive to deny the use of the southern Solomon islands by the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to use them as starting points for a campaign with the goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign, with the eventual goal of opening the way for the U.S. to retake the Philippines.[2] U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas,[3] created the South Pacific theater, with U.S. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley place in command on June 19, 1942, to direct the Allied offensive in the Solomons.

Allied strategists knew the Japanese Navy had occupied Tulagi in May 1942 and had constructed a seaplane base near there. Concern grew when in early July 1942 the Japanese Navy began constructing a large airfield near Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal. By August 1942, the Japanese had about 900 troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel (2,200 of whom were Korean construction workers) on Guadalcanal. These bases, when complete, would protect Japan's major base at Rabaul, threaten Allied supply and communication lines, and establish a staging area for possible future offensives against Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa. The Japanese planned to deploy 45 fighters and 60 bombers to Guadalcanal once the airfield was complete.[4]

In preparation for the offensive, in May, 1942, U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift moved his U.S. 1st Marine Division to New Zealand. Other Allied land, naval, and air force units were sent to establish bases in Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. Espiritu Santo in New Caledonia became the headquarters and main base for the impending offensive, codenamed Operation Watchtower, with the commencement date set for August 7, 1942. Invaluable information was obtained from coastwatchers who, organised by the Australian naval authorities, had secreted themselves and their wireless sets in the jungle before the Japanese arrived. Essentially, the Coastwatchers carried out a special reconnaissance mission.

More intelligence was added by observation from the air, but only by personal observation after landing was any really reliable and accurate detail possible. The American ULTRA cryptanalysts were able to read some of the Japanese radio traffic. The invasion force worked from hastily prepared mosaics photographed from the air and assembled with speed.

At first, the Allied offensive was planned just for Tulagi and the Santa Cruz Islands, omitting Guadalcanal. However, after Allied reconnaissance discovered the Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, capture of that airfield was added to the plan and the Santa Cruz operation was dropped.[5]

The Allied Watchtower expeditionary force of 75 warships and transports, which included vessels from both the U.S. and Australia, assembled near Fiji on July 26, 1942, and engaged in one rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on July 31. The rehearsal went poorly. The on-scene commander of the Allied expeditionary force was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, whose flagship was the U.S aircraft carrier Saratoga. The Allied commander of the amphibious transport force was U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner. Vandegrift was the commander of the 16,000 Allied (primarily U.S. Marine) ground forces involved in the landings.[6]

Landings

Due to bad weather, the Allied expeditionary force arrived in the vicinity of Guadalcanal undetected by the Japanese on the morning of August 7. The landing force ships split into two groups, with one group assaulting Guadalcanal, and the other Tulagi, Florida, and nearby islands. Allied warships bombarded the invasion beaches while U.S. carrier aircraft bombed Japanese positions on the target islands and destroyed 15 Japanese seaplanes at their base near Tulagi.[7]

Tulagi, and the two nearby, small islands of Gavutu and Tamambogo were assaulted by 3,000 U.S. Marines on August 7. The 886 Imperial Navy personnel on the three islands fiercely resisted the Marine attacks. With some difficulty, the U.S. Marines finally secured all three islands, Tulagi on August 8, and Gavutu and Tanambogo by August 9. All the Japanese defenders were killed as the Marines suffered 122 killed.

In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance. At 09:10 on August 7, General Vandegrift and 11,000 Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered no resistance except for "tangled" rain forest, and halted for the night about 1,000 yards from the Lunga Point airfield. The next day, again against little resistance, the Marines advanced all the way to the Lunga River, and secured the airfield by 16:00 on August 8. The Japanese naval construction units had abandoned the airfield area, leaving behind food, supplies, and intact construction equipment and vehicles.

During the landing operations on August 7 and 8, Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport George F. Elliot (which eventually sank two days later) and heavily damaging the U.S. destroyer Jarvis.[8] In the air attacks over the two days, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, both in combat and to accident, including 14 carrier fighter aircraft.[9]

After these clashes, Fletcher was concerned about the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength,[10] anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ship's fuel levels. Fletcher determined that he would withdraw from the Solomon Islands area with his carrier task forces the evening of August 8 to avoid further losses.[11] Due to the loss of carrier air cover, Turner decided that he would have no choice but also to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal, even though less than half of the supplies and heavy equipment on the transport ships needed by the troops ashore had been unloaded.[12] Turner intended to unload as many supplies as possible on Guadalcanal and Tulagi throughout the night of August 8 and then depart with his ships early on August 9.[13]

That night, as the transports unloaded, two groups of Allied warships screening the transports were surprised and defeated by a single Japanese force of seven cruisers and one destroyer, commanded by Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. Three U.S. and one Australian cruisers were sunk and one other U.S. cruiser and two destroyers were damaged in this lopsided Japanese victory. Fortunately for the Allies, Mikawa, who was unaware that Fletcher had withdrawn with the U.S. carriers, immediately returned to his home ports of Rabaul and Kavieng without attempting to attack the now unprotected Allied transports. Mikawa was concerned about U.S. carrier air attacks during daylight hours if he tarried in the southern Solomons area. After this defeat, Turner withdrew all remaining Allied naval forces by the evening of August 9, leaving the Marines ashore without much of the heavy equipment, provisions, and troops still aboard the transports.

Initial Operations

The Marines left ashore on Guadalcanal initially concentrated on forming a defense perimeter around the airfield, moving the landed supplies within the perimeter, and finishing the airfield. Vandegrift placed his 11,000 troops on Guadalcanal in a loose perimeter around the Lunga Point area. In four days of intense effort, the supplies were moved from the landing beach into dispersed dumps within the perimeter. Work began on the airfield immediately, mainly using captured Japanese equipment. On August 12, the airfield was named Henderson Field after Major Lofton Henderson, a Marine aviator who had been killed at the Battle of Midway. By August 18, the airfield was ready for operation.[14][15] Five days worth of food had been landed from the transports which, along with captured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days worth of food. Allied troops encountered a "severe strain" of dysentery soon after the landings, with one in five Marines afflicted by mid-August. Although some of the Korean construction workers surrendered to the Marines, most of the remaining Japanese and Korean personnel gathered just west of the Lunga perimeter on the west bank of the Matanikau river and subsisted mainly on coconuts. A Japanese naval outpost was also located at Taivu Point, about 22 miles east of the Lunga perimeter. On August 8, a Japanese destroyer delivered 113 naval reinforcement troops to the Matanikau position.[16]

On the evening of August 12, a 25-man U.S. Marine patrol, led by Lt. Col Frank Goettge and primarily consisting of intelligence personnel, landed by boat west of the Lunga perimeter, between Point Cruz and the Matanikau River, on a reconnaissance mission with a secondary objective of contacting a group of Japanese troops that the U.S. forces believed might be willing to surrender. Soon after the patrol landed, a nearby platoon of Japanese troops attacked and almost completely wiped-out the group of Marines. Goettge, whose body was never found, received a posthumous Medal of Honor. [17]

On August 19, Vandegrift sent three companies from the U.S. 5th Marine Regiment to attack the Japanese troop concentration west of the Matanikau. One Marine company attacked across the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau river while another company crossed the river 1,000 yards inland and attacked the Japanese forces located in Matanikau village. The third Marine company landed by boat further west and attacked Kokumbuna village. After briefly occupying the two villages, the three Marine companies returned to the Lunga perimeter, having killed about 65 Japanese soldiers while losing four themselves. This action, sometimes referred to as the "First Battle of the Matanikau," was the first of several major actions that would take place in the Matanikau river area during the campaign.[18]

On August 20, the U.S. escort carrier Long Island delivered two squadrons of Marine aircraft to Henderson Field. One squadron consisted of 19 Grumman F4F fighters and the other was a squadron of 12 SBD Dauntless dive bombers. The aircraft at Henderson became known as the "Cactus Air Force" after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal. The Marine fighters went into action the next day, attacking one of the Japanese bomber air raids that occurred almost daily. On August 22, five U.S. Army P-400 fighters (a variant of the P-39 Airacobra) and their pilots arrived at Henderson Field.

Battle of the Tenaru

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. The 17th Army, currently heavily involved with the Japanese campaign in New Guinea, had only a few units available to send to the southern Solomons area. Of these units, the 35th Infantry Brigade under Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi was at Palau, the 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment was in the Philippines and the 28th (Ichiki) Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki, was onboard transport ships near Guam. The different units began to move towards Guadalcanal immediately, but Ichiki's regiment, being the closest, would ultimately arrive first. The "First Element" of Ichiki's unit, consisting of about 917 soldiers, landed from destroyers at Taivu Point, east of the Lunga perimeter, on August 19.[19]

Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, Ichiki's unit conducted a nighttime frontal assault on Marine positions at Alligator Creek (often called the "Ilu River" on U.S. Marine maps) on the east side of the Lunga perimeter in the early morning hours of August 21. Ichiki's assault was defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese attackers in what became known as the Battle of the Tenaru. After daybreak, the Marine units counterattacked Ichiki's surviving troops, killing many more of them, including Ichiki. In total, all but 128 of the original 900 of the Ichiki Regiment's First Element were killed in the battle. The survivors of Ichiki's force returned to Taivu Point, notified 17th Army headquarters of their defeat in the battle, and awaited further reinforcements and orders from Rabaul.[20]

Battle of the Eastern Solomons

As the Tenaru battle was ending, more Japanese reinforcements were already on their way from Truk. Departing Truk on August 16 were three slow transports carrying the remaining 1,400 soldiers from Ichiki's (28th) Infantry Regiment plus 500 naval troops from the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force.[21] Guarding the transports were 13 warships commanded by Japanese Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka who planned to land the troops on Guadalcanal on August 24.[22] To cover the landings of these troops and provide support for the operation to retake Henderson Field from Allied forces, the Japanese Combined Fleet sortied from Truk on August 21 and headed towards the southern Solomon Islands with a force of three carriers and 30 other warships.[23]

Simultaneously, the U.S. carrier task forces under Fletcher approached Guadalcanal to counter the Japanese offensive efforts. On August 24 and August 25, the two carrier forces fought the Battle of the Eastern Solomons' that resulted in the fleets of both adversaries retreating from the area after taking some damage, with the Japanese losing one aircraft carrier sunk. Tanaka's convoy, after suffering heavy damage during the battle, including the sinking of one of the transports, was forced, due to the continued threat by U.S. aircraft based at Henderson Field, to divert to the Shortland Islands in the northern Solomons in order for the surviving troops to be transferred to destroyers for later delivery to Guadalcanal.[24]

Air battles over Henderson Field and strengthening of the Lunga defenses

Small numbers of U.S. aircraft and their crews, both fighters and bombers, continued to arrive at Guadalcanal. By the end of August, 64 aircraft of all types were stationed at Henderson Field.[25] On September 3, the commander of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, U.S. Marine Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, arrived with his staff and took command of all air operations at Henderson Field.[26] Air battles between the Allied aircraft at Henderson and Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul continued, with almost daily engagements between the two adversaries in the skies over Guadalcanal. Between August 26 and September 5, the U.S. lost about 15 aircraft while the Japanese lost approximately 19 aircraft. More than half of the U.S. aircrews, however, were rescued while most of the Japanese aircrews weren't recovered. The eight-hour round trip flight from Rabaul to Guadalcanal (about 1,120 miles total) seriously hampered Japanese efforts to establish air superiority over Henderson Field. Australian coastwatchers on Bougainville and New Georgia islands were usually able to provide Allied intelligence on Guadalcanal with advance notice of inbound Japanese air strikes, allowing the U.S. fighters time to take off and position themselves to ambush the Japanese bombers and fighters as they approached Henderson Field. Thus, the Japanese were slowly losing an air war of attrition over Guadalcanal.[27]

During this time, Vandegrift continued to direct efforts to strengthen and improve the defenses of the Lunga perimeter. Between August 21 and September 3, he relocated three Marine battalions from Tulagi and Gavutu to Guadalcanal. These units added about 1,500 troops to Vandegrift's original 11,000 men defending Henderson Field. The 1st Parachute battalion, which had suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo in August, was placed under Edson's command.

Small Allied naval convoys arrived at Guadalcanal between August 23 and September 8 to provide the Marines at Lunga with more food, ammunition, aircraft fuel, and aircraft technicians. The September 1 convoy also brought 392 U.S. Navy Seabees (construction engineers) to maintain and improve Henderson Field.[28]

Tokyo Express

By August 23, Kawaguchi's 35th Infantry Brigade reached Truk and was loaded onto slow transport ships for the rest of the trip to Guadalcanal. The damage done to Tanka's convoy during Battle of the Eastern Solomons caused the Japanese to reconsider trying to deliver more troops to Guadalcanal by slow transport. Instead, the ships carrying Kawaguchi's soldiers were sent to Rabaul. From there, the Japanese planned to deliver Kawaguchi's men to Guadalcanal by destroyers staging through a Japanese naval base in the Shortland Islands. The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make the round trip down "The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to Allied air attack. However, delivering the troops in this manner prevented most of the soldier's heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high speed destroyer runs to Guadalcanal, which occurred throughout the campaign, were later called the "Tokyo Express" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.[29] Due to either the inability or unwillingness of Allied naval commanders to challenge Japanese naval forces at night, the Japanese controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands during the nighttime. However, any Japanese ship remaining within range of the aircraft at Henderson Field during the daylight hours (about 200 miles) was in great danger from damaging air attack. This "curious tactical situation" would exist for the next several months during the campaign.[30]

Between August 29 and September 4 various Japanese light cruisers, destroyers, and patrol boats landed almost 5,000 troops at Taivu Point, including most of the 35th Infantry Brigade, much of the Aoba (4th) Regiment, and the rest of Ichiki's regiment. General Kawaguchi, who landed at Taivu Point on the August 31 Express run, was placed in command of all the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal. A barge convoy took another 1,000 soldiers of Kawaguchi's brigade, under the command of Colonel Akinosuka Oka, to Kamimbo, west of the Lunga perimeter.[31]

Battle of Edson's Ridge

On September 7, Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to "route and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield." Kawaguchi's attack plan called for his forces, split into three divisions, to approach the Lunga perimeter inland, culminating with a surprise night attack. Oka's forces would attack the perimeter from the west while Ichiki's Second Echelon, now renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east. The main attack would be by Kawaguchi's "Center Body," numbering 3,000 men in three battalions, from the south of the Lunga perimeter.By September 7, most of Kawaguchi's troops had departed Taivu to begin marching towards Lunga Point along the coastline. About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard the brigade's supply base at Taviu.[32]

Meanwhile, native island scouts brought reports to the U.S. Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu, near the village of Tasimboko. Edson planned a raid to "wipe-out" the Japanese troop concentration at Taivu.[33] On September 8, after being dropped-off near Taivu by boat, Edson's men captured Tasimboko as the Japanese defenders retreated into the jungle. In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered "vast stockpiles" of food, ammunition, medical supplies, and a powerful shortwave radio. After destroying everything in sight, except for some documents and equipment carried back with them, the Marines returned to the Lunga perimeter. The mounds of supplies, along with intelligence gathered from the captured documents, informed the Marines that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island and apparently planning an attack on the U.S. defenses.[34]

Edson believed that the Japanese attack would come at a narrow, grassy, 1,000-yard-long, coral ridge that paralleled the Lunga River and was located just south of Henderson Field. The unnamed ridge offered a natural avenue of approach to the airfield, commanded the surrounding area and, at that time, was almost undefended. On September 11, the 840 men of Edson's battalion deployed onto and around the ridge and prepared to defend it.[35]

On the night of September 12, Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion attacked the Raider's between the Lunga River and ridge, forcing one Marine company to fall back to the ridge. The next night, Kawaguchi faced Edson's 830 Raiders with 3,000 troops of his brigade, plus an assortment of light artillery. The Japanese attack began just after nightfall, with Kawaguchi's 1st battalion assaulting Edson's right flank, just to the west of the ridge. After breaking through the Marine lines, the battalion's assault was eventually stopped by Marine units guarding the northern part of the ridge.[36]

Two companies from Kawaguchi's 2nd battalion charged up the southern edge of the ridge and pushed Edson's troops back to Hill 123 on the center part of the ridge. Throughout the night, Marines at this position, supported by artillery, defeated wave after wave of frontal Japanese attacks. Japanese units that infiltrated past the ridge to the edge of the airfield were also repulsed. Attacks by the Kuma battalion and Oka's unit at other locations on the Lunga perimeter were also defeated by the Marine defenses. On September 14, Kawaguchi led the survivors of his shattered brigade on a five day march west to the Matanikau Valley to join with Oka's unit.[37] In total, Kawaguchi's forces lost about 850 killed and the Marines 104.[38]

On September 15, General Hyakutake at Rabaul learned of Kawaguchi's defeat and forwarded the news to the Imperial General Headquarters in Japan. In an emergency session, the top Japanese army and navy command staffs concluded that, "Guadalcanal might develop into the decisive battle of the war." The results of the battle now began to have a telling strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of the Pacific. Hyakutake realized that in order to send sufficient troops and materiel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal, he could no longer at the same time support the major Japanese offensive currently ongoing on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea. Hyakutake, with the concurrence of the General Headquarters, ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within 30-miles of their objective of Port Moresby, to withdraw until the "Guadalcanal matter" was resolved. Hyakutake prepared to send more troops to Guadalcanal for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field.[39]

Reinforcement

As the Japanese regrouped west of the Matanikau, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses. On September 14, Vandegrift moved another battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (3/2), from Tulagi to Guadalcanal. On September 18, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade (the 7th Marine Regiment plus a battalion from the 11th Marine Regiment and some additional support units), 137 vehicles, tents, aviation fuel, ammunition, rations, and engineering equipment to Guadalcanal. These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on September 19, to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter. While covering this convoy, the U.S. aircraft carrier Wasp was sunk by a Japanese submarine southeast of Guadalcanal, temporarily leaving only one Allied aircraft carrier (Hornet) in operation in the South Pacific area. Vandegrift also made some changes in the senior leadership of his combat units, transferring several officers off the island that didn't meet his performance standards, and promoting junior officers who had "proved themselves" to take their places. One of these was the recently promoted Colonel Merritt Edson, who was placed in command of the 5th Marine Regiment.[40]

A lull occurred in the air war over Guadalcanal, with no Japanese air raids occurring between September 14 and September 27 due to bad weather, during which both sides reinforced their prospective air units. The Japanese delivered 85 fighters and bombers to their air units at Rabaul while the U.S. brought 23 fighters and attack aircraft to Henderson Field. On September 20, the Japanese counted 117 total aircraft at Rabaul while the Allies tallied 71 aircraft at Henderson Field.[41] The air war resumed with a Japanese air raid on Guadalcanal on September 27, which was contested by U.S. Navy and Marine fighters from Henderson Field.[42]

The Japanese immediately began to prepare for their next attempt to recapture Henderson Field. The 3rd Battalion, 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment had landed at Kamimbo Bay on the western end of Guadalcanal on September 11, too late to join Kawaguchi's attack on the U.S. Marines. By now, though, the battalion had joined Oka's forces near the Matanikau. Tokyo Express runs in mid-September by eight destroyers brought food and ammunition, as well as 280 more soldiers. The Japanese 38th Division in the Dutch East Indies was notified to move to Rabaul in preparation for deployment to Guadalcanal.[43]

Action along the Matanikau

On 23 September, the Marines began a drive to establish defensive positions along the Mantanikau River. A land attack was combined with a small amphibious landing on the flank, but the operation was repulsed by the Japanese.

Battle of Cape Esperance

Battleship bombardment of Henderson Field

A lull in the fighting occurred as the Japanese prepared for a new attack. The Japanese Navy, led by battleships Kongō and Haruna, bombarded the airfield with special fragmentation shells on 13 and 14 October in an attempt to suppress the aircraft operating from the base. The airfield suffered heavy damage, but was returned to service.

Battle for Henderson Field

Finally on 23 October, with the addition of more troops, the Japanese made another attempt to capture Henderson Field] from the south. The newly arrived U.S. Army's 164th Infantry Regiment and the Marines' 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment repulsed the attack. The Japanese 29th Infantry Regiment lost 553 killed or missing and 479 wounded among its 2,554 men. Total American estimates for Japanese casualties on that ridge were 2,200.

Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

Aola Bay, Koli Point, and Carlson's "Long Patrol"

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

In November the Japanese sent reinforcements in the form of the 38th Infantry Division. During the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, however, the transports carrying this reinforcement were badly damaged and the division was reduced to the strength of a regiment. Through November, American forces continued its offensive in an attempt to push the perimeter out beyond artillery range of the airfield. The Mantanikau River area was finally cleared after overcoming strong Japanese resistance.

Final Allied offensives and Operation Ke

By December the weary 1st Marine Division was withdrawn for recuperation, and over the course of the next month the Marines' XIV Corps took over operations on the island. This corps consisted of the 2nd Marine Division, the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division, and its Americal Division.

Japanese strength on the island waned due to attrition and shortages of supplies. Despite the vital role played by intercepted Japanese radio messages using ULTRA, Allied intelligence completely failed to predict or detect the successful Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in February 1943. The Japanese inserted a deceptive element into the evacuation plan, but the mistaken assumption that the Japanese were about to mount an offensive led the Allies to believe the Japanese did not consider evacuation to be an option. As an episode in intelligence this shows that assumptions and preconceptions can inhibit the interpretation of data, resulting in this case in one of the worst Allied intelligence failures in the Pacific theater during World War II. The American XIV Corps began offensive operations on 10 January, 1943, but by 8 February they the remaining Japanese had been secretly evacuated.

The lack of supply on both sides meant that combat was especially intense and characterized by extreme desperation. The Japanese used fear as a tactic by placing the severed heads of dead Americans on pikes and planting them around the Marine perimeter. Additionally, neither side took many prisoners. Disease also played a significant role in the ground campaign, as both the Japanese and American forces were weakened by malaria in the insect-infested jungles. Both sides had difficulty maintaining their supplies to the island, the Japanese particularly, to the extent that island became also known as 'Starvation Island' to them.

Aftermath and historical significance

The Battle of Midway is widely considered to be the turning point in the Pacific theater, as it was a strategic naval victory which stopped Japan's eastern expansion toward Hawaii and the U.S. west coast. However, the Empire of Japan continued to expand in the southern Pacific, until receiving two decisive defeats at the hands of the Allies. Australian land forces had defeated Japanese marines in New Guinea at the Battle of Milne Bay in September 1942, which was the first land defeat suffered by the Japanese in the Pacific. And, by the end of 1942, it was clear that Japan also had lost the Guadalcanal campaign, a more serious blow to Japan's strategic plans and an unanticipated defeat at the hands of the Americans.

The Guadalcanal campaign was costly to Japan both strategically and in material losses. Japan lost control of the Solomon Islands and the ability to interdict Allied shipping to Australia. Japan's major base at Rabaul was now directly threatened by allied air power. Most importantly, scarce Japanese land, air, and naval forces had disappeared forever into the Guadalcanal jungle and surrounding sea. The Japanese aircraft and ships destroyed and sunk in this campaign were irreplaceable, as were their highly-trained and veteran crews. It thus can be argued that this Allied victory was the first step in a long string of successes that eventually led to the surrender of Japan.

The Battle of Guadalcanal was one of the first prolonged campaigns in the Pacific. The campaign was a battle of attrition that strained the logistical capabilities of both sides. For the U.S. this need prompted the development of effective combat air transport for the first time. Japan was forced to rely on reinforcement by barges, destroyers, and submarines, with very uneven results. Early in the campaign the Americans were hindered by a lack of resources due to the "Germany First" policy of the United States. However, as the campaign continued, and the American public became more and more aware of the plight and perceived heroism of the American forces on Guadalcanal, more forces were dispatched to the area. This spelled trouble for Japan as its military-industrial complex was unable to match the output of American industry and manpower. Thus, as the campaign wore on the Japanese were losing irreplaceable units while the Americans were rapidly replacing and even augmenting their forces.

After Guadalcanal the Japanese were clearly on the defensive in the Pacific. The constant need to reinforce Guadalcanal had weakened Japanese efforts in other theatres, contributing to a successful Australian counteroffensive in New Guinea which culminated in the capture of the key bases of Buna and Gona in early 1943. In June, the Allies launched Operation Cartwheel, which initiated a strategy of isolating the major Japanese forward base, at Rabaul, and concentrated on cutting its sea lines of communication. This prepared the way for the island hopping campaigns of General Douglas MacArthur in the South West Pacific and Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Central Pacific towards Japan.

According to Weinberg (1995), Guadalcanal's broader effect on the war has often been overlooked. Japan's leaders planned a major offensive in the Indian Ocean and so notified their German ally, but the ships and planes required for the undertaking were instead drained into the Guadalcanal quagmire. At the time Guadalcanal began, Britain was struggling to hold the Germans away from the Suez Canal. Resupply and reinforcements who contributed to the victory at El Alamein could be sent because the Indian Ocean was still open to Allied shipping.[44]

In addition, vital Lend Lease supplies from the U.S were able to travel through the Indian Ocean and across Iran just as the Soviet Union was struggling to stop the German invasion.

References

  1. Buell, Thomas B. Master of Sea Power (1980)
  2. Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 12.
  3. Director of Naval History, Volume 149:Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, United States Naval Administration in World War II
  4. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 23-31, 129, 628, Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 5, and Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 39.
  5. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 35-37, 53.
  6. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 57, 619-621.
  7. Hammel, Carrier Clash, p. 46-47 and Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 38.
  8. Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 90–103.
  9. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 80.
  10. Hammel, Carrier Clash, p. 99.
  11. Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 104–5. Loxton, Frank (Guadalcanal p. 94), and Morison (Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 28) contend that Fletcher's fuel situation wasn't at all critical but that Fletcher implied it was in order to provide further justification for his withdrawal from the battle area.
  12. Hammel, Carrier Clash, p. 100.
  13. Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal p. 31.
  14. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 14-15. At this time there were exactly 10,819 Marines on Guadalcanal.
  15. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 125-127.
  16. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 20, 35-36.
  17. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 58-60 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 35.
  18. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 132-133 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 36-42.
  19. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 88 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 141–143. Japanese army regiments often took the name of their commanding officers, who frequently commanded the same units for years. Thus, the names "Aoba" and "Ichiki" regiments.
  20. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 156-158 & 681 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 43.
  21. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 33-34.
  22. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 70; Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 159.
  23. Hammel, Carrier Clash, 124–125, 157.
  24. Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, 118-119; Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 293. An unknown, but "large" number of the 5th Yokosuka troops were killed in the sinking of their transport ship.
  25. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 74.
  26. Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 297.
  27. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 194-213 and Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 45.
  28. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 79, 91-92 & 94-95.
  29. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 113 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 198-199, 205, and 266.
  30. Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 113-114
  31. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 201-203, 218-9 Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 116-124, and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 87-112.
  32. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 219-220 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 113-15, 121.
  33. Zimmerman, Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 80 and Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 125.
  34. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 130-132, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 221-222 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 129-130; Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 298-299, p. 129 and Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 129-130.
  35. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 223 & 225-226, Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 132 & 134-135 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 130-131, 138.
  36. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 161-167. The Marine defenders that finally defeated Kokusho's charge were most likely from the U.S. 11th Marine Regiment with assistance from the 1st Pioneer Battalion (Smith, p. 167 and Frank, p. 235).
  37. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 162-193, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 237-246, and Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 141-147.
  38. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 144 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 184-194.
  39. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 197-198.
  40. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 247-252, 263; Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 156 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 198-200.
  41. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 264-265.
  42. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 272.
  43. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 152, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 224 & 266 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 132 & 158.
  44. Gerhard Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, (1995) pp. 208–209.