Compellence: Difference between revisions
imported>Caesar Schinas m (Robot: Changing template: TOC-right) |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz No edit summary |
||
Line 7: | Line 7: | ||
| title = The Strategy of Conflict | publisher = Harvard University Press | year = 1963}}, p. 195</ref></blockquote> | | title = The Strategy of Conflict | publisher = Harvard University Press | year = 1963}}, p. 195</ref></blockquote> | ||
It is discussed in [[international relations]] theory, but, in general, is not common in widely available strategic literature. In a study at the [[United States Air Force]], [[lieutenant colonel]] Michael Plehn observed the relative use of compellence and deterrence in U.S. policy documents:<ref name=Plehn>{{citation | |||
| url = https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2005/affellows/plehn05.pdf | |||
| title = The Sharpest Sword: Compellence, Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency | |||
| author = Michael T. Plehn | date = May 2005 | |||
| publisher = Air Force Fellows program, [[Air University]], [[United States Air Force]]}}, pp. 3-4</ref> | |||
{| class="wikitable" | |||
|- | |||
! Source | |||
! Compellence | |||
! Deterrence | |||
|- | |||
| [[National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)]] | |||
| 3 | |||
| 15 | |||
|- | |||
| National Military Strategy | |||
| 0 | |||
| 30 | |||
|- | |||
| 16 doctrinal documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military services | |||
| 58 | |||
| 250 | |||
|} | |||
Plehn suggests that the disparity is an artifact of the [[Cold War]], where nuclear deterrence was a necessity. He argues, however, that compellence is far more common in a multipolar world, in non-nuclear warfare, shows of force such as compelling the resignation of the [[Haiti]]an junta in 1994, and in [[counterinsurgency]]. | |||
==Legal== | ==Legal== | ||
As opposed to issuing a [[restraining order]], a court may issue a [[writ of mandamus]], ordering a party to take some actions. | As opposed to issuing a [[restraining order]], a court may issue a [[writ of mandamus]], ordering a party to take some actions. |
Revision as of 16:58, 18 April 2010
Compellence is a set of actions or positions that force an opponent to take some action desired by the initial actor. It is the opposite of deterrence, in which the actions are intended to prevent an opponent from taking some action. It is compellence when the classic lawman threatens a suspect with death if he does not surrrender; it is deterrence that inhibits the offender from initiating the action that would draw suspicion.
The term is often attributed to Thomas Schelling:
There is typically a difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do something and a threat intended to keep him from starting something. The distinction is in the timing in who has to make the first move, and whose initiative is put to the test.[1]
It is discussed in international relations theory, but, in general, is not common in widely available strategic literature. In a study at the United States Air Force, lieutenant colonel Michael Plehn observed the relative use of compellence and deterrence in U.S. policy documents:[2]
Source | Compellence | Deterrence |
---|---|---|
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002) | 3 | 15 |
National Military Strategy | 0 | 30 |
16 doctrinal documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military services | 58 | 250 |
Plehn suggests that the disparity is an artifact of the Cold War, where nuclear deterrence was a necessity. He argues, however, that compellence is far more common in a multipolar world, in non-nuclear warfare, shows of force such as compelling the resignation of the Haitian junta in 1994, and in counterinsurgency.
Legal
As opposed to issuing a restraining order, a court may issue a writ of mandamus, ordering a party to take some actions.
Geostrategic actions
While much of the Vietnam War used variants of deterrence, Operation LINEBACKER II used a compellence model to force the North Vietnamese to return to the Paris Peace Talks.
References
- ↑ Schelling, Thomas (1963), The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, p. 195
- ↑ Michael T. Plehn (May 2005), The Sharpest Sword: Compellence, Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency, Air Force Fellows program, Air University, United States Air Force, pp. 3-4