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{{ | An '''integrated air defense system''' puts all antiaircraft sensors (e.g., radar, visual observers, and other technical means) as well as antiaircraft weapons (e.g., anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft|air superiority fighters and interceptors, etc., under a common system of command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I). Depending on the national doctrine involved, the control is more or less decentralized. NATO doctrine is concerned with deconfliction, but allowing a fighter pilot the discretion to pursue the final attack. Soviet doctrine, including that of Iraq, was more centralized and less flexible for the pilot. | ||
An '''integrated air defense system''' puts all antiaircraft sensors (e.g., radar, visual observers, and other technical means) as well as antiaircraft weapons (e.g., | |||
Today's battlefield, in many respects, starts as a duel between the IADS and the | Today's battlefield, in many respects, starts as a duel between the IADS and the suppression of enemy air defense campaign against it. | ||
The first operational IADS, with no computer assistance other than in the brains of the defenders, was in the | The first operational IADS, with no computer assistance other than in the brains of the defenders, was in the Battle of Britain.<ref name=RAFBOB>{{citation | ||
| title=Battle of Britain | | title=Battle of Britain | ||
| author =Royal Air Force | | author =Royal Air Force | ||
Line 15: | Line 14: | ||
| url = http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA397960 | | url = http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA397960 | ||
| date = March 1997}}</ref> | | date = March 1997}}</ref> | ||
==Requirements of an IADS== | ==Requirements of an IADS== | ||
The basic rules of an IADS are: | The basic rules of an IADS are: | ||
*Find the attackers | *Find the attackers | ||
*Direct your defensive platforms (e.g., | *Direct your defensive platforms (e.g., surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), etc.) against them | ||
*Let your defensive platforms attack the enemy | *Let your defensive platforms attack the enemy | ||
*Don't let your defensive platforms attack your own side | *Don't let your defensive platforms attack your own side | ||
===Sensors=== | ===Sensors=== | ||
Radar is the backbone of modern IADS, and radar of many types: early warning, perhaps over-the-horizon early warning, "look down" airborne radar that can detect low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles, ballistic missile acquisition radar, missile fire control radar, ground- and air-based radar that direct fighters to their targets, missile guidance radar, to say nothing of weather radar to pick out routes that the enemy may try and that your forces can use. Still, it is possible to become overdependent on radar, or make too many assumptions that you are superior to the enemy's radar. | |||
Some Soviet/Russian SAMs, such as the | Some Soviet/Russian SAMs, such as the 2K12 (NATO reporting name SA-6 GAINFUL), have, in addition to radar, electro-optical assistance to visual guidance. <ref name=Cordesman2000>{{citation | ||
| title=The Effectiveness of the NATO Tactical Air and Missile Campaign Against Serbian Air and Ground Forces in Kosovo: A Working Paper | | title=The Effectiveness of the NATO Tactical Air and Missile Campaign Against Serbian Air and Ground Forces in Kosovo: A Working Paper | ||
| | | author = Anthony Cordesman | ||
| publisher = Center for Strategic and International Studies | | publisher = Center for Strategic and International Studies | ||
|date =August, 2000 | |date =August, 2000 | ||
Line 32: | Line 32: | ||
}}</ref> These were a rude surprise to NATO forces that believed they had destroyed all Serbian radars, or forced them to shut down. Anthony Cordesman observed that a lesson learned from the Kosovo campaign was "the continuing survivability of land-based air defenses, and the threat posed by “non-cooperative” air defenses that do not emit or deploy in ways that can be easily targeted. According to NATO figures, some 90% of Serbia’s SA-6 assets survived the war, and could fire using pop-up radar and/or electro-optical techniques at the end of the war." Further, he observed that modern air and missile power can | }}</ref> These were a rude surprise to NATO forces that believed they had destroyed all Serbian radars, or forced them to shut down. Anthony Cordesman observed that a lesson learned from the Kosovo campaign was "the continuing survivability of land-based air defenses, and the threat posed by “non-cooperative” air defenses that do not emit or deploy in ways that can be easily targeted. According to NATO figures, some 90% of Serbia’s SA-6 assets survived the war, and could fire using pop-up radar and/or electro-optical techniques at the end of the war." Further, he observed that modern air and missile power can | ||
achieve very high levels of suppression, [but\ cannot kill mobile systems or prevent land-based | achieve very high levels of suppression, [but\ cannot kill mobile systems or prevent land-based | ||
systems from riding out an extensive..." | systems from riding out an extensive..."suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) campaign. In contrast to the Iraqi KARI <ref>a French-built system; KARI is the French word "Irak" spelled backwards</ref> IADS was largely made up of fixed assets. | ||
===Layered structure=== | ===Layered structure=== | ||
A modern IADS has multiple layers of sensors and defensive systems. This is most obvious in the protection of a U.S. naval carrier group, in which the outermost ring consists of fighters and well-escorted airborne radar aircraft, with the next ring made up of long-range | A modern IADS has multiple layers of sensors and defensive systems. This is most obvious in the protection of a U.S. naval carrier group, in which the outermost ring consists of fighters and well-escorted airborne radar aircraft, with the next ring made up of long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) such as the RIM-156 Standard SM-2, another ring of medium-range SAMs such as the # RIM-162 ESSM, and point defenses such as the Phalanx close-in weapons system (i.e., autocannon) and RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles. | ||
When there was a still a major threat from Soviet Naval Aviation bombers launching long-range | When there was a still a major threat from Soviet Naval Aviation bombers launching long-range anti-shipping missiles (ASM), there were two rings of fighters, the Outer Air Battle aircraft being F-14 Tomcat interceptors armed with the extremely long range, but relatively unmaneuverable, AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile. On the theory that "it is better to stop the archer than the arrows", the Tomcats would try to intercept the bombers outside their maximum missile range. Another ring of fighters would engage any threat aircraft not carrying long-range weapons, and probably engage the fast but straight-running ASMs. | ||
Ballistic missile defense can have many layers. Israel is exploring acquiring the very long range | Ballistic missile defense can have many layers. Israel is exploring acquiring the very long range RIM-161 Standard SM-3 missile intended to engage theater ballistic missiles, and adapting them to a land-based role. The next ring would be the still long-range, very-high-altitude Arrow-2 missiles co-developed with the U.S. For critical areas of 15 mile or so radius, the remaining incoming warheads would face MIM-104 Patriot missiles. Final point defense of key installations might use autocannon such as the Oerlikon AHEAD shotgun-like pellets, or the developmental Nautilus, formerly the Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser (MTHEL). | ||
===Command and control=== | ===Command and control=== | ||
Today, if the enemy knows where your IADS command is located, and it is not mobile <u>''and''</u> well-defended, he will make it a high priority to kill. It becomes a | Today, if the enemy knows where your IADS command is located, and it is not mobile <u>''and''</u> well-defended, he will make it a high priority to kill. It becomes a center of gravity of one's defense. This was not true in the Battle of Britain; the Germans did not fully understand the network of sector stations linked to one another and to Fighter Command, and they did not have the precision-guided munitions to achieve sure kill on the command posts if they knew their significance. | ||
Iraqi IADS command posts, however, were some of the first targets of the 1991 | Iraqi IADS command posts, however, were some of the first targets of the 1991 Operation Desert Storm attack, although an early warning radar was the very first target. The latter was on the Saudi-Iraq border, and was unconventionally attacked by Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, led to the target by Air Force Special Operations MH-53 PAVE LOW helicopters with advanced low-level navigation. | ||
While | While Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) such as the E-3 Sentry or Russian Beriev A-50 seem safe in the air, that depends on the sophistication of the opponent. It is unlikely that a fighter can claw through the escorts surrounding an AWACS, but long-range air-to-air missiles that also have an anti-radiation missile capability may get through. The Soviet/Russian Vympel R-33/AA-9 AMOS has been considered an "AWACS killer". Longer-ranged versions of the U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM may have the same capability toward the other side. | ||
===Air defense platforms=== | ===Air defense platforms=== | ||
Active DCA uses air, sea, and ground based assets that either physically destroy the enemy, using | Active DCA uses air, sea, and ground based assets that either physically destroy the enemy, using antiaircraft artillery (AAA), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and fighter aircraft armed with autocannon or air-to-air missiles (AAM). Fighters have the greatest range and flexibility, but cannot provide continuous coverage of a protected area. | ||
In the past, certain | In the past, certain fighter aircraft were specialized for the aircraft interception mission. Multirole combat aircraft have replaced them, but some interceptors, such as the Russian MiG-25. Interceptors tend to have very high speed, but little maneuverability if they were intended to go against bombers. Their high speed and altitude capability can make them useful as reconnaissance platforms, such as the MiG-25R. | ||
Such systems can be divided by their area of coverage. Fighters and longer-range SAMs can cover areas containing numerous surface targets, while point defense of short-range SAMs and AAA can protect specific targets. A special case is the protection of high-value assets such as | Such systems can be divided by their area of coverage. Fighters and longer-range SAMs can cover areas containing numerous surface targets, while point defense of short-range SAMs and AAA can protect specific targets. A special case is the protection of high-value assets such as AWACS and air refueling|tankers, which usually involves fighters, and possibly electronic warfare aircraft, escorting them. | ||
===Deconfliction=== | ===Deconfliction=== | ||
Deconfliction is one of the key aspects of an IADS. In general, there are a series of concentric circles around a target: the outermost might be assigned to long-range fighters, the next to long-range SAMs, the next to shorter-range fighters, and the innermost to AAA and short-range SAMs. These circles may be three-dimensional; there may be a rule that while aircraft at high altitude over troop concentrations are not to be engaged by the ground missiles, if they descend below a given altitude, they become targets. | |||
Some IADS will mix systems in an IADS, either accepting a certain probability of | Some IADS will mix systems in an IADS, either accepting a certain probability of Fratricide (military)|fratricide,<ref name=Press>{{citation | ||
| id = ADA057830 | | id = ADA057830 | ||
| title =Tactical Integrated Air Defense System | | title =Tactical Integrated Air Defense System | ||
Line 62: | Line 62: | ||
| author = Press, Michael C. | | author = Press, Michael C. | ||
| date = 09 June 1978 | | date = 09 June 1978 | ||
| url =http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA057830 }}</ref> or relying on | | url =http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA057830 }}</ref> or relying on identification friend or foe and other electronics to avoid fratricide. <blockquote>Both air force and air defense force [Egyptian] commanders confirmed that, while it was an operational goal to use the MiG-21 as the first force to engage enemy aircraft at maximum range, it also was tactical doctrine for the interceptors to fight within the missile belt and continue harrying attacking forces all the way to their targets. They agreed that losses from friendly missiles were so relatively small that the tactics of using both interceptors and missiles in the same airspace was operationally sound and militarily effective against the offensive formations.<ref name=Hotz>{{citation | ||
confirmed that, while it was an operational goal to use the | |||
as the first force to engage enemy aircraft at maximum range, it | |||
also was tactical doctrine for the interceptors to fight within the | |||
missile belt and continue harrying attacking forces all the way to | |||
their targets. They agreed that losses from friendly missiles were | |||
so relatively small that the tactics of using both interceptors and | |||
missiles in the same airspace was operationally sound and militarily | |||
effective against the offensive formations.<ref name=Hotz>{{citation | |||
| contribution = Offense, Defense Tested in 1973 War | | contribution = Offense, Defense Tested in 1973 War | ||
| title = Both Sides of the Suez: Airpower In the Mideast | | title = Both Sides of the Suez: Airpower In the Mideast | ||
| publisher = Aviation Week and Space Technology | | publisher = Aviation Week and Space Technology | ||
| author = Hotz | | author = Robert Hotz | ||
| comment = cited in Press1998}}</ref> </blockquote> | | comment = cited in Press1998}}</ref> </blockquote> | ||
==IADS over time== | ==IADS over time== | ||
===Battle of Britain=== | ===Battle of Britain=== | ||
See | See Battle of Britain for the operational doctrine, and a somewhat more technical description of the Radar#Historic: Battle of Britain Chain Home|Chain Home radars. | ||
===Kammhuber Line=== | ===Kammhuber Line=== | ||
Named after its architect and commander, Generalleutnant Josef Kammhuber of the | Named after its architect and commander, Generalleutnant Josef Kammhuber of the Luftwaffe, this IADS, originally extending to the French coast, defended Germany from World War II strategic bombing. Obviously, its western installations were lost as the Allies moved inland, but the German defenses were still very credible. The radars were technically excellent, and one of the major problems was Adolf Hitler's unwillingness to invest in defensive systems. | ||
===NATO=== | ===NATO=== | ||
Line 86: | Line 79: | ||
===Soviet Union=== | ===Soviet Union=== | ||
===North Vietnam=== | ===North Vietnam=== | ||
While the North Vietnamese had relatively little air defense when first bombed after the | While the North Vietnamese had relatively little air defense when first bombed after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, they steadily improved. As a very significant difference from the Korean War, North Vietnamese air defenses moved quickly to integrate radar, command post, ground observers, anti-aircraft artillery, and, when the Soviets supplied them, surface-to-air missiles. | ||
By 1960, the U.S. was starting to direct strategic SIGINT at North Vietnam, to understand their air defense as well as other structures. | By 1960, the U.S. was starting to direct strategic SIGINT at North Vietnam, to understand their air defense as well as other structures. | ||
Their best fighter was the | Their best fighter was the MiG-21, but they had pilots who could get good results with obsolescent aircraft such as the MiG-17. | ||
After a regiment of PRC | After a regiment of PRC MiG-17 fighters arrived at Mengtzu in 1963, SIGINT predicted jet fighters would enter the DRV air defense network. This was reinforced with learning that high-level DRV and PRC personnel would have a meeting at Mengtzu in May 1964.<ref name=NSAVN-6>{{citation | ||
| chapter = Chapter 6 - Xerxes' Arrows: SIGINT Support to the Air War, 1964-1972 | | chapter = Chapter 6 - Xerxes' Arrows: SIGINT Support to the Air War, 1964-1972 | ||
| title = Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975 | | title = Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975 | ||
Line 100: | Line 93: | ||
| url = http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/spartans/chapter6.pdf }}</ref> | | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/spartans/chapter6.pdf }}</ref> | ||
The | The Gulf of Tonkin incident, in August 1964, involved DESOTO patrols by destroyer equipped with intercept vans, backed up with carrier air patrols and additional destroyers. | ||
<REF name=NSAtonkin>{{cite web | <REF name=NSAtonkin>{{cite web | ||
| last = National Security Agency | | last = National Security Agency | ||
Line 109: | Line 102: | ||
| url = http://www.espionageinfo.com/An-Ba/Army-Security-Agency.html | | url = http://www.espionageinfo.com/An-Ba/Army-Security-Agency.html | ||
| accessdate = 2007-10-02}}</ref>. | | accessdate = 2007-10-02}}</ref>. | ||
Image:SIGINT-SEA-1964-1968.png| thumb | left | SIGINT-related events, 1964-1968 | |||
=====Early DRV Air Defense Buildup===== | =====Early DRV Air Defense Buildup===== | ||
In the weeks immediately following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the most important SIGINT role was providing defensive information to US air strikes. This was done at three levels of generality. First, overall monitoring of the DRV air defense network, SIGINT could maintain situational awareness of North Vietnamese tracking via radar and visual observers. Second, SIGINT detected the activation of specific weapons systems in the air defense network, such as | In the weeks immediately following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the most important SIGINT role was providing defensive information to US air strikes. This was done at three levels of generality. First, overall monitoring of the DRV air defense network, SIGINT could maintain situational awareness of North Vietnamese tracking via radar and visual observers. Second, SIGINT detected the activation of specific weapons systems in the air defense network, such as S-75 Dvina Surface-to-air missile| surface-to-air missiles (SAM), Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and Fighter aircraft| fighter interceptors. Finally, it could detect immediate threats, such as missile launches or impending attacks by fighters.<ref name=NSAVN-6 /> | ||
Reports from the roughly 40 visual observation stations were sent to sector headquarters, which controlled AAA. These reports were sent by | Reports from the roughly 40 visual observation stations were sent to sector headquarters, which controlled AAA. These reports were sent by ITU frequency bands|high-frequency (HF) radiotelegraphy, in standardized message formats where only the specific details needed to be transmitted. It could take up to 30 minutes for a report to work its way through the system, so that more specific tracking or interception orders could be given. According to the NSA history, air defense communications did not change significantly during the war, so COMINT analysts were able to become very familiar with its patterns and usage. | ||
Command and control applied to four system components: air warning from radar and observer stations, limited radar tracking, AAA and SAMs, and fighters. Rapid upgrades started to go into place after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, with the arrival, within two days, of 36 | Command and control applied to four system components: air warning from radar and observer stations, limited radar tracking, AAA and SAMs, and fighters. Rapid upgrades started to go into place after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, with the arrival, within two days, of 36 MiG-15 (fighter)|MiG-15 and MiG-17 (fighter)|MiG-17 fighters. These arrived from China and were probably flown, at first, by Chinese pilots, but Vietnamese pilots were soon in familiarization flights. | ||
Two main communications links between the DRV and PRC were established, from Hanoi to Kuangchow and K'unming. These liaison networks allowed access to Chinese radar covering the Gulf of Tonkin, Laos, and Hainan Island, as well as the DRV itself. Air Defense headquarters was at | Two main communications links between the DRV and PRC were established, from Hanoi to Kuangchow and K'unming. These liaison networks allowed access to Chinese radar covering the Gulf of Tonkin, Laos, and Hainan Island, as well as the DRV itself. Air Defense headquarters was at Bac Mai. | ||
=====The DRV system matures, 1964===== | =====The DRV system matures, 1964===== | ||
Air Defense headquarters was at | Air Defense headquarters was at Bac Mai. North Vietnam's air defense system, as of 1965, had three main subsystems: | ||
:#Radar detection and tracking | :#Radar detection and tracking | ||
:#Situational awareness (senior controller at Bac Mai) | :#Situational awareness (senior controller at Bac Mai) | ||
:#Tactical fighter direction ( | :#Tactical fighter direction (Phuc Yen, Gia Lam Airport|Gia Lam, Kep) | ||
:#Airborne fighters | :#Airborne fighters | ||
:#SAMs and AAA | :#SAMs and AAA | ||
In 1964, no one had much experience with | In 1964, no one had much experience with surface-to-air missiles, for which North Vietnam primarily a Soviet S-75 Dvina (NATO designation S-75 Dvina). | ||
In 1965, the DRV had full radar coverage, with Chinese input, out to 150 miles from its borders. Detection and processing times dropped to five minutes. In contrast, the US did not have full radar coverage over the DRV, and SIGINT was seen as a way of filling the gaps in US knowledge of their air defense operations. <ref name=NSAVN-6 /> | In 1965, the DRV had full radar coverage, with Chinese input, out to 150 miles from its borders. Detection and processing times dropped to five minutes. In contrast, the US did not have full radar coverage over the DRV, and SIGINT was seen as a way of filling the gaps in US knowledge of their air defense operations. <ref name=NSAVN-6 /> | ||
By January 1966, all major air defense installations, including those in the PRC, were linked by a common HF radio network with standardized procedures. There was an Air Situation Center and an Air Weapons Control Staff. The latter assigned targets to the various defense weapons. By 1967-1968, there were approximately 110,000 persons in the DRV air defense system, supporting 150 radars, 150 SAM sites (rarely all active at the same time), and 8,000 AAA pieces. There were 105 fighters, including the | By January 1966, all major air defense installations, including those in the PRC, were linked by a common HF radio network with standardized procedures. There was an Air Situation Center and an Air Weapons Control Staff. The latter assigned targets to the various defense weapons. By 1967-1968, there were approximately 110,000 persons in the DRV air defense system, supporting 150 radars, 150 SAM sites (rarely all active at the same time), and 8,000 AAA pieces. There were 105 fighters, including the MiG-21. At any given time, one-third to one-half of the fighters were based at PRC airfields. | ||
A wider range of communications systems emanated from Air Defense Headquarters, including ITU frequency bands|VHF voice}}, landlines, and HF/MF. Due to the need to move information quickly, without any automation, most communications were either in low-grade ciphers or were unencrypted. | |||
===1973 Arab-Israeli war=== | ===1973 Arab-Israeli war=== | ||
Egyptian tactical IADS took the unusual risk of operating | Egyptian tactical IADS took the unusual risk of operating MiG-21 (fighter) interceptors in the same airspace as S-75 Dvina SAMs, possibly with the specific intent of bringing Israeli aircraft to low level. The Egyptian low-altitude system was the Soviet SA-6 GAINFUL, which the Israelis knew had a radar mode they believed they could counter; they did not know that these missiles also had an electro-optical tracking system that could not be jammed. | ||
===Iraq 1991=== | ===Iraq 1991=== | ||
Iraq's IADS, called | Iraq's IADS, called KARI, at first, seemed incredibly deadly. In Operation Desert Storm, the coalition's first priority was suppression of enemy air defense against KARI. | ||
===Balkans=== | ===Balkans=== | ||
In 1999, Kosovo kept up an IADS for a surprising amount of time <ref name=Cordesman2000 /> While there has not been official confirmation, the SA-6 may have been involved in shooting down a U.S. | In 1999, Kosovo kept up an IADS for a surprising amount of time <ref name=Cordesman2000 /> While there has not been official confirmation, the SA-6 may have been involved in shooting down a U.S. F-117 Nighthawk "stealth" fighter over Kosovo in 1999. Actual detection may have used an older long-wave radar, with the SA-6 fired using electro-optical tracking|electro-optical guidance. When the missile threatened the F-117, the latter may have maneuvered away, and into the path of fighters or AAA. <ref name=>{{citation | ||
| url = http://www. | | url = http://www.456fis.org/F-117_SHOT_DOWN.htm | ||
| title = A Lost Illusion}}</ref> | | title = A Lost Illusion}}</ref> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} |
Latest revision as of 04:39, 5 April 2024
This article may be deleted soon. | ||
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An integrated air defense system puts all antiaircraft sensors (e.g., radar, visual observers, and other technical means) as well as antiaircraft weapons (e.g., anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft|air superiority fighters and interceptors, etc., under a common system of command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I). Depending on the national doctrine involved, the control is more or less decentralized. NATO doctrine is concerned with deconfliction, but allowing a fighter pilot the discretion to pursue the final attack. Soviet doctrine, including that of Iraq, was more centralized and less flexible for the pilot. Today's battlefield, in many respects, starts as a duel between the IADS and the suppression of enemy air defense campaign against it. The first operational IADS, with no computer assistance other than in the brains of the defenders, was in the Battle of Britain.[1] The term IADS had not yet been invented, but more important was that the Germans did not see the British system as a system. They saw airfields, radars, etc., but did not grasp that the most critical and vulnerable part were the control centers. Indeed, some of the German radars of the time were more advanced, but were not as well integrated.[2] Requirements of an IADSThe basic rules of an IADS are:
SensorsRadar is the backbone of modern IADS, and radar of many types: early warning, perhaps over-the-horizon early warning, "look down" airborne radar that can detect low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles, ballistic missile acquisition radar, missile fire control radar, ground- and air-based radar that direct fighters to their targets, missile guidance radar, to say nothing of weather radar to pick out routes that the enemy may try and that your forces can use. Still, it is possible to become overdependent on radar, or make too many assumptions that you are superior to the enemy's radar. Some Soviet/Russian SAMs, such as the 2K12 (NATO reporting name SA-6 GAINFUL), have, in addition to radar, electro-optical assistance to visual guidance. [3] These were a rude surprise to NATO forces that believed they had destroyed all Serbian radars, or forced them to shut down. Anthony Cordesman observed that a lesson learned from the Kosovo campaign was "the continuing survivability of land-based air defenses, and the threat posed by “non-cooperative” air defenses that do not emit or deploy in ways that can be easily targeted. According to NATO figures, some 90% of Serbia’s SA-6 assets survived the war, and could fire using pop-up radar and/or electro-optical techniques at the end of the war." Further, he observed that modern air and missile power can achieve very high levels of suppression, [but\ cannot kill mobile systems or prevent land-based systems from riding out an extensive..."suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) campaign. In contrast to the Iraqi KARI [4] IADS was largely made up of fixed assets. Layered structureA modern IADS has multiple layers of sensors and defensive systems. This is most obvious in the protection of a U.S. naval carrier group, in which the outermost ring consists of fighters and well-escorted airborne radar aircraft, with the next ring made up of long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) such as the RIM-156 Standard SM-2, another ring of medium-range SAMs such as the # RIM-162 ESSM, and point defenses such as the Phalanx close-in weapons system (i.e., autocannon) and RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles. When there was a still a major threat from Soviet Naval Aviation bombers launching long-range anti-shipping missiles (ASM), there were two rings of fighters, the Outer Air Battle aircraft being F-14 Tomcat interceptors armed with the extremely long range, but relatively unmaneuverable, AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile. On the theory that "it is better to stop the archer than the arrows", the Tomcats would try to intercept the bombers outside their maximum missile range. Another ring of fighters would engage any threat aircraft not carrying long-range weapons, and probably engage the fast but straight-running ASMs. Ballistic missile defense can have many layers. Israel is exploring acquiring the very long range RIM-161 Standard SM-3 missile intended to engage theater ballistic missiles, and adapting them to a land-based role. The next ring would be the still long-range, very-high-altitude Arrow-2 missiles co-developed with the U.S. For critical areas of 15 mile or so radius, the remaining incoming warheads would face MIM-104 Patriot missiles. Final point defense of key installations might use autocannon such as the Oerlikon AHEAD shotgun-like pellets, or the developmental Nautilus, formerly the Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser (MTHEL). Command and controlToday, if the enemy knows where your IADS command is located, and it is not mobile and well-defended, he will make it a high priority to kill. It becomes a center of gravity of one's defense. This was not true in the Battle of Britain; the Germans did not fully understand the network of sector stations linked to one another and to Fighter Command, and they did not have the precision-guided munitions to achieve sure kill on the command posts if they knew their significance. Iraqi IADS command posts, however, were some of the first targets of the 1991 Operation Desert Storm attack, although an early warning radar was the very first target. The latter was on the Saudi-Iraq border, and was unconventionally attacked by Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, led to the target by Air Force Special Operations MH-53 PAVE LOW helicopters with advanced low-level navigation. While Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) such as the E-3 Sentry or Russian Beriev A-50 seem safe in the air, that depends on the sophistication of the opponent. It is unlikely that a fighter can claw through the escorts surrounding an AWACS, but long-range air-to-air missiles that also have an anti-radiation missile capability may get through. The Soviet/Russian Vympel R-33/AA-9 AMOS has been considered an "AWACS killer". Longer-ranged versions of the U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM may have the same capability toward the other side. Air defense platformsActive DCA uses air, sea, and ground based assets that either physically destroy the enemy, using antiaircraft artillery (AAA), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and fighter aircraft armed with autocannon or air-to-air missiles (AAM). Fighters have the greatest range and flexibility, but cannot provide continuous coverage of a protected area. In the past, certain fighter aircraft were specialized for the aircraft interception mission. Multirole combat aircraft have replaced them, but some interceptors, such as the Russian MiG-25. Interceptors tend to have very high speed, but little maneuverability if they were intended to go against bombers. Their high speed and altitude capability can make them useful as reconnaissance platforms, such as the MiG-25R. Such systems can be divided by their area of coverage. Fighters and longer-range SAMs can cover areas containing numerous surface targets, while point defense of short-range SAMs and AAA can protect specific targets. A special case is the protection of high-value assets such as AWACS and air refueling|tankers, which usually involves fighters, and possibly electronic warfare aircraft, escorting them. DeconflictionDeconfliction is one of the key aspects of an IADS. In general, there are a series of concentric circles around a target: the outermost might be assigned to long-range fighters, the next to long-range SAMs, the next to shorter-range fighters, and the innermost to AAA and short-range SAMs. These circles may be three-dimensional; there may be a rule that while aircraft at high altitude over troop concentrations are not to be engaged by the ground missiles, if they descend below a given altitude, they become targets. Some IADS will mix systems in an IADS, either accepting a certain probability of Fratricide (military)|fratricide,[5] or relying on identification friend or foe and other electronics to avoid fratricide.
IADS over timeBattle of BritainSee Battle of Britain for the operational doctrine, and a somewhat more technical description of the Radar#Historic: Battle of Britain Chain Home|Chain Home radars. Kammhuber LineNamed after its architect and commander, Generalleutnant Josef Kammhuber of the Luftwaffe, this IADS, originally extending to the French coast, defended Germany from World War II strategic bombing. Obviously, its western installations were lost as the Allies moved inland, but the German defenses were still very credible. The radars were technically excellent, and one of the major problems was Adolf Hitler's unwillingness to invest in defensive systems. NATONorth AmericaSoviet UnionNorth VietnamWhile the North Vietnamese had relatively little air defense when first bombed after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, they steadily improved. As a very significant difference from the Korean War, North Vietnamese air defenses moved quickly to integrate radar, command post, ground observers, anti-aircraft artillery, and, when the Soviets supplied them, surface-to-air missiles. By 1960, the U.S. was starting to direct strategic SIGINT at North Vietnam, to understand their air defense as well as other structures. Their best fighter was the MiG-21, but they had pilots who could get good results with obsolescent aircraft such as the MiG-17. After a regiment of PRC MiG-17 fighters arrived at Mengtzu in 1963, SIGINT predicted jet fighters would enter the DRV air defense network. This was reinforced with learning that high-level DRV and PRC personnel would have a meeting at Mengtzu in May 1964.[7] The Gulf of Tonkin incident, in August 1964, involved DESOTO patrols by destroyer equipped with intercept vans, backed up with carrier air patrols and additional destroyers. [8]. Image:SIGINT-SEA-1964-1968.png| thumb | left | SIGINT-related events, 1964-1968 Early DRV Air Defense BuildupIn the weeks immediately following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the most important SIGINT role was providing defensive information to US air strikes. This was done at three levels of generality. First, overall monitoring of the DRV air defense network, SIGINT could maintain situational awareness of North Vietnamese tracking via radar and visual observers. Second, SIGINT detected the activation of specific weapons systems in the air defense network, such as S-75 Dvina Surface-to-air missile| surface-to-air missiles (SAM), Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and Fighter aircraft| fighter interceptors. Finally, it could detect immediate threats, such as missile launches or impending attacks by fighters.[7] Reports from the roughly 40 visual observation stations were sent to sector headquarters, which controlled AAA. These reports were sent by ITU frequency bands|high-frequency (HF) radiotelegraphy, in standardized message formats where only the specific details needed to be transmitted. It could take up to 30 minutes for a report to work its way through the system, so that more specific tracking or interception orders could be given. According to the NSA history, air defense communications did not change significantly during the war, so COMINT analysts were able to become very familiar with its patterns and usage. Command and control applied to four system components: air warning from radar and observer stations, limited radar tracking, AAA and SAMs, and fighters. Rapid upgrades started to go into place after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, with the arrival, within two days, of 36 MiG-15 (fighter)|MiG-15 and MiG-17 (fighter)|MiG-17 fighters. These arrived from China and were probably flown, at first, by Chinese pilots, but Vietnamese pilots were soon in familiarization flights. Two main communications links between the DRV and PRC were established, from Hanoi to Kuangchow and K'unming. These liaison networks allowed access to Chinese radar covering the Gulf of Tonkin, Laos, and Hainan Island, as well as the DRV itself. Air Defense headquarters was at Bac Mai. The DRV system matures, 1964Air Defense headquarters was at Bac Mai. North Vietnam's air defense system, as of 1965, had three main subsystems:
In 1964, no one had much experience with surface-to-air missiles, for which North Vietnam primarily a Soviet S-75 Dvina (NATO designation S-75 Dvina). In 1965, the DRV had full radar coverage, with Chinese input, out to 150 miles from its borders. Detection and processing times dropped to five minutes. In contrast, the US did not have full radar coverage over the DRV, and SIGINT was seen as a way of filling the gaps in US knowledge of their air defense operations. [7] By January 1966, all major air defense installations, including those in the PRC, were linked by a common HF radio network with standardized procedures. There was an Air Situation Center and an Air Weapons Control Staff. The latter assigned targets to the various defense weapons. By 1967-1968, there were approximately 110,000 persons in the DRV air defense system, supporting 150 radars, 150 SAM sites (rarely all active at the same time), and 8,000 AAA pieces. There were 105 fighters, including the MiG-21. At any given time, one-third to one-half of the fighters were based at PRC airfields. A wider range of communications systems emanated from Air Defense Headquarters, including ITU frequency bands|VHF voice}}, landlines, and HF/MF. Due to the need to move information quickly, without any automation, most communications were either in low-grade ciphers or were unencrypted. 1973 Arab-Israeli warEgyptian tactical IADS took the unusual risk of operating MiG-21 (fighter) interceptors in the same airspace as S-75 Dvina SAMs, possibly with the specific intent of bringing Israeli aircraft to low level. The Egyptian low-altitude system was the Soviet SA-6 GAINFUL, which the Israelis knew had a radar mode they believed they could counter; they did not know that these missiles also had an electro-optical tracking system that could not be jammed. Iraq 1991Iraq's IADS, called KARI, at first, seemed incredibly deadly. In Operation Desert Storm, the coalition's first priority was suppression of enemy air defense against KARI. BalkansIn 1999, Kosovo kept up an IADS for a surprising amount of time [3] While there has not been official confirmation, the SA-6 may have been involved in shooting down a U.S. F-117 Nighthawk "stealth" fighter over Kosovo in 1999. Actual detection may have used an older long-wave radar, with the SA-6 fired using electro-optical tracking|electro-optical guidance. When the missile threatened the F-117, the latter may have maneuvered away, and into the path of fighters or AAA. [9] References
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