Great Recession

Supplementary material
''Links to news reports of the key events of the recession are available on the timelines subpage, accounts of the impact of the recession on individual countries are available on the addendum subpage, and definitions of the terms employed are available in the economics glossary and the finance glossary.''

Overview
The Great Recession followed a twenty-year period that has been termed the "Great Moderation", during which recessions had been less frequent and less severe than in previous periods, and during which there  been  a great deal of successful  financial innovation. Attitudes and habits of thought acquired during that period were to have a significant influence upon what was to come. Among other significant influences were the globalisation of financial markets, with the development of  large international capital flows, often from the developing to the developed economies;  the large-scale granting of credit to households in some of the major economies; and the creation there of house price booms, that have since been categorised as  bubbles, but were not recognised as such at the time. It struck the major economies at a time when they were suffering from the impact of a supply shock in which a surge in commodity prices was causing households to reduce their spending, and as a result of which economic forecasters were expecting a mild downturn.

The trigger that set it off was the malfunction of a part of the  United States  housing market that  resulted in the downgrading by the credit rating agencies of large numbers of internationally-held financial assets to create what came to be known as the subprime mortgage crisis. That crisis led to the discovery that the financial innovations that had been  richly rewarding traders in the financial markets,  had also  been threatening their collective survival. The crucial nature of that threat  arose from the fact that the global economy had become  dependent upon the services of a well-functioning international financial system. What was generally considered to be the impending collapse of the international financial system was averted towards the end of 2008 by widespread governmental guarantees of unlimited financial support to their countries' banks.

The consensus view among economists was that the combination of monetary and fiscal expansion that was then undertaken by policy-makers was nevertheless  necessary to avoid  a global catastrophe, possibly  on the scale of the Great Depression of the 1930s - although there was  a body of opinion at the  time that considered a fiscal stimulus to be unnecessary, ineffective and potentially damaging. Before those policy actions could take effect, there were sharp reductions in  the levels of activity in most of the world's developed economies, mainly because of the discovery  by banks and households that they had been  overestimating the value of their assets. That discovery prompted banks to reduce their lending, at first because of doubts about the reliability of the collateral offered by prospective borrowers and later, when those doubts receded, in order to avoid losing the confidence of their depositors by holding proportionately excessive amounts of debt. The practice of  debt reduction (known as deleveraging) was also adopted by those households that had acquired historically high levels of indebtedness, many of whom were experiencing unaccustomed falls in the market value of their houses. The effect of deleveraging by banks and by households was, in different ways, to increase the severity of the developing recession.

By the spring of 2009, the recession had involved most of the world's developed and developing economies. The countries most affected  (as noted on the addendum subpage) were those with relatively large financial sectors (chiefly  the United States, the United Kingdom,  Iceland and Japan), those that were affected by the downturn in world trade because of their relatively large export sectors (including Germany and Japan) and those that experienced the bursting of house price bubbles (including The United States,  The United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain), and although economic growth had returned to many economies by the end of 2009, unemployment continued rising and  output gap estimates  revealed the continuation of substantial underutilsation of productive capacity. Governments had been forced to borrow money by issuing bonds to offset the fiscal consequences of their  automatic stabilisers and  their fiscal stimuluses, as a result of which there had beem substantial increases in national debt. In late 2009 and early 2010, the bond markets  added several percentage points to the interest rates to be paid on the bond issues of several European governments to compensate for what was seen as a slight risk that they might  default on repayment, and in 2010 the economic policies of most developed countries came to be dominated by the problem of reducing national debt without hampering recovery.

The western economies
For about twenty years before the onset of the Great Recession, all of the major market economies except Japan's had been experiencing a hitherto unaccustomed stability, following a sudden reduction of their output volatility in the mid-1980s to about a third of its previous level. It was not clear at the time whether the "Great Stability", as it came to be called, should be attributed to to luck or to judgement, but the US Federal Reserve's Ben Bernanke has been inclined to attribute it to the adoption of an economic policy ,  referred  to by others in America as  the "Greenspan effect" ,  and Charles Bean (the  Deputy Governor of the Bank of England) has described the transition from  what had been thought of as the Keynesian use of fiscal policy -  through the unsuccessful monetarist attempts  to target the money supply,  to what he refers to as  "the neo-classical synthesis" or as "new  Keynesian" , under which monetary policy was targetted on the output gap using an empirical relationship such as the Taylor rule. Confidence in the new policy in the early 21st century was such as to enable Robert Lucas, the then President of the American Economic Association, to announce that " the central problem of depression-prevention [has] been solved, for all practical purposes.

The international financial system
There was a contrasting increase in the volatility of the international financial system - which experienced 139 financial crises during the 24 years from 1973 to 1997, compared with 38 during the previous 26 years. Many of those crises were associated with the the development of globalisation and its accomanying large and volatile international flows of capital. At first the predominant direction of flow was from the developing countries to the developing countries, but that changed toward the end of the 20th century. The oil-exporting countries and, Japan, China, and some other east Asian emerging developing nations accumulated large current account surpluses, and correspondingly  large current account deficits  developed elsewhere, especially   in the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain. Nearly all of the corresponding investments of the surplus countries were in the government bonds  or government-guaranteed bonds of the deficit countries and the increased demand for those bonds enabled their issuers to reduce their yields - typically from a real (ie inflation-adjusted)  maturity yield of 3 per cent in 1990 to less than 2 per cent in the early 21st century.

Financial innovation
deregulation