General Offensive-General Uprising

While confirmation will wait for access to some tightly held North Vietnamese records and interviews to be made available, it appears that North Vietnamese strategy, from roughly 1963 onwards to 1968, was intended to win the war with the General Offensive-General Uprising (Vietnamese: Tet Mau Than or Tong Kong Kich/Tong Kong Ngia (TCK/TCN, General Offensive/Uprising)) The TCK/TCN draws from the three phases of Mao's protracted war model, but adds some uniquely Vietnamese theoretical aspects. While it was not the way in which the war ended seven years later, it is worth understanding, because, if it was indeed the strategy, it brings together a number of actions that seemed to have no unifying principle.

Military sociology of Asian Communist armies
In the Korean War, Western intelligence agencies observed that quite low-ranking soldiers often were aware of detailed plans for upcoming offensives, details that are tightly held on a need-to-know basis to staff and commanders in Western armie. The idea of sharing such information seems to be implicit to some of the theories of revolutionary warfare, variously to break down class distinction and make the leadership (i.e., political officers, cadre, commissars) more legitimate to the troops. It should be noted that this pattern is specific to Asian communists; there was as much or more operational security in the Soviet bloc as in the West.

Revised focus on 1968
{{main|Tet Offensive}| This section, while it does discuss some relatively current intelligence, deals only with the part of the material that supports the strategic theory. Other aspects, which dealt with exactly where and how attacks might take place, remain in the articles on the specific battles.

North Vietnamese planners expected popular uprising (khnoi nghai), but this almost completely failed to occur. many South Vietnamese demonstrated stronger support for the ARVN. However, the Tet Offensive had a devastating impact on Johnson's political position in the U.S., and in that sense was a strategic victory for the Communists.

Reports from the Saigon station may have been strong warnings, but two assessments, from Bob Layton, on 21 November and 8 December 1967) based on human-source intelligence from prisoner interrogations and documents. They suggested that the PAVN was planning some type of decisive defeat for Allied forces in 1968. In conflict with the attention being given to Battle of Khe Sanh, these indicators pointed to urban terrorism coupled by military attacks on cities. There was a strong Communist belief that the GVN was so unpopular that an urban attack could irreparably damage confidence in the ARVN. These assessments also pointed to increasing international pressure on the Johnson administration to end the war.

A more detailed analysis, on December 8, described a distinct change in Communist thinking, away from the protracted war attritional model to something more decisive. It cited documentation of "an all-out military and political offensive during the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign [the period beginning around Tet] designed to gain decisive victory...large-scale continuous coordinated attacks by main force units, primarily in mountainous areas close to border sanctuaries"--a strategy subsequently reflected in the enemy's major attacks on Khe Sanh--and "widespread guerrilla attacks on large US/GVN units in rural and heavily populated areas." The PAVN saw the urban population as the center of gravity, not attrition to U.S. troops or the defeat of ARVN forces.

The plan was seen (emphasis added) "a serious effort to inflict unacceptable military and political losses on the Allies regardless of VC casualties during a US election year, in the hope that the US will be forced to yield to resulting domestic and international pressure and withdraw from South Vietnam." Even if the results did not force a settlement, the Communists would be in a "better position to continue a long-range struggle with a reduced force." He continued: "If the VC/NVN view the situation in this light, it is probably to their advantage to use their current apparatus to the fullest extent in hopes of fundamentally reversing current trends before attrition renders such an attempt impossible." "In sum," the study's final sentence read, "the one conclusion that can be drawn from all of this is that the war is probably nearing a turning point and that the outcome of the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign will in all likelihood determine the future direction of the war."

A 19 December report added more indicators that the NVA was preparing an all-out effort, although the Saigon analysts recognized the CIA Headquarters position that all of this exhortation might be an effort to bolster PAVN/VC morale.

These field reports conflicted with a major Headquarters analysis of December 8, from the jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, Office of National Estimates (O/NE), and Special Assistant to the DCI for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA).