Moral responsibility

Moral responsibility is an assignment of a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. From a philosophical standpoint, the classification of 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for ethics and metaethics, and from an anthropological or sociological standpoint, the specifics of what is 'good' or 'bad', and the ways of enforcing acceptable behavior, vary considerably from one group to another.
 * "Social learning theorists...feel that the learning of moral rules is not culturally invariant, but is, rather, critically related to particular learning environments and to the distinctive normative code of the society in question. The major influences on moral development are what B.F. Skinner calls "contingencies of reinforcement"...culturally variable factors that explain why different peoples acquire different types of moral orientations."

A large part of the philosophical discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon whether or not humans can actually control their actions, and if they can, to what extent and under what circumstances. Resolution of that issue is the philosophical subject of free will, a continuing debate that began millennia ago and seems destined to continue indefinitely. It is known that humans' control over their actions is limited in some circumstances, and there is debate over the role of moral responsibility where there is only curtailed agency.

Another facet of the philosophical discussion is the emotions attached to 'moral responsibility', which are considered by some to be the litmus test for the presence of an assessment of 'moral responsibility'.

Moral relativism
Adopting the view that 'moral responsibility' ascribes "duties and obligations to a person that devolve from moral, legal, or ritual imperatives", moral philosophy is a key to much that is so attributed. The implications of anthropology or sociology for moral philosophy largely fall under the topic of moral relativism. According to Gowans, moral relativism concerns two broad categories:
 * Descriptive Moral Relativism: As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be.

The last claim about the significance of disagreement is controversial, but the first claim is not. The other form of moral relativism is:
 * Metaethical Moral Relativism: The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.

This position can be contrasted with moral objectivism, the view "that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and well-informed person."

Moral sentiments
Although a great deal is written about moral responsibility, a surprising number of authors do not define the term, and focus upon emotional responses. The term 'moral sentiments' refers to reactions stemming from our approval and disapproval of persons' virtues and vices and their character traits, and they can be calm or violent, reasoned or instinctive.

Some authors do not define 'moral responsibility' itself, but rely for its identification upon exactly these visceral responses. Peter F. Strawson holds that moral responsibility is in its entirety reducible to these reactions. "Holding [a person] responsible is as natural and basic to human life as friendship, ..., and antipathy. It rests on needs and concerns that are not so much to be justified as acknowledged." However, according to Bruce Waller, justification plays a role:
 * "As I use the phrase..."moral responsibility" is the essential (necessary, if not sufficient) condition for justified blame and punishment."

He quotes Michael McKenna as stating:
 * "what most everyone is hunting for ... is the sort of moral responsibility that is desert entailing, the kind the makes blaming and punishing as well as praising and rewarding justified."

and he also quotes Randolph Clarke as saying:
 * "If any agent is truly responsible...that fact provides us with a specific type of justification for ...praise or blame, with finite rewards or punishments. To be a morally responsible human agent is to be truly deserving of these sorts of responses, and deserving in a way that no agent is that is not morally responsible."

This last excerpt is quoted by K.E. Boxer as well.

Fischer does not adopt 'justification' but rationality. He holds that "An agent is morally responsible for an action insofar as he is rationally accessible to certain kinds of attitudes and activities as a result of performing the action." Although he elaborates upon what constitutes a "rational candidate" (primarily an argument that a rational candidate does not have to have the 'freedom to do otherwise'), he does not focus upon which agents "ought to be praised or blamed (and to what extent) for their actions". Richard Double suggests that there is no one thing denoted by 'moral responsibility', that the term is "merely honorific and subjective" and cannot be "counted as [a candidate] among the class of real entities". He bases what he calls this nonrealist view upon the huge variety of factors "pragmatic, ideological, conventional, aesthetic, psychological, and/or idiosyncratic" and all fundamentally "non-objectively grounded" that enter a decision about 'moral responsibility', and suggests that no form of words captures the "deep senses" of the term, its "visceral" emotional source.

It can be questioned whether a definition based upon the triggering of emotional reactions gets to the root of the matter when the same action moves some enormously, even to violence, while leaving others unmoved. The appeal simply to 'praise', 'blame' and the like fails to distinguish the circumstances where these reactions are a 'moral' response from other cases where society expresses its support or disapproval, and discussion has to go beyond introducing the word 'moral' to identify the differences.

Dualist approach
It is possible to separate the actual deliberations involved in moral responsibility, as described by Hart, for example, from the implementation of these considerations, which may indeed involve the various feelings and inputs identified by many as integral to the concept of 'moral responsibility'.

Immanuel Kant took the view in his Critique of Pure Reason and Religion within the limits of reason alone that humankind had a 'will' that itself was exempt from the 'laws of nature'. He divided reality into two realms, the noumenal realm where humans could themselves cause things, and the phenomenal realm where the laws of nature applied, which in his day were thought to be entirely deterministic. Kant introduced two kinds of will, the Wille capable of moral reasoning, and a second, the Willkür, that takes the deliberations of the Wille into account, but makes the final choice between an individual's impulses, which choice might follow the dictates of moral responsibility, or not.

According to Velasquez:


 * "Many writers today agree with Kant. The philosopher/psychologist Steven Pinker, for example writes the following:
 * 'Science and morality are separate spheres of reasoning...[more of this quote is provided]'
 * Here Pinker is agreeing with Kant. ... So are we free or determined? Are we responsible agents or passive victims? Was Darrow right? Or was Sartre right? Or were both right as Kant and Pinker suggest?"

Something close to this viewpoint, although not so dramatic a division, can be found in Wallace, who divides his book Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments into "two main parts". "One is an account of what it is to hold people morally responsible, in terms of the moral sentiments. The other is an account of the conditions of moral agency, in terms of the rational power to grasp moral reasons and to control one's behavior in the light of them."

Role of free will
According to Sam Harris:
 * "The belief in free will has given us both the religious conception of 'sin' and our commitment to retributive justice. The US Supreme Court has called free will a "universal and persistent" foundation for our system of law, distinct from 'a deterministic view of human conduct that is inconsistent with he underlying precepts of our criminal justice system' (United States v. Grayson, 1978)"

This judgment is an enforcement of 'moral responsibility' based upon the common view of the origins of 'moral responsibility' in the capacity of humankind to control their own actions, at least to some degree. However, Harris and many others have devised arguments they are convinced make the idea of holding people responsible for their acts makes sense even if it turns out they have no control over their actions, that is, there is no free will or, alternatively, free will is not a relevant consideration.

Generally, it is also held by those with this 'no free will' view that a consequence of having no control or only limited control makes a retributive or punitive dealing with transgressions inappropriate. For example, one might be incarcerated to protect society from your dangerous proclivities, but not as punishment either because, after all, you really could not have chosen to do otherwise, or because punishment is ineffective.

A more confusing claim also is made that rehabilitation of transgressors might be possible. Although one can well understand from within this 'no free will' viewpoint that some 'reprogramming' of individuals could be successful by conditioning the subject's environment to produce the appropriate predetermined result, it is not clear how a decision to introduce such programs could be divorced from the ability of someone or some group to make the decision to implement such a plan, which is a choice that seems to contradict a claim that no autonomy of humankind is possible. Any attempt to push this implementation further up some decision tree seems to avoid a requirement for autonomy only at the expense of an infinite regress.

Harris suggests "judgements of responsibility depend upon the overall complexion of one's mind"..."Degrees of guilt can still be judged by reference to the facts of a case: the personality of the accused, his prior offenses, his patterns of association with others ....If a person's actions seem to have been entirely out of character this might influence our view..."

That is, one is held responsible for one's character. Is this to place decisions in various categories, in the manner described by David Hume? Hume adopts the view that moral judgments are determined by character, which can decide an individual's actions:
 * "Where [actions] proceed not from some cause in the characters and dispositions of the persons who perform them, they...can neither redound to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil...the person is not responsible for the [action]...as it proceed from nothing in him that is durable or constant."

If we are to endorse the 'no free will' viewpoint, on the other hand, we cannot suggest that even though any particular decision may be decided by outside forces, one does have control over the more deliberative, long-term trends of one's life that shape one's character. If one allows free will, however, the possibility exists for just such a differentiation of decisions. Hume himself accepted the ability to make decisions, and was not a believer in the governing power of causality at all, thinking it was just a convenient invention of the human mind to help to organize one's experience.

Further examination of these issues leads one to consider the subjective-objective dichotomy.