Osama bin Laden

Osama bin Laden (in full Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden, also Usama Bin Ladin, which is closer to the Arabic سامة بن محمد بن عوض بن لادن) March 10, 1957 – May 1, 2011, was one of the founders of al-Qaeda and its best-known spokesman. He is from a rich and prominent family in Saudi Arabia. He began his activism in the Afghanistan War (1978-92), initially mainly as a financial sponsor for the Afghan Arabs. Later he moved more into military and terrorist activity,. He was killed by United States forces in a nighttime attack on his compound in Pakistan in May 2011.

From the time of the 9-11 attack using hijacked aircraft against US buildings &mdash; carried out by al Qaeda and approved by Osama, though he had no direct role &mdash; Osama was a major focus of US intelligence gathering and a target for their military. There were occasional reports that he was dead throughout that period, even though messages purportedly from him continued to surface. Finally, almost ten years after the attack, they got him.

It is not always clear when "bin Laden's involvement" in an incident was a matter of his involvement or financing as an individual, of the Services Office (run by bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam) and other support groups, of "al-Qaeda central", of groups allied with Al Qaeda, or of local cells of individuals that either simply are motivated by al-Qaeda principles or perhaps obtained seed money but no operational direction.

Michael Scheuer, a former senior Central Intelligence Agency officer whose responsibilities included both tracking bin Laden, as well as recommending that he be captured or killed, also observed that understanding him is best illustrated by comparison to seminal Western figures, especially the abolitionist John Brown, but also John Bunyan, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Paine. According to his closest Muslim associates and many of the Westerners who have interviewed him, Osama bin Laden appears to be a genuinely pious Muslim; a devoted family man; a talented, focused and patient insurgent commander; a frank and eloquent speaker; a successful businessman; and an individual of conviction, intellectual honesty, compassion, humility and physical bravery. It is ironic that this man today leads an ideological and military force with more lethal potential than any other nonstate threat faced by the United States.

Theory and authority
Among his basic premises is that the world is divided into Muslim and not-Muslim. Within the Muslim world, he argued that national boundaries were irrelevant; there should be one great Muslim state. The boundaries, in his world-view, are imposed by what he called the "Zionist-Crusader Alliance". He had envisioned a broad international Muslim force since the mid-1980s, as he brought the Afghan Arabs to Afghanistan. One of his major steps beyond Afghanistan, in 1996, was to try to unify two Egyptian groups, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Jamaat al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group). At first, bin Laden tried to get them to cooperate on intra-Egyptian matters, but this approach failed with the accidental death of Abu Ubaydah, his military commander who was proposing an Egyptian-centered "Islamic Army". In a revised approach, bin Laden said the objective should be limited to the United States alone, not only in the Middle East but worldwide, to force the U.S. and its allies to reconsider its policy toward Islamic groups. He believed that the Jewish lobby controlled the United States, so defeating the United States policies toward the region would stop a long-term strategy of humiliating Muslim peoples and looting their lands.

Also in 1996, it was against the United States that he personally issued, in the form of a fatwa, a declaration of war against the United States. It was 12 pages long, and one its key demands was getting all non-Muslims out of Saudi Arabia. According to Abdel Bari Atwan, who quoted Saudi opposition activist Saad al-Faqih, this was a central religious view. It changed through his interactions with Ayman al-Zawahiri, leading to the more radical 1998 fatwa.

Bin Laden had long criticized the legitimacy of the Saudi government, as compromising with Islamic law; his friend Khaled al Fawwaz, the spokesman for a Saudi opposition group founded by bin Laden, the Advice and Reformation Committee, told Peter Bergen, of CNN, he accuses them of apostasy, an extremely serious charge in Sharia. One of those compromises was allowing non-Muslims into the country. In a 1997 interview with Bergen of CNN, bin Laden said "The country of Two Holy Places (Saudi Arabia) has in our religion a peculiarity of its own over the other Muslim countries. In our religion, it is not permissible for any non-Muslim to stay in our country. Therefore even though American civilians are not targeted in our plan, they must leave. We do not guarantee their safety.'"

He has issued fatwas on the legitimacy of his aims. In some cases, he has had these confirmed by clerics, but in other cases, they are based on his moral authority. The fatwa is a key part of legitimizing acts of jihad, and, traditionally, it is issued by Islamic scholars, recognized in the ulema. Some of the ulema accept, however, that a pious Muslim can, in cases of necessity, issue a fatwa. This is not at all a given, and a July 2005 conference of 200 of the ulema, hosted by King Abdullah of Jordan, established "Subjective and objective preconditions were established for the issuing of fatwas, hereafter condemning illegitimate edicts in the name of Islam or Allah." This is a possible ground to challenge some of bin Laden's authority.

Early life
Osama bin Laden's father, Mohammed, had multiple wives, and he grew up with dozens of half-siblings. It was a wealthy family; his father had founded an extremely successful construction business. In a 1999 interview with al-Jazeera, while he spoke highly of his father, he did not mention his mother, who was Syrian.

The young Osama was described as being religiously conservative, even when growing up. He and his siblings were exposed to the West. They went on group tours of Europe. Osama bin Laden worked in the family construction business as a young adult.

Khalid Batarfi, who was his neighbor when bin Laden was 16, said "he was a natural leader. He just sets an example and expects you to follow, and sometimes you follow even if you are not 100 percent convinced." Batarfi said that his mother was not as religiously conservative as her son.

He studied at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Among his teachers were Abdullah Azzam and Mohammed Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb. Some reports indicate he first went to Afghanistan shortly after the 1979 invasion, while others indicate he went there after he graduated in 1981. His degree was in economics and public administration.

First trip to Afghanistan
Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979; the domestic resistance, while split among tribal groups, was generically called the mudjahideen. Muslim volunteers that joined them were generically called Afghan Arabs, even though they might be from Chechniya or Indonesia. Bin Laden, however, was among the first, and a true Arab.

Edward Giardet, a reporter, met bin Laden outside Jalalabad in February 1989. Up to that point, Giardet, who had been covering the war, had not encountered many Arabs. Bin Laden, who had been congenial at first, told Giardet to leave or he would kill him, refusing to shake his hand, which was quite contrary to Afghan culture.

As part of its Cold War strategy, the United States, primarily through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), aided the Afghans opposing the Soviets. Their aid, however, was channeled through Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence, acting as a CIA proxy. Pakistan was intensely opposed to direct U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

It has been suggested that he was recruited by the CIA, but there is little evidence that the CIA directly funded the young bin Laden, or, at first, was even aware of his existence other than as a wealthy Saudi who "supported the same Afghan rebels that the Agency armed in their fight against the Soviet aggressors." Those that make the suggestion tend to regard the CIA as an all-powerful manipulator of the world, where those that argue against the position come from both the positions that the CIA is incompetent, or that there was very little direct contact between the CIA and the Afghan resistance.

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said that the CIA first became aware of bin Laden individually when he was in Sudan in the early 1990s. By 1993, they saw him as a major financial backer of terror, but not involved operationally.

Pakistan
He moved from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan in 1986, and was active in the Muslim Brotherhood there. He was closely allied with Abdullah Azzam and the Services Office, which provided critical external support to the Mudjahideen.

Until 1982, however, he remained based in Saudi Arabia, visiting Pakistan and Afghanistan to assess needs. After that point, however, he began spending more and more time in the area, doing heavy construction. He became an expert in tunneling and fortification to resist aerial bombing, and then, in 1984, created the first Arab combat engineer unit in Afghanistan. They directly supported Harqqani's troops in defending against Soviet Spetsnaz. Pakistani LTG Hamid Gul, who commanded ISI, described him as "he was more engineer than soldier, and was an expert at building tunnels, Gen Gul said. The tunnels, which were burrowed horizontally into the sides of mountains, were used as arms depots by the mojahedeen."

Combat role
In 1986, he formed a small fighting organization, Masada al Ansar (Lion's Den of the Supporters). While all agreed this Arab unit was ferociously brave, neither it nor bin Laden had strong military skills. Bin Laden spoke of martyrdom being extremely desirable, a cultural difference from the Afghans, ferocious fighters more concerned with providing their enemies with the opportunity for martyrdom.

A first attempt to form an Arab fighting unit, at Jaji, Afghanistan, failed in May; the Afghans asked them to leave. Azzam also opposed bin Laden's plan; Azzam was not a Pan-Arab nationalist but a Muslim unifier, and wanted the Arabs dispersed among the Afghan units.

Bin Laden returned and set up a permanent Arab camp at Jaji in December, in the territory controlled by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. While a permanent camp did not fit the guerrilla model, but bin Laden was thinking of forming a future Jihadi unit that could fight anywhere. Azzam sent Jamal Khalifa to persuade him to reconsider. Khalifa reminded him "We came here to help the Afghans, not to form our own party! Besides, you're not a military man, so why are you here?" Bin Laden argued back, "This is jihad! This is the way we want to go to heaven!" Khalifa, after telling him that God would make him responsible for every drop of his men's blood, left angrily; they were never to speak again.

Services Office
Azzam and bin Laden had been extremely close, but their differing interpretations of jihad caused an irrevocable break. Azzam was assassinated in November 1989; there are many conjectures but no consensus on who did it. Bin Laden took over the Services Office, which had a U.S. branch called al-Khifa. There are links, although not definitive ones, between either MAK and al-Khifa and terrorist acts before the formal founding of al-Qaeda, and before bin Laden's fatwa declaring war against the U.S. Al-Qaeda's actions often do not follow a strict organization table; there may well have been informal support or actual support under a cover identity.

By the summer of 1989, Azzam became concerned with the approach of bin Laden and Zawahiri, who wanted to expand the fight. Azzam's concern was finishing Afghanistan, and then dealing slowly with other Muslim states. Zawahiri wanted to act against Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Bin Laden thought worldwide. Others were concerned with Pakistan. Zawahiri told his son-in-law, Abdullah Anas, that he was worried about bin Laden if he stayed with the radicals: "This heaven-sent man, like an angel; I am worried about his future if he stays with these people."

Al Qaeda
According to Bergen, the first written mention of "al Qaeda", in the sense of an organization rather than a physical base, was in an article by Abdullah Azzam, in April 1988. "Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while forcing its way into society, pus up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination. This vanguard constitutes the solid base (al Qaeda al Sulbah) for the expected society."

Al-Qaeda proper was created in 1989, organized by Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi and bin Laden. Volunteers gave an oath of bayat to bin Laden. Their motivation was to carry on after the Soviets left. Some reports put its creation in 1988; there are also reports of terrorist acts where the jihadists, outside Afghanistan, were in contact with the Services Office. Besides bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, others have been associated with its formation, such as Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi. Their immediate followers changed with time and war; Mohammed Atef was the first military commander, killed in action in 2001.

According to Richard Clarke, Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of Saudi intelligence, had "empowered" bin Laden to get Arab volunteers into Afghanistan.

Return to Saudi Arabia
In 1990, he left Afghanistan, irritated with the infighting of the mudhaheddin, and went back into the family business. He founded an organizations to assist veterans returning from Afghanistan. The Kingdom's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, shocked him: he had offered his forces, but the King, instead, invited the Americans, deeply offending him. Prince Turki al-Faisal saw bin Laden's personality change as a result of that decision, "...from a calm, peaceful gentle man interested in helping Muslims to a person who believed he would be able to amass and command an army to liberate Kuwait. It revealed his arrogance and his haughtiness."

He left Saudi Arabia in 1991, and first went to Afghanistan. It is not clear why he left in 1992 and went to Sudan; Scheuer speculates that it was a combination of being unable to resolve the factional fighting among the mudjahideen, and the possibility that Saudi agents were trying to kill him. The first problem would later be solved by the Taliban. Saudi plots continued to be mentioned while he was in Sudan, but the Saudi intelligence agency has not been known as skilled in covert operations and the credibility of this threat is open to discussion.

Stay in Sudan
He moved to Khartoum, Sudan, in 1992. While he was under the political patronage of Hassan al-Turabi, who was then the extremely powerful speaker of the Parliament, there were a number of reasons why Sudan was, for a time, a logical place for him.

While there were many pressures that led him to leave in early 1996, it was probably his own decision. Scheuer thinks the major factors were:
 * 1) Assassination attempts against him personally
 * 2) Pressure against al-Turabi's Islamic state; this was complex. The two were sympathetic about al-Turabi's goal and may have agreed this was the best thing for it, but al-Turabi may have been happy to see bin-Laden go and remove some pressures on him.

Business and infrastructure
He was also involved in a number of legitimate construction business projects. In particular, his company was involved in building the major "Revolutionary Highway" between the capital of Khartoum and Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

International jihad
Both Turabi and bin Laden were more willing than other jihadists to form a broad front, obtaining cooperation from Sunnis and Shiites for attacks against the United States and Israel.

Direct threats
In contrast, it was during this period when Takfir wal-Hijra considered bin Laden insufficiently Muslim and tried to kill him, according to Abu Jandal.

Jamal al-Fadl testified that he had planned an assassination with Saudi intelligence, but never acted on it. Enmity was certainly increasing between bin Laden and the House of Saud, from policy disagreements in 1990 to actual attacks several years later.

Pressures
By 1995, several countries put pressure on Sudan to expel bin Laden. These included Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United States, according to the last U.S. Ambassador in Sudan to complete a full tour, Donald Petterson. Petterson said the Sudanese claims that they offered to turn him over to Saudi Arabia in 1996, but the Saudis were concerned about retaliation if they took bin Laden. Petterson said that the U.S. pressure was not specific to bin Laden, but to a variety of terrorist groups then in Sudan.

Jamal al-Fadl was an aide in Sudan, but left over a financial dispute and walked in to American intelligence, where he became a key source of information on bin Laden and on al-Qaeda. It was from al-Fadl, roughly in 1996, that American intelligence learned that bin Laden was more than a financier. The U.S., concerned with security, closed the Khartoum embassy in 1996, but, according to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, that cut off a valuable source of information.

According to Richard Clarke, the CIA was unable to devise a covert action to capture bin Laden. In 1996, he said, the military could not offer the White House a plan that did not have a serious chance of escalation. Clarke said a Special Forces colonel who worked with him was told, in 1998, that Fort Bragg did indeed have a plan, but was told, by the senior military, that the White House disapproved it. Clarke, however, said that President Clinton approved every covert action proposal given to him, and it was the senior military who opposed action.

Return to Afghanistan
Bin Laden left Sudan in early 1996 and returned to Afghanistan, allying with several factions and even, to some extent, unifying. The first invitation probably came from Yunis Khalis, who invited him to return to Afghanistan, according to Michael Scheuer: "Khalis had an avuncular interest in bin Laden...Osama lost his father when he was young, and Khalis became a substitute father figure to him. As far as Khalis was concerned, he considered Osama the perfect Islamic youth."

Subsequently, he put himself and his followers under the protection of the Taliban, led by Mullah Muhammad Omar, and provided them with major funding. In public, he called Mullah Omar :legitimate ruler of the state of Afghanistan...the pious caliphate will start from Afghanistan." While these statements were probably sincere, they also had the effect of invoking the Pashtunwali tradition of guest protection.

Osama bin Laden is credited with ordering the September 9, 2001, assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. Many believe this was in preparation to cripple Afghan opposition when the 9-11 attack, approved by bin Laden, took place two days later.

Osama bin Laden was also courted by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the rival militia Hezb-i-Islam Gulbuddin, and invited him to return to the areas of Afghanistan under his control.

Targeting the United States
Al-Zawahiri said the 1996 demands were sufficiently reasonable that they would not provoke dramatic action by the U.S., or radicalize enough Muslims. He told bin Laden to make a short declaration of war against all Americans and Jews everywhere. Al-Faqih said that bin Laden did not see every American as his enemy, but Zawahiri responded, "This is not for the purpose of killing Americans. This is for the purpose of driving them crazy. They are cowboys and will react without thinking."

In February 1998, bin Laden, along with al-Zawahiri of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, and the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh, issued a fatwa calling for jihad against "Crusaders and Jews", and, specifically, Americans. "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim."

This showed a new level of cooperation with al-Zawahiri. While the two had worked together in Sudan, al-Zawahiri initially went to Chechnya, attempting to start a branch of Islamic Jihad; he escaped custody and went to Afghanistan. The two complemented one another, bin Laden's inspirational abilities and al-Zawahiri's operational skills.

By strengthening his ties with the Taliban, he also strengthened his ties with the Afghan ulema, and was able to get a May 1998 fatwa, from recognized religious authorities, supporting his declaration against Americans.

Capture or killing
By 1998, there was U.S. interest in capturing or killing him, but the practical problems were immense. The U.S. had no paramilitary personnel of its own in Afghanistan. Opinions differed if the Afghan allies were capable of attacking the known bases. Gary Schroen, the CIA station chief in Pakistan, had prepared a plan to capture bin Laden near Kandarhar, but Tenet cancelled the operation on May 29. The cancellation was not purely based on risk in Afghanistan, but in the need for cooperation with Pakistan. India had tested a nuclear weapon on May 11, and Pakistan was on a state of alert.

One of the first major operations in the jihad was the August 7, 1998, bombing of the U.S. embassies, as well as civilian buildings, in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The short-term U.S. response was a cruise missile strike on August 20; there was a slight chance the attack on a camp in Khost, Afghanistan might have threatened bin Laden personally, but the retaliation there and in Sudan was essentially economic and symbolic.

The attacks of 9-11
The detailed 9-11 "Planes operation" was under the command of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), with the explicit approval of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and the al-Qaeda military commander, Mohammed Atef. KSM had collaborated with bin Laden in the past, but did not swear bayat until 1999 or 2000. He, like his nephew Ramzi Yousef, were examples of how bin Laden could be a coordinator and financier but not have operational control, as with their Operation BOJINKA.

Afghanistan War (2001-)
In response to the attacks of 9-11 the United States attacked Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban government who considered bin Laden its guest. Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden later took responsibility for the attacks, although intelligence data provided to NATO already pointed to that conclusion. In 2001, the U.S. released a video of bin Laden, in an informal setting, speaking of prior knowledge of the attacks and how the destruction in New York had exceeded his "optimistic" expectations; a translation and transcript was provided.

Capturing or killing bin Laden was a high priority. It is generally accepted, however, that bin Laden escaped into Pakistan's border areas from the Battle of Tora Bora.

After the Taliban fall
It was known that he had been in the Tora Bora area, but he was never located precisely enough to be targeted. Confirming he had escaped, he issued a videotape, broadcast by al-Jazeera, on 27 December 2001. In the statement, he urged listeners to focus more on the ideology&mdash;the awakening of Muslims&mdash;than on him or his followers. He emphasized that a Muslim "awakening" was the truly important goal.

Another tape was broadcast on 12 November 2002. He spoke, with approval, of an April 11, 2002 attack on a synagogue in Tunisia; a bombing in Bali in October, which killed 200 Australians and Britons; and a Chechen hostage incident in Moscow.

A statement issued on 16 February 2003 cited the Sykes-Picot Agreement as comparable to the Crusades.

Death
Bin Laden's death was announced by President Barack Obama on May 1, 2011, after DNA tests confirmed Osama had been killed in Pakistan. On that basis, President Obama said that photos of bin Laden after he was shot would not be released. News reports state unspecified family members were killed along with bin Laden. Reports indicate that US Navy Seals took part in the military operation and ensuing "firefight" which occurred outside of Islamaabad, the capital of Pakistan.

In the hours following the announcement of bin Laden's death, some US citizens celebrated outside the US White House with chants of "USA, USA". In contrast to this reaction, the Vatican suggested that bin Laden's death was a cause for reflection, not rejoicing. That reaction was expressed by many in the United States as well.

"The fight against terror goes on, but tonight America has sent an unmistakable message: No matter how long it takes, justice will be done," said President George W. Bush after hearing about bin Laden's death. Bush was president when the 9-11 attack took place and continued the search for bin Laden after the September 11, 2001 incident, intensifying efforts begun years earlier by President Clinton.

Details of the raid on bin Laden's compound remain somewhat clouded but news sources state two Black Hawk helicopters carrying 25 military personnel were scheduled to enter a courtyard of bin Laden's compound. One of the helicopters developed mechanical difficulties, was later blown up to protect US assets, and the 25 personnel performed a "surgical raid" to limit collateral damage. During the raid three of the four compound walls were breached as the military personnel entered the compound. Upon entry they killed two al Qaeda couriers along with an unidentified woman who was caught in the gunfire. One of the couriers killed was named Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti who some sources state was killed in the compound along with the unidentified woman with him. The navy SEALS then entered the first floor of the compound where they killed an unidentified man and bin Laden's son who was using a staircase. The navy SEALS entered bin Laden's bedroom where they found him along with one of his wives. His wife was shot in the leg after she tried to "rush" the navy SEALS during the incident. Bin Laden was shot in the chest and head by an unidentified navy SEAL.

Plans for anniversary attack
Intelligence gathered during the raid revealed that al-Qaeda members had discussed derailing US trains on September 11, 2011, the tenth anniversary of the original attack. While no particular cities were targeted by the plan it seems Washington, New York and Los Angeles were some of those under review. This information was found when navy SEALS recovered 10 hard drives, five computers and more than 100 storage devices from bin Laden's compound during the raid.