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'''American Revolution: military history
|−|This article deals with the military history of the American Revolution from 1775 to 1781. For the origins and the political history, see [[American Revolution]] |+|
'''American Revolution: military historydeals with the military history of the American Revolution from 1775 to 1781.
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Political tactics had failed, and the British sent a combat army to Boston to overawe the rebels. On April 18, 1775, Gage sent 700 elite troops to Concord, 21 miles from Boston, to seize illegal munitions stored there. Major John Pitcairn a month before wrote that "one active campaign, a smart action, and burning two or three of their towns, will set everything to rights." The minute men of Lexington blocked Pitcairn; someone unknown fired the first shot; the British pushed on to Concord. They found the munitions gone and began their return trek only to be stunned by the discovery the Americans were fighting back. Three thousand militia lined the route, firing
muskets from behind stone fences. ("The Americans," noted General Israel Putnam, "are not at all afraid of their heads, though very much afraid of their legs; if you cover these they will fight forever.") The Yankee assault was well-planned and well-carried out. Only the timely arrival of a rescue party saved the redcoats, who suffered 270 casualties (versus 93 American casualties). |+|
Political tactics had failed, and the Britishsent a combat armyto Bostonto overawe the rebels. On April 18, 1775, Gagesent 700 elite troops to Concord, 21 miles from Boston, to seize illegal munitions stored there. Major John Pitcairna month before wrote that "one active campaign, a smart action, and burning two or three of their towns, will set everything to rights." The minute menof Lexingtonblocked Pitcairn; someone unknown fired the first shot; the British pushed on to Concord. They found the munitions gone and began their return trek only to be stunned by the discovery the Americans were fighting back. Three thousand militialined the route, firing from behind stone fences. ("The Americans," noted General Israel Putnam, "are not at all afraid of their heads, though very much afraid of their legs; if you cover these they will fight forever.") The Yankee assault was well-planned and well-carried out. Only the timely arrival of a rescue party saved the redcoats, who suffered 270 casualties (versus 93 American casualties)
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|−|Fast riders sped word of the British aggression and American |+|
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|−|resistance up and down the coast. The news reached General |+|
Israel Putnam]], age 67, as he was plowing his Connecticut farm. He instantly unhitched a horse, left word for his militia to follow, and galluped the 100 miles in 18 hours. Within days Boston was surrounded by 10, 000 patriots, enlisted for the year, armed with muskets and ready to fight. Their opportunity came in June, at the [[Battle of Bunker Hill]], when 2, 400 redcoats attacked 1,600 patriots dug in on Breed's Hill (in front of Bunker Hill). Crouching low behind their breastworks, the Yankees were told to wait--" Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes!" The first two waves were mowed down; finally a bayonet charge took the hill. The redcoats won, at a stunning cost of 1, 054 casualties, including a high proportion of officers. The Americans lost 400 casualties, and shattered the illusion that they would not or could not stand up to well-trained regulars. |+|
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|−|Over the winter of 1775- 76, the Americans sent expeditions to conquer Canada. Some of the habitants in French Canada welcomed the Americans and joined the invading army. Some supported the British colonial government. Most remained neutral. <ref> Mason Wade ( 1945) vol 1 </ref> The American invasion was hopeless. Short of supplies, outnumbered, sick with disease and too reckless, the Americans were whipped by the British regulars and Canada would continue to fly the Union Jack. |+|
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|−|The British battened down in Boston, which was on a peninsula and could not be attacked without artillery on the hills around the city. Led by [[ Henry Knox]], a brilliant young clerk who had read military treatises and knew how to seize the moment, the patriots obtained 60 heavy guns from the capture of Ft. Ticonderoga, in upstate New York. Water traffic was controlled by the Royal Navy, so Knox organized ox teams that hauled the heavy guns across the snows and ice in winter 1775-76. When the guns finally arrived in Boston in March, 1776, the British in Boston were defenseless; they withdrew to the great British naval base in Halifax, Canada. The rebellion faced by their old enemy pleased the French, who began secret shipments of gunpowder, muskets and other vitally needed munitions, and allowed American privateers to use ports in France and the French West Indies. |+|
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|−|===Reference books=== |+|
|−|* Boatner III, Mark M. '' Encyclopedia of the American Revolution'' (1966); excellent guide to details |+|
|−|* Fremont-Barnes, Gregory, and Richard A. Ryerson, eds. ' 'The Encyclopedia of the American Revolutionary War: A Political, Social, and Military History' ' (ABC-CLIO, 2006) 5 volume paper and online editions; 1000 entries by 150 experts, covering all topics |+|
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and . , the . battles , . , in the . , . 'and . . of , . , the of ,
|−|* Barnes, Ian and Charles Royster. ''The Historical Atlas of the American Revolution'' (2000) |+|
|−|* Cappon, Lester. ''Atlas of the American Revolution'' (1976); best coverage of society, economics and politics; thin on military |+|
|−|* Symonds, Craig L. ''A Battlefield Atlas of the American Revolution'' (1986); best on battles |+|
|−|* ''West Point Atlas'' [ http://www.military.com/Resources/HistorySubmittedFileView?file=history_americanrevolution_maps.htm online] |+|
|−|* Ferling, John ed., ''The World Turned Upside Down: The American Victory in the War of Independence'' (1988). |+|
|−|* Higginbotham, Don. ' 'Revolution in America: Considerations and Comparisons. '' U. of Virginia Pr., 2005. 230 pp. |+|
|−|* Martin, James Kirby. ''In the Course of Human Events: An Interpretive Exploration of the American Revolution'' (1979), short survey (ISBN: 0882957953) |+|
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. the , , . of , , , . . , . The , , , and . 'of the , ' , , . --], . , , . . for . .
|−|* Alden, John R. ''A History of the American Revolution'' (1989), general survey; strong on military (ISBN: 0306803666) |+|
|−|* Higginbotham, Don. ''The war of American independence: military attitudes, policies, and practice, 1763-1789'' (1983) best scholarly overview; [http://www. historyebook. org/subscribinginsts.html online through ACLS History E-Book] |+|
|−|* Lancaster, ed. Bruce. ''The American Revolution'' (American Heritage Library) (ISBN: 0828102813) (1985), heavily illustrated |+|
|−|* Martin, James Kirby, and Mark E. Lender, ' 'A Respectable Army: The Military Origin of the Republic, 1763–1789'' (1982), short |+|
|−|* Matloff, Maurice. ''American Military History'' (1989) US Army textbook [http://www.army.mil/cmh- pg/books/AMH/amh- toc.htm online] |+|
|−|* Middlekauff, Robert. ''The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789'' (1982) [ http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=84633736 online edition] |+|
|−|* Miller, John C. |+|
|−|* Weintraub, Stanley. ''Iron Tears: America's Battle for Freedom, Britain's Quagmire: 1775-1783. '' Free Pr., 2005. 375 pp. |+|
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Surveys: British perspective === |+|
|−|*Bicheno, H. ''Rebels and Redcoats, The American Revolutionary War, '' London 2003 |+|
|−|* Black, Jeremy. ''War for America: The Fight for Independence,'' 1991. British perspective |+|
and , , . . and . A () and , . of --. '. of , . , . The American , by [. . ] .', -.:/. . , , , . , the of the and . 's in of ,,. ''American , , . and the , :/
|−|* Dupuy, R. Ernest, Gay Hammerman and Grace P. Hayes. ''The American Revolution: A Global War'' ( 1976) |+|
|−|* Flavell, Julie and Conway, Stephen, eds. ''Britain and America Go to War: The Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo- America, 1754- 1815.' ' U. Press of Florida, 2004. 284 pp. |+|
|−|* Lecky, William Edward Hartpole. ''The American Revolution, 1763-1783'' 1898 by leading British scholar; [ http://www. questia. com/PM.qst?a=o&d=9503720 online edition] |+|
|−|* Marston, Daniel. ' 'The American Revolution, 1774- 1783. '' Routledge. 2003. 95 pp survey [http:/ /www. questia. com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108324458 online edition] |+|
|−|* Mackesy, Piers. ''War for America, '' 2nd edition, 1993. British perspective |+|
|−|* Trevelyan |+|
|−|* Wrong, George M. ''Canada and the American Revolution: The Disruption of the First British Empire.'' 1935. by Canadian scholar[ http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6594760 online edition] |+|
|−|====Indians and Canada==== |+|
|−|* Allen, Robert S. ''His Majesty's Indian allies: British Indian policy in the defence of Canada, 1774-1815'' (1992) online [http://www.historyebook.org/ through ACLS History E-Book] |+|
|−|* Cameron, Margaret M. '' Canada & the American Revolution, 1774-1783. (1967) [ http://www.historyebook.org/ online through ACLS History E-Book] |+|
|−|* Washburn, Wilcomb E. "Indians and the American Revolution, " [http:/ /www.americanrevolution.org/ind1.html online] |+|
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|−|===State, regional and local studies=== |+|
, , and (, in , . , of and .
|−|* Robert A. Gross, ''The Minutemen and their World'' ( 1976). re Massachusetts |+|
|−|* Mitnick, Barbara J., ed. ''New Jersey in the American Revolution.'' Rutgers U. Pr., 2005. 268 pp. |+|
|−|* Higginbotham, Don. ''The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789'' (1971). an analytical history of the war |+|
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Military: North=== |+|
|−|* Fischer, David Hackett. ''Washington 's Crossing'' (2004), Pulitzer prize winner; study of 1776-77 [http://blog. oup.com/2006/02/washingtons_cro online excerpt] |+|
. Washington , . , . The . ' . , , . and . to the . . The ,() . The of a the . to the of a .
|−|* Ketchum, Richard M. ''Winter Soldiers: The Battles for Trenton and Princeton'' (1973) |+|
|−|* McCullough, David. ' '1776. '' 386 pp. |+|
|−|* Reed, John F. ''Campaign to Valley Forge: July 1, 1777–December 19, 1777'' (1965) |+|
|−|* Savas, Theodore P. , and Dameron, J. David. ''A Guide to the Battles of the American Revolution. '' 2006. |+|
|−|* Taaffe, Stephen R. ''The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777–1778'' ( 2003). |+|
|−|* Ward, Christopher. ''The War of the Revolution,'' 2 vols., 1952, a good narrative of all the major battles. |+|
|−|* Wallace, Willard M. ''Appeal to Arms'' (1951); good on battles |+|
|−|* Wrong, George M. ''Washington and His Comrades in Arms: A Chronicle of the War of Independence'' (1921) by a Canadian scholar [http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/2704 online edition] |+|
|−|* ''West Point Atlas'' [http://www.military.com/Resources/HistorySubmittedFileView?file=history_americanrevolution_maps. htm online] |+|
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, of . , .'''' ; , ''The and '' , -, , ..a (), American '. . , ]. of , () . . .
|−|* Creasy, Sir Edward; ''The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World'' [http://www.questia.com/PM. qst?a=o&d=106242918 1908 online] |+|
|−|* Ketchum, Richard M. ; '' Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War''; 1997, ISBN 0-8050-6123-1 |+|
|−|* Mintz, Max M.; ''The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates'' ; 1990, Yale University Press, ISBN 0- 300-04778-9; |+|
|−|* Nickerson, Hoffman; ''The Turning Point of the Revolution: Or, Burgoyne in America'' [http://www. questia. com/PM.qst?a =o&d=87105763 ( 1928) online] |+|
|−|* Patterson, Samuel White; ''Horatio Gates: Defender of American Liberties' ' [http://www. questia. com/PM.qst?a=o&d=100637218 Columbia University Press, 1941 online] |+|
|−|* Stone, W. L. ''The Campaign of Burgoyne, '' ( 1877) [http://cdl. library. cornell. edu/cgi-bin/moa/sgml/moa-idx?notisid=ABK4014-0055-103 online] |+|
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|−|===Military: South=== |+|
, and , . The the () , . . The the , , and () the in the North; the . a . The of -(, .) The the : Britain and of , . . , , the , the Revolution . to The , , of the , on the in the . . , --.
|−|* Crow, Jeffrey C. and Larry E. Tise, eds. ''The Southern Experience in the American Revolution'' ( 1978) |+|
|−|* Higgins, W. Robert ed. ''The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership'' ( 1979) |+|
|−|* Lumpkin, Henry. ''From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South'' (1981) |+|
|−|* John S. Pancake, ''This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782'' (1985) |+|
|−|* Hugh Rankin, ''The North Carolina Continentals'' (1971) |+|
|−|* Theodore Thayer; ''Nathanael Greene: Strategist of the American Revolution'' (1960) [http://www. questia.com/PM.qst?a =o&d=9033916 online edition] |+|
|−|* Russell F. Weigley, ''The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780- 1782'' ( 1970); portrays guerrilla war, like Vietnam |+|
|−|* Wallace, Willard M. ''Appeal to Arms'' (1951) ; good on battles |+|
|−|* Ward, Christopher. ''The War of the Revolution,'' 2 vols., 1952, a good narrative of all the major battles. |+|
|−|* Wilson, David K. ''The Southern Strategy: Britain 's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775-1780.'' U. of South Carolina Pr., 2005. 341 pp. |+|
|−|* Adams, Randolph G. "A View of Cornwallis's Surrender at Yorktown." ''American Historical Review'' 1931 37(1): 25-49. Issn: 0002-8762 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(193110)37%3A1%3C25%3AAVOCSA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X online at Jstor] |+|
|−|*Clement, R: “The World Turned Upside down At the Surrender of Yorktown”, ''Journal of American Folklore'', Vol. 92, No. 363 (Jan. - Mar., 1979), pp. 66-67 (available on Jstor) |+|
|−|* Greene, Jerome. ''Guns of Independence: The Siege of Yorktown, 1781'' (2005) |+|
|−|* Ketchum, Richard M. ''Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the Revolution '' (2004) |+|
|−|* Morrissey, Brendan and Adam Hook. ''Yorktown 1781: The World Turned Upside Down'' (1994) British perspective |+|
|−|* Tuchman, Barbara W. ''The First Salute'' 1988, chapter on battle |+|
|−|* Willcox, W: “The British Road to Yorktown: A Study in Divided Command”, ''The American Historical Review'', Vol. 52, No. 1. (Oct., 1946), pp. 1-35 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(194610)52%3A1%3C1%3ATBRTYA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W in JSTOR] |+|
|−|*Wood, W. J. ''Battles of the Revolutionary War, 1775–1781''. ISBN 0-306-81329-7 (2003) |+|
|−|*Wright, J: “Notes on the Siege of Yorktown in 1781 with Special Reference to the Conduct of a Siege in the Eighteenth Century”, ''William and Mary Quarterly'', 2nd Ser. , Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1932), pp. 229- 249, [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043- 5597(193210)212:4%3C229:NOTSOY%3E2. 0.CO;2-M&origin=historycoop ONLINE AT jstor] |+|
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|−|===Soldiers: American === |+|
American , . and in , . the the :, '''' , ''World'' ()
|−|* Bodle, Wayne. ''Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War'' (2002) |+|
|−|* Buchanan, John. ''The Road to Valley Forge: How Washington Built the Army That Won the Revolution.'' 2004. [http: //www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=106756208 online edition] |+|
|−|* Fischer, David Hackett. '' Paul Revere' s Ride' ' (1995) |+|
|−|* Gross, Robert A. '' The Minutemen and their World'' ( 1976) . re Massachusetts |+|
|−|* Kennett, Lee. ''French Forces in America, '' 1977. |+|
|−|* Royster, Charles. ''A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775–1783'' (1979) |+|
|−|* Shy, John. ''A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence,'' 1976. |+|
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|−|===British army & Loyalists=== |+|
British , . , . , , George :, '''' , ''The American Revolution,'' , ''''
|−|* Atwood, R. ''The Hessians, '' 1980. |+|
|−|* Billias, George A. ed., ''George Washington's Opponents'' (1969) essays on the chief British generals |+|
, , ... , the .
|−|*Frey, Sylvia. ''The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period'' (1981) |+|
|−|* Smith, Paul H. '' Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy,'' 1964. |+|
|−|* Van Tyne, Claude Halstead. ''The Loyalists in the American Revolution '' (1929) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=3030284 online edition] |+|
|−|* Billias, George A. ed. '' George Washington's Generals'' (1964) |+|
|−|* Higginbotham, Don. '' Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman'' (1961) |+|
|−|* Rankin, Hugh. ''Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox'' (1973) |+|
|−|====George Washington==== |+|
|−|* John Alden, ''George Washington: A Biography'' (1984); |+|
|−|* Freeman, Douglas Southall ''George Washington: A Biography'' (7 vols. , New York, 1948–1957); also one-vol abridged edition |+|
|−|* Lengel, Edward G. ''General George Washington: A Military Life. '' Random House, 2005. 450 pp. |+|
|−|* Lodge, Henry Cabot. ''Washington'' (1889) older biography [ http://www.gutenberg.net/etext/12652 online edition] |+|
|−|* Palmer, Dave. ''The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War of Independence'' (1975) |+|
|−|* Billias, George A. ed., ''George Washington's Opponents'' (1969) essays on the chief British generals |+|
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, : and , , . , . , . The Royal Navy in , .
|−|* Dull, Jonathan. ''The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1775-1787, '' 1975. |+|
|−|* Morison, Samuel Eliot. ''John Paul Jones'' (1959) |+|
|−|* Syrett, David. ''The Royal Navy in American Waters, '' 1989. |+|
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Weapons === |+|
|−|* Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason ( 1988), on European methods |+|
, The the () , , . ''of '' () , , ,. '', -'' ()
|−|* Peterson, Harold L. '' The Book of the Continental Soldier'' ( 1968) ; uniforms, weapons, gear |+|
|−|* Peterson, Harold L. '' Arms and Armor in Colonial America, 1526- 1783'' ( 1956) |+|
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|−|* Brunswicker (Hessian) prisoners [http://www. americanrevolution. org/hess15. html online] |+|
. . . [. . .
|−|* Naval prisoners (1913) [ http://www. americanrevolution. org/nav18. html online] |+|
|−|* Dandridge, Danske. ''American Prisoners of the Revolution'' (1910) [ http://books. google.com/books?id=VDeU- M_jvggC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=american+prisoners+of +the +revolution+i+by +danske+dandridge&source=web&ots=r1BY6G-LbO&sig=agDcFzO9mV9p6pqknzGKkusTNrw online at Google] |+|
, . of the [. -of the by , . and in the , . . . . -"at
|−|* Knight, Betsy. "Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution, " [http://links. jstor. org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28199104%293%3A48%3A2%3C201%3APEAPIT%3E2. 0. CO%3B2- R" online at JSTOR] |+|
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, . . . the '. of , , . 'the , . ', . , -
|−|* Bell, Jr. Whitfield. ''John Morgan: Continental Doctor'' (1965) |+|
|−|* Blanco, Richard L. ''Physician of the American Revolution: Jonathan Potts' ' (1979) |+|
|−|* Peckham, Howard H. ''The Toll of Independence'' (1974), casualties by battle |+|
|−|* Reiss, Oscar. ' 'Medicine and the American Revolution'' (1982) |+|
|−|* Saffron, Morris Harold. ' 'Surgeon to Washington, Dr. John Cochran, 1730- 1807'' (1977) |+|
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|−|* Carp, E. Wayne. '' To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775- 1783'' ( 1984); best study of supply problems |+|
|−|* Risch, Erna. ''Supplying Washington's Army' ' (GPO, 1981) |+|
, . . ''the at and American , - ''()
. Washington 's ',
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, . of and ,"and [. . .
|−|* Higginbotham, Don. "The Early American Way of War: Reconnaisance and Appraisal," ''William and Mary Quarterly'' 44 (1987) 230-73; valuable overview [ http://links. jstor. org/sici?sici=0043-5597(198704)3%3A44%3A2%3C230%3ATEAWOW%3E2. 0.CO%3B2-3 online at JSTOR] |+|
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|−|===Primary sources=== |+|
,, and ,of -of the . the . ./of the , and the of the , . The the British . Yankee ' of was , . of and ., ''George '' -. the , '.
|−|* Commager, Henry Steele, and Richard Morris, eds. ''The Spirit of 'Seventy- Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants'' (1967); excellent collection of primary ources; highly recommended |+|
|−|* Library of America. ''The American Revolution: Writings from the War of Independence'' (1995) 850pp [http://www. loa. org/ volume.jsp?RequestID=152§ion=toc table of contents] |+|
|−|* S. E. Morison; ''Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution, 1764-1788, and the Formation of the Federal Constitution'' (1923) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=8875493 online edition] |+|
|−|* Dann, ed. John C. ''The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the War for Independence (1980); from pension applications |+|
|−|*Hibbert, C: ''Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution Through British Eyes,'' London, 2001 |+|
|−|* Martin, J. P. ''Private Yankee Doodle' ' (1962); fascinating autobiography of an ordinary soldier who was everywhere |+|
|−|* Washington, George. ''Writings'' (1988) (Library of America edition) 440 letters and key documents. [http://loa.org/volume.jsp?RequestID=5§ion=toc online table of contents] |+|
|−|* Washington, George. '' The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series.'' University Press of Virginia. Latest volume is Vol. 14: March- April 1778. ed by Philander D. Chase, 2004. 832 pp. |+|
|−|* ''Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783' ' Ed. by K.G. Davies. 21 vols. (Irish Academic University Press, 1972), all the important British documents; available in large research libraries |+|
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|−|[[Category:History Workgroup]] [[Category:Military Workgroup]] [[Category:CZ Live]] |+|
Latest revision as of 08:17, 11 October 2013
- See also: American Revolution, naval history
American Revolution: military history deals with the military history of the American Revolution from 1775 to 1781.
Depictions of the British Army marching to Concord in April, 1775. This is a hand colored engraving by Amos Doolittle based on a sketch by Ralph Earl. Doolittle and Earle, the former a silversmith and the latter portraitist visited the countryside where Earl produce the sketch for the piece while Doolittle communicated details he had learned from eyewitnesses. Doolittle later translated Earle's work into metal at his shop on College Square near Yale.Image courtesy of the New York Public Library.
Political tactics had failed, and the British sent a combat army to Boston to overawe the rebels. On April 18, 1775, General Thomas Gage sent 700 elite troops to Concord, 21 miles from Boston, to seize illegal munitions stored there. Major John Pitcairn a month before wrote that "one active campaign, a smart action, and burning two or three of their towns, will set everything to rights." The minute men of Lexington blocked Pitcairn; someone unknown fired the first shot; the British pushed on to Concord. They found the munitions gone and began their return trek only to be stunned by the discovery the Americans were fighting back. Three thousand militia lined the route, firing muskets from behind stone fences. ("The Americans," noted General Israel Putnam, "are not at all afraid of their heads, though very much afraid of their legs; if you cover these they will fight forever.") The Yankee assault was well-planned and well-carried out. Only the timely arrival of a rescue party saved the redcoats, who suffered 270 casualties (versus 93 American casualties).
Fast riders sped word of the British aggression and American resistance up and down the coast. The news reached General Israel Putnam, age 67, as he was plowing his Connecticut farm. He instantly unhitched a horse, left word for his militia to follow, and galloped the 100 miles in 18 hours. Within days Boston was surrounded by 10,000 patriots, enlisted for the year, armed with muskets and ready to fight. Their opportunity came in June, at the Battle of Bunker Hill, when 2,400 redcoats attacked 1,600 patriots dug in on Breed's Hill (in front of Bunker Hill). Crouching low behind their breastworks, the Yankees were told to wait--"Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes!" The first two waves were mowed down; finally a bayonet charge took the hill. The redcoats won, at a stunning cost of 1,054 casualties, including a high proportion of officers. The Americans suffered 400 casualties, and shattered the illusion that they would not or could not stand up to well-trained regulars.
Over the winter of 1775-76, the Americans sent expeditions to conquer Canada. Some of the habitants in French Canada welcomed the Americans and joined the invading army. Some supported the British colonial government. Most remained neutral.  The American invasion was hopeless. Short of supplies, outnumbered, sick with disease and too reckless, the Americans were whipped by the British regulars and Canada would continue to fly the Union Jack.
The British battened down in Boston, which was on a peninsula and could not be attacked without artillery on the hills around the city. Led by Henry Knox, a brilliant young clerk who had read military treatises and knew how to seize the moment, the patriots obtained 60 heavy guns from the capture of Ft. Ticonderoga, in upstate New York. Water traffic was controlled by the Royal Navy, so Knox organized ox teams that hauled the heavy guns across the snows and ice in winter 1775-76. When the guns finally arrived in Boston in March, 1776, the British in Boston were defenseless; they withdrew to the great British naval base in Halifax, Canada. The rebellion faced by their old enemy pleased the French, who began secret shipments of gunpowder, muskets and other vitally needed munitions, and allowed American privateers to use ports in France and the French West Indies.
In full control of nearly all parts of the 13 states, and realizing they had to break from London once and for all if they ever were to receive French aid, the new United States of America declared its independence in July, 1776. This was a proclamation of a state of affairs that had taken effect at least a year earlier, when the Continental Congress took over the forces around Boston and formally established a Continental Army. The army's mission thus was to preserve the status quo of a new nation that had seized control of its fate. The British had to crush that symbol, and reassert the supremacy of the Crown. The Royal Navy blockaded the American coastline. Washington and his armies had to trudge overland, while the British forces could be moved rapidly by water from point to point. Although they had the naval power to seize any one point, Britain never had the manpower to occupy all the rebellious colonies simultaneously. At least 200,000 soldiers would have been needed for that, and probably more. London did expand its army, but service was unpopular and it could not raise enough troops. Efforts to hire mercenary armies around Europe turned up only 30,000 men rented out by the rulers of Hesse-Cassel and other tiny countries. (The rulers were paid so much per soldier, with a bonus for those killed.) The 3,000-mile-long supply line drastically limited the number of troops that could be maintained in America. The supply line furthermore had to be constantly protected from American privateers (privately operated armed merchant ships with a license to attack British merchantmen.) London assumed that a small number of radicals, wholly unrepresentative of American opinion, had seized control. The solution was not to negotiate but to crush them. The reasonable Americans would see their duty as British citizens, and renew their allegiance to the Crown once they saw the invincible British army had arrived.
When Congress took charge of the unorganized army at Boston in June, 1775, its consensus choice for commander in chief was George Washington, age 45. His military experience totaled five years in the French and Indian War, when he became colonel in charge of all Virginia forces at age 23. Now a wealthy tobacco planter, slaveholder, and political leader of Virginia, he had the stature, the energy, and the bearing of leadership the Americans needed. Washington had three roles during the war. In 1775-77, and again in 1781 he led his men against the main British forces. He lost many of his battles--save the last one--but always survived to fight another day. Second he was charged with organizing and training the army. He recruited regulars and assigned a German professional named von Steuben to train them. Steuben's homosexuality annoyed the straight Americans, but they needed all the help they could get. Washington had the major voice in selecting generals for command, and in planning their basic strategy. His achievements were mixed, as some of his favorites (like John Sullivan) never mastered the art of command. Eventually he found men who got the job done, like Nathaniel Greene. The American officers never equaled their opponents in tactics and maneuver, and consequently they lost most of the pitched battles. The great successes, at Saratoga and Yorktown, came from trapping the British far from base with much larger numbers of troops. Third, and most important, Washington was the embodiment of armed resistance to the Crown--the representative man of the Revolution. His enormous stature and political skills kept Congress, the army, the French, the militias, and the states all pointed toward a common goal. By voluntarily stepping down and disbanding his army when the war was won, he permanently established the principle of civilian supremacy in military affairs. And yet his constant reiteration of the point that well-disciplined professional soldiers counted for twice as much as erratic amateurs helped overcome the ideological distrust of a standing army. There was unanimous sentiment that he had to be the first president when the first election took place in 1788.
The Continental Army
The Continental Army was organized along British lines. Washington was general and Commander in Chief, reporting directly to Congress. He personally commanded the Main Army, which varied in strength from 6,000 to 18,000, and directed army-wide staff commands. Washington supervised major generals who commanded geographical divisions: Eastern (New England), Northern ([[New York (state)}New York]]), Highlands (West Point area of New York), Middle (New Jersey to Delaware), Southern (Virginia--the largest state--plus the Carolinas and Georgia), Western and Canadian. When the Main Army moved into a division, Washington assumed overall command there; most of the time it was based within a radius of 40 or 50 miles outside New York City. The divisional armies fluctuated in size, but usually comprised one to five brigades. Brigades comprised about 2,500 men commanded by a brigadier general. Congress approved 73 generals, 16 of whom had been officers in the British army (usually captains or majors), 36 in the colonial militias, and 21 with zero previous military experience. All that Nathanael Greene and Henry Knox knew about warfare came from reading manuals and military history, yet Greene was one of the two or three best fighters (after Benedict Arnold), and young Knox (born 1750) brilliantly handled Washington's artillery.
The brigades were the main fighting units of the army. They were made up of five to ten regiments, which were called battalions when in battle. Some regiments were "Continental," that is, organized and controlled by Congress, with long terms of service. Other regiments were "militia," organized and controlled by the states, with short terms of service (usually one year). In addition to these standard regiments, when the Americans were doing well local militia companies suddenly showed up; they would depart whenever they pleased. Washington was infuriated at his lack of control over them. "They come in you cannot tell how, go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment." He insisted that only a regular army with long terms of service could be properly trained, officered, moved from place to place, and counted upon to be around for a long campaign. But Washington was too awed by the professionalism of the British Army, and anyway the new American political and financial systems were much too weak to support a large standing army. Furthermore, most patriots deeply distrusted one. To this day historians debate whether in actual battle the militia fought as well as the Continentals. The Maryland Line and Delaware Line (militia) were outstanding, performing almost as well as the British regulars in executing tactical moves on the battlefield. In any case, a large standing army would have been a tempting target for the main British force. The basic British strategy in 1775-1778 was to track down and destroy Washington's main army. They hoped its destruction would lead to Americans coming to terms, which seems unlikely.
A colonel commanded an American regiment, assisted by a lieutenant colonel and a major. They usually were the organizers who recruited the regiment in the first place. The regulars had volunteered for different lengths of time (one year, three, the duration of the war), and regiments whose term had expired wanted to march home. Half the veteran officers and sergeants, and perhaps a third of the privates reenlisted; the rest called it a war and went home. It grew harder and harder to raise troops. Cash bounties were offered, a draft was imposed. A draftee could escape by paying a fine or finding a substitute; older men sent sons or younger brothers. The more established young men volunteered for war first; by 1777 it was the poor, the unemployed, immigrants, blacks, and drifters who entered the army. To organize the regiment a colonel's staff included a surgeon, quartermaster (supply officer), chaplain, paymaster, and an adjutant to quill the paperwork. The fighting power of the regiment comprised seven to ten companies, each commanded by a captain, assisted by a lieutenant or two, an ensign (the lowest ranking officer), four sergeants (who ran things), four corporals, and a drummer and fifer (to issue commands in battle). The privates, 30 to 70 per company, carried muskets, pitched their tents, cooked whatever food was available, and did what the corporals and sergeants ordered.
The weakness of the American army was that the sergeants and officers had little or no experience in warfare, and the generals displayed more genius for back-room politics than for battlefield action. The Americans had great difficulty carrying off complex, coordinated maneuvers. When Washington tried a four-pronged attack at Germantown in 1777, everything collapsed in confusion. At least Washington learned his lesson: he did not have an army that could maneuver as well or fight on equal terms, so he never again tried.
Most regiments were strictly infantry, armed just with muskets and bayonets. Sometimes elite troops were assigned to a light infantry company, which was always kept up to full strength. Brigade commanders would assemble all their light infantry companies into a special battalion for special missions. The British used light infantry more often and more effectively than the Americans, because their command and control structure worked better. A brigade might have one artillery company, with perhaps an artillery regiment assigned to department headquarters. Cavalry units (which fought on horseback) were rarely used. Dragoons were infantry who rode horses, but dismounted to fight. They appeared in southern campaigns, but were not used more often because few Americans owned suitable mounts, and the British could not handle the logistics of sending horses and all their fodder across the Atlantic. Furthermore Washington never learned to appreciate the strong advantages of mounted forces in covering great distances. On paper a regiment numbered 500 to 1,000 men. But it probably was not at full strength in the first place. At any one time, some soldiers were sick, some assigned elsewhere, some captured or dead or deserted, or just vanished. Having 350 men fit for duty was usual. When new recruits arrived they usually came in new regiments, but sometimes they filled out understrength old ones. Every year or two old regiments might be merged, reorganized or even disbanded as their one or three year enlistment terms expired.
Hygiene and medicine
Associated with each regiment were civilian sutlers (who sold food and clothes in a sort of post exchange, or PX), wagoners, and often their wives. These women washed, cooked, sewed, nursed, and maintained morale, and were entitled to half rations. (Very few were prostitutes.) British and German regiments typically had far more camp followers; apparently American women disliked that kind of life. The Americans, "not being used to doing things of this sort, choose rather to let their linen, etc., rot upon their backs than to be at the trouble of cleaning 'em themselves." The lack of women had more dangerous consequences: "Many of the Americans have sickened and died of the dysentery brought upon them in great measure through an inattention to cleanliness. When at home their female relations put them washing their hands and faces and keeping themselves neat and clean, but being absent from such monitors, through an indolent needless turn of mind, they have neglected the means of health, have grown filthy, and poisoned their constitution by nastiness." Everyone scratched away at the parasitic mites that burrowed into the seams of dirty clothing. Those itching from scurvy were in fact seriously ill, and were sent to the regimental field hospital. It was a rude hut where the surgeon, surgeon's mate, and nurses (camp followers) did would little they could.
Disease killed far more soldiers than did combat. Of the 100,000 to 150,000 men who served in U.S. forces at one time or another, about 6,800 died in battle, while disease carried away 10,000 in camp and 8,500 in British prisons. Putting thousands of men in close quarters, with bad sanitation and poor hygiene, was the prescription for epidemics. The care of the wounded was rudimentary; neither side had an ambulance service or corps of medics to apply first aid and rush the wounded back to field hospitals. A delay of several hours before any medical attention often meant bleeding to death, or the onset of fatal gangrene. Punctures made by bayonets were usually clean wounds with deep gashes; bayonets either killed immediately or offered a good chance for survival in an otherwise healthy soldier. The main function of bayonet charges, however, was not to stab the enemy but to frighten him into running away. Iron shrapnel from artillery and the lead musket balls produced torn, jagged wounds. Unlike the steel-jacketed high-velocity bullets of the late nineteenth century, the low-velocity one-ounce musket balls flattened on impact, ripped up flesh, traumatized tissue, and splintered bones. Chest, stomach and groin wounds were hopeless. Wounds of the face, neck and legs demanded immediate attention for there was still hope if the man did not go into shock. Blood transfusion was unknown so the surgeon stopped the bleeding with a tourniquet, calmed the wide-eyed patient with a slug of rum, opened the wound with a scalpel, and removed the fragments with forceps (or dirty fingers). The wound was cleaned with lint soaked in oil, bandaged, and changed daily. A serious leg or arm wound required immediate amputation to forestall gangrene; the operation took a half hour. Since the incision was made through healthy tissue, there was a better chance for survival if not much blood had been lost. Unfortunately, if the surgical patients were kept in the hospital more than a few days, they would probably catch, and perhaps die from an infectious disease--dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, or malaria. The surgeons were poorly trained (many not even doctors), and supplies were always short. Scarcely any effective drugs were available, though many popular remedies were tried, especially emetics and laxatives.
When a regiment was on the march, it would send out foragers to buy (or acquisition) whatever food, fodder and fuel the local farmers had not hidden away. British, French and German supply officers paid real money. Americans could pay only with depreciating Continental paper, or in near-worthless certificates. The job of forager was as unpopular as it was essential, and often was assigned to black troops. The officers were responsible for their own food and clothing, using their pay or, more often, their private wealth. The pay, when it occasionally arrived, seldom was enough to buy much. Their relatives sent along boots and blankets. The privates, however, depended on the quartermaster corps for shoes, clothes, blankets, and everything else, and routinely were disappointed. They mutinied from time to time--the only effective way they could signal Congress and the people that the system was not working. The mutinies were not refusals to fight, nor attacks on officers, and the men calmed down quickly enough when their generals and colonels promised them relief. As for the officers, they demanded, and finally got, a Congressional promise of eventual pensions (half-pay for life) and land grants in the west.
Comparison with British army
The British officers were convinced the Americans would not and could not fight. Hilarious anecdotes circulated about their inept soldiering in the French and Indian War. "They are raw, undisciplined, cowardly men," insisted the First Lord of the Admiralty. The British misperceptions of the American character typified the widening gap between London and the fast maturing colonies. The rank and file British soldiers were recruited from very low social ranks, were treated shabbily by their sergeants and officers, and held in contempt by everyone. The British private was a cog in the machine, not an individual. His duty was to obey his superiors immediately, without flinching or thinking. The main tactic of the infantry was to march as close as possible to the enemy, form ranks, then fire volleys of muskets regardless of enemy fire. Severe flogging was the punishment for any disrespect; the European ideal was that the soldier should fear his officers more than the enemy. British privates enlisted for life, attracted by the free food and clothing. Patriotism was scarcely a factor. American militiamen were part-time soldiers and full-time citizens and voters. They were individualistic, with their own needs and priorities, so they evaluated military service on their own terms. The instructions for recruiters in Maryland required "great Regard to moral Character; Sobriety in particular." "You are to inlist no Man who is not able bodied, healthy and a good marcher, nor such whose attachment to the liberties of America you have cause to suspect. Young hearty robust men who are tied by Birth or Family Connections to this County; and are well practiced in the use of firearms are by much to be preferred." Recruits thus were integrated into their community, and reflected its values, aspirations and fears. The militia elected its own junior officers, and judged their performance with a critical eye. When their enlistments expired, they went home. (Deserters went home too, and the community protected them. The American desertion rate was a very high 20 to 25 per 100 men per year.)
The British army of 1775 had a fearsome reputation that was not fully deserved. Britain normally fought its wars by subsidizing allies, like Prussia, that did the real fighting. The army was therefore quite small for a global empire. In 1775 it had worldwide only 49,000 men: 39,000 infantry, 2,500 artillery, and 6,900 cavalry. The average soldier, aged 30, had been nine years in the ranks, but that did not mean he was well trained. Since there had been no warfare for a dozen years, only the older men had battlefield experience. In peacetime the British army was scattered about in small units, the men often boarded in private homes. In America the men lived in barracks and were drilled six hours a day, with callisthenics, goose-step marching, and musket loading. However, there were no field exercises that would give the officers a feel for maneuvering thousands of men. Parliament expanded the forces quickly after Lexington, authorizing 40,000 more soldiers. Enlistment meant lifetime service, however, and only the most destitute men looked upon it is an attractive deal. They were not quick studies, and had narrow perspectives. Never were they permitted to take any initiative or question their orders. did not know what they were fighting for, except to avoid the iron discipline of their sergeants and lieutenants. The Hessians were even less eager for warfare--they had not volunteered and were not even paid. Realizing this weakness, Americans appealed to them to desert and join the American cause. Most Hessians looked at Americans as ferocious savages, but some changed their opinions. Hessian prisoners were held in German-speaking areas of Pennsylvania, and hired out to local farmers. Only 60 percent of the mercenaries returned to Germany; 23 percent died; 17 percent deserted and became Americans.
The Americans were notoriously sloppy, dirty and careless; formations were ragged, and routine discipline was at best erratic. To the martinets in red coats this proved that the rebels did not know how to make war. American officers had to learn how to elicit self discipline among their men. Parades and smart uniforms enhanced pride in the unit, which gradually became the community the long-terms regulars identified with. As drill master von Steuben later explained to a Prussian visitor, "You say to your soldier, 'Do this' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he does it." The redcoat was easy to order around. The Americans only followed orders they felt were correct; if the scene were too dangerous they would run away. If the generals were doing poorly they would go home. Conversely, if the officers could motivate them they would fight well, and if the enemy seemed in trouble they would suddenly show up by the thousands, as they did at Boston (1775), Saratoga (1777) and Yorktown (1781). The American militiaman, contrasted with a redcoat regular, was better educated, more easily trained, more accustomed to wilderness more acclimated to the disease environment, and more familiar with firearms. He was a full participant in the war because this was a struggle his home community was waging for its own independence and freedom.
Honor and ideology inside the armies
Europeans measured the qualities of officers not in terms of initiative, ingenuity or community ties, but in terms of honor and elevated social status. British officers were gentlemen, or even titled aristocrats who had purchased their commissions for huge sums of money. They had not attended a military academy; aristocrats thought their status alone made them deserving of command. Warfare was a way of enhancing the honor of their family; military hierarchies reflected social hierarchies, with a vast gap between top and bottom. The American armies had an amazingly small social differential between officer and private-- typified by the story of the captain-barber cutting his men's hair, or the colonels who cobbled boots for prisoners. According to the "Republican" ideology that had seized the American mind, it was the duty of every citizen to work for the good of the community. Sacrifice, especially the risk of life in battle, was the highest form of virtue. The bravest soldiers, the ones most dedicated to the cause, were therefore the ones with the highest virtue, and thus deserved to be officers. Their men ought to follow their orders not because of aristocratic status, or obedience to the King, but because the officers most nearly embodied the spirit of liberty and community. The officers had to uplift the men, help them reach their full potential as true Americans. Conversely, the most horrible status was that of traitor: the person who put alien allegiance ahead of civic virtue and loyalty to community. The Loyalists were seen as traitors, and worst of all was Benedict Arnold, the hero who became a turncoat. King George, by the Coercion Acts and the imposition of martial law, was challenging the very existence of an autonomous American community. To give in would be slavery; to resist, the highest form of virtue. "Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?" called out Patrick Henry of Virginia. "I know not what course others may take, but for me give me liberty or give me death!"
British victory at New York City, 1776
The Patriots' glorious spring of 1776 gave way to disasters in the summer and fall for the fledgling Continental army and its inexperienced commander. The British Royal Navy had complete control of the seas (since the French were still neutral). They could move large forces anywhere on the coastline much faster than the Americans could build defenses or march in reinforcements. As Washington discovered, "The amazing advantage the Enemy derive from their Ships and the Command of the Water, keeps us in a state of constant perplexity and the most anxious conjecture." Throughout the war the British strategy focused on cities. They realized that the colonies did not have a true center like London, but the cities were all accessible by sea, and they all contained large Loyalist contingents who wined and dined the British officers, leaving the mistaken impression that most Americans "really" favored the King. New York City was a prime target--it had the best port in the colonies, and could be used to isolate the New England region. Congress demanded that Washington defend Manhattan island (population 22,000) and nearby Long Island. But any defense was hopeless in the face of 30 British warships with 1,200 guns, and 10,000 sailors, not to mention the hundreds of transports that carried nearly half of the British army--32,000 trained regulars. This powerful force-- 45% of the Royal Navy and by far the most formidable fighting unit on the globe--was assembled only because King George III himself demanded action, and his minister for American affairs Lord George Germain brilliantly solved the logistic challenge. It was commanded by Major General William Howe and his older brother Admiral Richard Howe. Fortunately for the American cause, the Howes were trying to be conciliatory; a massive show of force on land and a tight blockade at sea would show the Yankees how insane their rebellion was, inducing them to accept the generous pardons which Howe was prepared to offer. Conciliation would be a better route to reunion, Howe felt, than annihilation of the rebel armies. But annihilation it nearly was. Washington foolishly divided his 28,000 men between Long Island and Manhattan, and neglected to defend his flanks. Instead of charging head-on, as they did in Boston, the Redcoats used their mobility to land troops in the rear, A surprise amphibious landing trapped Washington at the Battle of Long Island (Aug 1776). Miraculously he evaded the fleet and escaped to Manhattan. But another amphibious landing trapped him again. A second miraculous escape took Washington north of the city.
Washington had been whipped. Any remaining American taste for offensive warfare like the siege of Boston or the invasion of Canada dissolved in the face of British superiority in numbers and assault capability. Disorganization, shortages of supplies, fatigue, sickness, and above all, lack of confidence in the American leadership resulted in a melting away of untrained regulars and frightened militia. As Washington grumbled, "The honor of making a brave defence does not seem to be sufficient stimulus, when the success is very doubtful, and the falling into the Enemy's hands probable." The Connecticut contingent shrank from 8,000 to 2,000 in a matter of days. At White Plains, north of New York City, Washington again lost, and had to retreat to the hills of New Jersey. Meanwhile two major American forts, Lee and Washington, were surrounded and captured with 2,800 prisoners and the loss of sorely needed artillery and supplies. Manhattan and Long Island would fly the Union Jack until 1783. In December, 1776, the British seized control of New Jersey. The defeats were humiliating, but indecisive because the Howes neglected their opportunities to crush the insurgents. After all the casualties, captures, departures and desertions, Washington had only 16,000 men left--half the force he started with. He would never again battle the main British army, but would try to pick away at detachments and outposts. He knew the Redcoats could seize any city or other point they chose, but the new nation was so decentralized that it had no nerve center to be immobilized. Above all, Washington's goal was to keep his army alive as proof that the Revolution persisted.
Washington, however, was not finished. On Christmas Day, 1776, he crossed the ice-filled Delaware River and surprised the Hessian winter encampment at Trenton, New Jersey. Over 900 of the 1,400 Germans were captured, and 22 killed; only 4 Americans were dead. Washington followed up this brilliant stroke with a lightning attack on Princeton, New Jersey, on January 2. The overcautious General Howe decided to retreat to New York, abandoning New Jersey and thousands of Loyalist supporters. Only a small part of the great British army had been defeated, and yet New Jersey was lost. Washington broke all the rules. Well-behaved armies spent six "winter" months (December through May or June) in camp, not in the field. It was rude indeed to interrupt Hessians sleeping off their Christmas parties. And it was audacious to challenge a much larger, much better equipped enemy with a ragged, hungry little force. But battles are won by audacity, and Washington's bold moves revived patriot spirits and demonstrated to the British that conciliatory tactics would never bring the Americans to heel.
British occupation policy
If this was a revolution, the British needed a counter- revolutionary policy. Assuming the ringleaders were few and easily suppressed was a cardinal mistake, delaying any effective policy until after 1776. By then it was too late. To control an area the insurgents had to accomplish three goals: win the allegiance of more people, in terms of both active support and passive acquiescence. Then the rebels had to construct a viable organization. The organization needed identity (badges, flags), recruiting capability, weapons, training, leadership, ties to the national movement, and a secure sanctuary in case in case of attack. Finally the insurgents had to crush the opposition's will to exist through techniques that ranged from ostracism to seizure of property, imprisonment, and execution. In the 1770s the patriots were younger, more committed, more vigorous, less attached to the old order, more confident and better organized than the Loyalists. They would surely win unless the British successfully competed for the allegiance of the apathetics and neutrals, throttled the rebel organization, and revitalized the old government, especially as it touched people's lives.
In Queens County, New York, Loyalism was strong; about 12% of the people were patriots and 27% Loyalists. (The remainder were neutral, but some could be coerced one way or the other.) In addition to their rare numerical advantage, the Loyalists had the secure refuge, for New York City was only a few miles away. Furthermore the British commissary agents were paying farmers real gold for food, horses and fuel, while the rebels only had dubious paper money. In most of the country, the rebels early on seized control of local governments, and enlisted the militia on their side, but in Queens, the Loyalists won control of most of the towns. In most of the country, the religious configuration favored the rebels. The New England Congregationalists and the southern Anglicans, for example, supported the revolution. In Queens, one fifth of the people were Quakers. Ostensibly neutral, the Quakers in fact were comfortable with the royal regime that had protected them for so long. Queens had a large Anglican and Dutch Reformed population (both 4 to 1 Tory), and many Presbyterians (5 to 1 patriot). Most newspapers in the colonies favored the revolution, as did most orators. In Queens the propaganda seemed to favor the Crown. The atrocities and oppression the patriots talked about endlessly were not local matters; no one was afraid of Indians any longer. When the patriots failed to win control of the spirit of Queens in 1775, they bluntly arrested and attacked supporters of the Crown. This gave the Loyalists the image of reasonable moderates defending the community against terrorists.
When the redcoats occupied Queens from 1776 to 1783 the inhabitants discovered what the American Revolution was all about. Civilians were treated with contempt--attacked, raped, arrested, plundered, cheated, cut off from decisions. The British instituted a harsh martial law just to make sure there would be no unrest. Loyalism faded in Queens; the men increasingly refused to volunteer for Loyalist militia units, or spy on the patriots. Only one fifth of the original Tories went into exile after 1783; the remainder seemed pleased that the new government had restored peace. Not even under ideal conditions could the aristocratic British win the hearts and minds of the equalitarian Americans. But even if the British had figured out a counter-revolutionary strategy, after Saratoga it was too late.
Burgoyne's plan: split the Colonies, 1777
Early in the war one of the more dashing and imaginative British generals, John Burgoyne, had a plan to divide and conquer:
A large army of such foreign troops as might be hired to begin their operations up the Hudson River; another army composed partly of old, disciplined troops and partly of Canadians, to act from Canada; a large levy of Indians, and a supply of arms for the blacks, to awe the southern provinces, conjointly with detachments of regulars; and a numerous fleet to sweep the whole coast, might possibly do the business in one campaign.
Burgoyne won London's approval for most of his plan, and command of the army that was to march down from Canada and seize the Hudson River. Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger would lead a second army across New York from west to east, meeting up with Burgoyne in Albany. Finally, redcoats in New York City might (or might not) march north and join the other two armies. Burgoyne's basic idea was that New England was the hotbed of revolution. Cut it off and the nine central and southern colonies would lack leadership and determination. Canada was used as the main base partly because there were 10,000 regulars there who could come down the long Montreal - Hudson River corridor. By 1777, however, a hundred thousand patriotic New Englanders lived within marching range of Burgoyne's route. A campaign north from New York City would have been much shorter, safer and more effective. But Howe was the senior officer, and would command such an attack. If Burgoyne was to lead the decisive blow he would have to start from Canada. He moved deep into enemy territory, far from the Royal Navy's guns, far from his base of supplies, and out of touch with supporting troops.
Everything went smoothly for Burgoyne, at first. In June, 1777, he easily captured the important American fort at Ticonderoga. St. Leger, with 1,800 Loyalists and Indians, besieged 750 Americans at Ft. Stanwix in central New York. Indians and Loyalists led by Mohawk Chief Joseph Brant ambushed and defeated one relief party at Oriskany. But then luck turned. General Benedict Arnold (still on the American side) sent a half-wit into St. Leger's camp with exaggerated tales of vast American armies on the march. The Indians retreated when news of the superior force arrived, forcing St. Leger to withdraw. He would not be at the Albany rendezvous. Burgoyne meanwhile slowly hacked his way through dense forest south of Ticonderoga. The Loyalists he expected to rally to the Union Jack were disappointingly few. The Indians proved very difficult to coordinate; Burgoyne complained they were too bloodthirsty and too eager for plunder to be effective soldiers. "My effort," Burgoyne explained, "has been to keep up their terror and avoid their cruelty." The French Canadians, though willing to defend their homes from the Yankees, refused to march south with Burgoyne's invading army. Howe, aware of Burgoyne's efforts, decided nonetheless to capture Philadelphia; he moved most of his army there by sea. Howe would not rendezvous in Albany either.
Washington perhaps should have moved north to cut the Hudson River between Albany and New York. Instead he tried to defend Philadelphia, the national capital. Howe whipped him in set battles at Brandywine Creek in September, and at Germantown a month later. Rather than pursuing his elusive tormentor, Howe settled down to winter quarters in affluent Philadelphia, where the wealthy Loyalists entertained his troops lavishly. The British, with plenty of gold coin, never wanted for food or fuel. Washington's barefoot men shivered and starved all winter long at nearby Valley Forge. The commissary and quartermaster departments, which reported directly to Congress, had failed their mission. The main reason was a lack of transportation to move supplies to where they were needed, and a lack of long-term planning. Since the Royal Navy blockaded the ports and controlled the seas and major rivers, supplies had to be tediously moved overland by wagon; with the British in control of New York City and Philadelphia, circuitous routes were necessary.
The British lacked good intelligence about what was happening. In Europe the armies were so large, the space so small, and the population so numerous, that everyone knew where everyone else was. Vast, open, underpopulated America was a different world. In the first few years of the war, the British commander occasionally received reports, often garbled or contradictory or, worst of all, overoptimistic, but never handled them in systematic fashion. Howe in Philadelphia did not know whether Washington was camped 5 miles away or 105. Finally after four years of warfare, in May 1779, Clinton appointed his aide Captain John Andre as intelligence officer. The energetic young spymaster set up underground networks and systematically analyzed the inflow of data from spies, Loyalist informers, captured hostiles, and escaped British prisoners. Andre's most brilliant stroke was the purchase of the plans for the defense of West Point in 1780--in the process of which he was captured in disguise and hung. His successor perfected the British intelligence network. When the Pennsylvania regulars mutinied in January 1781, Clinton learned about it the same day as Washington. His emissaries offered to pay in cash the mutineers' back wages if they would defect, but the mutineers hanged them. When the New Jersey regulars mutinied three weeks later, Clinton learned about it before Washington did, but did not try anything. The spies were getting better--soon they reported that the French naval base at Newport, Rhode Island, was poorly guarded. Clinton decided on a surprise attack, but both Admiral Graves and General Charles Cornwallis refused to follow his orders, and the opportunity passed. Spies correctly reported the secret moves of Washington and Rochambeau toward Virginia in 1781. This time Clinton misinterpreted the data, for it contradicted his firm belief that the attack would be against him in New York rather than against Cornwallis in Virginia. The best intelligence in the world proved useless when the command structure could not deal with it.
Decisive victory: Saratoga, 1777
After taking patriot strongholds at Crown Point and Ft. Ticonderoga, Burgoyne marched his redcoats south toward Albany, New York. He was far behind schedule because the Americans systematically blocked his way; his long train of unnecessary artillery prevented fast movement. Supplies of food and fodder were running short; his foragers found the countryside had been stripped. A cautious commander might have declared victory (because of the capture of Ft. Ticonderoga) and hurried back to Canada, as General Guy Carleton had done in nearly the same location a year earlier. But "Gentleman Johnny" was the proudest of the British generals--an amateur playwright with a flair for the dramatic. His sharp criticism of Carleton's retreat had given him this command in the first place. Success would end the war and make him the toast of London. By early August, Burgoyne was still far from Albany, and was running short of food. He sent 700 Hessians to Bennington, Vermont, to capture supplies, but only a handful returned. This was the his first indication of trouble--desperate trouble. The American militias had mobilized by the hundreds, by the thousands, and had whipped the Hessians at the Battle of Bennington. Burgoyne was stunned to discover that Loyalists were refusing to join his army or supply provisions. "The great bulk of the country [upstate New York] is undoubtedly with the Congress in principle and in zeal.... Wherever the King's forces point, militia to the amount of three or four thousand assemble within twenty-four hours; they bring their own subsistence, and the alarm over they return to their farms." Burgoyne finally called for help, and in late September Clinton led 3,000 men--an inadequate force--to capture American forts around West Point. They never came closer than 100 miles to Burgoyne. His invading army, with 2000 British regulars, 500 Loyalists and 2500 Hessians, was outnumbered 2-1 and was trapped. On September 14 he crossed his Rubicon, to the west bank of the Hudson River, and headed inland. On September 19 he led an assault at Freeman's Farm in an attempt to move west of Bemis Heights. 4,200 redcoats encountered MG Benedict Arnold with 2,000 Americans. Colonel Daniel Morgan's riflemen and Major Henry Dearborn's light infantry were forced to withdraw after a Hessian envelopment of their right flank. The American commander, Major General Horatio "Granny" Gates had only committed these troops at Arnold's insistence, and refused to give them artillery or reinforcements. At nightfall Gates conceded the field. He understood the futility of direct assaults, and by limiting his casualties to only 65 dead he had encouraged more militia to join his army. Furthermore, the British victory proved costly, since they lost 600 irreplaceable men.
For the next three weeks Burgoyne stood paralyzed. An attack on September 20 or 21 might have sent the Americans running. Instead he waited for reinforcements from Clinton coming up the Hudson--waited, waited, waited. By October 3 the redcoats were hungry; quartermasters reduced rations by one-third. Casualties, desertions of Loyalists and Canadians, and sickness reduced the effectives to 5,000. Gates held all the trumps. New England militia companies, sensing the kill, were pouring into camp. The Americans now held a decisive 3:1 advantage. Gates carefully buttressed Bemis Heights with earthworks and breastworks; his army was being resupplied; and he knew the whereabouts and strengths of the British. Burgoyne realized it was impossible to retreat to Canada; he had to attack. On October 7 he again tried to move west of Bemis Heights. Gates sent Morgan and Dearborn to the British right, and General Enoch Poor's 800 man brigade to its left. Riflemen high in the trees took deadly aim at redcoat officers. Soon, both British flanks were exposed and BG Ebenezer Learned's brigade in the center engaged two German battalions. Arnold, who had been relieved of command by Gates, suddenly jumped into the action and led Learned's brigade in a brilliant attack. The Germans retreated behind Balcarres Redoubt. Arnold then took command of all the troops and led an assault around Burgoyne's right which captured the critical Breymann's Redoubt. Arnold's horse was shot and his leg broken; Morgan and Dearborn continued the charge. (Today there is a monument at Saratoga to Arnold's patriotic leg.) The British retreated, but had nowhere to go. As Burgoyne noted, the American militias were clumsy in method and movement (because of inexperienced field officers), but they were disciplined, and showed the "sobriety, subordination, regularity and courage" needed to win battles. Burgoyne had lost another 600 men, including two generals. American casualties were only 200. Burgoyne put off his formal surrender at Saratoga until October 17. Since there was still a danger of Clinton's arrival, Gates gave very generous terms. The redcoats would disarm, march to Boston, sail for home, and promise never to return. The officers did go home, but Congress reneged and kept the others prisoner for the rest of the war.
Overconfidence, poor strategy, amazingly confused coordination among Burgoyne, Howe and Clinton (which can be blamed on Lord Germain, in overall charge in London), and inadequate logistics destroyed a proud British army. Gates followed a simple, clear-cut strategy of blocking a force that was too small and too far from base. Sooner or later it had to surrender.
World War: France joins the Americans
The original British strategy had failed totally. Clearly there was no way to defeat the Americans in classical battles-- Washington would either disengage, or, when the odds were highly favorable, capture another British army. Unless Britain did something radically innovative, the American colonies were lost. The strategy of sending Burgoyne overland from Canada to seize the Hudson was a fundamental strategic blunder. It played to the Americans' strength and failed to use the British fleet effectively at a time it controlled the seas. Instead the British should have seized West Point 50 miles north of New York City by overland attack, then sailed small, well-armed frigates up and down the Hudson River. This would have prevented movements of supplies or soldiers between New England and New York. Washington was more alert to the geography than his enemies were, and by 1778 he had West Point well defended. Saratoga was a shattering blow. The British lost 8,000 men (plus supplies and artillery) that would be hard to replace. The Americans kept control of a strategic waterway and prevented the enemy from splitting the new nation. Americans were excited to discover that they could indeed defeat the best soldiers of a supposedly invincible superpower.
Even more decisively, the American victory undercut the entire world geopolitical position of Britain. France had long been eager to enter the war, and while Britain allowed its navy to rot, the French had built a powerful fleet and knit alliances across the continent. Paris stepped up munitions shipments and in February, 1778, signed a formal treaty with the U.S., becoming a fighting ally. In 1779 Paris brought the Spanish Empire into the new anti-British alliance. Paris acted in part out of revenge at the loss of Canada in the Seven Years War (1763), and even more for practical geopolitical and commercial goals. Independence for the American colonies meant that France's historic adversary would lose the richest, fastest growing, and most strategically located colonies in the world. Indeed, they would become French allies, permanently tilting the balance of power in the North Atlantic and the flow of trade. Holland joined with France, as did Spain. Madrid had only one interest, the return of Gibraltar, which Britain had captured in 1704. Spain offered to join Britain in the war if it could get Gibraltar; when London refused, she joined the allies. (In the end, Britain kept Gibraltar and returned Florida to the Spanish.) In a stunning failure of diplomacy, Britain was unable to sign up any allies anywhere on the globe, and most neutrals even took hostile positions. This was a world war, but Continental Europe was controlled by the enemy or neutral. Britain would have to fight its war at sea, and the land battles in North America assumed minor importance in the large picture.
Britain now was outnumbered in population and wealth, and worst of all, outgunned on the seas by an aggregate of 120 ships of the line to 90. The potential threat of the French fleet forced Clinton (now commander in chief) to evacuate Philadelphia in June, 1778. Yankees threatened his rear guard at Monmouth, but Clinton made good his escape to New York City. The Americans were lucky to get a draw at Monmouth. Their commander, the brilliant, experienced and erratic Charles Lee had lost control of the situation and had to be rescued by Washington. Lee complained bitterly, sought a court martial, was convicted and disgraced. (Decades later it was discovered that before Monmouth Lee had become a traitor who gave Howe a comprehensive plan to defeat Washington.) Monmouth was the last major battle in the North; for the next three years Washington positioned his army to make sure Clinton stayed in New York City. Washington never could talk the French into a joint attack on the well-defended city. The bulk of Royal Navy had to be stationed near England to defend against a possible French-Spanish invasion. (The invasion was threatened twice, but never took place.) The alliance involved risks for the allies: Britain might well defeat their navies separately and capture one of the French West Indies, or French holdings in India. Eventually Britain did accomplish all that. Furthermore, Paris had a poor financial systems; the war bankrupted the treasury, weakened the monarchy, and hastened the French Revolution in 1789. What did the new allies contribute to the American cause? The Spanish, operating from New Orleans, cleared the redcoats out of the lower Mississippi Valley, seizing Mobile on the Gulf Coast, Pensacola (in British West Florida) and the Bahama islands. They also blockaded Gibraltar. These actions diverted British resources, and helped neutralize the pro-British Indians who were attacking patriot settlements along the Carolina-Georgia frontier.
In larger perspective, the American alliance turned a tussle in a remote part of the globe into the fifth world war; indeed, the United States became a secondary theater. Britain would now have a very difficult time defeating the rebels. The fragility of its long supply line, the stretching of already thin resources, the continued corruption and weak and vacillating leadership in London, and the grave threats from every direction spelled doom. As the Earl of Sandwich (head of the Royal Navy) lamented:
England till this time was never engaged in a sea war with
the House of Bourbon [France and Spain] thoroughly united,
their naval force unbroken, and having no other war or object
to draw off their attention and resources. We unfortunately
have an additional war on our hands [vs USA] which
essentially drains our resources and employs a very
considerable part of our army and navy; we have no one friend
or ally to assist us; on the contrary all those who ought to
be our allies except Portugal act against us in supplying our
enemies with the means of equipping their fleet.
With defeatism rampant among British officers and politicians, the independence of the United States seemed inevitable. Britain lacked a coherent strategy, or brilliant generals or admirals with the genius to reverse the tide. London probably wanted peace with the Americans, if it could keep, as King George insisted:
Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas...and the more they are kept unlike the other [American] colonies the better, for it is by them that we are to keep a certain awe over the abandoned colonies.
However, there was one hope left: by fighting on perhaps the British forces could hold onto Canada, the Great Lakes, and New York City, and also chop off the most Loyalist, least developed part of the United States, the lower South. Then if the peace conference could confirm these holdings, the British Empire would emerge tattered but with honor intact, and a great deal of valuable territory as well. The US would be independent, but would be weak and not a threat. The downside to fighting on was that the alliance might win outright. France did send a large professional army which, combined with Washington's forces, had the potential to overwhelm the British. With control of the sea in doubt, the Royal Navy could no longer guarantee it could reinforce or evacuate a British land army that got in trouble. London realized that for all its corruption it was financially stronger than the allies; perhaps by holding out it could push the alliance into economic collapse. The new British strategy therefore called for a stronger navy, and an invasion of the American South. The navy was rebuilt successfully; the invasion was a disaster.
Ending the Indian threat
The great majority of Indians sided with the British during the war. The British provided arms for the Indians, under Loyalist leadership, to raid frontier settlements from the Carolinas to New York, massacring the settlers, especially in Pennsylvania. The most prominent was Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, who led a band of 300 Indian warriors and 100 white loyalists. In 1779 Washington sent General John Sullivan with four brigades of Continental soldiers to drive the Iroquois out of New York. There was little combat but Sullivan systematically burned the (empty) Indian villages and, most important, destroyed about 600,000 bushels of grain that comprised the winter food supply. Facing starvation the Iroquois permanently fled to Canada, where the British fed them. At the 1783 peace conference the British abandoned their Indian allies, and the Americans took the lands of the defeated tribes.
The Southern Campaigns of 1778-81
The new British strategy opened smoothly with the capture of Savannah in December, 1778. In February, 1780, Clinton brought 10,000 troops and 5,000 sailors in 90 ships to overwhelm Charleston. The forts defending the harbor were in disrepair, and the artillery no match for the British men of war. Worse, General Benjamin Lincoln allowed his 5,000 troops to be trapped inside the city. Clinton besieged Lincoln methodically, digging parallel lines, maintaining a heavy bombardment, and zigzagging forward to the next parallel. In accordance with classical rules of 18th century warfare, the city surrendered before the final assault. Lincoln's regulars were held on disease-ridden prison ships, while his militia were disarmed and allowed to go home. The Americans suffered the largest surrender in their history before the Civil War.
It was one matter to control the small city of Charleston, another to control the vast rural areas. The British treated as traitors everyone who failed to take the oath to King George. This harsh policy escalated tension and pushed most of the neutrals toward the American cause. The new British commander, General Charles Cornwallis, established a chain of forts inland. He sent Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his green-coated Legion of fierce Loyalist cavalry to hunt down rebel militia. Small American detachments besieged or assaulted the forts repeatedly, but were usually driven off. However, when the redcoats pursued the Americans, they lost more men by ambush, disease and desertion than they could replace. One British general offered a generous reward of 5 pounds for the return of any deserter, or 10 pounds for just his head. Food and fodder was scarce in the first place, but the Americans used a scorched earth policy to worsen the British logistical dilemma. The redcoats seized the farms and slaves of rebels, and installed Loyalists on them. Little food was produced, but much hatred and revenge. The British could hold the seacoast, the coastal towns, and a few inland forts, but they could not control the decisive locale, the countryside unless they hunted down the Americans. When small American armies (of 1,000 or 2,000 men) were defeated, they reformed as guerrilla bands. Terror and counter-terror were used. Tarleton warned the rebels, "If warfare allows me I shall give these disturbers of the peace no quarter; if humanity obliges me to spare their lives, I shall carry them close prisoners to Camden." His Legion whipped 300 militia at Waxhaw Creek, NC, and bayoneted the prisoners. "Tarleton's quarter!" the rebels spat, and promised to return the same. Old feuds resumed. Burned villages, crossroads massacres, late night arson, sudden assassination, slave stealing, rape and looting and desperate flight destroyed the social fabric of the Carolinas. Everyone realized that victory would go to the most ruthless men, with no quarter to the losers; no one recognized "innocent civilians."
Fourteen-year old Andrew Jackson joined the North Carolina militia as a messenger, and was captured after a skirmish at a patriot's house. The raiders sacked and burned the house and insulted the women. A lieutenant ordered the lad to shine his boots. Jackson refused, and was slashed by the officer's sword. He carried the scars for the rest of his life, getting his revenge at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. They took Jackson's prized pistol, a smart little gun that would "kick like sixty when loaded with a three-quarter-ounce ball or with nine buckshot." A few days later a patrol captured a Loyalist with the pistol--evidence that he had been one of the raiders. The Loyalist was hung, and Andy got his pistol back. The Loyalist who took Jackson's horse also was captured, but he was not hung because he had been shot through the stomach before he surrendered and was already dying. As Jackson later reflected, we "did not lose many points in the game of hanging, shooting and flogging." The British hard-line position indicated they had abandoned their original aim of restoring the colonies to loyalty to the Crown.
Washington sent General Horatio Gates to hold the South with a mere 1,400 regulars of the Maryland Line and the Delaware Line, and all the militia he could raise. Gates pushed his starved and sick troops through the swamps and woods of the border region between the two Carolinas, and suddenly encountered Cornwallis at Camden, South Carolina. His frightened militia fled without firing a shot, the regulars retreated, and Gates personally set an all-time record by fleeing 180 miles on horseback in less than four days. His replacement General Nathanael Greene, by contrast, proved a sophisticated and successful guerrilla commander. So did the subordinate generals Francis Marion (the "Swamp Fox"), Thomas Sumter, and Andrew Pickens. Greene realized that Cornwallis could not replace his loses. The solution therefore was to fight a series of engagements, none decisive but all painful to the British. If there was a danger of defeat, the Americans would break off and let Cornwallis and Tarleton pursue them further from the British base of supplies. When the British split their forces to chase rebel bands, they ran a severe risk. In October, 1780, 900 backwoods militiamen, with hunting rifles, chased 1,000 Loyalist soldiers to King's Mountain. The rebels stormed the mountain, capturing or killing the entire British force.
At Cowpens in January, 1781, Tarleton's 1,100 mounted troopers caught up with Daniel Morgan and his 1,000 militia riflemen. Morgan put General Pickens' raw soldiers in the front lines, told them to fire twice then retreat. The redcoats, sensing victory, charged with fixed bayonets, crashing into Morgan's second line, which wavered, then held. The American cavalry counterattacked Tarleton's right flank and the supposedly panicked Pickens' regiment suddenly reappeared on the left. It was a classical double envelopment. (Possibly Morgan knew about the similar action at the battle of Cannae, Italy, where Hannibal encircled and demolished the Romans in 216 B.C.) Tarleton lost 300 casualties and 525 prisoners out of 1,100 men; he barely escaped himself. The American victory resulted primarily from Morgan's ability to compensate for the weaknesses of his situation. His choice of terrain, his detailed preparation for the battle, his organization for combat, and his conduct of the battle all combined to give the British forces one of their most decisive defeats during the Revolutionary War. Moreover, Morgan's choice of Cowpens as the place to give battle resulted in an accidental psychological advantage - the terrain encouraged Tarleton to make a frontal assault without stopping to evaluate the open terrain. Tarleton was overconfident regarding the bravery of his troops, was too impatient of delay, and was too confident of success. The resultant impetuous frontal attack not only contributed to Tarleton's defeat, but affected the remaining course of the war by depriving the British Army of the major portion of its light troops during the remainder of the southern campaign.
At Guilford, North Carolina in March, Greene tried to duplicate Morgan's tactics (every ambitious general for 2000 years has tried for a double envelopment), but Cornwallis drove him off the field. In the process Cornwallis lost a fourth of his men; more victories like that, London sighed, and they would lose their armies. The British were able to break American sieges of their frontier outposts, but realized they could not hold them forever. They therefore pulled back into the ports of Charleston and Savannah, giving the Americans control over the rural South.
Final victory: Yorktown, 1781
Cornwallis originally planned to invade Virginia only after pacifying the Carolinas. After Cowpens that was hopeless. "It is not the number of troops Mr. Washington can spare from his army that is to be apprehended," one British general finally realized. "It is the multitude of militia and men in arms ready to turn out at an hour's notice at the show of a single Regiment of Continental troops." The combination of regulars and militia, supported by a fierce and successful determination to gain political control of the population no matter how much bloodshed, destroyed Cornwallis's plans to rally the Loyalists. He now gave up on the deep south and headed into Virginia with 7,500 men, without guarantees of supplies or reinforcements. His superior, General Henry Clinton in New York, wanted Cornwallis to retreat southward, which doubtless would have been wiser. The British were slow learners; they finally realized that there was no real help from Tories or Indians. As late as June, 1781, Clinton reassured Cornwallis that he faced only 2000 regular Continentals, plus a small body of ill-armed "spiritless" "peasantry". In the event Major General Lafayette commanded 5,000 American and French soldiers who parried the redcoats. Cornwallis finally retreated to the Yorktown peninsula in August.
Learning that the main French fleet was moving up from the West Indies, Washington grasped the opportunity. In a brilliant strategic move, he marched 6,000 soldiers from New York to Virginia, while deceiving Clinton as to their destination. Admiral Francois de Grasse brought the French fleet with 28 ships of the line and 3,000 more troops to Virginia on August 30. Washington had long appreciated that "In any and all circumstances a naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend." A British naval squadron, sent to rescue Cornwallis, was challenged by de Grasse at the Battle of the Virginia Capes on September 5. The British for once were outnumbered and outgunned, and had no choice but to retreat back to New York for reinforcements. By the time the reinforced fleet returned, it was too late.
At Yorktown Washington assembled 5,700 Continentals, 3,200 militia and 7,800 French regulars on loan as part of the alliance. French siege experts used their standard techniques, forcing the redcoats back while new trenches zig-zagged forward. By October 10, 46 heavy guns shelled all parts of the British camp, and another 50 were in action a week later. Cornwallis, huddled in a cave along the riverfront, knew it was hopeless. On October 19 his band played a melancholy tune, "The World Turned Upside Down," as his 8,000 men paraded in surrender. Despite the size of the contending forces, and the importance of the siege, there were only 260 allied and 550 British casualties. The Americans were annoyed when the French officers began fraternizing with British officer-prisoners. The rustic Yankee officers and their upper class French counterparts had always kept at arms' length. The battle of Yorktown was the last action needed for victory, as the King lost control of Parliament and the new government opened peace talks that came to fruition in 1783. The disaster at Yorktown broke the morale of the governing class in London and paralyzed Britain's national will to make war.
Medical and casualties
There were about 200,000 enlistments in militia and Continental forces (including many who enlisted twice). The number of deaths by combat and disease was 4,435, with another 6,188 seriously injured.
- ↑ The Colonial Williamsburg Journal, "Fields of Fire—Four Views of the Fatal Day", Summer 2006. Available at [http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Summer06/paintings.cfm http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Summer06/paintings.cfm.
- ↑ Mason Wade (1945) vol 1
- ↑ Higginbotham, (1983)
- ↑ Weigley, (1991) p 234; Washington quote 20 Dec 1776 Writings 6:403
- ↑ Higginbotham, (1983)
- ↑ The colonelcy of a British regiment was honorific; the lieutenant colonel was in actual command.
- ↑ Buchanan, (2004); Royster, (1979)
- ↑ Fischer (2004)
- ↑ Linda K. Kerber, “History Will Do It No Justice: Women’s Lives in Revolutionary America” (1987) online at ; Saffron (1977); Reiss (1982)
- ↑ Maryland Magazine of History (1974) vol 69 p93 quoted in Brugger
- ↑ Joseph S. Tiedemann, "A Revolution Foiled: Queens County, New York, 1775-1776." Journal of American History 1988 75(2): 417-444. Issn: 0021-8723 in Jstor
- ↑ Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, 22 June 1777, in Davies ed. Documents of the American Revolution, 14:119-21; Burgoyne to Germain 11 July 1777, ibid 14:140-1
- ↑ Burgoyne to Germain, 6 Aug 1777 in Davies ed. Documents of the American Revolution, 14:156-7
- ↑ Burgoyne to Germain, 20 Aug 1777 in Davies 14:166
- ↑ Burgoyne to Sir Henry Clinton, 28 Sept 1777 in Davies 14:191
- ↑ Burgoyne letters and reports in Davies 14:212-215, 228-37; page 236-7 for quote
- ↑ Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 110; Goodwin, The American and French Revolutions pp, 253-7
- ↑ Quoted in Kennedy, Rise and Fall p 97; see also Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (2004) Page 313
- ↑ Brooke, George III p 301; Robson, The American Revolution, p 178; Kennedy, Rise and Fall p 108
- ↑ The Oneida Indians split, with many supporting the American cause. Joseph T. Glatthaar and James Kirby Martin, Forgotten Allies: The Oneida Indians and the American Revolution (2007)
- ↑ see Barbara Graymont, "Thayendanegea," Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online
- ↑ Joseph R. Fischer, Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, July-September 1779 (1997)
- ↑ Michael D. Mahler, "190th Anniversary - the Battle at Cowpens." Military Review 1971 51(1): 56-63. Issn: 0026-4148
- ↑ .Clinton to Cornwallis 11 June 1781 in Davies 20:157
- ↑ Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, 20 Oct 1781, in Davies 20:244-248
- ↑ Brooke, George III p 353-4. However a naval war between Britain and France continued in the West Indies, with Admiral Rodney sinking DeGrasse's entire French fleet in April 1782.
- ↑ The British and Loyalist totals are not included. The data is conjectural. See "Statistical Summary America's Major Wars" at