Recession of 2009

Downturns in economic growth rates were apparent early in 2008, and  the subsequent intensification of the financial crash of 2008  led to a general expectation of worse to come. The resulting loss of confidence by investors and consumers contributed further to the severity of the reduction in world economic growth and it was apparent by the end of 2008 that the economies of the United States and Several European countries had for some time been in recession.


 * (for an explanation of the term "recession" see the article on recession (economics); for forecast and actual growth rates, and a summary of recent economic developments see the Addendum subpage; and for a sequential list of statistical reports and announcements see the Timelines subpage)

The developing recession
Throughout the period from mid-2007 to mid-2008, the growth of the world economy was hampered by increases in oil and food prices, and by a crisis in the financial markets. Oil prices rose from  $75  to  $146 a barrel and food prices rose sharply, forcing  householders to cut their spending on other products. On the financial markets, the subprime mortgage crisis  developed into the crash of 2008, as a result of which the availability of credit to households and businesses was curtailed, leading to  further reductions  in household spending and business investment. In the nine months to the middle of 2008, the advanced economies had grown at an annual rate of only one per cent (compared with two and a half per cent in the previous nine months) and the growth rate of the developing economies had eased from eight per cent to seven and a half per cent. According to the OECD the US economy was by then already facing substantial difficulties. Households had borrowed at an unprecedented rate during the previous 15 years, and their saving rates had fallen nearly to zero as they  increasingly relied on  housing wealth to finance consumption. With the housing market suffering the severest correction for 50 years, household wealth was declining, and  with credit conditions getting tighter, households had been forced to reduce their reliance on borrowing, and job losses and mortgage foreclosures were rising. The prospects of a recession in the United States and of severe reductions in economic growth elsewhere  were becoming apparent when the world economy was hit by another shock. The failure of  the Lehman Brothers investment bank in September  triggered  an  intensification of  the credit shortage  to the point at which the world’s financial system appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Massive government support averted that collapse but failed to restore the supply of credit to businesses and householders. By that time, demand reductions had led to reductions in the prices of oil and food, but the resulting relief of the downward  pressure on demand was being outweighed by the mounting  effects of the credit shortage. By the end of September the United States economy had been in recession for nine months with no apparent prospect of recovery within a further nine months, and equally deep and persistent recessions were expected in many other industrialised economies.

The policy debate
By October 2008, policy-makers in most industrialised countries had accepted that in order to avoid the development of persistent and unmanageable deflation such as occurred in the pre-war great depression, early corrective  action would have to be taken,  going beyond the necessary restoration of activity in the financial system. Most countries had long abandoned the use of reductions of taxation and increases in public expenditure to ward off economic downturns in favour of the use of interest rate reductions, but there were doubts whether  monetary policy would be sufficiently powerful, or sufficiently  quick-acting in view if the severity and imminence of the current deflationary threat. In the United States, in particular, the federal interest rate had already been reduced to 1 per cent - leaving little scope for further reductions, and banks there and elsewhere had become reluctant to pass on central bank reductions of interest rates.

The consensus view among economists, as expressed by the Chief Economist of the OECD is that :
 * Against the backdrop of a deep economic downturn, additional macroeconomic stimulus is needed. In normal times, monetary rather than fiscal policy would be the instrument of choice for macroeconomic stabilisation. But these are not normal times. Current conditions of extreme financial stress have weakened the monetary transmission mechanism. Moreover, in some countries the scope for further reductions in policy rates is limited. In this unusual situation, fiscal policy stimulus over and above the support provided through automatic stabilisers has an important role to play. Fiscal stimulus packages, however, need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in those countries where room for budgetary manoeuvre exists. It is vital that any discretionary action be timely and temporary and designed to ensure maximum effectiveness..

In its 2008 World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund has also noted that fiscal policy can quickly boost spending power, whereas  monetary policy acts with  long and  uncertain lags. However, it also advises that a fiscal stimulus can do more harm than good if it is not implemented well, and that tax cuts or spending increases that make debt unsustainable are likely to cause output to fall, not rise

A contrary view is that a fiscal stimulus is likely to be ineffective in the short run, and counterproductive in the long run. Consumers - it is argued - will not respond to a  tax cut because they will be aware that it will eventually be paid for by a tax increase. It has also been argued that the danger of incurring unsustainable debt, makes fiscal stimulus a risky option, especially  for countries with high levels  national debt (see the Tutorials subpage for pre-stimulus ratios of national debt to GDP.) There have also been warnings of resulting  disaster for countries with modest ratios of national debt to GDP. Britain's Shadow Chancellor, for example, has described a fiscal stimulus as "exactly the wrong approach" that could itself cause a decade-long economic slump.

In most countries, the outcome of the policy debate appears to have been acceptance that any fiscal stimulus that is large enough to be effective poses a risk of long-term economic harm, and that the immediate  policy choice depends upon the balance between that risk and the risk of failing to avert a deflationary depression.

General
The principal developments in the fourth quarter of 2008 were a reduction in the availability of credit, corresponding falls in business and consumer confidence, and a sharp reduction in oil prices. In the latter half of October, stock prices recovered partially from the precipitous falls of the previous month, but there was still widespread uncertainty about the effectiveness of government measures to tackle the financial crisis. News of output falls in the United States and the United Kingdom was accompanied in October by reports of falling consumer confidence.

In November 2008, the International Monetary Fund forecast that world growth would begin a slow recovery at the end of 2009, after falling from its 2007 growth rate of 5.0 per cent to 3.7 per cent in 2008 and 2.2 per cent in 2009 (the lowesr rate since 2002). . For the purpose of the forecast it was assumed that commodity and oil prices would stabilize, that U.S. housing prices and activity would hit bottom next year, and that there would be no  further deterioration of conditions in the financial system. The "emerging and developing countries" were expected to be the main source of world growth, with a 2009 growth rate of 5.1 per cent, compared with -0.7 per cent for the United States and -0.5 per cent for Europe.

A meeting of the world leaders (of the G20 group of countries), with the purpose of agreeing a coordinated response to the financial crisis, took place in Washington on 15th November. An ebook was published in advance, with the recommendations of an international group of twenty leading financial economists .They were unanimous on the need for Governments to take urgent action to recapitalise their banks, to guarantee cross-border bank claims, to restructure nonperforming assets, and to extend financial support for crisis countries. They were also agreed on the need for immediate, substantial, internationally coordinated fiscal stimulus, tailored to the circumstances of each country and taken with a view toward the impact on the rest of the world. There was also unanimity on the need to augment IMF resources immediately so that the institution has adequate firepower, and on the need to strengthen existing arrangements for global governance. Several of them also argued for new approaches to the regulation of large cross-border financial institutions.