Better than nothing security

Better than nothing security, or BTNS, is basically IPsec done without authentication , . Setting up and managing a secure authentication infrastructure is not a trivial task and unauthenticated encryption does at least protect against all passive eavesdropping.

However, BTNS does not resist a man-in-the-middle attack because the underlying Diffie-Hellman protocol does not resist that unless authentication is used. In normal IPsec usage, the Internet Key Exchange protocol does use authentication and therefore does resist such attacks, but in BTNS it does not.

As the simplest example, consider someone who wants to access information that his employer or government frowns on. Assume all his packets pass through a firewall controlled by the adversary. If the threat he is concerned about is  is simple eavesdropping &mdash; reading the packet contents as they pass through the firewall &mdash; then either full IPsec or BTNS blocks that. If the threat is traffic analysis, then neither BTNS nor full IPsec is of much help &mdash; the firewall can still see which server he is connecting to, and that may tell them all they need to know.

An active attacker can straightforwardly break BTNS but not full IPsec. He builds a proxy program that runs on the firewall. It tells the user it is the server he wants to connect to and tells the server it is the user. This is the classic man-in-the-middle attack; the victims believe they are talking to each other, but actually both are talking to the enemy. IPsec includes authentication precisely to prevent this attack. Since BTNS does not use authentication, it is completely vulnerable to this.

However, BTNS is still "better than nothing", and it is intended to be easy to set up and administer, so that it can easily be widely deployed.

BTNS is even simpler than opportunistic encryption, an earlier attempt at getting IPsec widely deployed with low administrative costs.